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VOL.  IX. 


HERBERT  SPENCER'S  WORKS. 


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D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY,   NEW  YORK. 


THE    PRINCIPLES   OF 
ETHICS 


BY 

HERBERT    SPENCER 


IN    TWO    VOLUMES 
VOL.   I 


NEW    YORK 

D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY 
1904 


COPYRIGHT,  1892,  1902, 
BY  D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY. 


Vv 

SANTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 


TtP     at        •**_ 

Qi2 


PREFACE. 


THE  divisions  of  which  this  work  consists  have  been  pub- 
lished in  an  irregular  manner.  Part  I  was  issued  in  1879, 
Part  IV  in  1891 ;  Parts  II  and  III,  forming,  along  with 
Part  I,  the  first  volume,  were  issued  in  1892 ;  and  Parts  Y 
and  YI,  concluding  the  second  volume,  were,  along  with 
Part  IY,  issued  in  1893.  The  reasons  for  this  seemingly 
eccentric  order  of  publication,  primarily  caused  by  ill-health, 
will  be  found  stated  in  the  respective  prefaces  of  the  parts 
and  the  volumes  as  originally  published ;  but  as  the 
contained  explanations  are  no  longer  needed  I  now  suppress 
them  with  the  exception  of  the  first,  which  has  a  permanent 
significance. 

It  was  there  said  that  "the  establishment  of  rules  of 
conduct  on  a  scientific  basis  is  a  pressing  need.  Now  that 
moral  injunctions  are  losing  the  authority  given  by  their 
supposed  sacred  origin,  the  secularization  of  morals  is 
becoming  imperative.  .  .  .  Those  who  reject  the  current 
creed  appear  to  assume  that  the  controlling  agency  furnished 
by  it  may  safely  be  thrown  aside  .  .  .  those  who  defend 
the  current  creed  allege  that  in  the  absence  of  the  guidance 
it  yields,  no  guidance  can  exist :  divine  commandments  they 
think  the  only  possible  guides."  Dissenting  from  both  of 
these  beliefs,  my  primary  purpose  has  been  to  show  that  apart 
from  any  supposed  supernatural  basis  the  principles  of  Ethics 
have  a  natural  basis.  In  the  two  volumes  which  here  follow, 
this  natural  basis  is  set  forth  and  its  corollaries  elaborated. 
If  the  conclusions  to  which  the  general  law  of  evolution 
introduces  us  are  not  in  all  cases  as  definite  as  might  be 


VI  PREFACE. 

wished,  yet  they  are  more  definite  than  those  to  which  we  are 
introduced  by  the  current  creed. 

Complete  definiteness  is  of  course  not  to  be  expected. 
Right  regulation  of  the  actions  of  so  complex  a  being  as 
Man,  living  under  conditions  so  complex  as  those  presented 
by  a  society,  evidently  forms  a  subject-matter  unlikely  to 
admit  of  specific  statements  throughout  its  entire  range. 

The  primary  division  of  it — private  conduct — dependent 
in  part  on  the  nature  of  the  individual,  his  constitutional 
state,  and  his  circumstances,  can  be  prescribed  but  approxi- 
mately; and  guidance  must,  in  large  part,  be  determined 
by  a  judicial  balancing  of  requirements  and  avoidance  of 
extremes.  But  entrance  on  the  first  great  division  of  public 
conduct — Justice — introduces  us  to  conclusions  which  are  in 
large  degree  definite.  Into  this  most  important  portion  of 
Ethics,  treating  of  certain  right  relations  between  individuals, 
irrespective  of  their  natures  or  circumstances,  there  enters 
the  ruling  conception  of  equity  or  equalness — there  is 
introduced  the  idea  of  measure  •  and  the  inferences  reached 
acquire  a  certain  quantitative  character,  which  partially 
assimilates  them  to  those  of  exact  science.  When,  leaving 
this  all-important  division,  the  injunctions  of  which  ignore 
personal  elements,  we  pass  into  the  remaining  divisions — 
Negative  and  Positive  Beneficence — we  enter  a  region  in 
which  the  complexities  of  private  conduct  are  involved  with 
the  complexities  of  conduct  in  those  around :  presenting 
problems  for  the  solution  of  which  we  have  nothing  like 
measure  to  guide  us,  and  must  mainly  be  led  by  empirical 
judgments. 

In  view  of  these  admissions  some  will  contend  that  no 
aid  is  here  furnished  by  the  general  Doctrine  of  Evolution. 
The  first  reply  is  that  in  that  chief  division  of  Ethics  treat- 
ing of  Justice,  it  furnishes  aid  both  as  verifying  conclusions 
empirically  drawn  and  as  leading  to  certain  unaccepted  con- 
clusions of  importance.  If  it  be  said  that  throughout  the 
final  divisions  of  Ethics,  dealing  with  Beneficence,  Negative 


PREFACE.  Vll 

and  Positive,  the  conclusions  must,  as  above  implied,  be 
chiefly  empirical ;  and  that  therefore  here,  at  any  rate,  the 
Doctrine  of  Evolution  does  not  help  us ;  the  reply  is  that  it 
helps  us  in  general  ways  though  not  in  special  ways.  lu  the 
first  place,  for  certain  modes  of  conduct  which  at  present 
are  supposed  to  have  no  sanction  if  they  have  not  a  super- 
natural sanction,  it  yields  us  a  natural  sanction.  In  the 
second  place,  where  it  leaves  us  to  form  empirical  judgments, 
it  brings  into  view  those  general  truths  by  which  our 
empirical  judgments  should  be  guided. 

Beyond  serving  to  re-inforce  the  injunctions  of  Benefi- 
cence, by  adding  to  the  empirical  sanction  a  rational  sanc- 
tion, the  contents  of  Parts  Y  and  YI  have  these  claims  to 
attention : — First,  that  under  each  head  there  are  definitely 
set  down  the  various  requirements  and  restraints  which 
should  be  taken  into  account :  so  aiding  the  formation  of 
balanced  judgments.  Second,  that  by  this  methodic  treat- 
ment there  is  given  a  certain  coherence  to  the  confused  and 
often  inconsistent  ideas  on  the  subject  of  Beneficence,  which 
are  at  present  lying  all  abroad.  And  third,  that  the  coher- 
ent body  of  doctrine  which  results,  is  made  to  include  regu- 
lation of  sundry  kinds  of  conduct  which  are  not  taken  cog- 
nizance of  by  Ethics  as  ordinarily  conceived. 

But  the  truth  of  chief  significance,  which  I  now  repeat  and 
emphasize,  is  that  the  supposed  supernatural  sanctions  of 
right  conduct  do  not,  if  rejected,  leave  a  blank;  but  that 
there  exist  natural  sanctions  no  less  peremptory  and  covering 
a  much  wider  field. 

Now  that  the  work  is  complete,  it  becomes  possible  to 
prefix  some  general  remarks,  which  could  not  rightly  be  pre- 
fixed to  any  one  of  the  instalments. 

The  ethical  doctrine  set  forth  is  fundamentally  a  corrected 
and  elaborated  version  of  the  doctrine  set  forth  in  Social 
Statics,  issued  at  the  end  of  1850.  The  correspondence  be- 
tween the  two  is  shown,  in  the  first  place,  by  the  coincidence 


PREFACE. 


of  their  constructive  divisions.  In  Social  Statics  the  subject- 
matter  of  Morality  is  divided  into  parts  which  treat  respect- 
ively of  Private  Conduct,  Justice,  Negative  Beneficence,  and 
Positive  Beneficence  ;  and  these  severally  answer  to  Part  III, 
Part  IV,  Part  V,  and  Part  VI,  constituting  the  constructive 
portion  of  this  work  :  to  which  there  are,  however,  here  pre- 
fixed Part  I,  The  Data,  and  Part  II,  The  Inductions  ;  in  con- 
formity with  the  course  I  have  pursued  throughout  The  Syn- 
thetic Philosophy.  In  Social  Statics  one  division  only  of 
the  ethical  system  marked  out  was  developed  —  Justice  ;  and 
I  did  not,  when  it  was  written,  suppose  that  I  should  ever 
develop  the  others. 

Besides  coinciding  in  their  divisions,  the  two  works 
agree  in  their  cardinal  ideas.  As  in  the  one  so  in  the 
other,  Man,  in  common  with  lower  creatures,  is  held  to  be 
capable  of  indefinite  change  by  adaptation  to  conditions. 
In  both  he  is  regarded  as  undergoing  transformation  from 
a  nature  appropriate  to  his  aboriginal  wild  life,  to  a  nature 
appropriate  to  a  settled  civilized  life;  and  in  both  this 
transformation  is  described  as  a  moulding  into  a  form 
fitted  for  harmonious  co-operation.  In  both,  too,  this 
moulding  is  said  to  be  effected  by  the  repression  of  certain 
primitive  traits  no  longer  needed,  and  the  development 
of  needful  traits.  As  in  the  first  work,  so  in  this  last,  the 
great  factor  in  the  progressive  modification  is  shown  to  be 
Sympathy.  It  was  contended  then,  as  it  is  contended  now, 
that  harmonious  social  co-operation  implies  that  limitation 
of  individual  freedom  which  results  from  sympathetic 
regard  for  the  freedoms  of  others;  and  that  the  law  of 
equal  freedom  is  the  law  in  conformity  to  which  equit- 
able individual  conduct  and  equitable  social  arrangements 
consist.  Morality,  truly  so  called,  was  described  in  the 
original  work  as  formulating  the  law  of  "the  straight 
man";  and  this  conception  corresponds  with  the  concep- 
tion of  Absolute  Ethics,  set  forth  in  this  work.  The  theory 
then  was,  as  the  theory  still  is,  that  those  mental  products  of 


PREFACE.  IX 

Sympathy  constituting  what  is  called  "the  Moral  Sense," 
arise  as  fast  as  men  are  disciplined  into  social  life;  and 
that  along  with  them  arise  intellectual  perceptions  of  right 
human  relations,  which  become  clearer  as  the  form  of  social 
life  becomes  better.  Further,  at  that  time  it  was  inferred, 
as  inferred  now,  that  there  is  being  effected  a  conciliation  of 
individual  natures  with  social  requirements;  so  that  there 
will  eventually  be  achieved  the  greatest  individuation  along 
with  the  greatest  mutual  dependence — an  equilibrium  of 
such  kind  that  each,  in  fulfilling  the  wants  of  his  own  life, 
will  aid  in  fulfilling  the  wants  of  all  other  lives.  Finally,  in 
the  first  work  there  were  drawn  essentially  the  same  corol- 
laries respecting  the  rights  of  individuals  and  their  relations 
to  the  State,  that  are  drawn  in  this  last  work. 

Of  course  it  yields  me  no  small  satisfaction  to  find  that 
sundry  of  these  ideas  which  fell  dead  in  1850,  have  now 
become  generally  diffused;  and,  more  especially  since  the 
publication  of  the  Data  of  Ethics  in  1879,  have  met  with  so 
wide  an  acceptance  that  the  majority  of  recent  works  on 
Ethics  take  cognizance  of  them,  and,  in  many  cases,  tacitly 
assume  them,  or  some  of  them.  Many  of  these  works  convey 
the  impression  that  the  evolutionary  view  of  Ethics  has  long 
been  familiar,  or  else  imply  that  it  dates  from  1859,  when 
the  doctrine  of  "  Natural  Selection  "  was  promulgated.  In 
this  connexion  I  may  name  Mr.  S.  Alexander's  Moral  Order 
and  Progress,  and  still  more  the  Review  of  the  Systems  of 
Ethics  founded  on  Evolution,  by  Mr.  C.  M.  Williams. 
Alike  in  the  introductory  remarks  of  this  last  volume,  and 
in  the  paragraph  closing  the  account  given  of  the  views  of 
Darwin,  "Wallace,  and  Haeckel,  it  is  alleged  that  these  "  great 
original  authorities  paved  the  way  for  a  system  of  Evolu- 
tionary Ethics."  Though  in  the  exposition  of  my  own 
views,  which  immediately  succeeds,  the  fact  that  they  date 
back  to  1851  is  recognized,  yet  the  collocation,  as  well  as 
the  express  statements,  practically  cancel  this  inconsistent 
admission,  and  leave  the  impression  that  my  views  are 


X  PREFACE. 

sequences  of  those  of  Mr.  Darwin.  And  this,  indeed,  is 
the  established  general  belief ;  as  is  sufficiently  shown  by 
the  phrase  "  Darwinism  in  Ethics,"  frequently  to  be  met 
with,  and  which  I  now  have  before  me  in  a  review  of  Mr. 
"Williams'  book. 

Rectification  of  this  misbelief  is  of  course  hopeless.  The 
world  resents  any  attempt  to  show  that  it  has  fallen  into  an 
error ;  so  that  I  should  perhaps  best  consult  my  personal  in- 
terests by  saying  nothing.  But  it  seems  to  me  proper  to 
point  out,  as  a  matter  of  historical  truth,  that  in  this  case,  as 
in  other  cases,  the  genesis  of  ideas  does  not  always  follow  the 
order  of  logical  sequence;  and  that  the  doctrine  of  organic 
evolution  in  its  application  to  human  character  and  intelli- 
gence, and,  by  implication,  to  society,  is  of  earlier  date  than 
The  Origin  of  Species. 

Without  entering  at  length  upon  the  prolegomena  of 
Ethics,  it  may  be  well  here  to  state  briefly  one  of  them. 
The  tacit  assumption  made  in  this  work,  as  more  or  less  con- 
sistently in  all  modern  works  on  Ethics,  is  that  the  conduct 
dealt  with  is  the  conduct  of  and  between  like-natured  indi- 
viduals— individuals  whose  likenesses  of  nature  are  so  great 
in  comparison  with  their  differences  as  to  constitute  them  of 
the  same  kind. 

The  possibility  of  another  assumption,  and  consequently 
of  another  Ethics,  may  be  best  shown  by  an  analogy.  The 
several  kinds  of  social  insects,  though  they  do  not  form 
societies  proper  (since  a  nest  of  them  is  one  large  family 
descended  from  the  same  parents),  yet  show  us  that  there 
may  exist  a  body  of  co-operators  among  which  a  marked  in- 
equality is  an  essential  trait ;  and  they  illustrate  the  possi- 
bility of  a  social  organization  such  that  the  normal  conduct 
of  class  to  class  is  guided  by  rules  appropriate  to  each  class, 
and  not  common  to  all  classes.  They  suggest  that  dissimilar 
members  of  a  community  may  work  together  harmoniously 
on  principles  adapted  to  inequalities  of  nature.  And  they 


PREFACE.  XI 

draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  there  have  been,  and  are, 
human  societies  constituted  in  a  way  which  is  analogous,  to 
the  extent  that  its  classes  of  units,  clearly  marked  off  from 
one  another,  and  devoted  to  different  kinds  of  activities, 
either  have,  or  tend  to  acquire,  contrasted  characters  proper 
to  their  relative  positions,  and  reciprocal  codes  of  conduct 
which  are  thought  obligatory.  Societies  formed  of  domi- 
nant and  enslaved  races  obviously  answer  to  this  description. 
In  the  United  States  in  slavery  days,  it  was  common  for 
slaves  to  ieer  at  free  negroes  as  having  no  white  man  to  take 

*lK«iaawB(HM»»»wWPw"><^w  »•*• . 

care  of  them.  To  such  an  extent  may  the  sentiments  be- 
come moulded  to  relations  of  inequality  that,  as  in  South 
Africa,  the  servants  of  a  mild  master  will  speak  contemptu- 
ously of  him  because  he  does  not  thrash  them.  With  ex- 
treme cases  such  as  these  to  give  the  clue,  we  may  perceive 
that  wherever  there  are  ruling  classes  and  servile  classes,  as 
throughout  Europe  in  early  days,  there  comes  to  be  an  ad- 
justment of  natures  such  that  command  on  the  one  side  and 
obedience  on  the  other  are  the  natural  concomitants  of  the 
social  type.  By  continuous  breeding  of  each  class  within 
itself,  there  tends  to  arise  a  differentiation  into  two  varieties, 
such  that  the  one  becomes  organically  adapted  to  supremacy 
and  the  other  to  subordination.  And  it  needs  but  to  recall 
the  ancient  feudal  loyalty,  running  down  through  all  grades, 
or  the  fealty  shown  by  an  ancient  Highlander  to  his  chief, 
to  see  that  there  grew  up  ethical  conceptions  adjusted  to  the 
conditions. 

But  systems  of  ethics  appropriate  to  social  systems  charac- 
terized by  these  organized  inequalities  of  status  cannot  be 
the  highest  systems  of  ethics.  Manifestly  they  presuppose 
imperfect  natures — natures  which  are  not  self-sufficing.  On 
the  one  side  there  is  the  need  for  control  from  without 
for  the  proper  regulation  of  conduct;  and  on  the  other 
side  there  is  the  need  for  exercise  of  control,  which,  in  an 
opposite  way,  implies  lack  of  self-sufficingness.  Further, 
external  regulation  is  less  economical  of  energy  than  inter- 


Xll  PREFACE. 

nal  regulation.  "When  classes  of  inferiors  are  governed  by 
classes  of  superiors,  there  is  a  waste  of  action  which  does  not 
occur  when  all  are  self -governed.  But  chiefly  the  imperfec- 
tion of  ethical  systems  appropriate  to  societies  characterized 
by  organized  inequality,  is  that  sympathy  and  all  those 
emotions  into  which  sympathy  enters,  and  all  that  happiness 
of  which  sympathy  is  the  root,  remain  incomplete.  Alien 
natures  cannot  sympathize  in  full  measure — can  sympathize 
only  in  respect  of  those  feelings  which  they  have  in  com- 
mon. Hence  the  unlikenesses  presupposed  between  perma- 
nently ruling  classes  and  permanently  subject  classes,  nega- 
tive that  highest  happiness  which  a  rational  ethics  takes  for 
its  end. 

Throughout  this  work,  therefore,  the  tacit  assumption  will 
be  that  the  beings  spoken  of  have  that  substantial  unity  of 
nature  which  characterizes  the  same  variety  of  Man  ;  and  the 
work  will  not,  save  incidentally  or  by  contrast,  take  account 
of  mixed  societies,  such  as  that  which  WP  have  established  in 
India,  and  still  less  of  slave-societies. 

June,  1893.  H.  S. 

(Remodelled  May,  1901.) 


PREFACE  TO  PART  I 

WHEN  FIRST  ISSUED  SEPAEATELY. 


A  EEFERENCE  to  the  programme  of  the  "  System  of  Syn- 
thetic Philosophy,"  will  show  that  the  chapters  herewith 
issued,  constitute  the  first  division  of  the  work  on  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Morality,  with  which  the  System  ends.  As  the 
second  and  third  volumes  of  the  Principles  of  Sociology  are 
as  yet  unpublished,  this  instalment  of  the  succeeding  work 
appears  out  of  its  place. 

I  have  been  led  thus  to  deviate  from  the  order  originally 
set  down,  by  the  fear  that  persistence  in  conforming  to  it 
might  result  in  leaving  the  final  work  of  the  series 
unexecuted.  Hints,  repeated  of  late  years  with  increasing 
frequency  and  distinctness,  have  shown  me  that  health  may 
permanently  fail,  even  if  life  does  not  end,  before  I  reach 
the  last  part  of  the  task  I  have  marked  out  for  myself. 
This  last  part  of  the  task  it  is,  to  which  I  regard  all  the  pre- 
ceding parts  as  subsidiary.  Written  as  far  back  as  1842,  my 
first  essay,  consisting  of  letters  on  The  Proper  Sphere  of 
Government,  vaguely  indicated  what  I  conceived  to  be 
certain  general  principles  of  right  and  wrong  in  political 
conduct ;  and  from  that  time  onwards  my  ultimate  purpose, 
lying  behind  all  proximate  purposes,  has  been  that  of  finding 
for  the  principles  of  right  and  wrong  in  conduct  at  large,  a 
scientific  basis.  To  leave  this  purpose  unfulfilled  after  mak* 
ing  so  extensive  a  preparation  for  fulfilling  it,  would  be 
a  failure  the  probability  of  which  I  do  not  like  to  contem- 
plate ;  and  I  am  anxious  to  preclude  it,  if  not  wholly,  still 
partially.  Hence  the  step  I  now  take.  Though  this  first 
division  of  the  work  terminating  the  Synthetic  Philosophy, 
cannot,  of  course,  contain  the  specific  conclusions  to  be  set 
forth  in  the  entire  work ;  yet  it  implies  them  in  such  wise 


xiv  PREFACE. 

that,  definitely  to  formulate  them  requires  nothing  beyond 
logical  deduction. 

I  am  the  more  anxious  to  indicate  in  outline,  if  I  cannot 
complete,  this  final  work,  because  the  establishment  of  rules 
of  right  conduct  on  a  scientific  basis  is  a  pressing  need. 
Now  that  moral  injunctions  are  losing  the  authority  given 
by  their  supposed  sacred  origin,  the  secularization  of  morals 
is  becoming  imperative.  Few  things  can  happen  more  dis- 
astrous than  the  decay  arid  death  of  a  regulative  system  no 
longer  fit,  before  another  and  fitter  regulative  system  has 
grown  up  to  replace  it.  Most  of  those  who  reject  the  cur- 
rent creed,  appear  to  assume  that  the  controlling  agency  fur- 
nished by  it  may  safely  be  thrown  aside,  and  the  vacancy  left 
unfilled  by  any  other  controlling  agency.  Meanwhile,  those 
who  defend  the  current  creed  allege  that  in  the  absence 
of  the  guidance  it  yields,  no  guidance  can  exist:  divine 
commandments  they  think  the  only  possible  guides.  Thus 
between  these  extreme  opponents  there  is  a  certain  commu- 
nity. The  one  holds  that  the  gap  left  by  disappearance  of 
the  code  of  supernatural  ethics,  need  not  be  filled  by  a  code 
of  natural  ethics ;  and  the  other  holds  that  it  cannot  be  so 
filled.  Both  contemplate  a  vacuum,  which  the  one  wishes 
and  the  other  fears.  As  the  change  which  promises  or 
threatens  to  bring  about  this  state,  desired  or  dreaded,  is  rap- 
idly progressing,  those  who  believe  that  the  vacuum  can  be 
filled,  and  that  it  must  be  filled,  are  called  on  to  do  some- 
thing in  pursuance  of  their  belief. 

To  this  more  special  reason  I  may  add  a  more  general 
reason.  Great  mischief  has  been  done  by  the  repellent  as- 
pect habitually  given  to  moral  rule  by  its  expositors;  and 
immense  benefits  are  to  be  anticipated  from  presenting 
moral  rule  under  that  attractive  aspect  which  it  has  when 
undistorted  by  superstition  and  asceticism.  If  a  father, 
sternly  enforcing  numerous  commands,  some  needful  and 
some  needless,  adds  to  his  severe  control  a  behaviour  wholly 
unsympathetic — if  his  children  have  to  take  their  pleasures 


PREFACE.  XV 


by  stealth,  or,  when  timidly  looking  up  from  their  play,  ever 
meet  a  cold  glance  or  more  frequently  a  frown ;  his  gov- 
ernment will  inevitably  be  disliked,  if  not  hated ;  and  the 
aim  will  be  to  evade  it  as  much  as  possible.  Contrariwise, 
a  father  who,  equally  firm  in  maintaining  restraints  needful 
for  the  well-being  of  his  children  or  the  well-being  of  other 
persons,  not  only  avoids  needless  restraints,  but,  giving  his 
sanction  to  all  legitimate  gratifications  and  providing  the 
means  for  them,  looks  on  at  their  gambols  with  an  approving 
smile,  can  scarcely  fail  to  gain  an  influence  which,  no  less 
efficient  for  the  time  being,  will  also  be  permanently  efficient. 
The  controls  of  such  two  fathers  symbolize  the  controls  of 
Morality  as  it  is  and  Morality  as  it  should  be. 

Nor  does  mischief  result  only  from  this  undue  severity  of 
the  ethical  doctrine  bequeathed  us  by  the  harsh  past.  Fur- 
ther mischief  results  from  the  impracticability  of  its  ideal. 
In  violent  reaction  against  the  utter  selfishness  of  life  as  car- 
ried on  in  barbarous  societies,  it  has  insisted  on  a  life  utterly 
unselfish.  But  just  as  the  rampant  egoism  of  a  brutal  mili- 
tancy, was  not  to  be  remedied  by  attempts  at  the  absolute 
subjection  of  the  ego  in  convents  and  monasteries  ;  so  neither 
is  the  misconduct  of  ordinary  humanity  as  now  existing,  to 
be  remedied  by  upholding  a  standard  of  abnegation  beyond 
human  achievement.  Rather  the  effect  is  to  produce  a  de- 
spairing abandonment  of  all  attempts  at  a  higher  life.  And 
not  only  does  an  effort  to  achieve  the  impossible,  end  in  this 
way,  but  it  simultaneously  discredits  the  possible.  By  asso- 
ciation with  rules  that  cannot  be  obeyed,  rules  that  can  be 
obeyed  lose  their  authority. 

Much  adverse  comment  will,  I  doubt  not,  be  passed  on  the 
theory  of  right  conduct  which  the  following  pages  shadow 
forth.  Critics  of  a  certain  class,  far  from  rejoicing  that 
ethical  principles  otherwise  derived  by  them,  coincide  with 
ethical  principles  scientifically  derived,  are  offended  by  the 
coincidence.  Instead  of  recognizing  essential  likeness  they 
enlarge  on  superficial  difference.  Since  the  days  of  perse- 


XVI  PREFACE. 

cution,  a  curious  change  has  taken  place  in  the  behaviour  of 
so-called  orthodoxy  towards  so-called  heterodoxy.  The  time 
was  when  a  heretic,  forced  by  torture  to  recant,  satisfied 
authority  by  external  conformity :  apparent  agreement  suf- 
ficed, however  profound  continued  to  be  the  real  disagree- 
ment. But  now  that  the  heretic  can  no  longer  be  coerced 
into  professing  the  ordinary  belief,  his  belief  is  made  to  ap- 
pear as  much  opposed  to  the  ordinary  as  possible.  Does  he 
diverge  from  established  theological  dogma  ?  Then  he  shall 
be  an  atheist ;  however  inadmissible  he  considers  the  term. 
Does  he  think  spiritualistic  interpretations  of  phenomena  not 
valid  ?  Then  he  shall  be  classed  as  a  materialist ;  indignantly 
though  he  repudiates  the  name.  And  in  like  manner,  what 
differences  exist  between  natural  morality  and  supernatural 
morality,  it  has  become  the  policy  to  exaggerate  into  funda- 
mental antagonisms.  In  pursuance  of  this  policy,  there  will 
probably  be  singled  out  for  reprobation  from  this  volume, 
doctrines  which,  taken  by  themselves,  may  readily  be  made 
to  seem  utterly  wrong.  With  a  view  to  clearness,  I  have 
treated  separately  some  correlative  aspects  of  conduct,  draw- 
ing conclusions  either  of  which  becomes  untrue  if  divorced 
from  the  other  ;  and  have  thus  given  abundant  opportunity 
for  misrepresentation. 

The  relations  of  this  work  to  works  preceding  it  in  the 
series,  are  such  as  to  involve  frequent  reference.  Contain- 
ing, as  it  does,  the  outcome  of  principles  set  forth  in  each  of 
them,  I  have  found  it  impracticable  to  dispense  with  re-state- 
ments of  those  principles.  Further,  the  presentation  of 
them  in  their  relations  to  different  ethical  theories,  has  made 
it  needful,  in  every  case,  briefly  to  remind  the  reader  what 
they  are,  and  how  they  are  derived.  Hence  an  amount  of 
repetition  which  to  some  will  probably  appear  tedious.  I  do 
not,  however,  much  regret  this  almost  unavoidable  result ; 
for  only  by  varied  iteration  can  alien  conceptions  be  forced 
on  reluctant  minds. 

June,  1879. 


CONTENTS  OF  TOL.  I, 


PAKT  I.— THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

CHAP.  PAGE 

I. CONDUCT   IN    GENERAL                 ...                  ...  ...  3 

II. THE   EVOLUTION    OF   CONDUCT                       ...  ...  8 

HI. GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT          ...                  ...  ...  21 

IV. WAYS   OF   JUDGING   CONDUCT...                  ...  ...  47 

V. — THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW                   ...                  ...  ...  64 

VI. THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW               ...                  ...  ...  75 

VH. — THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW      ...                  ...  ...  102 

VIII. THE    SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW           ...                  ...  ...  132 

IX. CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS                  ...  ...  150 

X. THE   RELATIVITY   OF   PAINS   AND   PLEASURES           ...  174 

XI. EGOISM    VERSUS  ALTRUISM     ...                  ...  ...  187 

XII. ALTRUISM    VERSUS  EGOISM     ...                  ...  ...  201 

XIII. TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE           ...                  ...  ...  219 

XIV. — CONCILIATION              ...                  ...                  ...  ...  242 

XV. ABSOLUTE   ETHICS   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS  ...  258 

XVI. — THE   SCOPE   OF   ETHICS                 ...                  ...  ...  281 

APPENDIX   TO   PART   I                  ...                  ...  ...  289 

PART  II.— THE  INDUCTIONS  OF  ETHICS. 

I. THE   CONFUSION    OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT...  ...  307 

II. WHAT   IDEAS    AND    SENTIMENTS    ARE   ETHICAL?  325 


XV111  CONTENTS. 

CHAP.  PAGE 

III. AGGRESSION  ...  ...  ...  ...  340 

IV. — ROBBERY...  ...  ...  ...  ...  352 

V. REVENGE  ...  ...  ...  ...  361 

VI. — JUSTICE     ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  369 

VII. — GENEROSITY  ...  ...  ...  ...  378 

VIII. HUMANITY  ...  ...  ...  ...  391 

IX. VERACITY  ...  ...  ...  ...  4:00 

X. — OBEDIENCE  ...  ...  ...  ...  410 

XL — INDUSTRY  ...  ...  ...  ...  422 

XII. — TEMPERANCE  ...  ...  ...  ...  435 

XIII. — CHASTITY  ...  ...  ...  ...  448 

XIV. — SUMMARY   OF   INDUCTIONS  ...  ...  ...  464 

PART  III.— THE  ETHICS  OF  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE. 

L— INTRODUCTORY  ...  ...  ...  ...  477 

II. — ACTIVITY...  ...  ...  ...  ...  485 

III. — REST           ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  493 

IV. — NUTRITION  ...  ...  ...  ...  500 

V. — STIMULATION  ...  ...  ...  ...  508 

VI. — CULTURE...  ...  ...  ...  ...  514 

VII. — AMUSEMENTS  ...  ...  ...  ...  523 

VIII. MARRIAGE  ...  ...  ...  ...  532 

IX. — PARENTHOOD  ...  ...  ...  .,..  544 

X. — GENERAL   CONCLUSIONS  555 


PAET  I. 
THE  DATA  OF  ETHICSc 


CHAPTEK  I. 

CONDUCT  IN  GENERAL. 

§  1.  The  doctrine  that  correlatives  imply  one  another 
— that  a  father  cannot  be  thought  of  without  thinking  of 
a  child,  and  that  there  can  be  no  consciousness  of  superior 
without  a  consciousness  of  inferior — has  for  one  of  its 
common  examples  the  necessary  connexion  between  the 
conceptions  of  whole  and  part.  Beyond  the  primary 
truth  that  no  idea  of  a  whole  can  be  framed  without  a 
nascent  idea  of  parts  constituting  it,  and  that  no  idea  of  a 
part  can  be  framed  without  a  nascent  idea  of  some  whole  to 
which  it  belongs,  there  is  the  secondary  truth  that  there 
can  be  no  correct  idea  of  a  part  without  a  correct  idea  of  the 
correlative  whole.  There  are  several  ways  in  which  inade- 
quate knowledge  of  the  one  involves  inadequate  knowledge 
of  the  other. 

If  the  part  is  conceived  without  any  reference  to  the 
whole,  it  becomes  itself  a  whole — an  independent  entity ; 
and  its  relations  to  existence  in  general  are  misapprehended. 
Further,  the  size  of  the  part  as  compared  with  the  size  of 
the  whole,  must  be  misapprehended  unless  the  whole  is  not 
only  recognized  as  including  it,  but  is  figured  in  its  total 
extent.  And  again,  the  position  which  the  part  occupies 
in  relation  to  other  parts,  cannot  be  rightly  conceived 
unless  there  is  some  conception  of  the  whole  in  its  distribu- 
tion as  well  as  in  its  amount. 

3 


4  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

Still  more  when  part  and  whole,  instead  of  being  stati- 
cally related  only,  are  dynamically  related,  must  there  be  a 
general  understanding  of  the  whole  before  the  part  can  be 
understood.  By  a  savage  who  has  never  seen  a  vehicle,  no 
idea  can  be  formed  of  the  use  and  action  of  a  wheel.  To 
the  unsymmetrically-pierced  disk  of  an  eccentric,  no  place 
or  purpose  can  be  ascribed  by  a  rustic  unacquainted 
with  machinery.  Even  a  mechanician,  if  he  has  never 
looked  into  a  piano,  will,  if  shown  a  damper,  be  unable  to 
conceive  its  function  or  relative  value. 

Most  of  all,  however,  where  the  whole  is  organic,  does 
complete  comprehension  of  a  part  imply  extensive  comprehen- 
sion of  the  whole.  Suppose  a  being  ignorant  of  the  human 
body  to  find  a  detached  arm.  If  not  misconceived  by  him 
as  a  supposed  whole,  instead  of  being  conceived  as  a  part,  still 
its  relations  to  other  parts,  and  its  structure,  would  be  wholly 
inexplicable.  Admitting  that  the  co-operation  of  its  bones 
and  muscles  might  be  divined,  yet  no  thought  could  be 
framed  of  the  share  taken  by  the  arm  in  the  actions  of  the 
unknown  whole  it  belonged  to ;  nor  could  any  interpretation 
be  put  upon  the  nerves  and  vessels  ramifying  through  it, 
which  severally  refer  to  certain  central  organs.  A  theory 
of  the  structure  of  the  arm  implies  a  theory  of  the  structure 
of  the  body  at  large. 

And  this  truth  holds  not  of  material  aggregates  only, 
but  of  immaterial  aggregates — aggregated  motions,  deeds, 
thoughts,  words.  The  Moon's  movements  cannot  be  fully 
interpreted  without  taking  into  account  the  movements  of 
the  Solar  System  at  large.  The  process  of  loading  a  gun 
is  meaningless  until  the  subsequent  actions  performed  with 
the  gun  are  known.  A  fragment  of  a  sentence,  if  not  unin- 
telligible, is  wrongly  interpreted  in  the  absence  of  the 
remainder.  Cut  off  its  beginning  and  end,  and  the  rest  of  a 
demonstration  proves  nothing.  Evidence  given  by  a  plain- 
tiff often  misleads  until  the  evidence  which  the  defendant 
produces  is  joined  with  it. 


CONDUCT   IN   GENERAL.  5 

§  2.  Conduct  is  a  whole ;  and,  in  a  sense,  it  is  an  organic 
whole — an  aggregate  of  inter-dependent  actions  performed 
by  an  organism.  That  division  or  aspect  of  conduct 
with  which  Ethics  deals,  is  a  part  of  this  organic  whole — a 
part  having  its  components  inextricably  bound  up  with  the 
rest.  As  currently  conceived,  stirring  the  fire,  or  reading 
a  newspaper,  or  eating  a  meal,  are  acts  with  which  Morality 
has  no  concern.  Opening  the  window  to  air  the  room,  put- 
ting on  an  overcoat  when  the  weather  is  cold,  are  thought  of 
as  having  no  ethical  significance.  These,  however,  are  all 
portions  of  conduct.  The  behaviour  we  call  good  and  the 
behaviour  we  call  bad,  are  included,  along  with  the  behaviour 
we  call  indifferent,  under  the  conception  of  behaviour  at 
large.  The  whole  of  which  Ethics  forms  a  part,  is  the 
whole  constituted  by  the  theory  of  conduct  in  general ;  and 
this  whole  must  be  understood  before  the  part  can  be  under- 
stood. Let  us  consider  this  proposition  more  closely. 

And  first,  how  shall  we  define  conduct?  It  is  not  co- 
extensive with  the  aggregate  of  actions,  though  it  is  nearly 
so.  Such  actions  as  those  of  an  epileptic  in  a  fit,  are 
not  included  in  our  conception  of  conduct :  the  conception 
excludes  purposeless  actions.  And  in  recognizing  this  ex- 
clusion, we  simultaneously  recognize  all  that  is  included. 
The  definition  of  conduct  which  emerges  is  either — acts 
adjusted  to  ends,  or  else — the  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends; 
according  as  we  contemplate  the  formed  body  of  acts,  or 
think  of  the  form  alone.  And  conduct  in  its  full  acceptation 
must  be  taken  as  comprehending  all  adjustments  of  acts  to 
ends,  from  the  simplest  to  the  most  complex,  whatever  their 
special  natures  and  whether  considered  separately  or  in  their 
totality. 

Conduct  in  general  being  thus  distinguished  from  the 
somewhat  larger  whole  constituted  by  actions  in  general,  let 
us  next  ask  what  distinction  is  habitually  made  between 
the  conduct  on  which  ethical  judgments  are  passed  and  the 
remainder  of  conduct.  As  already  said,  a  large  part  of 


6  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ordinary  conduct  is  indifferent.  Shall  I  walk  to  the  water- 
fall to-day?  or  shall  I  ramble  along  the  sea-shore?  Here 
the  ends  are  ethically  indifferent.  If  I  go  to  the  waterfall, 
shall  I  go  over  the  moor  or  take  the  path  through  the 
wood?  Here  the  means  are  ethically  indifferent.  And 
from  hour  to  hour  most  of  the  things  we  do  are  not  to 
be  judged  as  either  good  or  bad  in  respect  of  either  ends  or 
means.  No  less  clear  is  it  that  the  transition 

.from  indifferent  acts  to  acts  which  are  good  or  bad  is 
gradual.  If  a  friend  who  is  with  me  has  explored  the  sea- 
shore but  has  not  seen  the  waterfall,  the  choice  of  one  or 
other  end  is  no  longer  ethically  indifferent.  And  if,  the 
waterfall  being  fixed  on  as  our  goal,  the  way  over  the  moor 
is  too  long  for  his  strength,  while  the  shorter  way  through 
the  wood  is  not,  the  choice  of  means  is  no  longer  ethically 
indifferent.  Again,  if  a  probable  result  of  making  the 
one  excursion  rather  than  the  other,  is  that  I  shall  not  be 
back  in  time  to  keep  an  appointment,  or  if  taking  the  longer 
route  entails  this  risk  while  taking  the  shorter  does  not,  the 
decision  in  favour  of  one  or  other  end  or  means  acquires  in 
another  way  an  ethical  character;  and  if  the  appointment 
is  one  of  some  importance,  or  one  of  great  importance,  or 
one  of  life-and-death  importance,  to  self  or  others,  the 
ethical  character  becomes  pronounced.  These  instances  will 
sufficiently  suggest  the  truth  that  conduct  with  which 
Morality  is  not  concerned,  passes  into  conduct  which  is  moral 
or  immoral,  by  small  degrees  and  in  countless  ways. 

But  the  conduct  that  has  to  be  conceived  scientifically 
before  we  can  scientifically  conceive  those  modes  of  conduct 
which  are  the  objects  of  ethical  judgments,  is  a  conduct 
immensely  wider  in  range  than  that  just  indicated.  Com- 
plete comprehension  of  conduct  is  not  to  be  obtained  by 
contemplating  the  conduct  of  human  beings  only :  we  have 
to  regard  this  as  a  part  of  universal  conduct — conduct  as 
exhibited  by  all  living  creatures.  For  evidently  this  comes 
within  our  definition — acts  adjusted  to  ends.  The  con- 


CONDUCT   IN   GENERAL.  7 

duct  of  the  higher  animals  as  compared  with  that  of  man, 
and  the  conduct  of  the  lower  animals  as  compared  with  that 
of  the  higher,  mainly  differ  in  this,  that  the  adjustments 
of  acts  to  ends  are  relatively  simple  and  relatively  incom- 
plete. And  as  in  other  cases,  so  in  this  case,  we  must 
interpret  the  more  developed  by  the  less  developed.  Just 
as,  fully  to  understand  the  part  of  conduct  which  Ethics  deals 
with,  we  must  study  human  conduct  as  a  whole  ;  so,  fully  to 
understand  human  conduct  as  a  whole,  we  must  study  it  as 
a  part  of  that  larger  whole  constituted  by  the  conduct  of 
animate  beings  in  general. 

Nor  is  even  this  whole  conceived  with  the  needful  fulness, 
so  long  as  we  think  only  of  the  conduct  at  present  dis- 
played around  us.  We  have  to  include  in  our  conception 
the  less-developed  conduct  out  of  which  this  has  arisen  in 
course  of  time.  "We  have  to  regard  the  conduct  now  shown 
us  by  creatures  of  all  orders,  as  an  outcome  of  the  conduct 
which  has  brought  life  of  every  kind  to  its  present  height. 
And  this  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  our  preparatory  step 
must  be  to  study  the  evolution  of  conduct. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT. 

§  3.  "We  have  become  quite  familiar  with  the  idea  of  an 
evolution  of  structures  throughout  the  ascending  types  of 
animals.  To  a  considerable  degree  we  have  become  familiar 
with  the  thought  that  an  evolution  of  functions  has  gone  on 
paripassu  with  the  evolution  of  structures.  Now  advancing 
a  step,  we  have  to  frame  a  conception  of  the  evolution  of 
conduct,  as  correlated  with  this  evolution  of  structures  and 
functions. 

These  three  subjects  are  to  be  definitely  distinguished. 
Obviously  the  facts  comparative  morphology  sets  forth, 
form  a  whole  which,  though  it  cannot  be  treated  in  general 
or  in  detail  without  taking  into  account  facts  belonging 
to  comparative  physiology,  is  essentially  independent.  ~No 
less  clear  is  it  that  we  may  devote  our  attention  exclusively 
to  that  progressive  differentiation  of  functions,  and  com- 
bination of  functions,  which  accompanies  the  development 
of  structures — may  say  no  more  about  the  characters  and 
connexions  of  organs  than  is  implied  in  describing  their 
separate  and  joint  actions.  And  the  subject  of  conduct 
lies  outside  the  subject  of  functions,  if  not  as  far  as  this 
lies  outside  the  subject  of  structures,  still,  far  enough  to 
make  it  substantially  separate.  For  those  functions  which 
are  already  variously  compounded  to  achieve  what  we  re- 
gard as  single  bodily  acts,  are  endlessly  re-compounded 

8 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  9 

to  achieve  that  co-ordination  of  bodily  acts  which  is  known 
as  conduct. 

We  are  concerned  with  functions  in  the  true  sense,  while 
we  think  of  them  as  processes  carried  on  within  the  body ; 
and,  without  exceeding  the  limits  of  physiology,  we  may 
treat  of  their  adjusted  combinations,  so  long  as  these  are 
regarded  as  parts  of  the  vital  consensus.  If  we  observe 
how  the  lungs  aerate  the  blood  which  the  heart  sends  to 
them  ;  how  heart  and  lungs  together  supply  aerated  blood  to 
the  stomach,  and  so  enable  it  to  do  its  work ;  how  these 
co-operate  with  sundry  secreting  and  excreting  glands  to 
further  digestion  and  to  remove  waste  matter  ;  and  how  all 
of  them  join  to  keep  the  brain  in  a  fit  condition  for  carry- 
ing on  those  actions  which  indirectly  conduce  to  maintenance 
of  the  life  at  large ;  we  are  dealing  with  functions.  Even 
when  considering  how  parts  that  act  directly  on  the  environ- 
ment— legs,  arms,  wings — perform  their  duties,  we  are  still 
concerned  with  functions  in  that  aspect  of  them  constituting 
physiology,  so  long  as  we  restrict  our  attention  to  internal 
processes,  and  to  internal  combinations  of  them.  But 

we  enter  on  the  subject  of  conduct  when  we  begin  to 
study  such  combinations  among  the  actions  of  sensory  and 
motor  organs  as  are  externally  manifested.  Suppose  that 
instead  of  observing  those  contractions  of  muscles  by  which 
the  optic  axes  are  converged  and  the  foci  of  the  eyes  ad- 
justed (which  is  a  portion  of  physiology),  and  that  instead 
of  observing  the  co-operation  of  other  nerves,  muscles,  and 
bones,  by  which  a  hand  is  moved  to  a  particular  place  and 
the  fingers  closed  (which  is  also  a  portion  of  physiology),  we 
observe  a  weapon  being  seized  by  a  hand  under  guidance  of 
the  eyes.  "We  now  pass  from  the  thought  of  combined 
internal  functions  to  the  thought  of  combined  external 
motions.  Doubtless  if  we  could  trace  the  cerebral  processes 
which  accompany  these,  we  should  find  an  inner  physio- 
logical co-ordination  corresponding  with  the  outer  co-ordina- 
tion of  actions.  But  this  admission  is  consistent  with  the 


10  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

assertion,  that  when  we  ignore  the  internal  combination  and 
attend  only  to  the  external  combination,  we  pass  from  a 
portion  of  physiology  to  a  portion  of  conduct.  For  though 
it  may  be  objected  that  the  external  combination  instanced, 
is  too  simple  to  be  rightly  included  under  the  name  conduct, 
yet  a  moment's  thought  shows  that  it  is  joined  with  what  we 
call  conduct  by  insensible  gradations.  Suppose  the  weapon 
seized  is  used  to  ward  off  a  blow.  Suppose  a  counter- 
blow is  given.  Suppose  the  aggressor  runs  and  is  chased. 
Suppose  there  comes  a  struggle  and  a  handing  him  over 
to  the  police.  Suppose  there  follow  the  many  and  varied 
acts  constituting  a  prosecution.  Obviously  the  initial  ad- 
justment of  an  act  to  an  end,  inseparable  from  the  rest, 
must  be  included  with  them  under  the  same  general  head  ; 
and  obviously  from  this  initial  simple  adjustment,  having 
intrinsically  no  moral  character,  we  pass  by  degrees  to  the 
most  complex  adjustments  and  to  those  on  which  moral 
judgments  are  passed. 

Hence,  excluding  all  internal  co-ordinations,  our  subject 
here  is  the  aggregate  of  all  external  co-ordinations  ;  and  this 
aggregate  includes  not  only  the  simplest  as  well  as  the  most 
complex  performed  by  human  beings,  but  also  those  per- 
formed by  all  inferior  beings  considered  as  less  or  more 
evolved. 

§  4.  Already  the  question — What  constitutes  advance  in  the 
evolution  of  conduct,  as  we  trace  it  up  from  the  lowest  types 
of  living  creatures  to  the  highest  ?  has  been  answered  by 
implication.  A  few  examples  will  now  bring  the  answer 
into  conspicuous  relief. 

We  saw  that  conduct  is  distinguished  from  the  totality 
of  actions  by  excluding  purposeless  actions ;  but  during 
evolution  this  distinction  arises  by  degrees.  In  the  very 
lowest  creatures  most  of  the  movements  from  moment  to 
moment  made,  have  not  more  recognizable  aims  than  have 
the  struggles  of  an  epileptic.  An  infusorium  swims  randomly 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  11 

about,  determined  in  its  course  not  by  a  perceived  object  to 
be  pursued  or  escaped,  but,  apparently,  by  varying  stimuli 
in  its  medium  ;  and  its  acts,  unadjusted  in  any  appreciable 
way  to  ends,  lead  it  now  into  contact  with  some  nutritive 
substance  which  it  absorbs,  and  now  into  the  neighbourhood 
of  some  creature  by  which  it  is  swallowed  and  digested. 
Lacking  those  developed  senses  and  motor  powers  which 
higher  animals  possess,  ninety-nine  in  the  hundred  of  these 
minute  animals,  severally  living  but  for  a  few  hours,  dis- 
appear either  by  innutrition  or  by  destruction.  The  conduct 
is  constituted  of  actions  so  little  adjusted  to  ends,  that  life 
continues  only  as  long  as  the  accidents  of  the  environment 
are  favourable.  But  when,  among  aquatic  creatures,  we 
observe  one  which,  though  still  low  in  type,  is  much  higher 
than  the  infusorium — say  a  rotifer — we  see  how,  along 
with  larger  size,  more  developed  structures,  and  greater 
power  of  combining  functions,  there  goes  an  advance  in  con- 
duct. We  see  how  by  its  whirling  cilia  it  sucks  in  as  food 
these  small  animals  moving  around  ;  how  by  its  prehensile 
tail  it  fixes  itself  to  some  object ;  how  by  withdrawing  its 
outer  organs  and  contracting  its  body,  it  preserves  itself 
from  this  or  that  injury  from  time  to  time  threatened  ;  and 
how  thus,  by  better  adjusting  its  own  actions,  it  becomes  less 
dependent  on  the  actions  going  on  around,  and  so  preserves 
itself  for  a  longer  period. 

A  superior  sub-kingdom,  as  the  Mollusca,  still  better 
exemplifies  this  contrast.  When  we  compare  a  low  mollusc, 
such  as  a  floating  ascidian,  with  a  high  mollusc,  such  as  a 
cephalopod,  we  are  again  shown  that  greater  organic  evolu- 
tion is  accompanied  by  more  evolved  conduct.  At  the 
mercy  of  every  marine  creature  large  enough  to  swallow  it, 
and  drifted  about  by  currents  which  may  chance  to  keep  it 
at  sea  or  may  chance  to  leave  it  fatally  stranded,  the 
ascidian  displays  but  little  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  in 
comparison  with  the  cephalopod  ;  which,  now  crawling  over 
the  beach,  now  exploring  the  rocky  crevices,  now  swimming 


12  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

through  the  open  water,  now  darting  after  a  fish,  now  hiding 
itself  from  some  larger  animal  in  a  cloud  of  ink,  and  using 
its  suckered  arms  at  one  time  for  anchoring  itself  and  at 
another  for  holding  fast  its  prey  ;  selects,  and  combines,  and 
proportions,  its  movements  from  minute  to  minute,  so  as 
to  evade  dangers  which  threaten,  while  utilizing  chances  of 
food  which  offer  ;  so  showing  us  varied  activities  which,  in 
achieving  special  ends,  achieve  the  general  end  of  securing 
continuance  of  the  activities. 

Among  vertebrate  animals  we  similarly  trace  up,  along 
with  advance  in  structures  and  functions,  this  advance  in 
conduct.  A  fish  roaming  about  at  hazard  in  search  of 
something  to  eat,  able  to  detect  it  by  smell  or  sight  only 
within  short  distances,  and  now  and  again  rushing  away  in 
alarm  on  the  approach  of  a  bigger  fish,  makes  adjustments 
of  acts  to  ends  that  are  relatively  few  and  simple  in  their 
kinds ;  and  shows  us,  as  a  consequence,  how  small  is  the 
average  duration  of  life.  So  few  survive  to  maturity  that, 
to  make  up  for  destruction  of  unhatched  young  and  small 
fry  and  half-grown  individuals,  a  million  ova. have  to  be 
spawned  by  a  cod-fish  that  two  may  reach  the  spawning  age. 
Conversely,  by  a  highly-evolved  mammal,  such  as  an  ele- 
phant, those  general  actions  performed  in  common  with  the 
fish  are  far  better  adjusted  to  their  ends.  By  sight  as  well, 
probably,  as  by  odour,  it  detects  food  at  relatively  great 
distances  ;  and  when,  at  intervals,  there  arises  a  need  for 
escape,  relatively-great  speed  is  attained.  But  the  chief 
difference  arises  from  the  addition  of  new  sets  of  adjust- 
ments. We  have  combined  actions  which  facilitate  nutrition 
— the  breaking  off  of  succulent  and  fruit-bearing  branches,  the 
selecting  of  edible  growths  throughout  a  comparatively  wide 
reach ;  and,  in  case  of  danger,  safety  can  be  achieved  not  by 
flight  only,  but,  if  necessary,  by  defence  or  attack  :  bringing 
into  combined  use  tusks,  trunk,  and  ponderous  feet.  Fur- 
ther, we  see  various  subsidiary  acts  adjusted  to  subsidiary 
ends — now  the  going  into  a  river  for  coolness,  and  using  the 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  13 

trunk  as  a  means  of  projecting  water  over  the  body ;  now 
the  employment  of  a  bough  for  sweeping  away  flies  from 
the  back ;  now  the  making  of  signal  sounds  to  alarm  the 
herd,  and  adapting  the  actions  to  such  sounds  when  made 
by  others.  Evidently,  the  effect  of  this  more  highly-evolved 
conduct  is  to  secure  the  balance  of  the  organic  actions 
throughout  far  longer  periods. 

And  now,  on  studying  the  doings  of  the  highest  of  mam- 
mals, mankind,  we  not  only  find  that  the  adjustments  of 
acts  to  ends  are  both  more  numerous  and  better  than 
among  lower  mammals ;  but  we  find  the  same  thing  on  com- 
paring the  doings  of  higher  races  of  men  with  those  of  lower 
races.  If  we  take  any  one  of  the  major  ends  achieved,  we 
see  greater  completeness  of  achievement  by  civilized  than 
by  savage  ;  and  we  also  see  an  achievement  of  relatively 
numerous  minor  ends  subserving  major  ends.  Is  it  in 
nutrition  ?  The  food  is  obtained  more  regularly  in  response 
to  appetite  ;  it  is  far  higher  in  quality ;  it  is  free  from  dirt ; 
it  is  greater  in  variety ;  it  is  better  prepared.  Is  it  in 
warmth  ?  The  characters  of  the  fabrics  and  forms  of  the 
articles  used  for  clothing,  and  the  adaptations  of  them  to 
requirements  from  day  to  day  and  hour  to  hour,  are  much 
superior.  Is  it  in  dwellings  ?  Between  the  shelter  of  boughs 
and  grass  which  the  lowest  savage  builds,  and  the  mansion  of 
the  civilized  man,  the  contrast  in  aspect  is  not  more  ex- 
treme than  is  the  contrast  in  number  and  efficiency  of  the 
adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  betrayed  in  their  respective 
constructions.  And  when  with  the  ordinary  activities  of 
the  savage  we  compare  the  ordinary  civilized  activities — 
as  the  business  of  the  trader,  which  involves  multiplied  and 
complex  transactions  extending  over  long  periods,  or  as 
professional  avocations,  prepared  for  by  elaborate  studies 
and  daily  carried  on  in  endlessly-varied  forms,  or  as  political 
discussions  and  agitations,  directed  now  to  the  carrying  of 
this  measure  and  now  to  the  defeating  of  that, — we  see  sets 
of  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  not  only  immensely  exceeding 


14  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

those  seen  among  lower  races  of  men  in  variety  and  in- 
tricacy, but  sets  to  which  lower  races  of  men  present  nothing 
analogous.  And  along  with  this  greater  elaboration  of  life 
produced  by  the  pursuit  of  more  numerous  ends,  there  goes 
that  increased  duration  of  life  which  constitutes  the  su- 
preme end. 

And  here  is  suggested  the  need  for  supplementing  this 
conception  of  evolving  conduct.  For  besides  being  an 
improving  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends,  snch  as  furthers  pro- 
longation of  life,  it  is  such  as  furthers  increased  amount 
of  life.  Reconsideration  of  the  examples  above  given,  will 
show  that  length  of  life  is  not  by  itself  a  measure  of  evolu- 
tion of  conduct ;  but  that  quantity  of  life  must  be  taken  into 
account.  An  oyster,  adapted  by  its  structure  to  the  diffused 
food  contained  in  the  water  it  draws  in,  and  shielded  by  its 
shell  from  nearly  all  dangers,  may  live  longer  than  a  cuttle- 
fish, which  has  such  superior  powers  of  dealing  with 
numerous  contingencies  ;  but  then,  the  sum  of  vital 
activities  during  any  given  interval  is  far  less  in  the  oyster 
than  in  the  cuttle-fish.  So  a  worm,  ordinarily  sheltered  from 
most  enemies  by  the  earth  it  burrows  through,  which  also 
supplies  a  sufficiency  of  its  poor  food,  may  have  greater 
longevity  than  many  of  its  annulose  relatives,  the  insects ; 
but  one  of  these  during  its  existence  as  larva  and  imago, 
may  experience  a  greater  quantity  of  the  changes  which  con- 
stitute life.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  when  we  compare  the  more 
evolved  with  the  less  evolved  among  mankind.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  average  lengths  of  the  lives  of  savage  and 
civilized,  is  no  true  measure  of  the  difference  between  the 
totalities  of  their  two  lives,  considered  as  aggregates  of 
thought,  feeling,  and  action.  Hence,  estimating  life  by 
multiplying  its  length  into  its  breadth,  we  must  say  that  the 
augmentation  of  it  which  accompanies  evolution  of  conduct, 
results  from  increase  of  both  factors.  The  more  multiplied 
and  varied  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  by  which  the  more 
developed  creature  from  hour  to  hour  fulfils  more  numerous 


THE   EVOLUTION   OF   CONDUCT.  15 

requirements,  severally  add  to  the  activities  that  are  carried 
on  abreast,  and  severally  help  to  make  greater  the  period 
through  which  such  simultaneous  activities  endure.  Each 
further  evolution  of  conduct  widens  the  aggregate  of  actions 
while  conducing  to  elongation  of  it. 

§  5.  Turn  we  now  to  a  further  aspect  of  the  phenomena, 
separate  from,  but  necessarily  associated  with,  the  last. 
Thus  far  we  have  considered  only  those  adjustments  of  acts 
to  ends  which  have  for  their  final  purpose  complete  individual 
life.  Now  we  have  to  consider  those  adjustments  which  have 
for  their  final  purpose  the  life  of  the  species. 

Self-preservation  in  each  generation  has  all  along  depended 
on  the  preservation  of  offspring  by  preceding  generations. 
And  in  proportion  as  evolution  of  the  conduct  subserving 
individual  life  is  high,  implying  high  organization,  there 
must  previously  have  been  a  highly-evolved  conduct  sub- 
serving nurture  of  the  young.  Throughout  the  ascending 
grades  of  the  animal  kingdom,  this  second  kind  of  conduct 
presents  stages  of  advance  like  those  which  we  have  observed 
in  the  first.  Low  down,  where  structures  and  functions  are 
little  developed,  and  the  power  of  adjusting  acts  to  ends 
but  slight,  there  is  no  conduct,  properly  so  named,  further- 
ing salvation  of  the  species.  Race-maintaining  conduct,  like 
self-maintaining  conduct,  arises  gradually  out  of  that  which 
cannot  be  called  conduct:  adjusted  actions  are  preceded 
by  unadjusted  ones.  Protozoa  spontaneously  divide 

and  sub-divide,  in  consequence  of  physical  changes  over 
which  they  have  no  control ;  or,  at  other  times,  after  a  period 
of  quiescence,  break  UD  into  minute  portions  which  severally 
grow  into  new  individuals.  In  neither  case  can  conduct 
be  alleged.  Higher  up,  the  process  is  that  of  ripening,  at 
intervals,  germ-cells  and  sperm-cells,  which,  on  occasion, 
are  sent  forth  into  the  surrounding  water  and  left  to  their 
fate  :  perhaps  one  in  ten  thousand  surviving  to  maturity. 
Here,  again,  we  see  only  development  and  dispersion 
3 


16  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

going  on  apart  from  parental  care.  Types  above  these,  as 
fish  which  choose  fit  places  in  which  to  deposit  their  ova, 
or  as  the  higher  crustaceans  which  carry  masses  of  ova 
about  until  they  are  hatched,  exhibit  adjustments  of  acts 
to  ends  which  we  may  properly  call  conduct ;  though  it  is  of 
the  simplest  kind.  Where,  as  among  certain  fish,  the  male 
keeps  guard  over  the  eggs,  driving  away  intruders,  there  is 
an  additional  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends ;  and  the  appli- 
cability of  the  name  conduct  is  more  decided.  Passing 
at  once  to  creatures  far  superior,  such  as  birds  which, 
building  nests  and  sitting  on  their  eggs,  feed  their  broods 
for  considerable  periods,  and  give  them  aid  after  they  can 
fly ;  or  such  as  mammals  which,  suckling  their  young  for  a 
time,  continue  afterwards  to  bring  them  food  or  protect 
them  while  they  feed,  until  they  reach  ages  at  which  they 
can  provide  for  themselves ;  we  are  shown  how  this  conduct 
which  furthers  race-maintenance  evolves  hand-in-hand  with 
the  conduct  which  furthers  self-maintenance.  That  better 
organization  which  makes  possible  the  last,  makes  possible 
the  first  also.  Mankind  exhibit  a  great  progress 
of  like  nature.  Compared  with  brutes,  the  savage,  higher  in 
his  self-maintaining  conduct,  is  higher  too  in  his  race-main- 
taining conduct.  A  larger  number  of  the  wants  of  offspring 
are  provided  for ;  and  parental  care,  enduring  longer, 
extends  to  the  disciplining  of  offspring  in  arts  and  habits 
which  fit  them  for  their  conditions  of  existence.  Conduct  of 
this  order,  equally  with  conduct  of  the  first  order,  we  see 
becoming  evolved  in  a  still  greater  degree  as  we  ascend 
from  savage-  to  civilized.  The  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends 
in  the  rearing  of  children  become  far  more  elaborate,  alike 
in  number  of  ends  met,  variety  of  means  used,  and  efficiency 
of  their  adaptations ;  and  the  aid  and  oversight  are  continued 
throughout  a  much  greater  part  of  early  life. 

In  tracing  up  the  evolution  of  conduct,  so  that  we  may 
frame  a  true  conception  of  eondnet  in  general,  we  have  thus 
to  recognize  these  two  kind's  as  mutually  dependent.  Speak- 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  17 

ing  generally,  neither  can  evolve  without  evolution  of  the 
other ;  and  the  highest  evolutions  of  the  two  must  be  reached 
simultaneously. 

§  6.  To  conclude,  however,  that  on  reaching  a  perfect 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  subserving  individual  life  and 
the  rearing  of  offspring,  the  evolution  of  conduct  becomes 
complete,  is  to  conclude  erroneously.  Or  rather,  I  should 
say,  it  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  either  of  these  kinds  of 
conduct  can  assume  its  highest  form,  without  its  highest 
form  being  assumed  by  a  third  kind  of  conduct  yet  to  be 
named. 

The  multitudinous  creatures  of  all  kinds  which  fill  the 
Earth,  cannot  live  wholly  apart  from  one  another,  but  are 
more  or  less  in  presence  of  one  another — are  interfered  with 
by  one  another.  In  large  measure  the  adjustments  of  acts 
to  ends  which  we  have  been  considering,  are  components  of 
that  "  struggle  for  existence "  carried  on  both  between 
members  of  the  same  species  and  between  members  of 
different  species ;  and,  very  generally,  a  successful  adjust- 
ment made  by  one  creature  involves  an  unsuccessful  adjust- 
ment made  by  another  creature,  either  of  the  same  kind  or 
of  a  different  kind.  That  the  carnivore  may  live  herbivores 
must  die ;  and  that  its  young  may  be  reared  the  young  of 
weaker  creatures  must  be  orphaned.  Maintenance  of  the 
hawk  and  its  brood  involves  the  deaths  of  many  small  birds ; 
and  that  small  birds  may  multiply,  their  progeny  must  be 
fed  with  innumerable  sacrificed  worms  and  larvae.  Com- 
petition among  members  of  the  same  species  has  allied, 
though  less  conspicuous,  results.  The  stronger  often  carries 
off  by  force  the  prey  which  the  weaker  has  caught.  Mono- 
polizing certain  hunting  grounds,  the  more  ferocious  drive 
others  of  their  kind  into  less  favourable  places.  With  plant- 
eating  animals,  too,  the  like  holds :  the  better  food  is  secured 
by  the  more  vigorous  individuals,  while  the  less  vigorous 
and  worse  fed,  succumb  either  directly  from  innutrition  or 


18  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

indirectly  from  resulting  inability  to  escape  enemies.  That 
is  to  say,  among  creatures  whose  lives  are  carried  on  anta- 
gonistically, each  of  the  two  kinds  of  conduct  delineated 
above,  must  remain  imperfectly  evolved.  Even  in  such  few 
kinds  of  them  as  have  little  to  fear  from  enemies  or  compe^ 
titors,  as  lions  or  tigers,  there  is  still  inevitable  failure  in 
the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  towards  the  close  of  life. 
Death  by  starvation  from  inability  to  catch  prey,  shows  a 
falling  short  of  conduct  from  its  ideal. 

This  imperfectly-evolved  conduct  introduces  us  by  anti- 
thesis to  conduct  that  is  perfectly  evolved.  Contemplating 
these  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which  miss  completeness 
because  they  cannot  be  made  by  one  creature  without  other 
creatures  being  prevented  from  making  them,  raises  the 
thought  of  adjustments  such  that  each  creature  may  make 
them  without  preventing  them  from  being  made  by  other 
creatures.  That  the  highest  form  of  conduct  must  be  so 
distinguished,  is  an  inevitable  implication  ;  for  while  the  form 
of  conduct  is  such  that  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  by  some 
necessitate  non-adjustments  by  others,  there  remains  room 
for  modifications  which  bring  conduct  into  a  form  avoiding 
this,  and  so  making  the  totality  of  life  greater. 

From  the  abstract  let  us  pass  to  the  concrete.  Recogniz- 
ing men  as  the  beings  whose  conduct  is  most  evolved,  let 
us  ask  under  what  conditions  their  conduct,  in  all  three 
aspects  of  its  evolution,  reaches  its  limit.  Clearly  while 
the  lives  led  are  entirely  predatory,  as  those  of  savages,  the 
adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  fall  short  of  this  highest  form 
of  conduct  in  every  way.  Individual  life,  ill  carried,  on 
from  hour  to  hour,  is  prematurely  cut  short ;  the  fostering 
of  offspring  often  fails,  and  is  incomplete  when  it  does  not 
fail ;  and  in  so  far  as  the  ends  of  self-maintenance  and  race- 
maintenance  are  met,  they  are  met  by  destruction  of  other 
beings,  of  different  kind  or  of  like  kind.  In  social  groups 
formed  by  compounding  and  re-compounding  primitive  hordes, 
conduct  remains  imperfectly  evolved  in  proportion  as  there 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT.  19 

continue  antagonisms  between  the  groups  and  antagonisms 
between  members  of  the  same  group — two  traits  necessarily 
associated  ;  since  the  nature  which  prompts  international 
aggression  prompts  aggression  of  individuals  on  one  another. 
Hence  the  limit  of  evolution  can  be  reached  by  conduct  only 
in  permanently  peaceful  societies.  That  perfect  adjustment 
of  acts  to  ends  in  maintaining  individual  life  and  rearing 
new  individuals,  which  is  effected  by  each  without  hindering 
others  from  effecting  like  perfect  adjustments,  is,  in  its  very 
definition,  shown  to  constitute  a  kind  of  conduct  that  can  be 
approached  only  as  war  decreases  and  dies  out. 

A  gap  in  this  outline  must  now  be  filled  up.  There  re- 
mains a  further  advance  not  yet  even  hinted.  For  beyond 
so  behaving  that  each  achieves  his  ends  without  preventing 
others  from  achieving  their  ends,  the  members  of  a  society 
may  give  mutual  help  in  the  achievement  of  ends.  And  if, 
either  indirectly  by  industrial  co-operation,  or  directly  by 
volunteered  aid,  fellow  citizens  can  make  easier  for  one 
another  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  then  their  conduct 
assumes  a  still  higher  phase  of  evolution  ;  since  whatever 
facilitates  the  making  of  adjustments  by  each,  increases  the 
totality  of  the  adjustments  made,  and  serves  to  render  the 
lives  of  all  more  complete. 

§  T.  The  reader  who  recalls  certain  passages  in  First  Prin- 
ciples, in  the  Principles  of  Biology,  and  in  the  Principles 
of  Psychology,  will  perceive  above  a  re-statement,  in  another 
form,  of  generalizations  set  forth  in  those  works.  Especially 
will  he  be  reminded  of  the  proposition  that  Life  isjlthe 
definite  combination  of  heterogeneous  changes,  both  simul- 
taneous and  successive,  in  correspondence  with  external  co- 
existences and  sequences  ; "  and  still  more  of  that  abridged 
and  less  specific  formula,  in  which  Life  is  said  to  be  "  they 
continuous  adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  external  rejX- 
tions "  „  •  ~^r 

The  presentation  of  the  facts  here  made,  differs  from  the 


20  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

presentations  before  made,  mainly  by  ignoring  the  inner 
part  of  the  correspondence  and  attending  exclusively  to  that 
outer  part  constituted  of  visible  actions.  But  the  two  are  in 
harmony  ;  and  the  reader  who  wishes  further  to  prepare 
himself  for  dealing  with  our  present  topic  from  the  evolu- 
tion point  of  view,  may  advantageously  join  to  the  foregoing 
more  special  aspect  of  the  phenomena,  the  more  general 
aspects  before  delineated. 

After  this  passing  remark,  I  recur  to  the  main  proposition 
set  forth  in  these  two  chapters,  which  has,  I  think,  been  fully 
justified.  Guided  by  the  truth  that  as  the  conduct  with  which 
Ethics  deals  is  part  of  conduct  at  large,  conduct  at  large  must 
be  generally  understood  before  this  part  can  be  specially  un- 
derstood ;  and  guided  by  the  further  truth  that  to  understand 
conduct  at  large  we  must  understand  the  evolution  of  con- 
duct ;  we  have  been  led  to  see  that  Ethics  has  for  its  subject- 
matter,  that  form  which  universal  conduct  assumes  during 
the  last  stages  of  its  evolution.  We  have  also  concluded  that 
these  last  stages  in  the  evolution  of  conduct  are  those  dis- 
played by  the  highest  type  of  being,  when  he  is  forced,  by 
increase  of  numbers,  to  live  more  and  more  in  presence  of 
his  fellows.  And  there  has  followed  the  corollary  that  con- 
duct gains  ethical  sanction  in  proportion  as  the  activities,  be- 
coming less  and  less  militant  and  more  and  more  industrial, 
are  such  as  do  not  necessitate  mutual  injury  or  hindrance, 
but  consist  with,  and  are  furthered  by,  co-operation  and  mu- 
tual aid. 

These  implications  of  the  Evolution-Hypothesis,  we  shall 
now  see  harmonize  with  the  leading  moral  ideas  men  have 
otherwise  reached. 


CHAPTER  III. 

GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 

§  8.  By  comparing  its  meanings  in  different  connexions 
and  observing  what  they  have  in  common,  we  learn  the 
essential  meaning  of  a  word ;  and  the  essential  meaning 
of  a  word  that  is  variously  applied,  may  best  be  learnt  by 
comparing  with  one  another  those  applications  of  it  which 
diverge  most  widely.  Let  us  thus  ascertain  what  good  and 
bad  mean. 

In  which  cases  do  we  distinguish  as  good,  a  knife,  a  gun, 
a  house  ?  And  what  trait  leads  us  to  speak  of  a  bad 
umbrella  or  a  bad  pair  of  boots  ?  The  characters  here 
predicated  by  the  words  good  and  bad,  are  not  intrinsic 
characters ;  for  apart  from  human  wants,  such  things  have 
neither  merits  nor  demerits.  We  call  these  articles  good 
or  bad  according  as  they  are  well  or  ill  adapted  to  achieve 
prescribed  ends.  The  good  knife  is  one  which  will  cut ; 
the  good  gun  is  one  which  carries  far  and  true  ;  the 
good  house  is  one  which  duly  yields  the  shelter,  comfort, 
and  accommodation  sought  for.  Conversely,  the  badness 
alleged  of  the  umbrella  or  the  pair  of  boots,  refers  to  their 
failures  in  fulfilling  the  ends  of  keeping  off  the  rain  and 
comfortably  protecting  the  feet,  with  due  regard  to  appear- 
ances. So  is  it  when  we  pass  from  inanimate  objects 
to  inanimate  actions.  We  call  a  day  bad  in  which  storms 
prevent  us  from  satisfying  certain  of  our  desires.  A 

21 


22  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

good  season  is  the  expression  used  when  the  weather 
has  favoured  the  production  of  valuable  crops.  If 

from  lifeless  things  and  actions  we  pass  to  living  ones,  we 
similarly  find  that  these  words  in  their  current  applications 
refer  to  efficient  subservience.  The  goodness  or  badness  of 
a  pointer  or  a  hunter,  of  a  sheep  or  an  ox,  ignoring  all  other 
attributes  of  these  creatures,  refer  in  the  one  case  to  the 
fitness  of  their  actions  for  effecting  the  ends  men  use  them 
for,  and  in  the  other  case  to  the  qualities  of  their  flesh  as 
adapting  it  to  support  human  life.  And  those  doings 

of  men  which,  morally  considered,  are  indifferent,  we  class 
as  good  or  bad  according  to  their  success  or  failure.  A  good 
jump  is  a  jump  which,  remoter  ends  ignored,  well  achieves 
the  immediate  purpose  of  a  jump  ;  and  a  stroke  at  billiards 
is  called  good  when  the  movements  are  skilfully  adjusted  to 
the  requirements.  Oppositely,  the  badness  of  a  walk  that 
is  shuffling  and  an  utterance  that  is  indistinct,  is  alleged 
because  of  the  relative  non-adaptations  of  the  acts  to  the 
ends. 

Thus  recognizing  the  meanings  of  good  and  bad  as  other- 
wise used,  we  shall  understand  better  their  meanings  as 
used  in  characterizing  conduct  under  its  ethical  aspects. 
Here,  too,  observation  shows  that  we  apply  them  according 
as  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  are,  or  are  not,  efficient. 
This  truth  is  somewhat  disguised.  The  entanglement  of 
social  relations  is  such,  that  men's  actions  often  simulta- 
neously affect  the  welfares  of  self,  of  offspring,  and  of 
fellow-citizens.  Hence  results  confusion  in  judging  of  ac- 
tions as  good  or  bad  ;  since  actions  well  fitted  to  achieve 
ends  of  one  order,  may  prevent  ends  of  the  other  orders 
from  being  achieved.  Nevertheless,  when  we  disentangle 
the  three  orders  of  ends,  and  consider  each  separately,  it  be- 
comes clear  that  the  conduct  which  achieves  each  kind  of 
end  is  regarded  as  relatively  good  ;  and  is  regarded  as  rela- 
tively bad  if  it  fails  to  achieve  it. 

Take  first  the  primary  set  of  adjustments — those  sub- 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  23 

serving  individual  life.  Apart  from  approval  or  disapproval 
of  his  ulterior  aims,  a  man  who  lights  is  said  to  make  a  good 
defence,  if  his  defence  is  well  adapted  for  self-preservation  ; 
and,  the  judgments  on  other  aspects  of  his  conduct  remain- 
ing the  same,  he  brings  down  on  himself  an  unfavourable 
verdict,  in  so  far  as  his  immediate  acts  are  concerned,  if 
these  are  futile.  The  goodness  ascribed  to  a  man  of  busi- 
ness, as  such,  is  measured  by  the  activity  and  ability  with 
which  he  buys  and  sells  to  advantage ;  and  may  coexist 
with  a  hard  treatment  of  dependents  which  is  reprobated. 
Though  in  repeatedly  lending  money  to  a  friend  who  sinks 
one  loan  after  another,  a  man  is  doing  that  which,  considered 
in  itself  is  held  praiseworthy  ;  yet,  if  he  does  it  to  the  extent 
of  bringing  on  his  own  ruin,  he  is  held  blameworthy  for  a 
self-sacrifice  carried  too  far.  And  thus  is  it  with  the  opinions 
we  express  from  hour  to  hour  on  those  acts  of  people  around 
which  bear  on  their  health  and  personal  welfare.  "  You 
should  not  have  done  that;"  is  the  reproof  given  to  one 
who  crosses  the  street  amid  a  dangerous  rush  of  vehicles. 
"  You  ought  to  have  changed  your  clothes ; "  is  said  to 
another  who  has  taken  cold  after  getting  wet.  u  You  were 
right  to  take  a  receipt ; "  "  you  were  wrong  to  invest  with- 
out advice;"  are  common  criticisms.  All  such  approving 
and  disapproving  utterances  make  the  tacit  assertion  that, 
other  things  equal,  conduct  is  right  or  wrong  according  as 
its  special  acts,  well  or  ill  adjusted  to  special  ends,  do  or  do 
not  further  the  general  end  of  self-preservation. 

These  ethical  judgments  we  pass  on  self-regarding  acts 
are  ordinarily  little  emphasized  ;  partly  because  the  prompt- 
ings of  the  self-regarding  desires,  generally  strong  enough, 
do  not  need  moral  enforcement,  and  partly  because  the 
promptings  of  the  other-regarding  desires,  less  strong,  and 
often  over-ridden,  do  need  moral  enforcement.  Hence  re- 
sults a  contrast.  On  turning  to  that  second  class  of  adjust- 
ments of  acts  to  ends  which  subserve  the  rearing  of  offspring, 
we  no  longer  find  any  obscurity  in  the  application  of  the 


24  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

words  good  and  bad  to  them,  according  as  they  are  efficient 
or  inefficient.  The  expressions  good  nursing  and  bad  nurs- 
ing, whether  they  refer  to  the  supply  of  food,  the  quality 
and  amount  of  clothing,  or  the  due  ministration  to  infantine 
wants  from  hour  to  hour,  tacitly  recognize  as  special  ends 
which  ought  to  be  fulfilled,  the  furthering  of  the  vital 
functions,  with  a  view  to  the  general  end  of  continued  life 
and  growth.  A  mother  is  called  good  who,  ministering 
to  all  the  physical  needs  of  her  children,  also  adjusts  her 
behaviour  in  ways  conducive  to  their  mental  health  ;  and  a 
bad  father  is  one  who  either  does  not  provide  the  neces- 
saries of  life  for  his  family,  or  otherwise  acts  in  a  manner 
injurious  to  their  bodies  or  minds.  Similarly  of  the  educa- 
tion given  to  them,  or  provided  for  them.  Goodness  or 
badness  is  affirmed  of  it  (often  with  little  consistency,  how- 
ever) according  as  its  methods  are  so  adapted  to  physical 
and  psychical  requirements,  as  to  further  the  children's  lives 
for  the  time  being,  while  preparing  them  for  carrying  on 
complete  and  prolonged  adult  life. 

Most  emphatic,  however,  are  the  applications  of  the  words 
good  and  bad  to  conduct  throughout  that  third  division  of 
it  comprising  the  deeds  by  which  men  affect  one  another. 
In  maintaining  their  own  lives  and  fostering  their  offspring, 
men's  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  are  so  apt  to  hinder  the 
kindred  adjustments  of  other  men,  that  insistance  on  the 
needful  limitations  has  to  be  perpetual ;  and  the  mischiefs 
caused  by  men's  interferences  with  one  another's  life-sub- 
serving actions  are  so  great,  that  the  interdicts  have  to  be 
peremptory.  Hence  the  fact  that  the  words  good  and  bad 
have  come  to  be  specially  associated  with  acts  which  further 
the  complete  living  of  others  and  acts  which  obstruct  their 
complete  living.  Goodness,  standing  by  itself,  suggests, 
above  all  other  things,  the  conduct  of  one  who  aids  the  sick 
in  re-acquiring  normal  vitality,  assists  the  unfortunate  to 
recover  the  means  of  maintaining  themselves,  defends  those 
who  are  threatened  with  harm  in  person,  property,  or  repu- 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  25 

tation,  and  aids  whatever  promises  to  improve  the  living  of 
all  his  fellows.  Contrariwise,  badness  brings  to  mind,  as  its 
leading  correlative,  the  conduct  of  one  who,  in  carrying  on 
his  own  life,  damages  the  lives  of  others  by  injuring  their 
bodies,  destroying  their  possessions,  defrauding  them,  calum- 
niating them. 

Always,  then,  acts  are  called  good  or  bad,  according  as 
they  are  well  or  ill  adjusted  to  ends ;  and  whatever  incon* 
sistency  there  is  in  our  uses  of  the  words,  arises  from  incon^ 
sistency  of  the  ends.  Here,  however,  the  study  of  conduct 
in  general,  and  of  the  evolution  of  conduct,  have  prepared 
us  to  harmonize  these  interpretations.  The  foregoing  ex» 
position  shows  that  the  conduct  to  which  we  apply  the 
name  good,  is  the  relatively  more  evolved  conduct ;  and 
that  bad  is  the  name  we  apply  to  conduct  which  is  relatively 
less  evolved.  We  saw  that  evolution,  tending  ever  towards 
self-preservation,  reaches  its  limit  when  individual  life  is  the 
greatest,  both  in  length  and  breadth ;  and  now  we  see  that, 
leaving  other  ends  aside,  we  regard  as  good  the  conduct 
furthering  self-preservation,  and  as  bad  the  conduct  tending 
to  self-destrnction.  It  was  shown  that  along  with  increasing 
power  of  maintaining  individual  life,  which  evolution  brings, 
there  goes  increasing  power  of  perpetuating  the  species  by 
fostering  progeny,  and  that  in  this  direction  evolution 
reaches  its  limit  when  the  needful  number  of  young,  pre- 
served to  maturity,  are  then  fit  for  a  life  that  is  complete  in 
fulness  and  duration ;  and  here  it  turns  out  that  parental 
conduct  is  called  good  or  bad  as  it  approaches  or  falls  short 
of  this  ideal  result.  Lastly,  we  inferred  that  establishment 
of  an  associated  state,  both  makes  possible  and  requires  a 
form  of  conduct  such  that  life  may  be  completed  in  each 
and  in  his  offspring,  not  only  without  preventing  completion 
of  it  in  others,  but  with  furtherance  of  it  in  others ;  and  we 
have  found  above,  that  this  is  the  form  of  conduct  most 
emphatically  termed  good.  Moreover,  just  as  we  there  saw 
that  evolution  becomes  the  highest  possible  when  the  con- 


26  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

duct  simultaneously  achieves  the  greatest  totality  of  life  in 
self,  in  offspring,  and  in  fellow  men  ;  so  here  we  see  that 
the  conduct  called  good  rises  to  the  conduct  conceived  as 
best,  when  it  fulfils  all  three  classes  of  ends  at  the  same 
time. 

§  9.  Is  there  any  postulate  involved  in  these  judgments  on 
conduct  ?  Is  there  any  assumption  made  in  calling  good  the 
acts  conducive  to  life,  in  self  or  others,  and  bad  those 
which  directly  or  indirectly  tend  towards  death,  special  or 
general  ?  Yes ;  an  assumption  of  extreme  significance  has 
been  made — an  assumption  underlying  all  moral  estimates. 

The  question  to  be  definitely  raised  and  answered  before 
entering  on  any  ethical  discussion,  is  the  question  of  late 
much  agitated — Is  life  worth  living  ?  Shall  we  take  the 
pessimist  view  ?  or  sEalf  we  take  the  optimist  view  ?  or 
shall  we,  after  weighing  pessimistic  and  optimistic  argu- 
ments, conclude  that  the  balance  is  in  favour  of  a  qualified 
optimism  ? 

On  the  answer  to  this  question  depends  entirely  every 
decision  concerning  the  goodness  or  badness  of  conduct. 
By  those  who  think  life  is  not  a  benefit  but  a  misfortune, 
conduct  which  prolongs  it  is  to  be  blamed  rather  than 
praised :  the  ending  of  an  undesirable  existence  being  the 
thing  to  be  wished,  that  which  causes  the  ending  of  it  must 
be  applauded ;  while  actions  furthering  its  continuance, 
either  in  self  or  others,  must  be  reprobated.  Those  who, 
on  the  other  hand,  take  an  optimistic  view,  or  who,  if  not 
pure  optimists,  yet  hold  that  in  life  the  good  exceeds  the 
evil,  are  committed  to  opposite  estimates ;  and  must  regard 
as  conduct  to  be  approved  that  which  fosters  life  in  self  and 
others,  and  as  conduct  to  be  disapproved  that  which  injures 
or  endangers  life  in  self  or  others. 

The  ultimate  question,  therefore,  is — Has  evolution  been 
a  mistake  ;  and  especially  that  evolution  which  improves  the 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  in  ascending  stages  of  organiza- 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  27 

tion  ?  If  it  is  held  that  there  had  better  not  have  been  any 
animate  existence  at  all,  and  that  the  sooner  it  comes  to  an 
end  the  better ;  then  one  set  of  conclusions  with  respect  to 
conduct  emerges.  If,  contrariwise,  it  is  held  that  there  is  a 
balance  in  favour  of  animate  existence,  and  if,  still  further, 
it  is  held  that  in  the  future  this  balance  may  be  increased  ; 
then  the  opposite  set  of  conclusions  emerges.  Even  should 
it  be  alleged  that  the  worth  of  life  is  not  to  be  judged  by  its 
intrinsic  character,  but  rather  by  its  extrinsic  sequences — 
by  certain  results  to  be  anticipated  when  life  has  passed — 
the  ultimate  issue  re-appears  in  a  new  shape.  For  though 
the  accompanying  creed  may  negative  a  deliberate  shorten- 
ing of  life  that  is  miserable,  it  cannot  justify  a  gratuitous 
lengthening  of  such  life.  Legislation  conducive  to  in- 
creased longevity  would,  on  the  pessimistic  view,  remain 
blameable  ;  while  it  would  be  praiseworthy  on  the  optimis- 
tic view. 

But  now,  have  these  irreconcilable  opinions  anything  in 
common  ?  Men  being  divisible  into  two  schools  differing 
on  this  ultimate  question,  the  inquiry  arises — Is  there  any- 
thing which  their  radically-opposed  views  alike  take  for 
granted  ?  In  the  optimistic  proposition,  tacitly  made  when 
using  the  words  good  and  bad  after  the  ordinary  manner ; 
and  in  the  pessimistic  proposition  overtly  made,  which 
implies  that  the  words  good  and  bad  should  be  used  in  the 
reverse  senses  ;  does  examination  disclose  any  joint  proposi- 
tion— any  proposition  which,  contained  in  both  of  them, 
may  be  held  more  certain  than  either — any  universally- 
asserted  proposition  ? 

§  10.  Yes,  there  is  one  postulate  in  which  pessimists  and 
optimists  agree.  Both  their  arguments  assume  it  to  be  self- 
evident  that  life  is  good  or  bad,  according  as  it  does,  or  does 
not,  bring  a  surplus  of  agreeable  feeling.  The  pessimist 
says  he  condemns  life  because  it  results  in  more  pain  than 
pleasure.  The  optimist  defends  life  in  the  belief  that  it 


28  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

brings  more  pleasure  than  pain.  Each  makes  the  kind  of 
eentiency  which  accompanies  life  the  test.  They  agree  that 
the  justification  for  life  as  a  state  of  being,  turns  on  this 
issue — whether  the  average  consciousness  rises  above  indif- 
ference-point into  pleasurable  feeling  or  falls  below  it  into 
painful  feeling.  The  implication  common  to  their  antagonist 
views  is,  that  conduct  should  conduce  to  preservation  of  the 
individual,  of  the  family,  and  of  the  society,  only  supposing 
that  life  brings  more  happiness  than  misery. 

Changing  the  venue  cannot  alter  the  verdict.  If  either 
the  pessimist,  while  saying  that  the  pains  of  life  predomi- 
nate, or  the  optimist,  while  saying  that  the  pleasures  pre- 
dominate, urges  that  the  pains  borne  here  are  to  be  compen- 
sated by  pleasures  received  hereafter ;  and  that  so  life, 
whether  or  not  justified  in  its  immediate  results,  is  justified 
in  its  ultimate  results;  the  implication  remains  the  same. 
The  decision  is  still  reached  by  balancing  pleasures  against 
pains.  Animate  existence  would  be  judged  by  both  a  curse, 
if  to  a  surplus  of  misery  borne  here,  were  added  a  surplus  of 
misery  to  be  borne  hereafter.  And  for  either  to  regard 
animate  existence  as  a  blessing,  if  here  its  pains  were  held  to 
exceed  its  pleasures,  he  must  hold  that  hereafter  its  pleasures 
will  exceed  its  pains.  Thus  there  is  no  escape  from  the  ad- 
mission that  in  calling  good  the  conduct  which  subserves  life, 
and  bad  the  conduct  which  hinders  or  destroys  it,  and  in  so 
implying  that  life  is  a  blessing  and  not  a  curse,  we  are  inevi- 
tably asserting  that  conduct  is  good  or  bad  according  as  its 
total  effects  are  pleasurable  or  painful. 

One  theory  only  is  imaginable  in  pursuance  of  which 
other  interpretations  of  good  and  bad  can  be  given.  This 
theory  is  that  men  were  created  with  the  intention  that  they 
should  be  sources  of  misery  to  themselves  ;  and  that  they  are 
bound  to  continue  living  that  their  creator  may  have  the 
satisfaction  of  contemplating  their  misery.  Though  this  is 
not  a  theory  avowedly  entertained  by  many — though  it  is 
not  formulated  by  any  in  this  distinct  way  ;  yet  not  a  few  do 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  29 

accept  it  under  a  disguised  form.  Inferior  creeds  are  per- 
vaded by  the  belief  that  the  sight  of  suffering  is  pleasing  to 
the  gods.  Derived  from  bloodthirsty  ancestors,  such  gods 
are  naturally  conceived  as  gratified  by  the  infliction  of  pain  : 
when  living  they  delighted  in  torturing  other  beings ;  and 
witnessing  torture  is  supposed  still  to  give  them  delight. 
The  implied  conceptions  long  survive.  It  needs  but  to  name 
Indian  fakirs  who  hang  on  hooks  and  Eastern  dervishes  who 
gash  themselves,  to  show  that  in  societies  considerably  ad- 
vanced, are  still  to  be  found  many  who  think  that  submission 
to  anguish  brings  divine  favour.  And  without  enlarging  on 
fasts  and  penances,  it  will  be  clear  that  there  has  existed, 
and  still  exists,  among  Christian  peoples,  the  belief  that  the 
Deity  whom  Jephthah  thought  to  propitiate  by  sacrificing 
his  daughter,  may  be  propitiated  by  self-inflicted  pains. 
Further,  the  conception  accompanying  this,  that  acts  pleasing 
to  self  are  offensive  to  God,  has  survived  along  with  it,  and 
still  widely  prevails ;  if  not  in  formulated  dogmas,  yet  in 
beliefs  that  are  manifestly  operative. 

Doubtless,  in  modern  days  such  beliefs  have  assumed 
qualified  forms.  The  satisfactions  which  ferocious  gods 
were  supposed  to  feel  in  contemplating  tortures,  has  been,  in 
large  measure,  transformed  into  the  satisfaction  felt  by  a 
deity  in  contemplating  that  self -infliction  of  pain  which  is 
held  to  further  eventual  happiness.  But  clearly  those  who 
entertain  this  modified  view,  are  excluded  from  the  class 
whose  position  we  are  here  considering.  Restricting  our- 
selves to  this  class — supposing  that  from  the  savage  who 
immolates  victims  to  a  cannibal  god,  there  are  descendants 
among  the  civilized,  who  hold  that  mankind  were  made  for 
suffering,  and  that  it  is  their  duty  to  continue  living  in 
misery  for  the  delight  of  their  maker,  we  can  only  recog- 
nize the  fact  that  devil- worshippers  are  not  yet  extinct. 

Omitting  people  of  this  class,  if  there  are  any,  as  beyond 
or  beneath  argument,  we  find  that  all  others  avowedly  or 
tacitly  hold  that  the  final  justification  for  maintaining  life, 


30  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

can  only  be  the  reception  from  it  of  a  surplus  of  pleasurable 
feeling-  over  painful  feeling ;  and  that  goodness  or  badness 
can  be  ascribed  to  acts  which  subserve  life  or  hinder  life, 
only  on  this  supposition. 

And  here  we  are  brought  round  to  those  primary  mean- 
ings of  the  words  good  and  bad,  which  we  passed  over  when 
considering  their  secondary  meanings.  For  on  remember- 
ing that  we  call  good  and  bad  the  things  which  immediately 
produce  agreeable  and  disagreeable  sensations,  and  also  the 
sensations  themselves — a  good  wine,  a  good  appetite,  a  bad 
smell,  a  bad  headache — we  see  that  by  referring  directly  to 
pleasures  and  pains,  these  meanings  harmonize  with  those 
which  indirectly  refer  to  pleasures  and  pains.  If  we  call 
good  the  enjoyable  state  itself,  as  a  good  laugh — if  we  call 
good  the  proximate  cause  of  an  enjoyable  state,  as  good 
music — if  we  call  good  any  agent  which  conduces  imme- 
diately or  remotely  to  an  enjoyable  state,  as  a  good  shop,  a 
good  teacher — if  we  call  good  considered  intrinsically,  each 
act  so  adjusted  to  its  end  as  to  further  self-preservation  and 
that  surplus  of  enjoyment  which  makes  self-preservation  de- 
sirable—if we  call  good  every  kind  of  conduct  which  aids 
the  lives  of  others,  and  do  this  under  the  belief  that  life 
brings  more  happiness  than  misery  ;  then  it  becomes  unde- 
niable that,  taking  into  account  immediate  and  remote 
effects  on  all  persons,  the  good  is  universally  the  pleas- 
urable. 

§  11.  Sundry  influences — moral,  theological,  and  political 
— conspire  to  make  people  disguise  from  themselves  this 
truth.  As  in  narrower  cases  so  in  this  widest  case,  they 
become  so  pre-occupied  with  the  means  by  which  an  end  is 
achieved,  as  eventually  to  mistake  it  for  the  end.  Just  as 
money,  which  is  a  means  of  satisfying  wants,  comes  to  be 
regarded  by  a  miser  as  the  sole  thing  to  be  worked  for, 
leaving  the  wants  unsatisfied  ;  so  the  conduct  men  have 
found  preferable  because  most  conducive  to  happiness,  has 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  31 

come  to  be  thought  of  as  intrinsically  preferable :  not  only 
to  be  made  a  proximate  end  (which  it  should  be),  but  to  be 
made  an  ultimate  end,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  true  ultimate 
end.  And  yet  cross-examination  quickly  compels  everyone 
to  confess  the  true  ultimate  end.  Just  as  the  miser,  asked 
to  justify  himself,  is  obliged  to  allege  the  power  of  money 
to  purchase  desirable  things,  as  his  reason  for  prizing  it ;  so 
the  moralist  who  thinks  this  conduct  intrinsically  good  and 
that  intrinsically  bad,  if  pushed  home,  has  no  choice  but 
to  fall  back  on  their  pleasure-giving  and  pain-giving  effects. 
To  prove  this  it  needs  but  to  observe  how  impossible  it 
would  be  to  think  of  them  as  we  do,  if  their  effects  were 
reversed. 

Suppose  that  gashes  and  bruises  caused  agreeable  sen- 
sations, and  brought  in  their  train  increased  power  of  doing 
work  and  receiving  enjoyment ;  should  we  regard  assault  in 
the  same  manner  as  at  present  ?  Or  suppose  that  self- 
mutilation,  say  by  cutting  off  a  hand,  was  both  intrinsically 
pleasant  and  furthered  performance  of  the  processes  by 
which  personal  welfare  and  the  welfare  of  dependents  is 
achieved ;  should  we  hold  as  now,  that  deliberate  injury  to 
one's  own  body  is  to  be  reprobated  ?  Or  again,  suppose  that 
picking  a  man's  pocket  excited  in  him  joyful  emotions,  by 
brightening  his  prospects ;  would  theft  be  counted  among 
crimes,  as  in  existing  law-books  and  moral  codes  ?  In  these 
extreme  cases,  no  one  can  deny  that  what  we  call  the  badness 
of  actions  is  ascribed  to  them  solely  for  the  reason  that  they 
entail  pain,  immediate  or  remote,  and  would  not  be  so  as- 
cribed did  they  entail  pleasure. 

If  we  examine  our  conceptions  on  their  obverse  side,  this 
general  fact  forces  itself  on  our  attention  with  equal  dis- 
tinctness. Imagine  that  ministering  to  a  sick  person  always 
increased  the  pains  of  illness.  Imagine  that  an  orphan's 
relatives  who  took  charge  of  it,  thereby  necessarily  brought 
miseries  upon  it.  Imagine  that  liquidating  another  man's 
pecuniary  claims  on  you  redounded  to  his  disadvantage. 
4 


32  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

Imagine  that  crediting  a  man  with  noble  behaviour  hindered 
his  social  welfare  and  consequent  gratification.  What  should 
we  say  to  these  acts  which  now  fall  into  the  class  we  call 
praiseworthy?  Should  we  not  contrariwise  class  them  as 
blameworthy  ? 

Using,  then,  as  our  tests,  these  most  pronounced  forms  of 
good  and  bad  conduct,  we  find  it  unquestionable  that  our 
ideas  of  their  goodness  and  badness  really  originate  from 
our  consciousness  of  the  certainty  or  probability  that  they 
will  produce  pleasures  or  pains  somewhere.  And  this  truth 
is  brought  out  with  equal  clearness  by  examining  the  stand- 
ards of  different  moral  schools ;  for  analysis  shows  that  every 
one  of  them  derives  its  authority  from  this  ultimate  standard. 
Ethical  systems  are  roughly  distinguishable  according  as 
they  take  for  their  cardinal  ideas  (1)  the  character  of  the 
agent ;  (2)  the  nature  of  his  motive ;  (3)  the  quality  of  his 
deeds  ;  and  (4)  the  results.  Each  of  these  may  be  character- 
ized as  good  or  bad  ;  and  those  who  do  not  estimate  a  mode 
of  life  by  its  effects  on  happiness,  estimate  it  by  the  implied 
goodness  or  badness  in  the  agent,  in  his  motive,  or  in  his 
deeds.  We  have  perfection  in  the  agent  set  up  as  a  test 
by  which  conduct  is  to  be  judged.  Apart  from  the  agent  we 
have  his  feeling  considered  as  moral.  And  apart  from  the 
feeling  we  have  his  action  considered  as  virtuous. 

Though  the  distinctions  thus  indicated  have  so  little  defi- 
niteness  that  the  words  marking  them  are  used  interchange- 
ably, yet  there  correspond  to  them  doctrines  partially  unlike 
one  another  ;  which  we  may  here  conveniently  examine  sep- 
arately, with  the  view  of  showing  that  all  their  tests  of 
goodness  are  derivative. 

§  12.  It  is  strange  that  a  notion  so  abstract  as  that  of 
perfection,  or  a  certain  ideal  completeness  of  nature,  should 
ever  have  been  thought  one  from  which  a  system  of  guidance 
can  be  evolved ;  as  it  was  in  a  general  way  by  Plato  and 
more  distinctly  by  Jonathan  Edwardes.  Perfection  is  sy- 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  33 

nonymous  with  goodness  in  the  highest  degree ;  and  hence 
to  define  good  conduct  in  terms  of  perfection,  is  indirectly  to 
define  good  conduct  in  terms  of  itself.  Naturally,  therefore, 
it  happens  that  the  notion  of  perfection  like  the  notion  of 
goodness  can  be  framed  only  in  relation  to  ends. 

We  allege  imperfection  of  any  inanimate  thing,  as  a  tool, 
if  it  lacks  some  part  needful  for  effectual  action,  or  if  some 
part  is  so  shaped  as  not  to  fulfil  its  purpose  in  the  best  man- 
ner. Perfection  is  alleged  of  a  watch  if  it  keeps  exact  time, 
however  plain  its  case  ;  and  imperfection  is  alleged  of  it 
because  of  inaccurate  time-keeping,  however  beautifully  it  is 
ornamented.  Though  we  call  things  imperfect  if  we  detect 
in  them  any  injuries  or  flaws,  even  when  these  do  not  detract 
from  efficiency  ;  yet  we  do  this  because  they  imply  that  in- 
ferior workmanship,  or  that  wear  and  tear,  with  which  ineffi- 
ciency is  commonly  joined  in  experience  :  absence  of  minor 
imperfections  being  habitually  associated  with  absence  of 
major  imperfections. 

As  applied  to  living  things,  the  word  perfection  has  the 
same  meaning.  The  idea  of  perfect  shape  in  a  race-horse  is 
derived  by  generalization  from  those  observed  traits  of  race- 
horses which  have  usually  gone  along  with  attainment  of 
the  highest  speed  ;  and  the  idea  of  perfect  constitution  in  a 
race-horse  similarly  refers  to  the  endurance  which  enables 
him  to  continue  that  speed  for  the  longest  time.  With  men, 
physically  considered,  it  is  the  same  :  we  are  able  to  furnish 
no  other  test  of  perfection,  than  that  of  complete  power  in 
all  the  organs  to  fulfil  their  respective  functions.  That  our 
conception  of  perfect  balance  among  the  internal  parts,  and 
of  perfect  proportion  among  the  external  parts,  originates 
thus,  is  made  clear  by  observing  that  imperfection  of  any 
viscus,  as  lungs,  heart,  or  liver,  is  ascribed  for  no  other 
reason  than  inability  to  meet  in  full  the  demands  which 
the  activities  of  the  organism  make  on  it ;  and  on  observ- 
ing that  the  conception  of  insufficient  size,  or  of  too  great 
size,  in  a  limb,  is  derived  from  accumulated  experiences 


34  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

respecting  that  ratio  among  the  limbs  which  furthers  in  the 
highest  degree  the  performance  of  all  needful  actions. 

And  of  perfection  in  mental  nature  we  have  no  other 
measure.  If  imperfection  of  memory,  of  judgment,  of  tem- 
per, is  alleged,  it  is  alleged  because  of  inadequacy  to  the  re- 
quirements of  life  ;  and  to  imagine  a  perfect  balance  of  the 
intellectual  powers  and  of  the  emotions,  is  to  imagine  that 
proportion  among  them  which  ensures  an  entire  discharge  of 
each  and  every  obligation  as  the  occasion  calls  for  it. 

So  that  the  perfection  of  man  considered  as  an  agent, 
means  the  being  constituted  for  effecting  complete  adjust- 
ment of  acts  to  ends  of  every  kind.  And  since,  as  shown 
above,  the  complete  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  is  that  which 
both  secures  and  constitutes  the  life  that  is  most  evolved, 
alike  in  breadth  and  length  ;  while,  as  also  shown,  the  justi- 
fication for  whatever  increases  life  is  the  reception  from  life 
of  more  happiness  than  misery  ;  it  follows  that  conducive- 
ness  to  happiness  is  the  ultimate  test  of  perfection  in  a  man's 
nature.  To  be  fully  convinced  of  this  it  needs  but  to  observe 
how  the  proposition  looks  when  inverted.  It  needs  but  to 
suppose  that  every  approach  towards  perfection  involved 
greater  misery  to  self,  or  others,  or  both,  to  show  by  oppo- 
sition that  approach  to  perfection  really  means  approach  to 
that  which  secures  greater  happiness. 

§  13.  Pass  we  now  from  the  view  of  those  who  make  ex- 
cellence of  being  the  standard,  to  the  view  of  those  who 
make  virtuousness  of  action  the  standard.  I  do  not  here 
refer  to  moralists  who,  having  decided  empirically  or  ration- 
ally, inductively  or  deductively,  that  acts  of  certain  kinds 
have  the  character  we  call  virtuous,  argue  that  such  acts  are 
to  be  performed  without  regard  to  proximate  consequences  : 
these  have  ample  justification.  But  I  refer  to  moralists  who 
suppose  themselves  to  have  conceptions  of  virtue  as  an  end, 
underived  from  any  other  end — rwho  think  that  the  idea  of 
virtue  is  not  resolvable  into  simpler  ideas. 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  35 

This  is  the  doctrine  which  appears  to  have  been  enter- 
tained by  Aristotle.  I  say,  appears  to  have  been,  because  his 
statements  are  far  from  consistent  with  one  another.  Recog- 
nizing happiness  as  the  supreme  end  of  human  endeavour, 
it  would  at  first  sight  seem  that  he  cannot  be  taken  as 
typical  of  those  who  make  virtue  the  supreme  end.  Yet 
he  puts  himself  in  this  category  by  seeking  to  define  hap- 
piness in  terms  of  virtue,  instead  of  defining  virtue  in  terms 
of  happiness.  The  imperfect  separation  of  words  from 
things,  which  characterizes  Greek  speculation  in.  general, 
seems  to  have  been  the  cause  of  this.  In  primitive  thought 
the  name  and  the  object  named,  are  associated  in  such  wise 
that  the  one  is  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  other — so  much 
so,  that  knowing  a  savage's  name  is  considered  by  him 
as  having  some  of  his  being,  and  a  consequent  power  to 
work  evil  on  him.  This  belief  in  a  real  connexion  between 
word  and  thing,  continuing  through  lower  stages  of  progress, 
and  long  surviving  in  the  tacit  assumption  that  the  mean- 
ings of  words  are  intrinsic,,  pervades  the  dialogues  of  Plato, 
and  is  traceable  even  in  Aristotle.  For  otherwise  it  is  not 
easy  to  see  why  he  should  have  so  incompletely  dissociated 
the  abstract  idea  of  happiness  from  particular  forms  of 
happiness.  Naturally  where  the  divorcing  of  words 

as  symbols,  from  things  as  symbolized,  is  imperfect,  there 
must  be  difficulty  in  giving  to  abstract  words  a  sufficiently 
abstract  meaning.  If  in  the  first  stages  of  language  the 
concrete  name  cannot  be  separated  in  thought  from  the 
concrete  object  it  belongs  to,  it  is  inferable  that  in  the 
course  of  forming  successively  higher  grades  of  abstract 
names,  there  will  have  to  be  resisted  the  tendency  to  inter- 
pret each  more  abstract  name  in  terms  of  some  one  class 
of  the  less  abstract  names  it  covers.  Hence,  I  think,  the 
fact  that  Aristotle  supposes  happiness  to  be  associated  with 
some  one  order  of  human  activities,  rather  than  with  all 
orders  of  human  activities.  Instead  of  including  in  it  the 
pleasurable  feelings  accompanying  actions  that  constitute 


iJO  THE   DATA    OF   ETHICS. 

mere  living,  which  actions  he  says  man  has  in  common 
with  vegetables ;  and  instead  of  making  it  include  the  men- 
tal states  which  the  life  of  external  perception  yields,  which 
he  says  man  has  in  common  with  animals  at  large  ;  he  ex- 
cludes these  from  his  idea  of  happiness,  and  includes  in  it 
only  the  modes  of  consciousness  accompanying  rational  life. 
Asserting  that  the  proper  work  of  man  "consists  in  the 
active  exercise  of  the  mental  capacities  conformably  to  rea- 
son ; "  he  concludes  that  "  the  supreme  good  of  man  will 
consist  in  performing  this  work  with  excellence  or  virtue  : 
herein  he  will  obtain  happiness."  And  he  finds  confirma- 
tion for  his  view  in  its  correspondence  with  views  previously 
enunciated  ;  saying — "  our  notion  nearly  agrees  with  theirs 
who  place  happiness  in  virtue  ;  for  we  say  that  it  consists  in 
the  action  of  virtue ;  that  is,  not  merely  in  the  possession, 
but  in  the  use." 

Now  the  implied  belief  that  virtue  can  be  defined  other- 
wise than  in  terms  of  happiness  (for  else  the  proposition 
is  that  happiness  is  to  be  obtained  by  actions  conducive  to 
happiness)  is  allied  to  the  Platonic  belief  that  there  is  an 
ideal  or  absolute  good,  which  gives  to  particular  and  relative 
goods  their  property  of  goodness ;  and  an  argument  anal- 
ogous to  that  which  Aristotle  uses  against  Plato's  concep- 
tion of  good,  may  be  used,  against  his  own  conception  of 
virtue.  As  with  good  so  with  virtue — it  is  not  singular  but 
plural :  in  Aristotle's  own  classification,  virtue,  when  treated 
of  at  large,  is  transformed  into  virtues.  Those  which  he 
calls  virtues,  must  be  so  called  in  consequence  of  some  com- 
mon character  that  is  either  intrinsic  or  extrinsic.  We  may 
class  things  together  either  because  they  are  made  alike  by 
all  having  in  themselves  some  peculiarity,  as  we  do  verte- 
brate animals  because  they  all  have  vertebral  columns ;  or 
we  may  class  them  together  because  of  some  community  in 
their  outer  relations,  as  when  we  group  saws,  knives,  mallets, 
harrows,  under  the  head  of  tools.  Are  the  virtues  classed  as 
such  because  of  some  intrinsic  community  of  nature  ?  Then 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  37 

there  must  be  identifiable  a  common  trait  in  all  the  cardinal 
virtues  which  Aristotle  specifies  — "  Courage,  Temperance, 
Liberality,  Magnanimity,  Magnificence,  Meekness,  Amiability 
or  Friendliness,  Truthfulness,  Justice."  What  now  i*  the 
trait  possessed  in  common  by  Magnificence  and  Meekness '? 
and  if  any  such  common  trait  can  be  disentangled,  is  it  that 
which  also  constitutes  the  essential  trait  in  Truthfulness  ? 
The  answer  must  be — No.  The  virtues,  then,  not  being 
classed  as  such  because  of  an  intrinsic  community  of  char- 
acter, must  be  classed  as  such  because  of  something  extrinsic ; 
and  this  something  can  be  nothing  else  than  the  happiness 
which  Aristotle  says  consists  in  the  practice  of  them.  They 
are  united  by  their  common  relation  to  this  result ;  while 
they  are  not  united  by  their  inner  natures. 

Perhaps  still  more  clearly  may  the  inference  be  drawn 
thus : — If  virtue  is  primordial  and  independent,  no  reason 
can  be  given  why  there  should  be  any  correspondence  be- 
tween virtuous  conduct  and  conduct  that  is  pleasure-giving 
in  its  total  effects  on  self,  or  others,  or  both ;  and  if  there 
is  not  a  necessary  correspondence,  it  is  conceivable  that  the 
conduct  classed  as  virtuous  should  be  pain-giving  in  its  total 
effects.  That  we  may  see  the  consequence  of  so  conceiving 
it,  let  us  take  the  two  virtues  considered  as  typically  such 
in  ancient  times  and  in  modern  times— courage  and  chas- 
tity. By  the  hypothesis,  then,  courage,  displayed  alike  in 
self-defence  and  in  defence  of  country,  is  to  be  conceived 
as  not  only  entailing  pains  incidentally,  but  as  being  neces- 
sarily a  cause  of  misery  to  the  individual  and  to  the  State  ; 
while,  by  implication,  the  absence  of  it  redounds  to  per- 
sonal and  general  well-being.  Similarly,  by  the  hypothesis, 
we  have  to  conceive  that  irregular  sexual  relations  are  di- 
rectly and  indirectly  beneficial — that  adultery  is  conducive 
to  domestic  harmony  and  the  careful  rearing  of  children  ; 
while  marital  relations  in  proportion  as  they  are  persistent, 
generate  discord  between  husband  and  wife  and  entail  on 
their  offspring,  suffering,  disease,  and  death.  Unless  it  is 


38  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

asserted  that  courage  and  chastity  could  still  be  thought  of 
as  virtues  though  thus  productive  of  misery,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  conceptions  of  virtue  cannot  be  separated 
from  the  conception  of  happiness  producing  conduct ;  and 
that  as  this  holds  of  all  the  virtues,  however  otherwise  unlike, 
it  is  from  their  conduciveness  to  happiness  that  they  come  to 
be  classed  as  virtues. 

§  14.  When  from  those  ethical  estimates  which  take 
perfection  of  nature,  or  virtuousness  of  action,  as  tests,  we 
pass  to  those  which  take  for  test  rectitude  of  motive,  we 
approach  the  intuitional  theory  of  morals ;  and  we  may 
conveniently  deal  with  such  estimates  by  a  criticism  on  this 
theory. 

By  the  intuitional  theory  I  here  mean,  not  that  which 
recognizes  as  produced  by  the  inherited  effects  of  continued 
experiences,  the  feelings  of  liking  and  aversion  we  have  to 
acts  of  certain  kinds  ;  but  I  mean  the  theory  which  regards 
such  feelings  as  divinely  given,  and  as  independent  of  results 
experienced  by  self  or  ancestors.  "  There  is  therefore,"  says 
Hutcheson,  "as  each  one  by  close  attention  and  reflection 
may  convince  himself,  a  natural  and  immediate  determina- 
tion to  approve  certain  affections,  and  actions  consequent 
upon  them  ; "  and  since,  in  common  with  others  of  his  time, 
he  believes  in  the  special  creation  of  man,  and  all  other  be- 
ings, this  "natural  sense  of  immediate  excellence"  he  consid- 
ers as  a  supernaturally-derived  guide.  Though  he  says  that 
the  feelings  and  acts  thus  intuitively  recognized  as  good,  "  all 
agree  in  one  general  character,  of  tending  to  the  happiness 
of  others ; "  yet  he  is  obliged  to  conceive  this  as  a  pre-or- 
dained correspondence.  Nevertheless,  it  may  be  shown  that 
conduciveness  to  happiness,  here  represented  as  an  incidental 
trait  of  the  acts  which  receive  these  innate  moral  approvals, 
is  really  the  test  by  which  these  approvals  are  recognized  as 
moral.  The  intuitionists  place  confidence  in  these  verdicts 
of  conscience,  simply  because  they  vaguely,  if  not  distinctly, 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  39 

perceive  them  to  be  consonant  with  the  disclosures  of  that 
ultimate  test.     Observe  the  proof. 

By  the  hypothesis,  the  wrongness  of  murder  is  known  by 
a  moral  intuition  which  the  human  mind  was  originally  con- 
stituted to  yield  ;  and  the  hypothesis  therefore  negatives  the 
admission  that  this  sense  of  its  wrongness  arises,  immediately 
or  remotely,  from  the  consciousness  that  murder  involves 
deduction  from  happiness,  directly  and  indirectly.  But  if 
you  ask  an  adherent  of  this  doctrine  to  contrast  his  intuition 
with  that  of  the  Fijian,  who,  considering  murder  an  honour- 
able action,  is  restless  until  he  has  distinguished  himself  by 
killing  some  one ;  and  if  you  inquire  of  him  in  what  way 
the  civilized  intuition  is  to  be  justified  in  opposition  to  the 
intuition  of  the  savage  ;  no  course  is  open  save  that  of  show- 
ing how  conformity  to  the  one  conduces  to  well-being,  while 
conformity  to  the  other  entails  suffering,  individual  and 
general.  When  asked  why  the  moral  sense  which  tells  him 
that  it  is  wrong  to  take  another  man's  goods,  should  be 
obeyed  rather  than  the  moral  sense  of  a  Turcoman,  who 
proves  how  meritorious  he  considers  theft  to  be  by  making 
pilgrimages  to  the  tombs  of  noted  robbers  to  make  offer- 
ings ;  the  intuitionist  can  do  nothing  but  urge  that,  certainly 
under  conditions  like  ours,  if  not  also  under  conditions  like 
those  of  the  Turcomans,  disregard  of  men's  claims  to  their 
property  not  only  inflicts  immediate  misery,  but  involves  a 
social  state  inconsistent  with  happiness.  Or  if,  again,  there 
is  required  from  him  a  justification  for  his  feeling  of  repug- 
nance to  lying,  in  contrast  with  the  feeling  of  an  Egyptian, 
who  prides  himself  on  skill  in  lying  (even  thinking  it  praise- 
worthy to  deceive  without  any  further  end  than  that  of 
practising  deception)  ;  he  can  do  no  more  than  point  to  the 
social  prosperity  furthered  by  entire  trust  between  man 
and  man,  and  the  social  disorganization  that  follows  uni- 
versal untruthfulness — consequences  that  are  necessarily 
conducive  to  agreeable  feelings  and  disagreeable  feelings 
respectively. 


40  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

The  unavoidable  conclusion  is,  then,  that  the  intuitionist 
does  not,  and  cannot,  ignore  the  ultimate  derivations  of 
right  and  wrong  from  pleasure  and  pain.  However  much 
he  may  be  guided,  and  rightly  guided,  by  the  decisions  of 
conscience  respecting  the  characters  of  acts ;  he  has  come 
to  have  confidence  in  these  decisions  because  he  perceives, 
vaguely  but  positively,  that  conformity  to  them  furthers 
the  welfare  of  himself  and  others,  and  that  disregard  of 
them  entails  in  the  long  run  suffering  on  all.  Require  him 
to  name  any  moral-sense  judgment  by  which  he  knows  as 
right,  some  kind  of  act  that  will  bring  a  surplus  of  pain, 
taking  into  account  the  totals  in  this  life  and  in  any  assumed 
other  life,  and  you  find  him  unable  to  name  one  :  a  fact 
proving  that  underneath  all  these  intuitions  respecting  the 
goodness  or  badness  of  acts,  there  lies  the  fundamental 
assumption  that  acts  are  good  or  bad  according  as  their 
aggregate  effects  increase  men's  happiness  or  increase  their 
misery. 

§  14.  It  is  curious  to  see  how  the  devil-worship  of  the 
savage,  surviving  in  various  disguises  among  the  civilized, 
and  leaving  as  one  of  its  products  that  asceticism  which  in 
many  forms  and  degrees  still  prevails  widely,  is  to  be  found 
influencing  in  marked  ways,  men  who  have  apparently 
emancipated  themselves,  not  only  from  primitive  supersti- 
tions but  from  more  developed  superstitions.  Yiews  of  life 
and  conduct  which  originated  with  those  who  propitiated 
deified  ancestors  by  self-tortures,  enter  even  still  into  the 
ethical  theories  of  many  persons  who  have  years  since  cast 
away  the  theology  of  the  past,  and  suppose  themselves  to  be 
no  longer  influenced  by  it. 

In  the  writings  of  one  who  rejects  dogmatic  Christianity 
together  with  the  Hebrew  cult  which  preceded  it,  a  career 
of  conquest  costing  tens  of  thousands  of  lives,  is  narrated 
with  a  sympathy  comparable  to  that  rejoicing  which  the 
Hebrew  traditions  show  us  over  destruction  of  enemies  in 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  41 

the  name  of  God.  You  may  find,  too,  a  delight  in  contem- 
plating the  exercise  of  despotic  power,  joined  with  insistance 
on  the  salutariness  of  a  state  in  which  the  wills  of  slaves  and 
citizens,  are  humbly  subject  to  the  wills  of  masters  and 
rulers — a  sentiment  also  reminding  us  of  that  ancient  Ori- 
ental life  which  biblical  narratives  portray.  Along  with 
this  worship  of  the  strong  man — along  with  this  justifica- 
tion of  whatever  force  may  be  needed  for  carrying  out  his 
ambition — along  with  this  yearning  for  a  form  of  society  in 
which  supremacy  of  the  few  is  unrestrained  and  the  virtue 
of  the  many  consists  in  obedience  to  them  ;  we  not  unnatu- 
rally find  repudiation  of  the  ethical  theory  which  takes,  in 
some  shape  or  other,  the  greatest  happiness  as  the  end  of 
conduct :  we  not  unnaturally  find  this  utilitarian  philosophy 
designated  by  the  contemptuous  title  of  "  pig-philosophy." 
And  then,  serving  to  show  what  comprehension  there  has 
been  of  the  philosophy  so  nicknamed,  we  are  told  that  not 
happiness  but  blessedness  must  be  the  end. 

Obviously,  the  implication  is  that  blessedness  is  not  a  kind 
of  happiness ;  and  this  implication  at  once  suggests  the 
question — What  mode  of  feeling  is  it  ?  If  it  is  a  state  of 
consciousness  at  all,  it  is  necessarily  one  of  three  states — 
painful,  indifferent,  or  pleasurable.  Does  it  leave  the  pos- 
sessor at  the  zero  point  of  sentiency  ?  Then  it  leaves  him 
just  as  he  would  be  if  he  had  not  got  it.  Does  it  not  leave 
him  at  the  zero  point  ?  Then  it  must  leave  him  below  zero 
or  above  zero. 

Each  of  these  possibilities  may  be  conceived  under  two 
forms.  That  to  which  the  term  blessedness  is  applied,  may 
be  a  particular  state  of  consciousness — one  among  the  many 
states  that  occur  ;  and  on  this  supposition  we  have  to  recog- 
nize it  as  a  pleasurable  state,  an  indifferent  state,  or  a  painful 
state.  Otherwise,  blessedness  is  a  word  not  applicable  to  a 
particular  state  of  consciousness,  but  characterizes  the  aggre- 
gate of  its  states  ;  and  in  this  case  the  average  of  the  aggre- 
gate is  to  be  conceived  as  one  in  which  the  pleasurable  pre- 


42  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

dominates,  or  one  in  which  the  painful  predominates,  or 
one  in  which  pleasures  and  pains  exactly  cancel  one  another. 
Let  us  take  in  turn  these  two  imaginable  applications  of  the 
word. 

"  Blessed  are  the  merciful ; "  "  Blessed  are  the  peace- 
makers;" "Blessed  is  he  that  considereth  the  poor;"  are 
sayings  which  we  may  fairly  take  as  conveying  the  accepted 
meaning  of  blessedness.  What  now  shall  we  say  of  one 
who  is,  for  the  time  being,  blessed  in  performing  an  act  of 
mercy  ?  Is  his  mental  state  pleasurable  ?  If  so  the  hypothesis 
is  abandoned  :  blessedness  is  a  particular  form  of  happiness. 
Is  the  state  indifferent  or  painful  ?  In  that  case  the  blessed 
man  is  so  devoid  of  sympathy  that  relieving  another  from 
pain,  or  the  fear  of  pain,  leaves  him  either  wholly  unmoved, 
or  gives  him  an  unpleasant  emotion.  Again,  if  one  who  is 
blessed  in  making  peace  receives  no  gratification  from  the 
act,  then  seeing  men  injure  each  other  does  not  affect  him 
at  all,  or  gives  him  a  pleasure  which  is  changed  into  a  pain 
when  he  prevents  the  injury.  Once  more,  to  say  that  the 
blessedness  of  one  who  "considereth  the  poor"  implies  no 
agreeable  feeling,  is  to  say  that  his  consideration  for  the 
poor  leaves  him  without  feeling  or  entails  on  him  a  disagree- 
able feeling.  So  that  if  blessedness  is  a  particular  mode  of 
consciousness  temporarily  existing  as  a  concomitant  of  each 
kind  of  beneficent  action,  those  who  deny  that  it  is  a  pleas- 
ure, or  constituent  of  happiness,  confess  themselves  either 
not  pleased  by  the  welfare  of  others  or  displeased  by  it. 

Otherwise  understood,  blessedness  must,  as  we  have  seen, 
refer  to  the  totality  of  feelings  experienced  during  the  life 
of  one  who  occupies  himself  with  the  actions  the  word  con- 
notes. This  also  presents  the  three  possibilities — surplus  of 
pleasures,  surplus  of  pains,  equality  of  the  two.  If  the 
pleasurable  states  are  in  excess,  then  the  blessed  life  can  be 
distinguished  from  any  other  pleasurable  life  only  by  the 
relative  amount,  or  the  quality,  of  its  pleasures  :  it  is  a  life 
which  makes  happiness  of  a  certain  kind  and  degree  its  end ; 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  43 

and  the  assumption  that  blessedness  is  not  a  form  of  happi- 
ness, lapses.  If  the  blessed  life  is  one  in  which  the  pleasures 
and  pains  received  balance  one  another,  so  producing  an 
average  that  is  indifferent ;  or  if  it  is  one  in  which  the 
pleasures  are  out-balanced  by  the  pains ;  then  the  blessed 
life  has  the  character  which  the  pessimist  alleges  of  life  at 
large,  and  therefore  regards  it  as  cursed.  Annihilation  is 
best,  he  will  argue  ;  since  if  an  average  that  is  indifferent  is 
the  outcome  of  the  blessed  life,  annihilation  at  once  achieves 
it ;  and  if  a  surplus  of  suffering  is  the  outcome  of  this  high- 
est kind  of  life  called  blessed,  still  more  should  life  in  gen- 
eral be  ended. 

A  possible  rejoinder  must  be  named  and  disposed  of. 
While  it  is  admitted  that  the  particular  kind  of  consciousness 
accompanying  conduct  that  is  blessed,  is  pleasurable  ;  it  may 
be  contended  that  pursuance  of  this  conduct  and  receipt  of 
the  pleasure,  brings  by  the  implied  self-denial,  and  per- 
sistent effort,  and  perhaps  bodily  injury,  a  suffering  that 
exceeds  it  in  amount.  And  it  may  then  be  urged  that 
blessedness,  characterized  by  this  excess  of  aggregate  pains 
over  aggregate  pleasures,  should  nevertheless  be  pursued  as 
an  end,  rather  than  the  happiness  constituted  by  excess  of 
pleasures  over  pains.  But  now,  defensible  though  this  con- 
ception of  blessedness  may  be  when  limited  to  one  indi- 
vidual, or  some  individuals,  it  becomes  indefensible  when 
extended  to  all  individuals ;  as  it  must  be  if  blessedness  is 
taken  for  the  end  of  conduct.  To  see  this  we  need  but  ask 
for  what  purpose  are  these  pains  in  excess  of  pleasures  to  be 
borne.  Blessedness  being  the  ideal  state  for  all  persons; 
and  the  self-sacrifices  made  by  each  person  in  pursuance 
of  this  ideal  state,  having  for  their  end  to  help  all  other  per- 
sons in  achieving  the  like  ideal  state  ;  it  results  that  the 
blessed  though  painful  state  of  each,  is  to  be  acquired  by 
furthering  the  like  blessed  though  painful  states  of  others : 
the  blessed  consciousness  is  to  be  constituted  by  the  con- 
templation of  their  consciousness  in  a  condition  of  average 


44  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

suffering.  Does  any  one  accept  this  inference  ?  If  not,  his 
rejection  of  it  involves  the  admission  that  the  motive  for 
bearing  pains  in  performing  acts  called  blessed,  is  not  the 
obtaining  for  others  like  pains  of  blessedness,  but  the  obtain- 
ing of  pleasures  for  others ;  and  that  thus  pleasure  some- 
where is  the  tacitly-implied  ultimate  end. 

In  brief,  then,  blessedness  has  for  its  necessary  condition 
of  existence,  increased  happiness,  positive  or  negative,  in 
some  consciousness  or  other;  and  disappears  utterly  if  we 
assume  that  the  actions  called  blessed,  are  known  to  cause 
decrease  of  happiness  in  others  as  well  as  in  the  actor. 

§  15.  To  make  clear  the  meaning  of  the  general  argument 
set  forth  in  this  chapter,  its  successive  parts  must  be  briefly 
summarized. 

That  which  in  the  last  chapter  we  found  to  be  highly- 
evolved  conduct,  is  that  which,  in  this  chapter,  we  find  to 
be  what  is  called  good  conduct ;  and  the  ideal  goal  to  the 
natural  evolution  of  conduct  there  recognized,  we  here 
recognize  as  the  ideal  standard  of  conduct  ethically  con- 
sidered. 

The  acts  adjusted  to  ends,  which  while  constituting  the 
outer  visible  life  from  moment  to  moment  further  the  con- 
tinuance of  life,  we  saw  become,  as  evolution  progresses, 
better  adjusted  ;  until  finally  they  make  the  life  of  each 
individual  entire  in  length  and  breadth,  at  the  same  time 
that  they  efficiently  subserve  the  rearing  of  young,  and  do 
both  these  not  only  without  hindering  other  individuals  from 
doing  the  like,  but  while  giving  aid  to  them  in  doing  the 
like.  And  here  we  see  that  goodness  is  asserted  of  such 
conduct  under  each  of  these  three  aspects.  Other  things 
equal,  well-adjusted  self-conserving  acts  we  call  good  ;  other 
things  equal,  we  call  good  the  acts  that  are  well  adjusted  for 
bringing  up  progeny  capable  of  complete  living  ;  and  other 
things  equal,  we  ascribe  goodness  to  acts  which  further  the 
complete  living  of  others. 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.        ,  45 

This  judging  as  good,  conduct  which  conduces  to  life  in 
each  and  all,  we  found  to  involve  the  assumption  that 
animate  existence  is  desirable.  By  the  pessimist,  conduct 
which  subserves  life  cannot  consistently  be  called  good  :  to 
call  it  good  implies  some  form  of  optimism.  We  saw,  how- 
ever, that  pessimists  and  optimists  both  start  with  the  postu- 
late that  life  is  a  blessing  or  a  curse,  according  as  the  average 
consciousness  accompanying  it  is  pleasurable  or  painful. 
And  since  avowed  or  implied  pessimists,  and  optimists  of 
one  or  other  shade,  taken  together  constitute  all  men,  it 
results  that  this  postulate  is  universally  accepted.  "Whence 
it  follows  that  if  we  call  good  the  conduct  conducive  to  life, 
we  can  do  so  only  with  the  implication  that  it  is  conducive 
to  a  surplus  of  pleasures  over  pains. 

The  truth  that  conduct  is  considered  by  us  as  good  or 
bad,  according  as  its  aggregate  results,  to  self  or  others  or 
both,  are  pleasurable  or  painful,  we  found  on  examination  to 
be  involved  in  all  the  current  judgments  on  conduct :  the 
proof  being  that  reversing  the  applications  of  the  words 
creates  absurdities.  And  we  found  that  every  other  pro- 
posed standard  of  conduct  derives  its  authority  from  this 
standard.  Whether  perfection  of  nature  is  the  assigned 
proper  aim,  or  virtuousness  of  action,  or  rectitude  of  motive, 
we  saw  that  definition  of  the  perfection,  the  virtue,  the  recti- 
tude, inevitably  brings  us  down  to  happiness  experienced  in 
some  form,  at  some  time,  by  some  person,  as  the  funda- 
mental idea.  Nor  could  we  discover  any  intelligible  con- 
ception of  blessedness,  save  one  which  implies  a  raising  of 
consciousness,  individual  or  general,  to  a  happier  state ; 
either  by  mitigating  pains  or  increasing  pleasures. 

Even  with  those  who  judge  of  conduct  from  the  religious 
point  of  view,  rather  than  from  the  ethical  point  of  view,  it 
is  the  same.  Men  who  seek  to  propitiate  God  by  inflicting 
pains  on  themselves,  or  refrain  from  pleasures  to  avoid 
offending  him,  do  so  to  escape  greater  ultimate  pains  or  to 
get  greater  ultimate  pleasures.  If  by  positive  or  negative 


46  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

suffering  here,  they  expected  to  achieve  more  suffering  here- 
after, they  would  not  do  as  they  do.  That  which  they  now 
think  duty  they  would  not  think  duty  if  it  promised  eternal 
misery  instead  of  eternal  happiness.  Nay,  if  there  be  any 
who  believe  that  human  beings  were  created  to  be  unhappy, 
and  that  they  ought  to  continue  living  to  display  their 
unhappiness  for  the  satisfaction  of  their  creator,  such  be- 
lievers are  obliged  to  use  this  standard  of  judgment;  for 
the  pleasure  of  their  diabolical  god  is  the  end  to  be 
achieved. 

So  that  no  school  can  avoid  taking  for  the  ultimate  moral 
aim  a  desirable  state  of  feeling  called  by  whatever  name — 
gratification,  enjoyment,  happiness.  Pleasure  somewhere, 
at  some  time,  to  some  being  or  beings,  is  an  inexpugnable 
element  of  the  conception.  It  is  as  much  a  necessary  form 
of  moral  intuition  as  space  is  a  necessary  form  of  intellectual 
intuition. 

*  It  has  been  remarked,  quite  truly,  that  this  is  a  somewhat  inconsistent 
comparison  to  be  made  by  me ;  remembering  my  partial  denial  of  the  doctrine 
that  space  is  a  form  of  intellectual  intuition  (see  Principles  of  Psychology, 
§  399).  Contending,  as  I  do,  that  space  is  a  form  of  the  intuitions  yielded  by 
touch  and  vision  only,  and  is  not  a  form  of  the  intuitions  which  we  know  as 
sounds  and  odours,  I  ought  to  have  said  that  happiness  is  more  truly  a  form  of 
moral  intuition  than  space  is  a  form  of  intellectual  intuition :  being  as  we  see, 
a  universal  form  of  it. 


CHAPTEE  IY. 

WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 

§  IT.  Intellectual  progress  is  by  no  one  trait  so  ade- 
quately characterized,  as  by  development  of  the  idea  of 
causation ;  since  development  of  this  idea  involves  develop- 
ment of  so  many  other  ideas.  Before  any  way  can  be  made, 
thought  and  language  must  have  advanced  far  enough  to 
render  properties  or  attributes  thinkable  as  such,  apart  from 
objects ;  which,  in  low  stages  of  human  intelligence,  they  are 
not.  Again,  even  the  simplest  notion  of  cause,  as  we  under- 
stand it,  can  be  reached  only  after  many  like  instances  have 
been  grouped  into  a  simple  generalization  ;  and  through  all 
ascending  steps,  higher  notions  of  causation  imply  wider 
notions  of  generality.  Further,  as  there  must  be  clustered 
in  the  mind,  concrete  causes  of  many  kinds  before  there  can 
emerge  the  conception  of  cause,  apart  from  particular  causes ; 
it  follows  that  progress  in  abstractness  of  thought  is  implied. 
Concomitantly,  there  is  implied  the  recognition  of  constant 
relations  among  phenomena,  generating  ideas  of  uniformity 
of  sequence  and  of  co-existence — the  idea  of  natural  law. 
These  advances  can  go  on  only  as  fast  as  perceptions  and 
resulting  thoughts,  are  made  definite  by  the  use  of  measures ; 
serving  to  familiarize  the  mind  with  exact  correspondence, 
truth,  certainty.  And  only  when  growing  science  accumu- 
lates examples  of  quantitative  relations,  foreseen  and  verified, 
throughout  a  widening  range  of  phenomena,  does  causation 
5  47 


48  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

come  to  be  conceived  as  necessary  and  universal.  So  that 
though  all  these  cardinal  conceptions  aid  one  another  in  de- 
veloping, we  may  properly  say  that  the  conception  of  causation 
especially  depends  for  its  development  on  the  developments 
of  the  rest ;  and  therefore  is  the  best  measure  of  intellectual 
development  at  large. 

How  slowly,  as  a  consequence  of  its  dependence,  the 
conception  of  causation  evolves,  a  glance  at  the  evidence 
shows.  We  hear  with  surprise  of  the  savage  who,  falling 
down  a  precipice,  ascribes  the  failure  of  his  foothold  to  a 
malicious  demon ;  and  we  smile  at  the  kindred  notion  of  the 
ancient  Greek,  that  his  death  was  prevented  by  a  goddess 
who  unfastened  for  him  the  thong  of  the  helmet  by  which 
his  enemy  was  dragging  him.  But  daily,  without  surprise, 
we  hear  men  who  describe  themselves  as  saved  from  ship- 
wreck by  "  divine  interposition,"  who  speak  of  having 
"  providentially "  missed  a  train  which  met  with  a  fatal 
disaster,  and  who  call  it  a  "  mercy  "  to  have  escaped  injury 
from  a  falling  chimney-pot — men  who,  in  such  cases,  recog- 
nize physical  causation  no  more  than  do  the  uncivilized  or 
semi-civilized.  The  Veddah  who  thinks  that  failure  to  hit 
an  animal  with  his  arrow,  resulted  from  inadequate  invo- 
cation of  an  ancestral  spirit,  and  the  Christian  priest  who 
says  prayers  over  a  sick  man  in  the  expectation  that  the 
course  of  his  disease  will  so  be  stayed,  differ  only  in  respect 
of  the  agent  from  whom  they  expect  supernatural  aid  and 
the  phenomena  to  be  altered  by  him  :  the  necessary  relations 
among  causes  and  effects  are  tacitly  ignored  by  the  last  as 
much  as  by  the  first.  Deficient  belief  in  causation  is,  indeed, 
exemplified  even  in  those  whose  discipline  has  been  specially 
fitted  to  generate  this  belief — even  in  men  of  science.  For 
a  generation  after  geologists  had  become  uniformitarians 
in  Geology,  they  remained  catastrophists  in  Biology  :  while 
recognizing  none  but  natural  agencies  in  the  genesis  of  the 
Earth's  crust,  they  ascribed  to  supernatural  agency  the  gene- 
sis of  the  organisms  on  its  surface.  Nay  more — among  those 


WAYS   OF  JUDGING   CONDUCT.  49 

who  are  convinced  that  living  things  in  genera  have  been 
evolved  by  the  continued  inter-action  of  forces  everywhere 
operating,  there  are  some  who  make  an  exception  of  man  ; 
or  who,  if  they  admit  that  his  body  has  been  evolved  in 
the  same  manner  as  the  bodies  of  other  creatures,  allege  that 
his  mind  has  been  not  evolved  but  specially  created.  If, 
then,  universal  and  necessary  causation  is  only  now  approach- 
ing full  recognition,  even  by  those  whose  investigations  are 
daily  re-illustrating  it,  we  may  expect  to  find  it  very  little 
recognized  among  men  at  large,  whose  culture  has  not  been 
calculated  to  impress  them  with  it ;  and  we  may  expect  to 
find  it  least  recognized  by  them  in  respect  of  those  classes 
of  phenomena  amid  which,  in  consequence  of  their  com- 
plexity, causation  is  most  difficult  to  trace — the  psychical, 
the  social,  the  moral. 

Why  do  I  here  make  these  reflections  on  what  seems  an 
irrelevant  subject  ?  I  do  it  because  on  studying  the  various 
ethical  theories,  I  am  struck  with  the  fact  that  they  are  all 
characterized  either  by  entire  absence  of  the  idea  of  causa- 
tion, or  by  inadequate  presence  of  it.  Whether  theological, 
political,  intuitional,  or  utilitarian,  they  all  display,  if  not  in 
the  same  degree,  still,  each  in  a  large  degree,  the  defects 
which  result  from  this  lack.  We  will  consider  them  in  the 
order  named. 

§  18.  The  school  of  morals  properly  to  be  considered  as 
the  still-extant  representative  of  the  most  ancient  school,  is 
that  which  recognizes  no  other  rule  of  conduct  than  the  al- 
leged will  of  God.  It  originates  with  the  savage  whose  only 
restraint  beyond  fear  of  his  fellow  man,  is  fear  of  an  ances- 
tral spirit ;  and  whose  notion  of  moral  duty  as  distinguished 
from  his  notion  of  social  prudence,  arises  from  this  fear. 
Here  the  ethical  doctrine  and  the  religious  doctrine  are  iden- 
tical— have  in  no  degree  differentiated. 

This  primitive  form  of  ethical  doctrine,  changed  only 
by  the  gradual  dying  out  multitudinous  minor  supernatural 


50  THE  DATA  OF   ETHICS. 

agents  and  accompanying  development  of  one  universal 
supernatural  agent,  survives  in  great  strength  down  to  our 
own  day.  Religious  creeds,  established  and  dissenting,  all 
embody  the  belief  that  right  and  wrong  are  right  and  wrong 
simply  in  virtue  of  divine  enactment.  And  this  tacit  as- 
sumption has  passed  from  systems  of  theology  into  systems 
of  morality ;  or  rather,  let  us  say  that  moral  systems  in  early 
stages  of  development,  little  differentiated  from  the  accom- 
panying theological  systems,  have  participated  in  this  assump- 
tion. We  see  this  in  the  works  of  the  Stoics,  as  well  as  in 
the  works  of  certain  Christian  moralists.  Among  recent  ones 
I  may  instance  the  Essays  on  the  Principles  of  Morality,  by 
Jonathan  Dymond,  a  Quaker,  which  makes  "  the  authority 
of  the  Deity  the  sole  ground  of  duty,  and  His  communicated 
will  the  only  ultimate  standard  of  right  and  wrong."  Nor 
is  it  by  writers  belonging  to  so  relatively  unphilosophical  a 
sect  only,  that  this  view  is  held  ;  it  is  held  with  a  difference 
by  writers  belonging  to  sects  contrariwise  distinguished. 
For  these  assert  that  in  the  absence  of  belief  in  a  deity, 
there  would  be  no  moral  guidance  ;  and  this  amounts  to 
asserting  that  moral  truths  have  no  other  origin  than  the 
will  of  God,  which,  if  not  considered  as  revealed  in  sacred 
writings,  must  be  considered  as  revealed  in  conscience. 

This  assumption  when  examined,  proves  to  be  suicidal. 
If  there  are  no  other  origins  for  right  and  wrong  than  this 
enunciated  or  intuited  divine  will,  then,  as  alleged,  were 
there  no  knowledge  of  the  divine  will,  the  acts  now  known 
as  wrong  would  not  be  known  as  wrong.  But  if  men  did 
not  know  such  acts  to  be  wrong  because  contrary  to  the  di- 
vine will,  and  so,  in  committing  them,  did  not  offend  by 
disobedience  ;  and  if  they  could  not  otherwise  know  them 
to  be  wrong ;  then  they  might  commit  them  indifferently  with 
the  acts  now  classed  as  right :  the  results,  practically  consid^ 
ered,  would  be  the  same.  In  so  far  as  secular  matters  are 
concerned,  there  would  be  no  difference  between  the  two ; 
for  to  say  that  in  the  affairs  of  life,  any  evils  would  arise 


WAYS    OF   JUDGING   CONDUCT.  51 

from  continuing  to  do  the  acts  called  wrong  and  ceasing  to 
do  the  acts  called  right,  is  to  say  that  these  produce  in  them- 
selves certain  mischievous  consequences  and  certain  beneficial 
consequences ;  which  is  to  say  there  is  another  source  for 
moral  rules  than  the  revealed  or  inferred  divine  will :  they 
may  be  established  by  induction  from  these  observed  con- 
sequences. 

From  this  implication  I  see  no  escape.  It  must  be  either 
admitted  or  denied  that  the  acts  called  good  and  the  acts 
called  bad,  naturally  conduce,  the  one  to  human  well-being 
and  the  other  to  human  ill-being.  Is  it  admitted?  Then 
the  admission  amounts  to  an  assertion  that  the  conduciveness 
is  shown  by  experience ;  and  this  involves  abandonment  of 
the  doctrine  that  there  is  no  origin  for  morals  apart  from 
divine  injunctions.  Is  it  denied,  that  acts  classed  as  good 
and  bad  differ  in  their  effects  ?  Then  it  is  tacitly  affirmed 
that  human  affairs  would  go  on  just  as  well  in  ignorance  of 
the  distinction;  and  the  alleged  need  for  commandments 
from  God  disappears. 

And  here  we  see  how  entirely  wanting  is  the  conception 
of  cause.  This  notion  that  such  and  such  actions  are  made 
respectively  good  and  bad  simply  by  divine  injunction,  is 
tantamount  to  the  notion  that  such  and  such  actions  have 
not  in  the  nature  of  things  such  and  such  kinds  of  effects. 
If  there  is  not  an  unconsciousness  of  causation  there  is  an 
ignoring  of  it. 

§  19.  Following  Plato  and  Aristotle,  who  make  State- 
enactments  the  sources  of  right  and  wrong ;  and  following 
Hobbes,  who  holds  that  there  can  be  neither  justice  nor 
injustice  till  a  regularly-constituted  coercive  power  exists  to 
issue  and  enforce  commands ;  not  a  few  modern  thinkers 
hold  that  there  is  no  other  origin  for  good  and  bad  in  con- 
duct than  law.  And  this  implies  the  belief  that  moral  obli- 
gation originates  with  Acts  of  Parliament,  and  can  be  changed 
this  way  or  that  way  by  majorities.  They  ridicule  the  idea 


52  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

that  men  have  any  natural  rights,  and  allege  that  rights  are 
wholly  results  of  convention  :  the  necessary  implication  be- 
ing that  duties  are  so  too.  Before  considering  whether  this 
theory  coheres  with  outside  truths,  let  us  observe  how  far  it 
is  coherent  within  itself. 

In  pursuance  of  his  argument  that  rights  and  duties 
originate  with  established  social  arrangements,  Hobbes 
gays — 

•'  Where  no  covenant  hath  preceded,  there  hath  no  right  been  transferred,  and 
every  mail  has  right  to  every  thing ;  and  consequently,  no  action  can  be  unjust. 
But  when  a  covenant  is  made,  then  to  break  it  is  unjust ;  and  the  definition  of 
INJUSTICE,  is  no  other  than  the  not  performance  of  covenant.  And  whatsoever 
is  not  unjust,  is  just.  .  .  .  Therefore  before  the  names  of  just  and  unjust  can 
have  place,  there  must  be  some  coercive  power,  to  compel  men  equally  to  the 
performance  of  their  covenants,  by  the  terror  of  some  punishment,  greater  than 
the  benefit  they  expect  by  the  breach  of  their  covenant."  * 

In  this  paragraph  the  essential  propositions  are : — justice 
is  fulfilment  of  covenant ;  fulfilment  of  covenant  implies  a 
power  enforcing  it :  "  just  and  unjust  can  have  no  place  " 
unless  men  are  compelled  to  perform  their  covenants.  But 
this  is  to  say  that  men  cannot  perform  their  covenants  with- 
out compulsion.  Grant  that  justice  is  performance  of  cove- 
nant. Now  suppose  it  to  be  performed  voluntarily :  there  is 
justice.  In  such  case,  however,  there  is  justice  in  the  absence 
of  coercion  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis.  The  only 
conceivable  rejoinder  is  an  absurd  one  : — voluntary  perform- 
ance of  covenant  is  impossible.  Assert  this,  and  the  doctrine 
that  right  and  wrong  come  into  existence  with  the  establish- 
ment of  sovereignty  is  defensible  Decline  to  assert  it,  and 
the  doctrine  vanishes. 

From  inner  incongruities  pass  now  to  outer  ones.  The 
justification  for  his  doctrine  of  absolute  civil  authority  as 
the  source  of  rules  of  conduct,  Hobbes  seeks  in  the  miseries 
entailed  by  the  chronic  war  between  man  and  man  which  must 
exist  in  the  absence  of  society ;  holding  that  under  any  kind 
of  government  a  better  life  is  possible  than  in  the  state  of 

*  Leviathan,  ch.  xv. 


WAYS   OF  JUDGING   CONDUCT.  53 

nature.  Now  whether  we  accept  the  gratuitous  and  baseless 
theory  that  men  surrendered  their  liberties  to  a  sovereign 
power  of  some  kind,  with  a  view  to  the  promised  increase 
of  satisfactions ;  or  whether  we  accept  the  rational  theory, 
inductively  based,  that  a  state  of  political  subordination 
gradually  became  established  through  experience  of  the 
increased  satisfactions  derived  under  it ;  it  equally  remains 
obvious  that  the  acts  of  the  sovereign  power  have  no  other 
warrant  than  their  subservience  to  the  purpose  for  which 
it  came  into  existence.  The  necessities  which  initiate 
government,  themselves  prescribe  the  actions  of  govern- 
ment. If  its  actions  do  not  respond  to  the  necessities,  they 
are  unwarranted.  The  authority  of  law  is,  then,  by  the 
hypothesis,  derived ;  and  can  never  transcend  the  authority 
of  that  from  which  it  is  derived.  If  general  good,  or 
welfare,  or  utility,  is  the  supreme  end ;  and  if  State-enact- 
ments are  justified  as  means  to  this  supreme  end ;  then, 
State-enactments  have  such  authority  only  as  arises  from 
conduciveness  to  this  supreme  end.  When  they  are  right, 
it  is  only  because  the  original  authority  endorses  them ; 
and  they  are  wrong  if  they  do  not  bear  its  endorsement. 
That  is  to  say,  conduct  cannot  be  made  good  or  bad  by  law ; 
but  its  goodness  or  badness  is  to  the  last  determined  by  its 
effects  as  naturally  furthering,  or  not  furthering,  the  lives 
of  citizens. 

Still  more  when  considered  in  the  concrete,  than  when 
considered  in  the  abstract,  do  the  views  of  Hobbes  and  his 
disciples  prove  to  be  inconsistent.  Joining  in  the  general 
belief  that  without  such  security  for  life  as  enables  men  to 
go  fearlessly  about  their  business,  there  can  be  neither 
happiness  nor  prosperity,  individual  or  general,  they  agree 
that  measures  for  preventing  murder,  manslaughter,  assault, 
&c.,  are  requisite ;  and  they  advocate  this  or  that  penal 
system  as  furnishing  the  best  deterrents :  so  arguing,  both 
in  respect  of  the  evils  and  the  remedies,  that  such  and  such 
causes  will,  by  the  nature  of  things,  produce  such  and  such 


04  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

effects.  They  recognize  as  inferable  a  priori,  the  truth  that 
men  will  not  lay  by  property  unless  they  can  count  with 
great  probability  on  reaping  advantages  from  it;  that 
consequently  where  robbery  is  unchecked,  or  where  a 
rapacious  ruler  appropriates  whatever  earnings  his  subjects 
do  not  effectually  hide,  production  will  scarcely  exceed 
immediate  consumption ;  and  that  necessarily  there  will 
be  none  of  that  accumulation  of  capital  required  for 
social  development,  with  all  its  aids  to  welfare.  In  neither 
case,  however,  do  they  perceive  that  they  are  tacitly  asserting 
the  need  of  certain  restraints  on  conduct  as  deducible  from 
the  necessary  conditions  to  complete  life  in  the  social  state  \ 
and  are  so  making  the  authority  of  law  derivative  and  not 
original. 

If  it  be  said  by  any  belonging  to  this  school,  that  certain 
moral  obligations  to  be  distinguished  as  cardinal,  must  be 
admitted  to  have  a  basis  deeper  than  legislation,  and  that  it 
is  for  legislation  not  to  create  but  merely  to  enforce  them — 
if,  I  say,  admitting  this,  they  go  on  to  allege  a  legislative 
origin  for  minor  claims  and  duties;  then  we  have  the 
implication  that  whereas  some  kinds  of  conduct  do,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  tend  to  work  out  certain  kinds  of  results, 
other  kinds  of  conduct  do  not,  in  the  nature  of  things,  tend 
to  work  out  certain  kinds  of  results.  While  of  these  acts 
the  natural  good  or  bad  consequences  must  be  allowed,  it 
may  be  denied  of  those  acts  that  they  have  naturally  good 
or  bad  consequences.  Only  after  asserting  this  can  it  be 
consistently  asserted  that  acts  of  the  last  class  are  made  right 
or  wrong  by  law.  For  if  such  acts  have  any  intrinsic 
tendencies  to  produce  beneficial  or  mischievous  effects,  then 
these  intrinsic  tendencies  furnish  the  warrant  for  legislative 
requirements  or  interdicts ;  and  to  say  that  the  requirements 
or  interdicts  make  them  right  or  wrong,  is  to  say  that  they 
have  no  intrinsic  tendencies  to  produce  beneficial  or  mis- 
chievous effects. 

Here,  then,  we  have  another  theory  betraying  deficient 


WAYS   OF   JUDGING   CONDUCT.  55 

consciousness  of  causation.  An  adequate  consciousness  of 
causation  yields  the  irresistible  belief  that  from  the  most 
serious  to  the  most  trivial  actions  of  men  in  society,  there 
must  flow  consequences  which,  quite  apart  from  legal  agency, 
conduce  to  well-being  or  ill-being  in  greater  or  smaller  de- 
grees. If  murders  are  socially  injurious  whether  forbidden 
by  law  or  not — if  one  man's  appropriation  of  another's  gains 
by  force,  brings  special  and  general  evils,  whether  it  is  or  is 
not  contrary  to  a  ruler's  edicts — if  non-fulfilment  of  con- 
tract, if  cheating,  if  adulteration,  work  mischiefs  on  a  com- 
munity in  proportion  as  they  are  common,  quite  irrespective 
of  prohibitions ;  then,  is  it  not  manifest  that  the  like  holds 
throughout  all  the  details  of  men's  behaviour  ?  Is  it  not 
clear  that  when  legislation  insists  on  certain  acts  which  have 
naturally  beneficial  effects,  and  forbids  others  that  have 
naturally  injurious  effects,  the  acts  are  not  made  good  or  bad 
by  legislation  ;  but  the  legislation  derived  its  authority  from 
the  natural  effects  of  the  acts  ?  Non-recognition  of  this 
implies  non-recognition  of  natural  causation. 

§  20.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  the  pure  intuitionists,  who 
hold  that  moral  perceptions  are  innate  in  the  original 
sense — thinkers  whose  view  is  that  men  have  been  divinely 
endowed  with  moral  faculties ;  not  that  these  have  re- 
sulted from  inherited  modifications  caused  by  accumulated 
experiences. 

To  affirm  that  we  know  some  things  to  be  right  and 
other  things  to  be  wrong,  by  virtue  of  a  supernatu  rally- 
given  conscience ;  and  thus  tacitly  to  affirm  that  we  do  not 
otherwise  know  right  from  wrong ;  is  tacitly  to  deny  any 
natural  relations  between  acts  and  results.  For  if  there 
exists  any  such  relations,  then  we  may  ascertain  by  induc- 
tion, or  deduction,  or  both,  what  these  are.  And  if  it  be 
admitted  that  because  of  such  natural  relations,  happiness  is 
produced  by  this  kind  of  conduct,  which  is  therefore  to  be 
approved,  while  misery  is  produced  by  that  kind  of  conduct, 


56  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

which  is  therefore  to  be  condemned  ;  then  it  is  admitted 
that  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  actions  are  determinable, 
and  must  finally  be  determined,  by  the  goodness  or  badness 
of  the  effects  that  flow  from  them  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the 
hypothesis. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  rejoined  that  effects  are  deliberately 
ignored  by  this  school ;  which  teaches  that  courses  recog- 
nized by  moral  intuition  as  right,  must  be  pursued  without 
regard  to  consequences.  But  on  inquiry  it  turns  out  that 
the  consequences  to  be  disregarded  are  particular  conse- 
quences and  not  general  consequences.  When,  for  example, 
it  is  said  that  property  lost  by  another  ought  to  be  restored 
irrespective  of  evil  to  the  finder,  who  possibly  may,  by  re- 
storing it,  lose  that  which  would  have  preserved  him  from 
starvation ;  it  is  meant  that  in  pursuance  of  the  principle, 
the  immediate  and  special  consequences  must  be  disregarded, 
not  the  diffused  and  remote  consequences.  By  which  we  are 
shown  that  though  the  theory  forbids  overt  recognition  of 
causation,  there  is  an  unavowed  recognition  of  it. 

And  this  implies  the  trait  to  which  I  am  drawing  atten- 
tion. The  conception  of  natural  causation  is  so  imperfectly 
developed,  that  there  is  only  an  indistinct  consciousness  that 
throughout  the  whole  of  human  conduct,  necessary  relations 
of  causes  and  effects  prevail ;  and  that  from  them  are  ulti- 
mately derived  all  moral  rules,  however  much  these  may  be 
proximately  derived  from  moral  intuitions. 

§  21.  Strange  to  say,  even  the  utilitarian  school,  which, 
at  first  sight,  appears  to  be  distinguished  from  the  rest  by 
recognizing  natural  causation,  is,  if  not  so  far  from  complete 
recognition  of  it,  yet  very  far. 

Conduct,  according  to  its  theory,  is  to  be  estimated  by 
observation  of  results.  When,  in  sufficiently  numerous 
cases,  it  has  been  found  that  behaviour  of  this  kind  works 
evil  while  behaviour  of  that  kind  works  good,  these  kinds  of 
behaviour  are  to  be  judged  as  wrong  and  right  respectively. 


WAYS   OF   JUDGING   CONDUCT.  57 

Now  though  it  seems  that  the  origin  of  moral  rules  in  natu- 
ral causes,  is  thus  asserted  by  implication,  it  is  but  partially 
asserted.  The  implication  is  simply  that  we  are  to  ascertain 
by  induction  that  such  and  such  mischiefs  or  benefits  do  go 
along  with  such  and  such  acts ;  and  are  then  to  infer  that 
the  like  relations  will  hold  in  future.  But  acceptance  of 
these  generalizations  and  the  inferences  from  them,  does  not 
amount  to  recognition  of  causation  in  the  full  sense  of  the 
word.  So  long  as  only  some  relation  between  cause  and 
effect  in  conduct  is  recognized,  and  not  the  relation,  a  com- 
pletely-scientific form  of  knowledge  has  not  been  reached. 
At  present,  utilitarians  pay  no  attention  to  this  distinction. 
Even  when  it  is  pointed  out,  they  disregard  the  fact  that 
empirical  utilitarianism  is  but  a  transitional  form  to  be 
passed  through  on  the  way  to  rational  utilitarianism. 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Mill,  written  some  sixteen  years  ago, 
repudiating  the  title  anti-utilitarian  which  he  had  applied  to 
me  (a  letter  subsequently  published  in  Mr.  Bain's  work  on 
Mental  and  Moral  Science),  I  endeavoured  to  make  clear 
the  difference  above  indicated  ;  and  I  must  here  quote  cer- 
tain passages  from  that  letter. 

The  view  for  which  I  contend  is,  that  Morality  properly  so-called — the 
science  of  right  conduct — has  for  its  object  to  determine  how  and  why  certain 
modes  of  conduct  are  detrimental,  and  certain  other  modes  beneficial.  These 
good  and  bad  results  cannot  be  accidental,  but  must  be  necessary  consequences 
of  the  constitution  of  things ;  and  I  conceive  it  to  be  the  business  of  Moral 
Science  to  deduce,  from  the  laws  of  life  and  the  conditions  of  existence,  what 
kinds  of  action  necessarily  tend  to  produce  happiness,  and  what  kinds  to  pro- 
duce unhappiness.  Having  done  this,  its  deductions  are  to  be  recognized  as 
laws  of  conduct ;  and  are  to  be  conformed  to  irrespective  of  a  direct  estimatioa 
of  happiness  or  misery. 

Perhaps  an  analogy  will  most  clearly  show  my  meaning.  During  its  early 
stages,  planetary  Astronomy  consisted  of  nothing  more  than  accumulated  ob- 
servations respecting  the  positions  and  motions  of  the  sun  and  planets ;  from 
which  accumulated  observations  it  came  by  and  by  to  be  empirically  predicted, 
with  an  approach  to  truth,  that  certain  of  the  heavenly  bodies  would  have 
certain  positions  at  certain  times.  But  the  modern  science  of  planetary 
Astronomy  consists  of  deductions  from  the  law  of  gravitation — deductions 
showing  why  the  celestial  bodies  necessarily  occupy  certain  places  at  certain 
tunes.  Now,  the  kind  of  relation  which  thus  exists  between  ancient  and 


58  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

modern  Astronomy,  is  analogous  to  the  kind  of  relation  which,  I  conceive, 
eiists  between  the  Expediency-Morality  and  Moral  Science  properly  BO  called. 
And  the  objection  which  I  have  to  the  current  Utilitarianism  is,  that  it  recog- 
nizes no  more  developed  form  of  Morality — docs  not  see  that  it  has  reached 
but  the  initial  stage  of  Moral  Science. 

Doubtless  if  utilitarians  are  asked  whether  it  can  be  by 
mere  chance  that  this  kind  of  action  works  evil  and  that 
works  good,  they  will  answer — No  :  they  will  admit  that 
such  sequences  are  parts  of  a  necessary  order  among 
phenomena.  But  though  this  truth  is  beyond  question  ; 
and  though  if  there  are  causal  relations  between  acts  and 
their  results,  rules  of  conduct  can  become  scientific  only 
when  they  are  deduced  from  these  causal  relations ;  there 
continues  to  be  entire  satisfaction  with  that  form  of  utilitari- 
anism in  which  these  causal  relations  are  practically  ignored. 
It  is  supposed  that  in  future,  as  now,  utility  is  to  be  deter- 
mined only  by  observation  of  results ;  and  that  there  is  no 
possibility  of  knowing  by  deduction  from  fundamental  prin- 
ciples, what  conduct  must  be  detrimental  and  what  conduct 
must  be  beneficial. 

§  22.  To  make  more  specific  that  conception  of  ethical 
science  here  indicated,  let  me  present  it  under  a  concrete 
aspect ;  beginning  with  a  simple  illustration  and  compli- 
cating this  illustration  by  successive  steps. 

If,  by  tying  its  main  artery,  we  stop  most  of  the  blood 
going  to  a  limb,  then,  for  as  long  as  the  limb  performs  its 
function,  those  parts  which  are  called  into  play  must  be 
wasted  faster  than  they  are  repaired :  whence  eventual 
disablement.  The  relation  between  due  receipt  of  nutritive 
matters  through  its  arteries,  and  due  discharge  of  its  duties 
by  the  limb,  is  a  part  of  the  physical  order.  If,  instead  of 
cutting  off  the  supply  to  a  particular  limb,  we  bleed  the 
patient  largely,  so  drafting  away  the  materials  needed  for 
repairing  not  one  limb  but  all  limbs,  and  not  limbs  only  but 
viscera,  there  results  both  a  muscular  debility  and  an  en- 
feeblement  of  the  vital  functions.  Here,  again,  cause  and 


WAYS   OF   JUDGING   CONDUCT.  59 

effect  are  necessarily  related.  The  mischief  that  results  from 
great  depletion,  results  apart  from  any  divine  command,  or 
political  enactment,  or  moral  intuition.  Now  advance  a  step. 
Suppose  the  man  to  be  prevented  from  taking  in  enough  of 
the  solid  and  liquid  food  containing  those  substances  con- 
tinually abstracted  from  his  blood  in  repairing  his  tissues : 
suppose  he  has  cancer  of  the  oesophagus  and  cannot  swallow 
— what  happens  ?  By  this  indirect  depletion,  as  by  direct 
depletion,  he  is  inevitably  made  incapable  of  performing  the 
actions  of  one  in  health.  In  this  case,  as  in  the  other  cases, 
the  connection  between  cause  and  effect  is  one  that  cannot 
be  established,  or  altered,  by  any  authority  external  to  the 
phenomena  themselves.  Again,  let  us  say  that  instead  of 
being  stopped  after  passing  his  mouth,  that  which  he  would 
swallow  is  stopped  before  reaching  his  mouth  ;  so  that  day 
after  day  the  man  is  required  to  waste  his  tissues  in  getting 
food,  and  day  after  day  the  food  he  has  got  to  meet  this 
waste,  he  is  forcibly  prevented  from  eating.  As  before,  the 
progress  towards  death  by  starvation  is  inevitable — the  con- 
nexion between  acts  and  effects  is  independent  of  any  alleged 
theological  or  political  authority.  And  similarly  if,  being 
forced  by  the  whip  to  labour,  no  adequate  return  in  food  is 
supplied  to  him,  there  are  equally  certain  evils,  equally  in- 
dependent of  sacred  or  secular  enactment.  Pass  now 
to  those  actions  more  commonly  thought  of  as  the  occasions 
for  rules  of  conduct.  Let  us  assume  the  man  to  be  con- 
tinually robbed  of  that  which  was  given  him  in  exchange 
for  his  labour,  and  by  which  he  was  to  make  up  for  nervo- 
muscular  expenditure  and  renew  his  powers.  No  less  than 
before  is  the  connexion  between  conduct  and  consequence 
rooted  in  the  constitution  of  things  ;  unchangeable  by  State- 
made  law,  and  not  needing  establishment  by  empirical  gen- 
eralization. If  the  action  by  which  the  man  is  affected  is 
a  stage  further  away  from  the  results,  or  produces  results 
of  a  less  decisive  kind,  still  we  see  the  same  basis  for  mo- 
rality in  the  physical  order.  Imagine  that  payment  for 


CO  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

his  services  is  made  partly  in  bad  coin  ;  or  that  it  is  de- 
layed beyond  the  date  agreed  upon  ;  or  that  what  he  buys 
to  eat  is  adulterated  with  innutritive  matter.  Manifestly, 
by  any  of  these  deeds  which  we  condemn  as  unjust,  and 
which  are  punished  by  law,  there  is,  as  before,  an  inter- 
ference with  the  normal  adjustment  of  physiological  repair 
to  physiological  waste.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  when  we  pass  to 
kinds  of  conduct  still  more  remotely  operative.  If  he  is  hin- 
dered from  enforcing  his  claim — if  class-predominance  pre- 
vents him  from  proceeding,  or  if  a  bribed  judge  gives  a 
verdict  contrary  to  evidence,  or  if  a  witness  swears  falsely ; 
have  not  these  deeds,  though  they  affect  him  more  indirectly, 
the  same  original  cause  for  their  wrongness  ?  Even 

with  actions  which  work  diffused  and  indefinite  mischiefs 
it  is  the  same.  Suppose  that  the  man,  instead  of  being 
dealt  with  fraudulently,  is  calumniated.  There  is,  as  before, 
a  hindrance  to  the  carrying  on  of  life-sustaining  activities ; 
for  the  loss  of  character  detrimentally  affects  his  business. 
Nor  is  this  all.  The  mental  depression  caused  partially  in- 
capacitates him  for  energetic  activity,  and  perhaps  brings 
on  ill-health.  So  that  maliciously  or  carelessly  propagating 
false  statements,  tends  both  to  diminish  his  life  and  to 
diminish  his  ability  to  maintain  life.  Hence  its  flagitious- 
ness.  Moreover,  if  we  trace  to  their  ultimate  rami- 
fications the  effects  wrought  by  any  of  these  acts  which 
morality  called  intuitive  reprobates — if  we  ask  what  results 
not  to  the  individual  himself  only,  but  also  to  his  belongings 
— if  we  observe  how  impoverishment  hinders  the  rearing  of 
his  children,  by  entailing  under-feeding  or  inadequate  cloth- 
ing, resulting  perhaps  in  the  death  of  some  and  the  constitu- 
tional injury  of  others ;  we  see  that  by  the  necessary  connex- 
ions of  things  these  acts,  besides  tending  primarily  to  lower 
the  life  of  the  individual  aggressed  upon,  tend,  secondarily, 
to  lower  the  lives  of  all  his  family,  and,  thirdly,  to  lower  the 
life  of  society  at  large  ;  which  is  damaged  by  whatever  dam- 
ages its  units. 


WAYS   OF   JUDGING   CONDUCT.  61 

A  more  distinct  meaning  will  now  be  seen  in  the  state- 
ment that  the  utilitarianism  which  recognizes  only  the  prin- 
ciples of  conduct  reached  by  induction,  is  but  preparatory 
to  the  utilitarianism  which  deduces  these  principles  from  the 
processes  of  life  as  carried  on  under  established  conditions 
of  existence. 

§  220.  Thus,  then,  is  justified  the  allegation  made  at  the 
outset,  that,  irrespective  of  their  distinctive  characters  and 
their  special  tendencies,  all  the  current  methods  of  ethics 
have  one  general  defect — they  neglect  ultimate  causal  con- 
nexions. Of  course  I  do  not  mean  that  they  wholly  ignore 
the  natural  consequences  of  actions ;  but  I  mean  that  they 
recognize  them  only  incidentally.  They  do  not  erect  into 
a  method  the  ascertaining  of  necessary  relations  between 
causes  and  effects,  and  deducing  rules  of  conduct  from  for- 
mulated statements  of  them. 

Every  science  begins  by  accumulating  observations,  and 
presently  generalizes  these  empirically ;  but  only  when  it 
reaches  the  stage  at  which  its  empirical  generalizations  are 
included  in  a  rational  generalization,  does  it  become  devel- 
oped science.  Astronomy  has  already  passed  through  its 
successive  stages  :  first  collections  of  facts ;  then  inductions 
from  them  ;  and  lastly  deductive  interpretations  of  these, 
as  corollaries  from  a  universal  principle  of  action  among 
masses  in  space.  Accounts  of  structures  and  tabulations  of 
strata,  grouped  and  compared,  have  led  gradually  to  the  as- 
signing of  various  classes  of  geological  changes  to  igneous 
and  aqueous  actions ;  and  it  is  now  tacitly  admitted  that 
Geology  becomes  a  science  proper,  only  as  fast  as  such 
changes  are  explained  in  terms  of  those  natural  processes 
which  have  arisen  in  the  cooling  and  solidifying  Earth,  ex- 
posed to  the  Sim's  heat  and  the  action  of  the  Moon  upon  its 
ocean.  The  science  of  life  has  been,  and  is  still,  exhibiting 
a  like  series  of  steps :  the  evolution  of  organic  forms  at 
large,  is  being  affiliated  on  physical  actions  in  operation 


62  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

from  the  beginning ;  and  the  vital  phenomena  each  organ- 
ism presents,  are  coming  to  be  understood  as  connected  sets 
of  changes,  in  parts  formed  of  matters  that  are  affected  by 
certain  forces  and  disengage  other  forces.  So  is  it  with 
mind.  Early  ideas  concerning  thought  and  feeling  ignored 
everything  like  cause,  save  in  recognizing  those  effects  of 
habit  which  were  forced  on  men's  attention  and  expressed 
in  proverbs ;  but  there  are  growing  up  interpretations  of 
thought  and  feeling  as  correlates  of  the  actions  and  re- 
actions of  a  nervous  structure,  that  is  influenced  by  outer 
changes  and  works  in  the  body  adapted  changes :  the  impli- 
cation being  that  Psychology  becomes  a  science,  as  fast  as 
these  relations  of  phenomena  are  explained  as  consequences 
of  ultimate  principles.  Sociology,  too,  represented  down  to 
recent  times  only  by  stray  ideas  about  social  organization, 
scattered  through  the  masses  of  worthless  gossip  furnished  us 
by  historians,  is  coming  to  be  recognized  by  some  as  also  a  sci- 
ence ;  and  such  adumbrations  of  it  as  have  from  time  to  time 
appeared  in  the  shape  of  empirical  generalizations,  are  now 
beginning  to  assume  the  character  of  generalizations  made 
coherent  by  derivation  from  causes  lying  in  human  nature 
placed  under  given  conditions.  Clearly,  then,  Ethics,  which 
is  a  science  dealing  with  the  conduct  of  associated  human 
beings,  regarded  under  one  of  its  aspects,  has  to  undergo  a 
like  transformation  ;  and,  at  present  undeveloped,  can  be 
considered  a  developed  science  only  when  it  has  undergone 
this  transformation. 

A  preparation  in  the  simpler  sciences  is  pre-supposed. 
Ethics  has  a  physical  aspect ;  since  it  treats  of  human  ac> 
tivities  which,  in  common  with  all  expenditures  of  energy, 
conform  to  the  law  of  the  persistence  of  energy  :  moral 
principles  must  conform  to  physical  necessities.  It  has  a 
biological  aspect ;  since  it  concerns  certain  effects,  inner 
and  outer,  individual  and  social,  of  the  vital  changes  going 
on  in  the  highest  type  of  animal.  It  has  a  psychological 
aspect  ;  for  its  subject-matter  is  an  aggregate  of  actions 


WAYS   OF  JUDGING   CONDUCT.  63 

that  are  prompted  by  feelings  and  guided  by  intelligence. 
And  it  has  a  sociological  aspect ;  for  these  actions,  some  of 
them  directly  and  all  of  them  indirectly,  affect  associated 
beings. 

What  is  the  implication  ?  Belonging  under  one  aspect  to 
each  of  these  sciences  —  physical,  biological,  psychological, 
sociological, — it  can  find  its  ultimate  interpretations  only  in 
those  fundamental  truths  which  are  common  to  all  of  them. 
Already  we  have  concluded  in  a  general  way  that  conduct  at 
large,  including  the  conduct  Ethics  deals  with,  is  to  be  fully 
understood  only  as  an  aspect  of  evolving  life  ;  and  now  we 
are  brought  to  this  conclusion  in  a  more  special  way. 

§  23.  Here,  then,  we  have  to  enter  on  the  consideration  of 
moral  phenomena  as  phenomena  of  evolution  ;  being  forced 
to  do  this  by  finding  that  they  form  a  part  of  the  aggregate 
of  phenomena  which  evolution  has  wrought  out.  If  the 
entire  visible  universe  has  been  evolved — if  the  solar  system 
as  a  whole,  the  earth  as  a  part  of  it,  the  life  in  general  which 
the  earth  bears,  as  well  as  that  of  each  individual  organism — 
if  the  mental  phenomena  displayed  by  all  creatures,  up  to 
the  highest,  in  common  with  the  phenomena  presented  by 
aggregates  of  these  highest — if  one  and  all  conform  to  the 
laws  of  evolution  ;  then  the  necessary  implication  is  that 
those  phenomena  of  conduct  in  these  highest  creatures  with 
which  Morality  is  concerned,  also  conform. 

The  preceding  volumes  have  prepared  the  way  for  dealing 
with  morals  as  thus  conceived.  Utilizing  the  conclusions 
they  contain,  let  us  now  observe  what  data  are  furnished 
by  these.  We  will  take  in  succession — the  physical  view, 
the  biological  view,  the  psychological  view,  and  the  socio- 
logical view. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW. 

§  24.  Every  moment  we  pass  instantly  from  men's  per- 
ceived actions  to  the  motives  implied  by  them ;  and  so  are 
led  to  formulate  these  actions  in  mental  terms  rather  than 
in  bodily  terms.  Thoughts  and  feelings  are  referred  to  when 
we  speak  of  any  one's  deeds  with  praise  or  blame  ;  not  those 
outer  manifestations  which  reveal  the  thoughts  and  feelings. 
Hence  we  become  oblivious  of  the  truth  that  conduct  as  ac- 
tually experienced,  consists  of  changes  recognized  by  touch, 
sight  and  hearing. 

This  habit  of  contemplating  only  the  psychical  face  of  con- 
duct, is  so  confirmed  that  an  effort  is  required  to  contemplate 
only  the  physical  face.  Undeniable  as  it  is  that  another's 
behaviour  to  us  is  made  up  of  movements  of  his  body  and 
limbs,  of  his  facial  muscles,  and  of  his  vocal  apparatus ;  it 
yet  seems  paradoxical  to  say  that  these  are  the  only  elements 
of  conduct  really  known  by  us,  while  the  elements  of  con- 
duct which  we  exclusively  think  of  as  constituting  it,  are 
not  known  but  inferred. 

Here,  however,  ignoring  for  the  time  being  the  inferred 
elements  in  conduct,  we  have  to  deal  with  the  perceived  ele- 
ments— we  have  to  observe  its  traits  considered  as  a  set  of 
combined  motions.  Taking  the  evolution  point  of  view,  and 
remembering  that  while  an  aggregate  evolves,  not  only  the 
matter  composing  it.  but  also  the  motion  of  that  matter, 

64 


THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW.  65 

passes  from  an  indefinite  incoherent  homogeneity  to  a  defi- 
nite coherent  heterogeneity,  we  have  now  to  ask  whether 
conduct  as  it  rises  to  its  higher  forms,  displays  in  increasing 
degrees  these  characters ;  and  whether  it  does  not  display 
them  in  the  greatest  degree  when  it  reaches  that  highest 
form  which  we  call  moral. 

§  25.  It  will  be  convenient  to  deal  first  with  the  trait  of 
increasing  coherence.  The  conduct  of  lowly-organized 
creatures  is  broadly  contrasted  with  the  conduct  of  highly- 
organized  creatures,  in  having  its  successive  portions  feebly 
connected.  The  random  movements  which  an  animalcule 
makes,  have  severally  no  reference  to  movements  made  a 
moment  before ;  nor  do  they  affect  in  specific  ways  the 
movements  made  immediately  after.  To-day's  wanderings 
of  a  fish  in  search  of  food,  though  perhaps  showing  by 
their  adjustments  to  catching  different  kinds  of  prey  at 
different  hours,  a  slightly-determined  order,  are  unrelated  to 
the  wanderings  of  yesterday  and  to-morrow.  But  such 
more  developed  creatures  as  birds,  show  us  in  the  building 
of  nests,  the  sitting  on  eggs,  the  rearing  of  chicks,  and  the 
aiding  of  them  after  they  fly,  sets  of  motions  which  form 
a  dependent  series,  extending  over  a  considerable  period. 
And  on  observing  the  complexity  of  the  acts  performed  in 
fetching  and  fixing  the  fibres  of  the  nest  or  in  catching  and 
bringing  to  the  young  each  portion  of  food,  we  discover  in 
the  combined  motions,  lateral  cohesion  as  well  as  longitudi- 
nal cohesion. 

Man,  even  in  his  lowest  state,  displays  in  his  conduct  far 
more  coherent  combinations  of  motions.  By  the  elaborate 
manipulations  gone  through  in  making  weapons  that  are  to 
serve  for  the  chase  next  year,  or  in  building  canoes  and 
wigwams  for  permanent  uses — by  acts  of  aggression  and 
defence  which  are  connected  with  injuries  long  since 
received  or  committed,  the  savage  exhibits  an  aggregate 
of  motions  which,  in  some  of  its  parts,  holds  together  over 


(J(J  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

great  periods.  Moreover,  if  we  consider  the  many  move- 
mente  implied  by  the  transactions  of  each  day,  in  the  wood, 
on  the  water,  in  the  camp,  in  the  family ;  we  see  that  this 
coherent  aggregate  of  movements  is  composed  of  many 
minor  aggregates,  that  are  severally  coherent  within  them- 
selves and  with  one  another.  In  civilized  man 
this  trait  of  developed  conduct  becomes  more  conspic- 
uous still.  Be  his  business  what  it  may,  its  processes  in- 
volve relatively-numerous  dependent  motions;  and  day 
by  day  it  is  so  carried  on  as  to  show  connexions  between 
present  motions  and  motions  long  gone  by,  as  well  as  mo- 
tions anticipated  in  the  distant  future.  Besides  the  many 
doings,  related  to  one  another,  which  the  farmer  goes 
through  in  looking  after  his  cattle,  directing  his  labourers, 
keeping  an  eye  on  his  dairy,  buying  his  implements,  selling 
his  produce,  &c. ;  the  business  of  getting  his  lease  involves 
numerous  combined  movements  on  which  the  movements 
of  subsequent  years  depend ;  and  in  manuring  his  fields 
with  a  view  to  larger  returns,  or  putting  down  drains  with 
the  like  motive,  he  is  performing  acts  which  are  parts  of  a 
coherent  combination  relatively  extensive.  That  the  like 
holds  of  the  shopkeeper,  manufacturer,  banker,  is  manifest ; 
and  this  increased  coherence  of  conduct  among  the  civilized, 
will  strike  us  even  more  when  we  remember  how  its  parts 
are  often  continued  in  a  connected  arrangement  through 
life,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  fortune,  founding  a  family, 
gaining  a  seat  in  parliament. 

Now  mark  that  a  greater  coherence  among  its  component 
motions,  broadly  distinguishes  the  conduct  we  call  moral 
from  the  conduct  we  call  immoral.  The  application  of  the 
word  dissolute  to  the  last,  and  of  the  word  self -restrained  to 
the  first,  implies  this — implies  that  conduct  of  the  lower 
kind,  constituted  of  disorderly  acts,  has  its  parts  relatively 
loose  in  their  relations  with  one  another ;  while  conduct 
of  the  higher  kind,  habitually  following  a  fixed  order,  so 
gains  a  characteristic  unity  and  coherence.  In  proportion 


THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW.  67 

as  the  conduct  is  what  we  call  moral,  it  exhibits  compara- 
tively settled  connexions  between  antecedents  and  conse- 
quents ;  for  the  doing  right  implies  that  under  given  con- 
ditions the  combined  motions  constituting  conduct  will 
follow  in  a  way  that  can  be  specified.  Contrariwise,  in  the 
conduct  of  one  whose  principles  are  not  high,  the  sequences 
of  motions  are  doubtful.  He  may  pay  the  money  or  he  may 
not ;  he  may  keep  his  appointment  or  he  may  fail ;  he  may 
tell  the  truth  or  he  may  lie.  The  words  trustworthiness  and 
untrustworthiness,  as  used  to  characterize  the  two  respec- 
tively, sufficiently  imply  that  the  actions  of  the  one  can  be 
foreknown  while  those  of  the  other  can  not ;  and  this  im- 
plies that  the  successive  movements  composing  the  one  bear 
more  constant  relations  to  one  another  than  do  those  com- 
posing the  other — are  more  coherent. 

§  26.  Indefiniteness  accompanies  incoherence  in  conduct 
that  is  little  evolved ;  and  throughout  the  ascending  stages 
of  evolving  conduct,  there  is  an  increasingly-definite  co-ordi- 
nation of  the  motions  constituting  it. 

Such  changes  of  form  as  the  rudest  protozoa  show  us,  are 
utterly  vague — admit  of  no  precise  description  ;  and  though 
in  higher  kinds  the  movements  of  the  parts  are  more 
definable,  yet  the  movement  of  the  whole  in  respect  of 
direction  is  indeterminate :  there  is  no  adjustment  of  it 
to  this  or  the  other  point  in  space.  In  such  ccelenterate 
animals  as  polypes,  we  see  the  parts  moving  in  ways  which 
lack  precision ;  and  in  one  of  the  locomotive  forms,  as  a 
medusa,  the  course  taken,  otherwise  at  random,  can  be 
described  only  as  one  which  carries  it  towards  the  light, 
where  degrees  of  light  and  darkness  are  present.  Among 
annulose  creatures  the  contrast  between  the  track  of  a  worm, 
turning  this  way  or  that  at  hazard,  and  the  definite  course 
taken  by  a  bee  in  its  flight  from  flower  to  flower  or  back 
to  the  hive,  shows  us  the  same  thing:  the  bee's  acts  in 
building  cells  and  feeding  larvse  further  exhibiting  pre- 


68  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

cision  in  the  simultaneous  movements  as  well  as  in  the 
successive  movements.  Though  the  motions  made  by  a 
fish  in  pursuing  its  prey  have  considerable  definiteness, 
yet  they  are  of  a  simple  kind,  and  are  in  this  respect  con- 
trasted with  the  many  definite  motions  of  body,  head,  and 
limbs  gone  through  by  a  carnivorous  mammal  in  the  course 
of  waylaying,  running  down,  and  seizing  a  herbivore ;  and 
further,  the  fish  shows  us  none  of  those  definitely-adjusted 
sets  of  motions  which  in  the  mammal  subserve  the  rearing 
of  young. 

Much  greater  definiteness,  if  not  in  the  combined  move- 
ments forming  single  acts,  still  in  the  adjustments  of  many 
combined  acts  to  various  purposes,  characterizes  human 
conduct,  even  in  its  lowest  stages.  In  making  and  using 
weapons  and  in  the  mano3uvrings  of  savage  warfare,  numer- 
ous movements  all  precise  in  their  adaptations  to  proximate 
ends,  are  arranged  for  the  achievement  of  remote  ends,  with  a 
precision  not  paralleled  among  lower  creatures.  The  lives  of 
civilized  men  exhibit  this  trait  far  more  conspicuously. 
Each  industrial  art  exemplifies  the  effects  of  movements 
which  are  severally  definite;  and  which  are  definitely  ar- 
ranged in  simultaneous  and  successive  order.  Business 
transactions  of  every  kind  are  characterized  by  exact  rela- 
tions between  the  sets  of  motions  constituting  acts,  and  the 
purposes  fulfilled,  in  time,  place,  and  quantity.  Further, 
the  daily  routine  of  each  person  shows  us  in  its  periods  and 
amounts  of  activity,  of  rest,  of  relaxation,  a  measured  ar- 
rangement which  is  not  shown  us  by  the  doings  of  the 
wandering  savage ;  who  has  no  fixed  times  for  hunting, 
sleeping,  feeding,  or  any  one  kind  of  action. 

Moral  conduct  differs  from  immoral  conduct  in  the  same 
manner  and  in  a  like  degree.  The  conscientious  man  is 
exact  in  all  his  transactions.  He  supplies  a  precise  weight 
for  a  specified  sum ;  he  gives  a  definite  quality  in  ful- 
filment of  understanding ;  he  pays  the  full  amount  he 
bargained  to  do.  In  times  as  well  as  in  quantities,  his  acts 


THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW.  69 

answer  completely  to  anticipations.  If  he  has  made  a 
business  contract  he  is  to  the  day ;  if  an  appointment  he 
is  to  the  minute.  Similarly  in  respect  to  truth :  his 
statements  correspond  accurately  with  the  facts.  It  is  thus 
too  in  his  family  life.  He  maintains  marital  relations  that 
are  definite  in  contrast  with  the  relations  that  result  from 
breach  of  the  marriage  contract ;  and  as  a  father,  fitting 
his  behaviour  with  care  to  the  nature  of  each  child  and  to 
the  occasion,  he  avoids  the  too  much  and  the  too  little  of 
praise  or  blame,  reward  or  penalty.  Nor  is  it  otherwise 
in  his  miscellaneous  acts.  To  say  that  he  deals  equitably 
with  those  he  employs,  whether  they  behave  well  or  ill,  is 
to  say  that  he  adjusts  his  acts  to  their  deserts;  and  to 
say  that  he  is  judicious  in  his  charities,  is  to  say  that 
he  portions  out  his  aid  with  discrimination  instead  of 
distributing  it  indiscriminately  to  good  and  bad,  as  do 
those  who  have  no  adequate  sense  of  their  social  respon- 
sibilities. 

That  progress  towards  rectitude  of  conduct  is  progress 
towards  duly-proportioned  conduct,  and  that  duly-pro- 
portioned conduct  is  relatively  definite,  we  may  see 
from  another  point  of  view.  One  of  the  traits  of  conduct 
we  call  immoral,  is  excess ;  while  moderation  habitually 
characterizes  moral  conduct.  Now  excesses  imply  extreme 
divergences  of  actions  from  some  medium,  while  mainte- 
nance of  the  medium  is  implied  by  moderation ;  whence  it 
follows  that  actions  of  the  last  kind  can  be  defined  more 
nearly  than  those  of  the  first.  Clearly  conduct  which,  being 
unrestrained,  runs  into  great  and  incalculable  oscillations, 
therein  differs  from  restrained  conduct  of  which,  by  impli- 
cation, the  oscillations  fall  within  narrower  limits.  And 
falling  within  narrower  limits  necessitates  relative  definite- 
ness  of  movements. 

§  27.  That  throughout  the  ascending  forms  of  life,  along 
with  increasing  heterogeneity  of  structure  and  function, 


70  THE   DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

there  goes  increasing  heterogeneity  of  conduct— increasing 
diversity  in  the  sets  of  external  motions  and  combined 
sets  of  such  motions — needs  not  be  shown  in  detail.  Nor 
need  it  be  shown  that  becoming  relatively  great  in  the 
motions  constituting  the  conduct  of  the  uncivilized  man, 
this  heterogeneity  has  become  still  greater  in  those  which 
the  civilized  man  goes  through.  We  may  pass  at  once  to 
that  further  degree  of  the  like  contrast  which  we  see  on 
ascending  from  the  conduct  of  the  immoral  to  that  of  the 
moral. 

Instead  of  recognizing  this  contrast,  most  readers  will  be 
inclined  to  identify  a  moral  life  with  a  life  little  varied  in 
its  activities.  But  here  we  come  upon  a  defect  in  the  cur- 
rent conception  of  morality.  This  comparative  uniformity 
in  the  aggregate  of  motions,  which  goes  along  with  morality 
as  commonly  conceived,  is  not  only  not  moral  but  is  the 
reverse  of  moral.  The  better  a  man  fulfils  every  require- 
ment of  life,  alike  as  regards  his  own  body  and  mind,  as 
regards  the  bodies  and  minds  of  those  dependent  on  him, 
and  as  regards  the  bodies  and  minds  of  his  fellow-citizens, 
the  more  varied  do  his  activities  become.  The  more  fully 
he  does  all  these  things,  the  more  heterogeneous  must  be  his 
movements. 

One  who  satisfies  personal  needs  only,  goes  through, 
other  things  equal,  less  multiform  processes  than  one  who 
also  administers  to  the  needs  of  wife  and  children.  Sup- 
posing there  are  no  other  differences,  the  addition  of  family 
relations  necessarily  renders  the  actions  of  the  man  who 
fulfils  the  duties  of  husband  and  parent,  more  heterogeneous 
than  those  of  the  man  who  has  no  such  duties  to  fulfil,  or, 
having  them,  does  not  fulfil  them ;  and  to  say  that  his  ac- 
tions are  more  heterogeneous  is  to  say  that  there  is  a  greater 
heterogeneity  in  the  combined  motions  he  goes  through. 
The  like  holds  of  social  obligations.  These,  in  proportion  as 
a  citizen  duly  performs  them,  complicate  his  movements 
considerably.  If  he  is  helpful  to  inferiors  dependent  on 


'THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW.  71 

him,  if  he  takes  a  part  in  political  agitation,  if  he  aids  in 
diffusing  knowledge,  he,  in  each  of  these  ways,  adds  to  his 
kinds  of  activity — makes  his  sets  of  movements  more  multi- 
form ;  so  different  from  the  man  who  is  the  slave  of  one  de- 
sire or  group  of  desires. 

Though  it  is  unusual  to  consider  as  having  a  moral  aspect, 
those  activities  which  culture  involves,  yet  to  the  few  who 
hold  that  due  exercise  of  all  the  higher  faculties,  intellectual 
and  aesthetic,  must  be  included  in  the  conception  of  com- 
plete life,  here  identified  with  the  ideally  moral  life,  it  will 
be  manifest  that  a  further  hetereogeneity  is  implied  by 
them.  For  each  of  such  activities,  constituted  by  that  play 
of  these  faculties  which  is  eventually  added  to  their  life- 
subserving  uses,  adds  to  the  multiformity  of  the  aggregated 
motions. 

Briefly,  then,  if  the  conduct  is  the  best  possible  on  every 
occasion,  it  follows  that  as  the  occasions  are  endlessly  varied 
the  acts  will  be  endlessly  varied  to  suit — the  heterogeneity 
in  the  combinations  of  motions  will  be  extreme. 

§  28.  Evolution  in  conduct  considered  under  its  moral 
aspect,  is,  like  all  other  evolution,  towards  equilibrium.  I 
do  not  mean  that  it  is  towards  the  equilibrium  reached  at 
death,  though  this  is,  of  course,  the  final  state  which  the 
evolution  of  the  highest  man  has  in  common  with  all  lower 
evolution ;  but  I  mean  that  it  is  towards  a  moving  equili- 
brium. 

We  have  seen  that  maintaining  life,  expressed  in  physical 
terms,  is  maintaining  a  balanced  combination  of  internal 
actions  in  face  of  external  forces  tending  to  overthrow  it ; 
and  we  have  seen  that  advance  towards  a  higher  life,  has 
been  an  acquirement  of  ability  to  maintain  the  balance  for 
a  longer  period,  by  the  successive  additions  of  organic  appli- 
ances which  by  their  actions  counteract,  more  and  more 
fully,  the  disturbing  forces.  Here,  then,  we  are  led  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  life  called  moral  is  one  in  which  this 


(*2  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

maintenance  of  the  moving  equilibrium  reaches  complete- 
ness, or  approaches  most  nearly  to  completeness. 

This  truth  is  clearly  disclosed  on  observing  how  those 
physiological  rhythms  which  vaguely  show  themselves 
when  organization  begins,  become  more  regular  as  well  .is 
more  various  in  their  kinds,  as  organization  advances. 
Periodicity  is  but  feebly  marked  in  the  actions,  inner  and 
outer,  of  the  rudest  types.  Where  life  is  low  there  is 
passive  dependence  on  the  accidents  of  the  environment; 
and  this  entails  great  irregularities  in  the  vital  processes. 
The  taking  in  of  food  by  a  polype  is  at  intervals  now  short 
now  very  long,  as  circumstances  determine ;  and  the 
utilization  of  it  is  by  a  slow  dispersion  of  the  absorbed 
part  through  the  tissues,  aided  only  by  the  irregular  move- 
ments of  the  creature's  body;  while  such  aeration  as  is 
effected  is  similarly  without  a  trace  of  -rhythm.  Much 
higher  up  we  still  find  very  imperfect  periodicities ;  as  in 
the  inferior  molluscs  which,  though  possessed  of  vascular 
systems,  have  no  proper  circulation,  but  merely  a  slow 
movement  of  the  crude  blood,  now  in  one  direction  through 
the  vessels  and  then,  after  a  pause,  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion, Only  with  well-developed  structures  do  there  come  a 
rhythmical  pulse  and  a  rhythm  of  the  respiratory  actions. 
And  then  in  birds  and  mammals,  along  with  great  rapidity 
and  regularity  in  these  essential  rhythms,  and  along  with  a 
consequently  great  vital  activity  and  therefore  great  expendi- 
ture, comparative  regularity  in  the  rhythm  of  the  alimentary 
actions  is  established,  as  well  as  in  the  rhythm  of  activity 
and  rest ;  since  the  rapid  waste  to  which  rapid  pulsation  and 
respiration  are  instrumental,  necessitates  tolerably  regular 
supplies  of  nutriment,  as  well  as  recurring  intervals  of 
sleep  during  which  repair  may  overtake  waste.  And  from 
these  stages  the  moving  equilibrium  characterized  by  such 
inter-dependent  rhythms,  is  continually  made  better  by  the 
counteracting  of  more  and  more  of  those  actions  which 
tend  to  perturb  it.  So  it  is  as  we  ascend 


THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW.  73 

from  savage  to  civilized  and  from  the  lowest  among  the 
civilized  to  the  highest.  The  rhythm  of  external  actions 
required  to  maintain  the  rhythm  of  internal  actions,  be- 
comes at  once  more  complicated  and  more  complete ;  making 
them  into  a  better  moving  equilibrium.  The  irregularities 
which  their  conditions  of  existence  entail  on  primitive  men, 
continually  cause  wide  deviations  from  the  mean  state  of 
the  moving  equilibrium — wide  oscillations ;  which  imply 
imperfection  of  it  for  the  time  being,  and  bring  about  its 
premature  overthrow.  In  such  civilized  men  as  we  call 
ill-conducted,  frequent  perturbations  of  the  moving  equi- 
librium are  caused  by  those  excesses  characterizing  a  career 
in  which  the  periodicities  are  much  broken  ;  and  a  common 
result  is  that  the  rhythm  of  the  internal  actions  being  often 
deranged,  the  moving  equilibrium,  rendered  by  so  much 
imperfect,  is  generally  shortened  in  duration.  While  one  in 
whom  the  internal  rhythms  are  best  maintained  is  one  by 
whom  the  external  actions  required  to  fulfil  all  needs  and 
duties,  severally  performed  on  the  recurring  occasions,  con- 
duce to  a  moving  equilibrium  that  is  at  once  involved  and 
prolonged. 

Of  course  the  implication  is  that  the  man  who  thus 
reaches  the  limit  of  evolution,  exists  in  a  society  congruous 
with  his  nature — is  a  man  among  men  similarly  constituted, 
who  are  severally  in  harmony  with  that  social  environment 
which  they  have  formed.  This  is,  indeed,  the  only  possi- 
bility.  For  the  production  of  the  highest  type  of  man,  can  go 
on  only  pa/ri  passu  with  the  production  of  the  highest  type 
of  society.  The  implied  conditions  are  those  before  de- 
scribed as  accompanying  the  most  evolved  conduct — condi- 
tions under  which  each  can  fulfil  all  his  needs  and  rear  the 
due  number  of  progeny,  not  only  without  hindering  others 
from  doing  the  like,  but  while  aiding  them  in  doing  the  like. 
And  evidently,  considered  under  its  physical  aspect,  the  con- 
duct of  the  individual  so  constituted,  and  associated  with  like 
individuals,  is  one  in  which  all  the  actions,  that  is  the  com- 


7-4  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

bined  motions  of  all  kinds,  have  become  such  as  duly  to 
meet  every  daily  process,  every  ordinary  occurrence,  and 
every  contingency  in  his  environment.  Complete  life  in  a 
complete  society  is  but  another  name  for  complete  equi- 
librium between  the  co-ordinated  activities  of  each  social 
unit  and  those  of  the  aggregate  of  units. 

§  29.  Even  to  readers  of  preceding  volumes,  and  still 
more  to  other  readers,  there  will  seem  a  strangeness,  or 
even  an  absurdity,  in  this  presentation  of  moral  conduct  in 
physical  terms.  It  has  been  needful  to  make  it  however. 
If  that  re-distribution  of  matter  and  motion  constituting 
evolution  goes  on  in  all  aggregates,  its  laws  must  be  ful- 
filled in  the  most  developed  being  as  in  every  other  thing  ; 
and  his  actions,  when  decomposed  into  motions,  must  exem- 
plify its  laws.  This  we  find  that  they  do.  There  is  an  entire 
correspondence  between  moral  evolution  and  evolution  as 
physically  defined. 

Conduct  as  actually  known  to  us  in  perception  and  not 
as  interpreted  into  the  accompanying  feelings  and  ideas, 
consists  of  combined  motions.  On  ascending  through  the 
various  grades  of  animate  creatures,  we  find  these  combined 
motions  characterized  by  increasing  coherence,  increasing 
definiteness  considered  singly  and  in  their  co-ordinated 
groups,  and  increasing  heterogeneity ;  and  in  advancing 
from  lower  to  higher  types  of  man,  as  well  as  in  advancing 
from  the  less  moral  to  the  more  moral  type  of  man,  these 
traits  of  evolving  conduct  become  more  marked  still. 
Further,  we  see  that  the  increasing  coherence,  definiteness, 
and  heterogeneity,  of  the  combined  motions,  are  instru- 
mental to  the  better  maintenance  of  a  moving  equilibrium. 
Where  the  evolution  is  small  this  is  very  imperfect  and 
soon  cut  short ;  with  advancing  evolution,  bringing  greater 
power  and  intelligence,  it  becomes  more  steady  and 
longer  continued  in  face  of  adverse  actions  ;  in  the  human 
race  at  large  it  is  comparatively  regular  and  enduring ;  and 
its  regularity  and  enduringness  are  greatest  in  the  highest. 


CHAPTEE  VI. 

THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

§  30.  The  truth  that  the  ideally  moral  man  is  one  in 
•whom  the  moving  equilibrium  is  perfect,  or  approaches 
nearest  to  perfection,  becomes,  when  translated  into  physio- 
logical language,  the  truth  that  he  is  one  in  whom  the 
functions  of  all  kinds  are  duly  fulfilled.  Each  function  has 
some  relation,  direct  or  indirect,  to  the  needs  of  life  :  the 
fact  of  its  existence  as  a  result  of  evolution,  being  itself  a 
proof  that  it  has  been  entailed,  immediately  or  remotely,  by 
the  adjustment  of  inner  actions  to  outer  actions.  Conse- 
quently, non-fulfilment  of  it  in  normal  proportion  is  non- 
fulfilment  of  a  requisite  to  complete  life.  If  there  is 
defective  discharge  of  the  function,  the  organism  expe- 
riences some  detrimental  result  caused  by  the  inadequacy. 
If  the  discharge  is  in  excess,  there  is  entailed  a  reaction 
upon  the  other  functions,  which  in  some  way  diminishes 
their  efficiencies. 

It  is  true  that  during  full  vigour,  while  the  momentum 
of  the  organic  actions  is  great,  the  disorder  caused  by 
moderate  excess  or  defect  of  any  one  function,  soon  dis- 
appears— the  balance  is  re-established.  But  it  is  none  the 
less  true  that  always  some  disorder  results  from  excess 
or  defect,  that  it  influences  every  function  bodily  and 
mental,  and  that  it  constitutes  a  lowering  of  the  life  for  the 
time  being. 

Beyond  the  temporary  falling  short  of  complete  life  im- 

75 


76  THE   DATA  OF   ETHICS. 

plied  by  undue  or  inadequate  discharge  of  a  function,  there 
is  entailed,  as  an  ultimate  result,  decreased  length  of  life. 
If  some  function  is  habitually  performed  in  excess  of  the 
requirement,  or  in  defect  of  the  requirement ;  and  if,  as  a 
consequence,  there  is  an  often-repeated  perturbation  of  the 
functions  at  large  ;  there  results  some  chronic  derangement 
in  the  balance  of  the  functions.  Necessarily  reacting  on  the 
structures,  and  registering  in  them  its  accumulated  effects, 
this  derangement  works  a  general  deterioration ;  and  when 
the  vital  energies  begin  to  decline,  the  moving  equilibrium, 
further  from  perfection  than  it  would  else  have  been,  is 
sooner  overthrown  :  death  is  more  or  less  premature. 

Hence  the  moral  man  is  one  whose  functions — many  and 
varied  in  their  kinds  as  we  have  seen — are  all  discharged  in 
degrees  duly  adjusted  to  the  conditions  of  existence. 

§  31.  Strange  as  the  conclusion  looks,  it  is  nevertheless  a 
conclusion  to  be  here  drawn,  that  the  performance  of  every 
function  is,  in  a  sense,  a  moral  obligation. 

It  is  usually  thought  that  morality  requires  us  only  to 
restrain  such  vital  activities  as,  in  our  present  state, 
are  often  pushed  to  excess,  or  such  as  conflict  with 
average  welfare,  special  or  general ;  but  it  also  requires 
us  to  carry  on  these  vital  activities  up  to  their  normal 
limits.  All  the  animal  functions,  in  common  with  all 
the  higher  functions,  have,  as  thus  understood,  their 
imperativeness.  While  recognizing  the  fact  that  in  our 
state  of  transition,  characterized  by  very  imperfect  adap- 
tation of  constitution  to  conditions,  moral  obligations  of 
supreme  kinds  often  necessitate  conduct  which  is  physically 
injurious ;  we  must  also  recognize  the  fact  that,  considered 
apart  from  other  effects,  it  is  immoral  so  to  treat  the  body 
as  in  any  way  to  diminish  the  fulness  or  vigour  of  its 
vitality. 

Hence  results  one  test  of  actions.  There  may  in  every 
case  be  put  the  questions — Does  the  action  tend  to  main- 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  77 

tenance  of  complete  life  for  the  time  being  ?  and  does  it  tend 
to  prolongation  of  life  to  its  full  extent  ?  To  answer  yes  or 
no  to  either  of  these  questions,  is  implicitly  to  class  the 
action  as  right  or  wrong  in  respect  of  its  immediate  bearings, 
whatever  it  may  be  in  respect  of  its  remote  bearings. 

The  seeming  paradoxicalness  of  this  statement  results 
from  the  tendency,  so  difficult  of  avoidance,  to  judge  a 
conclusion  which  pre-supposes  an  ideal  humanity,  by  its 
applicability  to  humanity  as  now  existing.  The  foregoing 
conclusion  refers  to  that  highest  conduct  in  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  evolution  of  conduct  terminates — that  con- 
duct in  which  the  making  of  all  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends 
subserving  complete  individual  life,  together  with  all  those 
subserving  maintenance  of  offspring  and  preparation  of  them 
for  maturity,  not  only  consist  with  the  making  of  like  adjust- 
ments by  others,  but  furthers  it.  And  this  conception  of 
conduct  in  its  ultimate  form,  implies  the  conception  of  a 
nature  having  such  conduct  for  its  spontaneous  outcome — 
the  product  of  its  normal  activities.  So  understanding  the 
matter,  it  becomes  manifest  that  under  such  conditions,  any 
falling  short  of  function,  as  well  as  any  excess  of  function, 
implies  deviation  from  the  best  conduct  or  from  perfectly 
moral  conduct. 

§  32.  Thus  far  in  treating  of  conduct  from  the  biological 
point  of  view,  we  have  considered  its  constituent  actions 
under  their  physiological  aspects  only ;  leaving  out  of 
sight  their  psychological  aspects.  We  have  recognized  the 
bodily  changes  and  have  ignored  the  accompanying  mental 
changes.  And  at  first  sight  it  seems  needful  for  us  here  to 
do  this ;  since  taking  account  of  states  of  consciousness,  ap- 
parently implies  an  inclusion  of  the  psychological  view  in 
the  biological  view. 

This  is  not  so  however.  As  we  pointed  out  in  the 
Principles  of  Psychology  (§§  52,  53)  we  enter  upon  psy- 
chology proper,  only  when  we  begin  to  treat  of  mental 


*rg  THE   DATA  OF   ETHICS. 

etates  and  their  relations,  considered  as  referring  to  external 
agents  and  their  relations.  While  we  concern  ourselves  ex- 
clusively with  modes  of  mind  as  correlatives  of  nervous 
changes,  we  are  treating  of  what  was  there  distinguished  as 
aestho-physiology.  We  pass  to  psychology  only  when  we 
consider  the  correspondence  between  the  connexions  among 
subjective  states  and  the  connexions  among  objective  actions. 
Here,  then,  without  transgressing  the  limits  of  our  immedi- 
ate topic,  we  may  deal  with  feelings  and  functions  in  their 
mutual  dependencies. 

We  cannot  omit  doing  this ;  because  the  psychical  changes 
which  accompany  many  of  the  physical  changes  in  the 
organism,  are  biological  factors  in  two  ways.  Those  feel- 
ings, classed  as  sensations,  which,  directly  initiated  in  the 
bodily  framework,  go  along  with  certain  states  of  the  vital 
organs  and  more  conspicuously  with  certain  states  of  the 
external  organs,  now  serve  mainly  as  guides  to  the  perform- 
ance of  functions  but  partly  as  stimuli,  and  now  serve 
mainly  as  stimuli  but  in  a  smaller  degree  as  guides.  Yisual 
sensations  which,  as  co-ordinated,  enable  us  to  direct  our 
movements,  also,  if  vivid,  raise  the  rate  of  respiration ; 
while  sensations  of  cold  and  heat,  greatly  depressing  or 
raising  the  vital  actions,  serve  also  for  purposes  of  discrim- 
ination. So,  too,  the  feelings  classed  as  emotions,  which 
are  not  localizable  in  the  bodily  framework,  act  in  more 
general  ways,  alike  as  guides  and  stimuli — having  influences 
over  the  performance  of  functions  more  potent  even  than 
have  most  sensations.  Fear,  at  the  same  time  that  it  urges 
flight  and  evolves  the  forces  spent  in  it,  also  affects  the 
heart  and  the  alimentary  canal ;  while  joy,  prompting  per- 
sistence in  the  actions  bringing  it,  simultaneously  exalts  the 
yisceral  processes. 

Hence  in  treating  of  conduct  under  its  biological  aspect, 
we  are  compelled  to  consider  that  inter-action  of  feelings  and 
functions,  which  is  essential  to  animal  life  in  all  its  more 
developed  forms. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  79 

§  33.  In  the  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  124,  it  was  shown 
that  necessarily,  throughout  the  animate  world  at  large, 
u  pains  are  the  correlatives  of  actions  injurious  to  the  organ- 
ism, while  pleasures  are  the  correlatives  of  actions  conducive 
to  its  welfare ; "  since  "  it  is  an  inevitable  deduction  from 
the  hypothesis  of  Evolution,  that  races  of  sentient  creatures 
could  have  come  into  existence  under  no  other  conditions." 
The  argument  was  as  follows  : — 

If  we  substitute  for  the  word  Pleasure  the  equivalent  phrase — a  feeling 
which  we  seek  to  bring  into  consciousness  and  retain  there,  and  if  we  substitute 
for  the  word  Pain  the  equivalent  phrase — a  feeling  which  we  seek  to  get  out  of 
consciousness  and  to  keep  out ;  we  see  at  once  that,  if  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness which  a  creature  endeavours  to  maintain  are  the  correlatives  of  injurious 
actions,  and  if  the  states  of  consciousness  which  it  endeavours  to  expel  are  the 
correlatives  of  beneficial  actions,  it  must  quickly  disappear  through  persistence 
in  the  injurious  and  avoidance  of  the  beneficial.  In  other  words,  those  races 
of  beings  only  can  have  survived  in  which,  on  the  average,  agreeable  or  desired 
feelings  went  along  with  activities  conducive  to  the  maintenance  of  life,  while 
disagreeable  and  habitually-avoided  feelings  went  along  with  activities  directly 
or  indirectly  destructive  of  life;  and  there  must  ever  have  been,  other  things 
equal,  the  most  numerous  and  long-continued  survivals  among  races  in  which 
these  adjustments  of  feelings  to  actions  were  the  best,  tending  ever  to  bring 
about  perfect  adjustment. 

Fit  connexions  between  acts  and  results  must  establish 
themselves  in  living  things,  even  before  consciousness 
arises ;  and  after  the  rise  of  consciousness  these  connexions 
can  change  in  no  other  way  than  to  become  better  estab- 
lished. At  the  very  outset,  life  is  maintained  by  persistence 
in  acts  which  conduce  to  it,  and  desistance  from  acts  which 
impede  it ;  and  whenever  sentiency  makes  its  appearance  as 
an  accompaniment,  its  forms  must  be  such  that  in  the  one 
case  the  produced  feeling  is  of  a  kind  that  will  be  sought — 
pleasure,  and  in  the  other  case  is  of  a  kind  that  will  be 
shunned — pain.  Observe  the  necessity  of  these  relations  as 
exhibited  in  the  concrete. 

A  plant  which  envelops  a  buried  bone  with  a  plexus  of 
rootlets,  or  a  potato  which  directs  its  blanched  shoots  to- 
wards a  grating  through  which  light  comes  into  the  cellar, 
shows  us  that  the  changes  which  outer  agents  themselves 
7 


80  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

set  up  in  its  tissues  are  changes  which  aid  the  utilization 
of  these  agents.  If  we  ask  what  would  happen  if  a  plant's 
roots  grew  not  towards  the  place  where  there  was  moisture 
but  away  from  it,  or  if  its  leaves,  enabled  by  light  to 
assimilate,  nevertheless  bent  themselves  toward  the  dark- 
ness ;  we  see  that  death  would  result  in  the  absence  of  the 
existing  adjustments.  This  general  relation  is  still  better 
shown  in  an  insectivorous  plant,  such  as  the  Dion-cea  mus- 
cipula,  which  keeps  its  trap  closed  round  animal  matter 
but  not  round  other  matter.  Here  it  is  manifest  that  the 
stimulus  arising  from  the  first  part  of  the  absorbed  sub- 
stance, itself  sets  up  those  actions  by  which  the  mass  of  the 
substance  is  utilized  for  the  plant's  benefit.  When 

we  pass  from  vegetal  organisms  to  unconscious  animal 
organisms,  we  see  a  like  connexion  between  proclivity  and 
advantage.  On  observing  how  the  tentacles  of  a  polype 
attach  themselves  to,  and  begin  to  close  round,  a  living 
creature,  or  some  animal  substance,  while  they  are  indiffer- 
ent to  the  touch  of  other  substance ;  we  are  similarly  shown 
that  diffusion  of  some  of  the  nutritive  juices  into  the  ten- 
tacles, which  is  an  incipient  assimilation,  causes  the  motions 
effecting  prehension.  And  it  is  obvious  that  life  would 
cease  were  these  relations  reversed.  Nor  is  it  otherwise 
with  this  fundamental  connexion  between  contact  with  food 
and  taking  in  of  food,  among  conscious  creatures,  up  to  the 
very  highest.  Tasting  a  substance  implies  the  passage  of 
its  molecules  through  the  mucous  membrane  of  the  tongue 
and  palate ;  and  this  absorption,  when  it  occurs  with  a  sub- 
stance serving  for  food,  is  but  a  commencement  of  the 
absorption  carried  on  throughout  the  alimentary  canal. 
Moreover,  the  sensation  accompanying  this  absorption,  when 
it  is  of  the  kind  produced  by  food,  initiates  at  the  place 
where  it  is  strongest,  in  front  of  the  pharynx,  an  automatic 
act  of  swallowing,  in  a  manner  rudely  analogous  to  that  in 
which  the  stimulus  of  absorption  in  a  polype's  tentacles 
initiates  prehension. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  81 

If  from  these  processes  and  relations  that  imply  contact 
between  a  creature's  surface  and  the  substance  it  takes  in, 
we  turn  to  those  set  up  by  diffused  particles  of  the  sub- 
stance, constituting  to  conscious  creatures  its  odour,  we  meet 
a  kindred  general  truth.  Just  as,  after  contact,  some  mole- 
cules of  a  mass  of  food  are  absorbed  by  the  part  touched, 
and  excite  the  act  of  prehension  ;  so  are  absorbed  such  of  its 
molecules  as,  spreading  through  the  water,  reach  the  organ- 
ism ;  and,  being  absorbed  by  it,  excite  those  actions  by  which 
contact  with  the  mass  is  effected.  If  the  physical  stimulation 
caused  by  the  dispersed  particles  is  not  accompanied  by  con- 
sciousness, still  the  motor  changes  set  up  must  conduce  to 
survival  of  the  organism  if  they  are  such  as  end  in  con- 
tact ;  and  there  must  be  relative  innutrition  and  mortality 
of  organisms  in  which  the  produced  contractions  do  not 
bring  about  this  result.  Nor  can  it  be  questioned  that  when- 
ever and  wherever  the  physical  stimulation  has  a  concomitant 
sentiency,  this  must  be  such  as  consists  with,  and  conduces 
to,  movement  towards  the  nutritive  matter  :  it  must  be  not  a 
repulsive  but  an  attractive  sentiency.  And  this  which  holds 
with  the  lowest  consciousness,  must  hold  throughout ;  as  we 
see  it  do  in  all  such  superior  creatures  as  are  drawn  to  their 
food  by  odour. 

Besides  those  movements  which  cause  locomotion,  those 
which  effect  seizure  must  no  less  certainly  become  thus 
adjusted.  The  molecular  changes  caused  by  absorption  of 
nutritive  matter  from  organic  substance  in  contact,  or 
from  adjacent  organic  substance,  initiate  motions  which 
are  indefinite  where  the  organization  is  low,  and  whicli 
become  more  definite  with  the  advance  of  organization. 
At  the  outset,  while  the  undifferentiated  protoplasm  is 
everywhere  absorbent  and  everywhere  contractile,  the 
changes  of  form  initiated  by  the  physical  stimulation  of 
adjacent  nutritive  matter  are  vague,  and  ineffectually  adapted 
to  utilization  of  it ;  but  gradually,  along  with  the  special- 
ization into  parts  that  are  contractile  and  parts  that  are 


82  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

absorbent,  these  motions  become  better  adapted  ;  for  neces- 
sarily individuals  in  which  they  are  least  adapted  disappear 
faster  than  those  in  which  they  are  most  adapted.  Recog- 
nizing this  necessity  we  have  here  especially  to  recognize 
a  further  necessity.  The  relation  between  these  stimula- 
tions and  adjusted  contractions  must  be  such  that  increase 
of  the  one  causes  increase  of  the  other ;  since  the  directions 
of  the  discharges  being  once  established,  greater  stimula- 
tion causes  greater  contraction,  and  the  greater  contraction 
causing  closer  contact  with  the  stimulating  agent,  causes 
increase  of  stimulus  and  is  thereby  itself  further  increased. 
And  now  we  reach  the  corollary  which  more  particularly 
concerns  us.  Clearly  as  fast  as  an  accompanying  sentiency 
arises,  this  cannot  be  one  that  is  disagreeable,  prompting 
desistance,  but  must  be  one  that  is  agreeable,  prompting 
persistence.  The  pleasurable  sensation  must  be  itself  the 
stimulus  to  the  contraction  by  which  the  pleasurable  sensa- 
tion is  maintained  and  increased ;  or  must  be  so  bound  up 
with  the  stimulus  that  the  two  increase  together.  And  this 
relation  which  we  see  is  directly  established  in  the  case  of 
a  fundamental  function,  must  be  indirectly  established  with 
all  other  functions  ;  since  non-establishment  of  it  in  any 
particular  case  implies,  in  so  far,  unfitness  to  the  conditions 
of  existence. 

In  two  ways  then,  it  is  demonstrable  that  there  exists  a 
primordial  connexion  between  pleasure-giving  acts  and  con- 
tinuance or  increase  of  life,  and,  by  implication,  between 
pain-giving  acts  and  decrease  or  loss  of  life.  On  the  one 
hand,  setting  out  with  the  lowest  living  things,  we  see  that 
the  beneficial  act  and  the  act  which  there  is  a  tendency  to 
perform,  are  originally  two  sides  of  the  same ;  and  cannot 
be  disconnected  without  fatal  results.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
we  contemplate  developed  creatures  as  now  existing,  we  see 
that  each  individual  and  species  is  from  day  to  day  kept 
alive  by  pursuit  of  the  agreeable  and  avoidance  of  the  dis- 
agreeable. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  83 

Thus  approaching  the  facts  from  a  different  side,  analysis 
brings  us  down  to  another  face  of  that  ultimate  truth  dis- 
closed by  analysis  in  a  preceding  chapter.  "We  found  it  was 
no  more  possible  to  frame  ethical  conceptions  from  \vhich 
the  consciousness  of  pleasure,  of  some  kind,  at  some  time,  to 
some  being,  is  absent,  than  it  is  possible  to  frame  the  con- 
ception of  an  object  from  which  the  consciousness  of  space 
is  absent.  And  now  we  see  that  this  necessity  of  thought 
originates  in  the  very  nature  of  sentient  existence.  Sentient 
existence  can  evolve  only  on  condition  that  pleasure-giving 
acts  are  life-sustaining  acts. 

§  34.  Notwithstanding  explanations  already  made,  the 
naked  enunciation  of  this  as  an  ultimate  truth,  underlying 
all  estimations  of  right  and  wrong,  will  in  many,  if  not  in 
most,  cause  astonishment.  Having  in  view  certain  beneficial 
results  that  are  preceded  by  disagreeable  states  of  conscious- 
ness, such  as  those  commonly  accompanying  labour ;  and 
having  in  view  the  injurious  results  that  follow  the  receipt 
of  certain  gratifications,  such  as  those  which  excess  in  drink- 
ing produces  ;  the  majority  tacitly  or  avowedly  believe  that 
the  bearing  of  pains  is  on  the  whole  beneficial,  and  that  the 
receipt  of  pleasures  is  on  the  whole  detrimental.  The  excep- 
tions so  fill  their  minds  as  to  exclude  the  rule. 

When  asked,  they  are  obliged  to  admit  that  the  pains  ac- 
companying wounds,  bruises,  sprains,  are  the  concomitants 
of  evils,  alike  to  the  sufferer  and  to  those  around  him  ;  and 
that  the  anticipations  of  such  pains  serve  as  deterrents  from 
careless  or  dangerous  acts.  They  cannot  deny  that  the 
tortures  of  burning  or  scalding,  and  the  miseries  which  in- 
tense cold,  starvation,  and  thirst  produce,  are  indissolubly 
connected  with  permanent  or  temporary  mischiefs,  tending 
to  incapacitate  one  who  bears  them  for  doing  things  that 
should  be  done,  either  for  his  own  welfare  or  the  welfare  of 
others.  The  agony  of  incipient  suffocation  they  are  com- 
pelled to  recognize  as  a  safeguard  to  life,  and  must  allow 


84  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

that  avoidance  of  it  is  conducive  to  all  that  life  can  bring 
or  achieve.  Nor  will  they  refuse  to  own  that  one  who  is 
chained  in  a  cold,  damp,  dungeon,  in  darkness  and  silence, 
is  injured  in  health  and  efficiency ;  alike  by  the  positive 
pains  thus  inflicted  on  him  and  by  the  accompanying  nega- 
tive pains  due  to  absence  of  light,  of  freedom,  of  com- 
panionship. Conversely,  they  do  not  doubt  that 
notwithstanding  occasional  excesses  the  pleasure  which  ac- 
companies the  taking  of  food,  goes  along  with  physical 
benefit ;  and  that  the  benefit  is  the  greater  the  keener  the 
satisfaction  of  appetite.  They  have  no  choice  but  to  ac- 
knowledge that  the  instincts  and  sentiments  which  so  over- 
poweringly  prompt  marriage,  and  those  which  find  their 
gratification  in  the  fostering  of  offspring,  work  out  an 
immense  surplus  of  benefit  after  deducting  all  evils.  Nor 
dare  they  question  that  the  pleasure  taken  in  accumulating 
property,  leaves  a  large  balance  of  advantage,  private  and 
public,  after  making  all  drawbacks.  Yet  many  and  con- 
spicuous as  are  the  cases  in  which  pleasures  and  pains, 
sensational  and  emotional,  serve  as  incentives  to  proper  acts 
and  deterrents  from  improper  acts,  these  pass  unnoticed  ; 
and  notice  is  taken  only  of  those  cases  in  which  men  are 
directly  or  indirectly  misled  by  them.  The  well-working  in 
essential  matters  is  ignored  ;  and  the  ill-working  in  unessen- 
tial matters  is  alone  recognized. 

Is  it  replied  that  the  more  intense  pains  and  pleasures, 
which  have  immediate  reference  to  bodily  needs,  guide  us 
rightly ;  while  the  weaker  pains  and  pleasures,  not  immediate- 
ly connected  with  the  maintenance  of  life,  guide  us  wrongly  ? 
Then  the  implication  is  that  the  system  of  guidance  by  pleas- 
ures and  pains,  which  has  answered  with  all  types  of  crea- 
tures below  the  human,  fails  with  the  human.  Or  rather,  the 
admission  being  that  with  mankind  it  succeeds  in  so  far  as 
fulfilment  of  certain  imperative  wants  goes,  it  fails  in  respect 
of  wants  that  are  not  imperative.  Those  who  think  this 
are  required,  in  the  first  place,  to  show  us  how  the  line  is 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  85 

to  be  drawn  between  the  two  ;  and  then  to  show  us  why 
the  system  which  succeeds  in  the  lower  will  not  succeed  in 
the  higher. 

§  35.  Doubtless,  however,  after  all  that  has  been  said, 
there  will  be  raised  afresh  the  same  difficulty — there  will  be 
instanced  the  mischievous  pleasures  and  the  beneficent  pains. 
The  drunkard,  the  gambler,  the  thief,  who  severally  pursue 
gratifications,  will  be  named  in  proof  that  the  pursuit  of 
gratifications  misleads  ;  while  the  self-sacrificing  relative,  the 
worker  who  perseveres  through  weariness,  the  honest  man 
who  stints  himself  to  pay  his  way,  will  be  named  in  proof 
that  disagreeable  modes  of  consciousness  accompany  acts 
that  are  really  beneficial.  But  after  recalling  the  fact 
pointed  out  in  §  20,  that  this  objection  does  not  tell  against 
guidance  by  pleasures  and  pains  at  large,  since  it  merely 
implies  that  special  and  proximate  pleasures  and  pains  must 
be  disregarded  out  of  consideration  for  remote  and  diffused 
pleasures  and  pains  ;  and  after  admitting  that  in  mankind  as 
at  present  constituted,  guidance  by  proximate  pleasures  and 
pains  fails  throughout  a  wide  range  of  cases  ;  I  go  on  to 
set  forth  the  interpretation  Biology  gives  of  these  anomalies, 
as  being  not  necessary  and  permanent  but  incidental  and 
temporary. 

Already  while  showing  that  among  inferior  creatures, 
pleasures  and  pains  have  all  along  guided  the  conduct  by 
which  life  has  been  evolved  and  maintained,  I  have  pointed 
out  that  since  the  conditions  of  existence  for  each  species 
have  been  occasionally  changing,  there  have  been  occasion- 
ally arising  partial  mis-adjustments  of  the  feelings  to  the 
requirements,  necessitating  re-adjustments.  This  general 
cause  of  derangement  operating  on  all  sentient  beings,  has 
been  operating  on  human  beings  in  a  manner  unusually 
decided,  persistent,  and  involved.  It  needs  but  to  contrast 
the  mode  of  life  followed  by  primitive  men,  wandering  in 
the  forests  and  living  on  wild  food,  with  the  mode  of  life 


86  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

followed  by  rustics,  artisans,  traders,  and  professional  men 
in  a  civilized  community ;  to  see  that  the  constitution, 
bodily  and  mental,  well-adjusted  to  the  one  is  ill-adjusted 
to  the  other.  It  needs  but  to  observe  the  emotions  kept 
awake  in  each  savage  tribe,  chronically  hostile  to  neighbour- 
ing tribes,  and  then  to  observe  the  emotions  which  peaceful 
production  and  exchange  bring  into  play,  to  see  that  the 
two  are  not  only  unlike  but  opposed.  And  it  needs  but 
to  note  how,  during  social  evolution,  the  ideas  and  senti- 
ments appropriate  to  the  militant  activities  carried  on  by 
coercive  co-operation,  have  been  at  variance  with  the  ideas 
and  sentiments  appropriate  to  the  industrial  activities, 
carried  on  by  voluntary  co-operation  ;  to  see  that  there 
has  ever  been  within  each  society,  and  still  continues,  a 
conflict  between  the  two  moral  natures  adjusted  to  these 
two  unlike  modes  of  life.  Manifestly,  then,  this  re-adjust- 
ment of  constitution  to  conditions,  involving  re-adjustment 
of  pleasures  and  pains  for  guidance,  which  all  creatures 
from  time  to  time  undergo,  has  been  in  the  human  race 
during  civilization,  especially  difficult;  not  only  because 
of  the  greatness  of  the  change  from  small  nomadic  groups 
to  vast  settled  societies,  and  from  predatory  habits  to  peace- 
ful habits ;  but  also  because  the  old  life  of  enmity  between 
societies  has  been  maintained  along  with  the  new  life  of 
amity  within  each  society.  While  there  co-exist  two  ways 
of  life  so  radically  opposed  as  the  militant  and  the  indus- 
trial, human  nature  cannot  become  properly  adapted  to 
either. 

That  hence  results  such  failure  of  guidance  by  pleasures 
and  pains  as  is  daily  exhibited,  we  discover  on  observing 
in  what  parts  of  conduct  the  failure  is  most  conspicuous. 
As  above  shown,  the  pleasurable  and  painful  sensations  are 
fairly  well  adjusted  to  the  peremptory  physical  require- 
ments :  the  benefits  of  conforming  to  the  sensations  which 
prompt  us  in  respect  of  nutrition,  respiration,  maintenance 
of  temperature,  &c.,  immensely  exceed  the  incidental  evils  ; 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  87 

and  such  mis-adjustments  as  occur  may  be  ascribed  to  the 
change  from  the  out-door  life  of  the  primitive  man  to  the 
in-door  life  which  the  civilized  man  is  often  compelled  to 
lead.  It  is  the  emotional  pleasures  and  pains  which  are  in 
so  considerable  a  degree  out  of  adjustment  to  the  needs  of  life 
as  carried  on  in  society ;  and  it  is  of  these  that  the  re-adjust- 
ment is  made,  in  the  way  above  shown,  so  tardy  because  so 
difficult. 

From  the  biological  point  of  view  then,  we  see  that  the 
connexions  between  pleasure  and  beneficial  action  and  be- 
tween pain  and  detrimental  action,  which  arose  when  sen- 
tient existence  began,  and  have  continued  among  animate 
creatures  up  to  man,  are  generally  displayed  in  him  also 
throughout  the  lower  and  more  completely-organized  part  of 
his  nature ;  and  must  be  more  and  more  fully  displayed 
throughout  the  higher  part  of  his  nature,  as  fast  as  his 
adaptation  to  the  conditions  of  social  life  increases. 

§  36.  Biology  has  a  further  judgment  to  pass  on  the  rela- 
tions of  pleasures  and  pains  to  welfare.  Beyond  the  con- 
nexions between  acts  beneficial  to  the  organism  and  the 
pleasures  accompanying  performance  of  them,  and  between 
acts  detrimental  to  the  organism  and  the  pains  causing 
desistance  from  them,  there  are  connexions  between  pleasure 
in  general  and  physiological  exaltation,  and  between  pain  in 
general  and  physiological  depression.  Every  pleasure  in- 
creases vitality  ;  every  pain  decreases  vitality.  Every  pleas- 
ure raises  the  tide  of  life  ;  every  pain  lowers  the  tide  of  life. 
Let  us  consider,  first,  the  pains. 

By  the  general  mischiefs  that  result  from  submission  to 
pains,  I  do  not  mean  those  arising  from  the  diffused  effects 
of  local  organic  lesions,  such  as  follow  an  aneurism  caused 
by  intense  effort  spite  of  protesting  sensations,  or  such  as 
follow  the  varicose  veins  brought  on  by  continued  disregard 
of  fatigue  in  the  legs,  or  such  as  follow  the  atrophy  set  up 
in  muscles  that  are  persistently  exerted  when  extremely 


88  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

weary  ;  but  I  mean  the  general  mischiefs  caused  by  that 
constitutional  disturbance  which  pain  forthwith  sets  up. 
These  are  conspicuous  when  the  pains  are  acute,  whether 
they  be  sensational  or  emotional.  Bodily  agony 

long  borne,  produces  death  by  exhaustion.  More  fre- 
quently, arresting  the  action  of  the  heart  for  a  time,  it 
causes  that  temporary  death  we  call  fainting.  On  other 
occasions  vomiting  is  a  consequence.  And  where  such 
manifest  derangements  do  not  result,  we  still,  in  the  pallor 
and  trembling,  trace  the  general  prostration.  Beyond  the 
actual  loss  of  life  caused  by  subjection  to  intense  cold,  there 
are  depressions  of  vitality  less  marked  caused  by  cold  less 
extreme — temporary  enfeeblement  following  too  long  an 
immereion  in  icy  water ;  enervation  and  pining  away  con- 
sequent on  inadequate  clothing.  Similarly  is  it  with  submis- 
sion to  great  heat :  we  have  lassitude  reaching  occasionally 
to  exhaustion ;  we  have,  in  weak  persons,  fainting,  suc- 
ceeded by  temporary  debilitation ;  and  in  steaming  tropical 
jungles,  Europeans  contract  fevers  which  when  not  fatal 
often  entail  life-long  incapacities.  Consider,  again,  the 
evils  that  follow  violent  exertion  continued  in  spite  of 
painful  feelings — now  a  fatigue  which  destroys  appetite  or 
arrests  digestion  if  food  is  taken,  implying  failure  of  the 
reparative  processes  when  they  are  most  needed  ;  and  now 
a  prostration  of  the  heart,  here  lasting  for  a  time  and  there, 
where  the  transgression  has  been  repeated  day  after  day, 
made  permanent :  reducing  the  rest  of  life  to  a  lower 
level.  No  less  conspicuous  are  the  depressing  effects 

of  emotional  pains.  There  are  occasional  cases  of  death 
from  grief  ;  and  in  other  cases  the  mental  suffering  which  a 
calamity  causes,  like  bodily  suffering,  shows  its  effects  by 
syncope.  Often  a  piece  of  bad  news  is  succeeded  by  sick- 
ness ;  and  continued  anxiety  will  produce  loss  of  appetite, 
perpetual  indigestion,  and  diminished  strength.  Excessive 
fear,  whether  aroused  by  physical  or  moral  danger,  will,  in 
like  manner,  arrest  for  a  time  the  processes  of  nutrition ; 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  89 

and,  not  tmfrequently,  in  pregnant  women  brings  on  mis- 
carriage ;  while,  in  less  extreme  cases,  the  cold  perspiration 
and  unsteady  hands  indicate  a  general  lowering  of  the  vital 
activities,  entailing  partial  incapacity  of  body  or  mind  or 
both.  How  greatly  emotional  pain  deranges  the  visceral 
actions  is  shown  us  by  the  fact  that  incessant  worry  is  not 
unf requently  followed  by  jaundice.  And  here,  indeed,  the 
relation  between  cause  and  effect  happens  to  have  been 
proved  by  direct  experiment.  Making  such  arrangements 
that  the  bile-duct  of  a  dog  delivered  its  product  outside  the 
body,  Claude  Bernard  observed  that  so  long  as  he  petted  the 
dog  and  kept  him  in  good  spirits,  secretion  went  on  at  its 
normal  rate ;  but  on  speaking  angrily,  and  for  a  time  so 
treating  him  as  to  produce  depression,  the  flow  of  bile 
was  arrested.  Should  it  be  said  that  evil  results  of 

such  kinds  are  proved  to  occur  only  when  the  pains,  bodily 
or  mental,  are  great ;  the  reply  is  that  in  healthy  persons 
the  injurious  perturbations  caused  by  small  pains,  though 
not  easily  traced,  are  still  produced  ;  and  that  in  those 
whose  vital  powers  are  much  reduced  by  illness,  slight 
physical  irritations  and  trifling  moral  annoyances,  often 
cause  relapses. 

Quite  opposite  are  the  constitutional  effects  of  pleasure. 
It  sometimes,  though  rarely,  happens  that  in  feeble  persons 
intense  pleasure — pleasure  that  is  almost  pain — gives  a 
nervous  shock  that  is  mischievous  ;  but  it  does  not  do 
this  in  those  who  are  undebilitated  by  voluntary  or  enforced 
submission  to  actions  injurious  to  the  organism.  In  the 
normal  order,  pleasures,  great  and  small,  are  stimulants  to 
the  processes  by  which  life  is  maintained.  Among 

the  sensations  may  be  instanced  those  produced  by  bright 
light.  Sunshine  is  enlivening  in  comparison  with  gloom 
— even  a  gleam  excites  a  wave  of  pleasure ;  and  experiments 
have  shown  that  sunshine  raises  the  rate  of  respiration : 
raised  respiration  being  an  index  of  raised  vital  activities  in 
general.  A  warmth  that  is  agreeable  in  degree  favours  the 


90  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

heart's  action,  and  furthers  the  various  functions  to  which 
this  is  instrumental.  Though  those  who  are  in  full  vigour 
and  fitly  clothed,  can  maintain  their  temperature  in  winter, 
and  can  digest  additional  food  to  make  up  for  the  loss  of 
heat,  it  is  otherwise  with  the  feeble ;  and,  as  vigour  declines, 
the  beneficence  of  warmth  becomes  conspicuous.  That 
benefits  accompany  the  agreeable  sensations  produced  by 
fresh  air,  and  the  agreeable  sensations  that  accompany 
muscular  action  after  due  rest,  and  the  agreeable  sensations 
caused  by  rest  after  exertion,  cannot  be  questioned.  Receipt 
of  these  pleasures  conduces  to  the  maintenance  of  the  body 
in  fit  condition  for  all  the  purposes  of  life.  More 

manifest  still  are  the  physiological  benefits  of  emotional 
pleasures.  Every  power,  bodily  and  mental,  is  increased 
by  "  good  spirits ; "  which  is  our  name  for  a  general 
emotional  satisfaction.  The  truth  that  the  fundamental 
vital  actions — those  of  nutrition — are  furthered  by  laughter- 
moving  conversation,  or  rather  by  the  pleasurable  feeling 
causing  laughter,  is  one  of  old  standing;  and  every  dys- 
peptic knows  that  in  exhilarating  company,  a  large  and 
varied  dinner  including  not  very  digestible  things,  may  be 
eaten  with  impunity,  and  indeed  with  benefit,  while  a  small, 
carefully-chosen  dinner  of  simple  things,  eaten  in  solitude, 
will  be  followed  by  indigestion.  This  striking  effect  on  the 
alimentary  system  is  accompanied  by  effects,  equally  certain 
though  less  manifest,  on  the  circulation  and  the  respiration. 
Again,  one  who,  released  from  daily  labours  and  anxieties, 
receives  delights  from  fine  scenery  or  is  enlivened  by  the 
novelties  he  sees  abroad,  comes  back  showing  by  toned-up 
face  and  vivacious  manner,  the  greater  energy  with  which 
he  is  prepared  to  pursue  his  avocation.  Invalids  especially, 
on  whose  narrowed  margin  of  vitality  the  influence  of  con- 
ditions is  most  visible,  habitually  show  the  benefits  derived 
from  agreeable  states  of  feeling.  A  lively  social  circle, 
the  call  of  an  old  friend,  or  even  removal  to  a  brighter 
room,  will,  by  the  induced  cheerfulness,  much  improve  the 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  91 

physical  state.     In  brief,  as  every  medical  man  knows,  there 
is  no  such  tonic  as  happiness. 

These  diffused  physiological  effects  of  pleasures  and  pains, 
which  are  joined  with  the  local  or  special  physiological 
effects,  are,  indeed,  obviously  inevitable.  We  have  seen 
(Principles  of  Psychology,  §§  123-125)  that  while  craving, 
or  negative  pain,  accompanies  the  under  -  activity  of  an 
organ,  and  while  positive  pain  accompanies  its  over-activity, 
pleasure  accompanies  its  normal  activity.  We  have  seen 
that  by  evolution  no  other  relations  could  be  established ; 
since,  through  all  inferior  types  of  creatures,  if  defect  or 
excess  of  function  produced  no  disagreeable  sentiency,  and 
medium  function  no  agreeable  sentiency,  there  would  be 
nothing  to  ensure  a  proportioned  performance  of  function. 
And  as  it  is  one  of  the  laws  of  nervous  action  that  each 
stimulus,  beyond  a  direct  discharge  to  the  particular  organ 
acted  on,  indirectly  causes  a  general  discharge  throughout 
the  nervous  system  (Prin.  of  Psy.  §§  21,  39),  it  results  that 
the  rest  of  the  organs,  all  influenced  as  they  are  by  the 
nervous  system,  participate  in  the  stimulation.  So  that 
beyond  the  aid,  more  slowly  shown,  which  the  organs  yield 
to  one  another  through  the  physiological  division  of  labour, 
there  is  the  aid,  more  quickly  shown,  which  mutual  excita- 
tion gives.  While  there  is  a  benefit  to  be  presently 
felt  by  the  whole  organism  from  the  due  performance  of 
each  function,  there  is  an  immediate  benefit  from  the  ex- 
altation of  its  functions  at  large  caused  by  the  accom- 
panying pleasure;  and  from  pains,  whether  of  excess  or 
defect,  there  also  come  these  double  effects,  immediate  and 
remote. 

§  37.  Non-recognition  of  these  general  truths  vitiates 
moral  speculation  at  large.  From  the  estimate  of  right 
and  wrong  habitually  framed,  these  physiological  effects 
wrought  on  the  actor  by  his  feelings  are  entirely  omitted. 
It  is  tacitly  assumed  that  pleasures  and  pains  have  no 


92  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

reactions  on  the  body  of  the  recipient,  affecting  his  fitness 
for  the  duties  of  life.  The  only  reactions  recognized  are 
those  on  character ;  respecting  which  the  current  supposi- 
tion is,  that  acceptance  of  pleasures  is  detrimental  and 
submission  to  pains  beneficial.  The  notion,  remotely  de- 
scended from  the  ghost-theory  of  the  savage,  that  mind  and 
body  are  independent,  has,  among  its  various  implications, 
this  belief  that  states  of  consciousness  are  in  no  wise  re- 
lated to  bodily  states.  "  You  have  had  your  gratification 
— it  is  past ;  and  you  are  as  you  were  before,"  says  the 
moralist  to  one.  And  to  another  he  says,  "You  have 
borne  the  suffering — it  is  over ;  and  there  the  matter  ends." 
Both  statements  are  false.  Leaving  out  of  view  indirect 
results,  the  direct  results  are  that  the  one  has  moved  a  step 
away  from  death  and  the  other  has  moved  a  step  towards 
death. 

Leaving  out  of  view,  I  say,  the  indirect  results.  It  is 
these  indirect  results,  here  for  the  moment  left  out  of  view, 
which  the  moralist  has  conclusively  in  view :  being  so 
occupied  by  them  that  he  ignores  the  direct  results.  The 
gratification,  perhaps  purchased  at  undue  cost,  perhaps  en- 
joyed when  work  should  have  been  done,  perhaps  snatched 
from  the  rightful  claimant,  is  considered  only  in  relation  to 
remote  injurious  effects,  and  no  set-off  is  made  for  imme- 
diate beneficial  effects.  Conversely,  from  positive  and  nega- 
tive pains,  borne  now  in  the  pursuit  of  some  future  advan- 
tage, now  in  discharge  of  responsibilities,  now  in  performing 
a  generous  act,  the  distant  good  is  alone  dwelt  on  and  the 
proximate  evil  ignored.  Consequences,  pleasurable  and 
painful,  experienced  by  the  actor  forthwith,  are  of  no  im- 
portance ;  and  they  become  of  importance  only  when  antici- 
pated as  occurring  hereafter  to  the  actor  or  to  other  persons. 
And  further,  future  evils  borne  by  the  actor  are  considered 
of  no  account  if  they  result  from  self-denial,  and  are  em- 
phasized only  when  they  result  from  self-gratification.  Ob- 
viously, estimates  so  framed  are  erroneous ;  and  obviously, 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  93 

the  pervading  judgments  of  conduct  based  on  such  esti- 
mates must  be  distorted.  Mark  the  anomalies  of  opinion 
produced. 

If,  as  the  sequence  of  a  malady  contracted  in  pursuit  of 
illegitimate  gratification,  an  attack  of  iritis  injures  vision, 
the  mischief  is  to  be  counted  among  those  entailed  by  im- 
moral conduct ;  but  if,  regardless  of  protesting  sensations, 
the  eyes  are  used  in  study  too  soon  after  ophthalmia,  and 
there  follows  blindness  for  years  or  for  life,  entailing  not 
only  personal  unhappiness  but  a  burden  on  others,  moralists 
are  silent.  The  broken  leg  which  a  drunkard's  accident 
causes,  counts  among  those  miseries  brought  on  self  and 
family  by  intemperance,  which  form  the  ground  for  repro- 
bating it ;  but  if  anxiety  to  fulfil  duties  prompts  the 
continued  use  of  a  sprained  knee  spite  of  the  pain,  and 
brings  on  a  chronic  lameness  involving  lack  of  exercise, 
consequent  ill-health,  inefficiency,  anxiety,  and  unhappiness, 
it  is  supposed  that  ethics  has  no  verdict  to  give  in  the 
matter.  A  student  who  is  plucked  because  he  has  spent 
in  amusement  the  time  and  money  that  should  have 
gone  in  study,  is  blamed  for  thus  making  parents  un- 
happy and  preparing  for  himself  a  miserable  future ; 
but  another  who,  thinking  exclusively  of  claims  on  him, 
reads  night  after  night  with  hot  or  aching  head,  and, 
breaking  down,  cannot  take  his  degree,  but  returns  home 
shattered  in  health  and  unable  to  support  himself,  is 
named  with  pity  only,  as  not  subject  to  any  moral  judg- 
ment ;  or  rather,  the  moral  judgment  passed  is  wholly 
favourable. 

Thus  recognizing  the  evils  caused  by  some  kinds  of  con- 
duct only,  men  at  large,  and  moralists  as  exponents  of 
their  beliefs,  ignore  the  suffering  and  death  daily  caused 
around  them  by  disregard  of  that  guidance  which  has 
established  itself  in  the  course  of  evolution.  Led  by  the 
tacit  assumption,  common  to  Pagan  stoics  and  Christian 
ascetics,  that  we  are  so  diabolically  organized  that  pleasures 


94  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

are  injurious  and  pains  beneficial,  people  on  all  sides  yield 
examples  of  lives  blasted  by  persisting  in  actions  against 
which  their  sensations  rebel.  Here  is  one  who,  drenched 
to  the  skin  and  sitting  in  a  cold  wind,  pooh-poohs  his  shiv- 
erings  and  gets  rheumatic  fever  with  subsequent  heart- 
disease,  which  makes  worthless  the  short  life  remaining 
to  him.  Here  is  another  who,  disregarding  painful  feel- 
ings, works  too  soon  after  a  debilitating  illness,  and  estab- 
lishes disordered  health  that  lasts  for  the  rest  of  his  days, 
and  makes  him  useless  to  himself  and  others.  Now  the 
account  is  of  a  youth  who,  persisting  in  gymnastic  feats 
spite  of  scarcely  bearable  straining,  bursts  a  blood  vessel, 
and,  long  laid  on  the  shelf,  is  permanently  damaged ;  while 
now  it  is  of  a  man  in  middle  life  who,  pushing  muscular 
effort  to  painful  excess,  suddenly  brings  on  hernia.  In  this 
family  is  a  case  of  aphasia,  spreading  paralysis,  and  death, 
caused  by  eating  too  little  and  doing  too  much ;  in  that, 
softening  of  the  brain  has  been  brought  on  by  ceaseless 
mental  efforts  against  which  the  feelings  hourly  protested  ; 
and  in  others,  less  serious  brain-affections  have  been  con- 
tracted by  over-study  continued  regardless  of  discomfort 
and  the  cravings  for  fresh  air  and  exercise.*  Even  without 
accumulating  special  examples,  the  truth  is  forced  on  us  by 
the  visible  traits  of  classes.  The  careworn  man  of  business 
too  long  at  his  office,  the  cadaverous  barrister  poring  half 
the  night  over  his  briefs,  the  feeble  factory  hands  and 
unhealthy  seamstresses  passing  long  hours  in  bad  air,  the 
anaemic,  flat-chested  school  girls,  bending  over  many  lessons 
and  forbidden  boisterous  play,  no  less  than  Sheffield  grinders 
who  die  of  suffocating  dust,  and  peasants  crippled  with 
rheumatism  due  to  exposure,  show  us  the  wide-spread 
miseries  caused  by  persevering  in  actions  repugnant  to  the 
sensations  and  neglecting  actions  which  the  sensations 
prompt.  Nay  the  evidence  is  still  more  extensive  and 

*  I  can  count  up  more  than  a  dozen  such  cases  among  those  personally  well 
known  to  me. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  95 

conspicuous.  What  are  the  puny  malformed  children 
seen  in  poverty-stricken  districts,  but  children  whose  ap- 
petites for  food  and  desires  for  warmth  have  not  been 
adequately  satisfied  ?  What  are  populations  stinted  in 
growth  and  prematurely  aged,  such  as  parts  of  France 
show  us,  but  populations  injured  by  work  in  excess  and 
food  in  defect :  the  one  implying  positive  pain,  the  other 
negative  pain  ?  What  is  the  implication  of  that  greater 
mortality  which  occurs  among  people  who  are  weakened  by 
privations,  unless  it  is  that  bodily  miseries  conduce  to  fatal 
illnesses  ?  Or  once  more,  what  must  we  infer  from  the 
frightful  amount  of  disease  and  death  suffered  by  armies  in 
the  field,  fed  on  scanty  and  bad  provisions,  lying  on  damp 
ground,  exposed  to  extremes  of  heat  and  cold,  inadequately 
sheltered  from  rain,  and  subject  to  exhausting  efforts ; 
unless  it  be  the  terrible  mischiefs  caused  by  continuously 
subjecting  the  body  to  treatment  which  the  feelings  protest 
against  ? 

It  matters  not  to  the  argument  whether  the  actions  entail- 
ing such  effects  are  voluntary  or  involuntary.  It  matters 
not  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  whether  the  motives 
prompting  them  are  high  or  low.  The  vital  functions  accept 
no  apologies  on  the  ground  that  neglect  of  them  was  un- 
avoidable, or  that  the  reason  for  neglect  was  noble.  The 
direct  and  indirect  sufferings  caused  by  nonconformity  to 
the  laws  of  life,  are  the  same  whatever  induces  the  non- 
conformity ;  and  cannot  be  omitted  in  any  rational  estimate 
of  conduct.  If  the  purpose  of  ethical  inquiry  is  to  establish 
rules  of  right  living;  and  if  the  rules  of  right  living  are 
those  of  which  the  total  results,  individual  and  general, 
direct  and  indirect,  are  most  conducive  to  human  happiness ; 
then  it  is  absurd  to  ignore  the  immediate  results  and  recog- 
nize only  the  remote  results. 

§  38.  Here  might  be  urged  the  necessity  for  preluding 
the  study   of    moral   science,   by  the   study  of    biological 
8 


96  THE  DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

science.  Here  might  be  dwelt  on  the  error  men  make  in 
thinking  they  can  understand  those  special  phenomena  of 
human  life  with  which  Ethics  deals,  while  paying  little  or 
no  attention  to  the  general  phenomena  of  human  life,  and 
while  utterly  ignoring  the  phenomena  of  life  at  large.  And 
doubtless  there  would  be  truth  in  the  inference  that  such 
acquaintance  with  the  world  of  living  things  as  discloses  the 
part  which  pleasures  and  pains  have  played  in  organic 
evolution,  would  help  to  rectify  these  one-sided  conceptions 
of  moralists.  It  cannot  be  held,  however,  that  lack  of  this 
knowledge  is  the  sole  cause,  or  the  main  cause,  of  their 
one-sidedness.  For  facts  of  the  kind  above  instanced, 
which,  duly  attended  to,  would  prevent  such  distortions  of 
moral  theory,  are  facts  which  it  needs  no  biological  inquiries 
to  learn,  but  which  are  daily  thrust  before  the  eyes  of  all. 
The  truth  is,  rather,  that  the  general  consciousness  is  so 
possessed  by  sentiments  and  ideas  at  variance  with  the  con- 
clusions necessitated  by  familiar  evidence,  that  the  evidence 
gets  no  attention.  These  adverse  sentiments  and  ideas  have 
several  roots. 

There  is  the  theological  root.  As  before  shown,  from  the 
worship  of  cannibal  ancestors  who  delighted  in  witnessing 
tortures,  there  resulted  the  primitive  conception  of  deities 
who  were  propitiated  by  the  bearing  of  pains,  and,  conse- 
quently, angered  by  the  receipt  of  pleasures.  Through  the 
religions  of  the  semi-civilized,  in  which  this  conception  of 
the  divine  nature  remains  conspicuous,  it  has  persisted, 
in  progressively  modified  forms,  down  to  our  own  times ; 
and  still  colours  the  beliefs,  both  of  those  who  adhere 
to  the  current  creed  and  of  those  who  nominally  reject 
it.  There  is  another  root  in  the  primitive  and  still- 

surviving  militancy.  While  social  antagonisms  continue  to 
generate  war,  which  consists  in  endeavours  to  inflict  pain 
and  death  while  submitting  to  the  risks  of  pain  and  death, 
and  which  necessarily  involves  great  privations ;  it  is  need- 
ful that  physical  suffering,  whether  considered  in  itself  or  in 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  97 

the  evils  it  bequeaths,  should  be  thought  little  of,  and  that 
among  pleasures  recognized  as  most  worthy  should  be  those 
which  victory  brings.  Nor  does  partially-developed 

industrialism  fail  to  furnish  a  root.  With  social  evolution, 
which  implies  transition  from  the  life  of  wandering  hunters 
to  the  life  of  settled  peoples  engaged  in  labour,  and  which 
therefore  entails  activities  widely  unlike  those  to  which  the 
aboriginal  constitution  is  adapted,  there  comes  an  under- 
exercise  of  faculties  for  which  the  social  state  affords  no 
scope,  and  an  over-taxing  of  faculties  required  for  the  social 
state :  the  one  implying  denial  of  certain  pleasures,  and  the 
other  submission  to  certain  pains.  Hence,  along  with  that 
growth  of  population  which  makes  the  struggle  for  existence 
intense,  bearing  of  pains  and  sacrifice  of  pleasures  is  daily 
necessitated. 

Now  always  and  everywhere,  there  arises  among  men  a 
theory  conforming  to  their  practice.  The  savage  nature, 
originating  the  conception  of  a  savage  deity,  evolves  a  theory 
of  supernatural  control  sufficiently  stringent  and  cruel  to 
influence  his  conduct.  With  submission  to  despotic  gov- 
ernment severe  enough  in  its  restraints  to  keep  in  order 
barbarous  natures,  there  grows  up  a  theory  of  divine  right 
to  rule,  and  the  duty  of  absolute  submission.  Where  war 
is  made  the  business  of  life  by  the  existence  of  warlike 
neighbours,  virtues  which  are  required  for  war  come  to  be 
regarded  as  supreme  virtues ;  while,  contrariwise,  when  in- 
dustrialism has  grown  predominant,  the  violence  and  the 
deception  which  warriors  glory  in  come  to  be  held  criminal. 
In  like  manner,  then,  there  arises  a  tolerable  adjustment  of 
the  actually-accepted  (not  the  nominally-accepted)  theory  of 
right  living,  to  living  as  it  is  daily  carried  on.  If  the  life  is 
one  that  necessitates  habitual  denial  of  pleasures  and  bearing 
of  pains,  there  grows  up  an  answering  ethical  system  under 
which  the  receipt  of  pleasures  is  tacitly  disapproved  and  the 
bearing  of  pains  avowedly  approved.  The  mischiefs  entailed 
by  pleasures  in  excess  are  dwelt  on,  while  the  benefits  which 


98  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

normal  pleasures  bring  are  ignored  ;  and  the  good  results 
achieved  by  submission  to  pains  are  fully  set  forth  while  the 
evils  are  overlooked. 

But  while  recognizing  the  desirableness  of,  and  indeed  the 
necessity  for,  systems  of  ethics  adapted,  like  religious  sys- 
tems and  political  systems,  to  their  respective  times  and 
places  ;  we  have  here  to  regard  the  first  as,  like  the  others, 
transitional.  We  must  infer  that  like  a  purer  creed  and  a 
better  government,  a  truer  ethics  belong  to  a  more  advanced 
social  state.  Led,  a  priori,  to  conclude  that  distortions  must 
exist,  we  are  enabled  to  recognize  as  such,  the  distortions  we 
find  :  answering  in  nature,  as  these  do,  to  expectation.  And 
there  is  forced  on  us  the  truth  that  a  scientific  morality 
arises  only  as  fast  as  the  one-sided  conceptions  adapted  to 
transitory  conditions,  are  developed  into  both-sided  concep- 
tions. The  science  of  right  living  has  to  take  account  of 
all  consequences  in  so  far  as  they  affect  happiness,  person- 
ally or  socially,  directly  or  indirectly ;  and  by  as  much  as  it 
ignores  any  class  of  consequences,  by  so  much  does  it  fail  to 
be  science. 

§  39.  Like  the  physical  view,  then,  the  biological  view 
corresponds  with  the  view  gained  by  looking  at  conduct  in 
general  from  the  stand-point  of  Evolution. 

That  which  was  physically  defined  as  a  moving  equili- 
brium, we  define  biologically  as  a  balance  of  functions.  The 
implication  of  such  a  balance  is  that  the  several  functions  in 
their  kinds,  amounts,  and  combinations,  are  adjusted  to  the 
several  activities  which  maintain  and  constitute  complete  life ; 
and  to  be  so  adjusted  is  to  have  reached  the  goal  towards 
which  the  evolution  of  conduct  continually  tends. 

Passing  to  the  feelings  which  accompany  the  performance 
of  functions,  we  see  that  of  necessity  during  the  evolution  of 
organic  life,  pleasures  have  become  the  concomitants  of  nor- 
mal amounts  of  functions,  while  pains,  positive  and  negative, 
have  become  the  concomitants  of  excesses  and  defects  of 


THE    BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  99 

functions.  And  though  in  every  species  derangements  of 
these  relations  are  often  caused  by  changes  of  conditions, 
they  ever  re-establish  themselves  :  disappearance  of  the  spe- 
cies being  the  alternative. 

Mankind,  inheriting  from  creatures  of  lower  kinds,  such 
adjustments  between  feelings  and  functions  as  concern  fun- 
damental bodily  requirements  ;  and  daily  forced  by  peremp- 
tory feelings  to  do  the  things  which  maintain  life  and  avoid 
those  which  bring  immediate  death  ;  has  been  subject  to  a 
change  of  conditions  unusually  great  and  involved.  This 
has  considerably  deranged  the  guidance  by  sensations,  and 
has  deranged  in  a  much  greater  degree  the  guidance  by  emo- 
tions. The  result  is  that  in  many  cases  pleasures  are  not 
connected  with  actions  which  must  be  performed,  nor  pains 
with  actions  which  must  be  avoided,  but  contrariwise. 

Several  influences  have  conspired  to  make  men  ignore  the 
well-working  of  these  relations  between  feelings  and  func- 
tions, and  to  observe  whatever  of  ill-working  is  seen  in  them. 
Hence,  while  the  evils  which  some  pleasures  entail  are  dilated 
upon,  the  benefits  habitually  accompanying  receipt  of  pleas- 
ures are  unnoticed  ;  at  the  same  time  that  the  benefits 
achieved  through  certain  pains  are  magnified  while  the  im- 
mense mischiefs  which  pains  bring  are  made  little  of. 

The  ethical  theories  characterized  by  these  perversions, 
are  products  of,  and  are  appropriate  to,  the  forms  of 
social  life  which  the  imperfectly-adapted  constitutions  of 
men  produce.  But  with  the  progress  of  adaptation,  bring- 
ing faculties  and  requirements  into  harmony,  such  incon- 
gruities of  experience,  and  consequent  distortions  of  theory, 
must  diminish  ;  until,  along  with  complete  adjustment  of 
humanity  to  the  social  state,  will  go  recognition  of  the  truths 
that  actions  are  completely  right  only  when,  besides  being 
conducive  to  future  happiness,  special  and  general,  they  are 
immediately  pleasurable,  and  that  painfulness,  not  only  ulti- 
mate but  proximate,  is  the  concomitant  of  actions  which 
are  wrong. 


100  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

So  that  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  ethical  science 
becomes  a  specification  of  the  conduct  of  associated  men  who 
are  severally  so  constituted  that  the  various  self-preserving 
activities,  the  activities  required  for  rearing  offspring,  and 
those  which  social  welfare  demands,  are  fulfilled  in  the 
spontaneous  exercise  of  duly  proportioned  faculties,  each 
yielding  when  in  action  its  quantum  of  pleasure ;  and  who 
are,  by  consequence,  so  constituted  that  excess  or  defect  in 
any  one  of  these  actions  brings  its  quantum  of  pain,  imme- 
diate and  remote. 

Non  TO  §  33.  In  his  Physical  Ethics,  Mr.  Alfred  Barratt  has  expressed  a 
view  which  here  calls  for  notice.  Postulating  Evolution  and  its  general  laws, 
he  refers  to  certain  passages  in  the  Principles  of  Psychology  (1st  Ed.  Pt.  III. 
ch.  viii.  pp.  395,  sqq.  cf.  Pt.  IV.  ch.  iv.)  in  which  I  have  treated  of  the  relation 
between  irritation  and  contraction  which  "  marks  the  dawn  of  sensitive  life ; " 
have  pointed  out  that  "  the  primordial  tissue  must  be  differently  affected  by 
contact  with  nutritive  and  with  innutritive  matters  " — the  two  being  for  aquatic 
creatures  respectively  the  soluble  and  the  insoluble ;  and  have  argued  that 
the  contraction  by  which  a  protruded  part  of  a  rhizopod  draws  in  a  fragment 
of  assimilable  matter  "  is  caused  by  a  commencing  absorption  of  the  assimilable 
matter."  Mr.  Barratt,  holding  that  consciousness  "must  be  considered  as 
an  invariable  property  of  animal  life,  and  ultimately,  in  its  elements,  of 
the  material  universe"  (p.  43),  regards  these  responses  of  animal  tissue 
to  stimuli,  as  implying  feeling  of  one  or  other  kind.  "  Some  kinds  of 
impressed  force,"  he  says,  "  are  followed  by  movements  of  retraction  and 
withdrawal,  others  by  such  as  secure  a  continuance  of  the  impression.  These 
two  kinds  of  contraction  are  the  phenomena  and  external  marks  of  pain 
and  pleasure  respectively.  Hence  the  tissue  acts  so  as  to  secure  pleasure 
and  avoid  pain  by  a  law  as  truly  physical  and  natural  as  that  whereby  a 
needle  turns  to  the  pole,  or  a  tree  to  the  light "  (p.  52).  Now  without 
questioning  that  the  raw  material  of  consciousness  is  present  even  in  undiffer- 
entiated  protoplasm,  and  everywhere  exists  potentially  in  that  Unknowable 
Power  which,  otherwise  conditioned,  is  manifested  in  physical  action  (Prin.  of 
P»y.  %  272-3),  I  demur  to  the  conclusion  that  it  at  first  exists  under  the  forms 
of  pleasure  and  pain.  These,  I  conceive,  arise,  as  the  more  special  feelings  do, 
by  a  compounding  of  the  ultimate  elements  of  consciousness  (Prin.  of  Psy. 
§§  60,  61):  being,  indeed,  general  aspects  of  these  more  special  feelings  when 
they  reach  certain  intensities.  Considering  that  even  in  creatures  which  have 
developed  nervous  systems,  a  great  part  of  the  vital  processes  are  carried  on  by 
unconscious  reflex  actions,  I  see  no  propriety  in  assuming  the  existence  of  what 
we  understand  by  consciousness  in  creatures  not  only  devoid  of  nervous  sys- 
tems but  devoid  of  structures  in  general. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  101 

NOTE  TO  §  36.  More  than  once  in  the  Emotions  and  the  Will,  Dr.  Bain 
insists  on  the  connexion  between  pleasure  and  exaltation  of  vitality,  and  the 
connexion  between  pain  and  depression  of  vitality.  As  above  shown,  I  concur 
in  the  view  taken  by  him ;  which  is,  indeed,  put  beyond  dispute  by  general  ex- 
perience as  well  as  by  the  more  special  experience  of  medical  men. 

When,  however,  from  the  invigorating  and  relaxing  effects  of  pleasure  and 
pain  respectively,  Dr.  Bain  derives  the  original  tendencies  to  persist  in  acts 
which  give  pleasure  and  to  desist  from  those  which  give  pain,  I  find  myself 
unable  to  go  with  him.  He  says — "We  suppose  movements  spontaneously 
begun,  and  accidentally  causing  pleasure ;  we  then  assume  that  with  the 
pleasure  there  will  be  an  increase  of  vital  energy,  in  which  increase  the 
fortunate  movements  will  share,  and  thereby  increase  the  pleasure.  Or,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  suppose  the  spontaneous  movements  to  give  pain,  and  assume 
that,  with  the  pain,  there  will  be  a  decrease  of  energy,  extending  to  the  move- 
ments that  cause  the  evil,  and  thereby  providing  a  remedy"  (3rd  Ed.  p.  315). 
This  interpretation,  implying  that  "  the  fortunate  movements  "  merely  share  in 
the  effects  of  augmented  vital  energy  caused  by  the  pleasure,  does  not  seem  to 
me  congruous  with  observation.  The  truth  appears  rather  to  be  that  though 
there  is  a  concomitant  general  increase  of  muscular  tone,  the  muscles  specially 
excited  are  those  which,  by  their  increased  contraction,  conduce  to  increased 
pleasure.  Conversely,  the  implication  that  desistance  from  spontaneous  move- 
ments which  cause  pain,  is  due  to  a  general  muscular  relaxation  shared  in  by 
the  muscles  causing  these  particular  movements,  seems  to  me  at  variance  with 
the  fact  that  the  retraction  commonly  takes  the  form  not  of  a  passive  lapse  but 
of  an  active  withdrawal.  Further,  it  may  be  remarked  that  depressing  as  pain 
eventually  is  to  the  system  at  large,  we  cannot  say  that  it  at  once  depresses  the 
muscular  energies.  Not  simply,  as  Dr.  Bain  admits,  does  an  acute  smart  produce 
spasmodic  movements,  but  pains  of  all  kinds,  both  sensational  and  emotional 
stimulate  the  muscles  (Essays,  1st  series,  p.  360,  1,  or  2nd  ed.  Vol.  I.  p.  211,  12). 
Pain  however  (and  also  pleasure  when  very  intense)  simultaneously  has  an  inhibi- 
tory effect  on  all  the  reflex  actions ;  and  as  the  vital  functions  in  general  are  car- 
ried on  by  reflex  actions,  this  inhibition,  increasing  with  the  intensity  of  the  pain, 
proportionately  depresses  the  vital  functions.  Arrest  of  the  heart's  action  and 
fainting  is  an  extreme  result  of  this  inhibition ;  and  the  viscera  at  large  feel  its 
effects  in  degrees  proportioned  to  the  degrees  of  pain.  Pain,  therefore,  while 
directly  causing  a  discharge  of  muscular  energy  as  pleasure  does,  eventually 
lowers  muscular  power  by  lowering  those  vital  processes  on  which  the  supply  of 
energy  depends.  Hence  we  cannot,  I  think,  ascribe  the  prompt  desistance  from 
muscular  movements  causing  pain,  to  decrease  in  the  flow  of  energy ;  for  this 
decrease  is  felt  only  after  an  interval.  Conversely,  we  cannot  ascribe  the  per- 
sistence in  a  muscular  act  which  yields  pleasure  to  the  resulting  exaltation  of 
energy ;  but  must,  as  indicated  in  §  33,  ascribe  it  to  the  establishment  of  lines 
of  discharge  between  the  place  of  pleasurable  stimulation  and  those  contractile 
structures  which  maintain  and  increase  the  act  causing  the  stimulation — con- 
nexions allied  with  the  reflex,  into  which  they  pass  by  insensible  gradations. 


SANTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

§  40.  The  last  chapter,  in  so  far  as  it  dealt  with  feelings 
in  their  relation  to  conduct,  recognized  only  their  physio- 
logical aspects :  their  psychological  aspects  were  passed  over. 
In  this  chapter,  conversely,  we  are  not  concerned  with  the 
constitutional  connexions  between  feelings,  as  incentives  or 
deterrents,  and  physical  benefits  to  be  gained  or  mischiefs 
to  be  avoided ;  nor  with  the  reactive  effects  of  feelings  on 
the  state  of  the  organism,  as  fitting  or  unfitting  it  for  future 
action.  Here  we  have  to  consider  represented  pleasures 
and  pains,  sensational  and  emotional,  as  constituting  deliber- 
ate motives — as  forming  factors  in  the  conscious  adjustments 
of  acts  to  ends. 

§  41.  The  rudimentary  psychical  act,  not  yet  differentiated 
from  a  physical  act,  implies  an  excitation  and  a  motion.  In 
a  creature  of  low  type  the  touch  of  food  excites  prehension. 
In  a  somewhat  higher  creature  the  odour  from  nutritive 
matter  sets  up  motion  of  the  body  towards  the  matter. 
And  where  rudimentary  vision  exists,  sudden  obscuration  of 
light,  implying  the  passage  of  something  large,  causes  con- 
vulsive muscular  movements  which  mostly  carry  the  body 
away  from  the  source  of  danger.  In  each  of  these  cases  we 
may  distinguish  four  factors.  There  is  (a\  that  property  of 
the  external  object  which  primarily  affects  the  organism — 

102 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  103 

the  taste,  smell,  or  capacity;  and,  connected  with  such 
property,  there  is  in  the  external  object  that  character  (5), 
which  renders  seizure  of  it,  or  escape  from  it,  beneficial. 
Within  the  organism  there  is  (c),  the  impression  or  sensa- 
tion which  the  property  (a),  produces,  serving  as  stimulus ; 
and  there  is,  connected  with  it,  the  motor  change  (d\  by 
which  seizure  or  escape  is  effected.  Now  Psychology 

is  chiefly  concerned  with  the  connexion  between  the  relation 
a  5,  and  the  relation  c  d,  under  all  those  forms  which  they 
assume  in  the  course  of  evolution.  Each  of  the  factors,  and 
each  of  the  relations,  grows  more  involved  as  organization 
advances.  Instead  of  being  single  the  identifying  attribute 
a,  often  becomes,  in  the  environment  of  a  superior  ani- 
mal, a  cluster  of  attributes ;  such  as  the  size,  form,  colours, 
motions,  displayed  by  a  distant  creature  that  is  dangerous. 
The  factor  5,  with  which  this  combination  of  attri- 
butes is  associated,  becomes  the  congeries  of  characters, 
powers,  habits,  which  constitute  it  an  enemy.  Of  the 
subjective  factors,  c  becomes  a  complicated  set  of  visual 
sensations  co-ordinated  with  one  another  and  with  the  ideas 
and  feelings  established  by  experience  of  such  enemies, 
and  constituting  the  motive  to  escape  ;  while  d  becomes  the 
intricate,  and  often  prolonged,  series  of  runs,  leaps,  doubles, 
dives,  &c.,  made  in  eluding  the  enemy.  In 

human  life  we  find  the  same  four  outer  and  inner 
factors  still  more  multiform  and  entangled  in  their 
compositions  and  connexions.  The  entire  assemblage  of 
physical  attributes  #,  presented  by  an  estate  that  is  ad- 
vertized for  sale,  passes  enumeration;  and  the  assemblage 
of  various  utilities,  J,  going  along  with  these  attributes, 
is  also  beyond  brief  specification.  The  perceptions  and 
ideas,  likes  and  dislikes,  c,  set  up  by  the  aspect  of 
the  estate,  and  which,  compounded  and  re-compounded, 
eventually  form  the  motive  for  buying  it,  make  a  whole  too 
large  and  complex  for  description  ;  and  the  transactions, 
legal,  pecuniary,  and  other,  gone  through  in  making  the 


104  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

purchase  and  taking  possession,  are  scarcely  less  numerous 
and  elaborate.  Nor  must  we  overlook  the  fact 

that  as  evolution  progresses,  not  only  do  the  factors  increase 
in  complexity  but  also  the  relations  among  them.  Origi- 
nally, a  is  directly  and  simply  connected  with  J,  while  c  is 
directly  and  simply  connected  with  d.  But  eventually,  the 
connexions  between  a  and  J,  and  between  c  and  d,  become 
very  indirect  and  involved.  On  the  one  hand,  as  the  first 
illustration  shows  us,  sapidity  and  nutritiveness  are  closely 
bound  together ;  as  are  also  the  stimulation  caused  by  the 
one  and  the  contraction  which  utilizes  the  other.  But,  as 
we  see  in  the  last  illustration,  the  connexion  between  the 
visible  traits  of  an  estate  and  those  characters  which  con- 
stitute its  value,  is  at  once  remote  and  complicated ;  while 
the  transition  from  the  purchaser's  highly-composite  motive 
to  the  numerous  actions  of  sensory  and  motor  organs, 
severally  intricate,  which  effect  the  purchase,  is  though  an 
entangled  plexus  of  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  his 
decision. 

After  this  explanation  will  be  apprehended  a  truth  other- 
wise set  forth  in  the  Principles  of  Psychology.  Mind  con- 
sists of  feelings  and  the  relations  among  feelings.  By  coin- 
position  of  the  relations,  and  ideas  of  relations,  intelligence 
arises.  By  composition  of  the  feelings,  and  ideas  of  feelings, 
emotion  arises.  And,  other  things  equal,  the  evolution  of 
either  is  great  in  proportion  as  the  composition  is  great. 
One  of  the  necessary  implications  is  that  cognition  becomes 
higher  in  proportion  as  it  is  remoter  from  reflex  action ; 
while  emotion  becomes  higher  in  proportion  as  it  is  remoter 
from  sensation. 

And  now  of  the  various  corollaries  from  this  broad  view 
of  psychological  evolution,  let  us  observe  those  which  con- 
cern the  motives  and  actions  that  are  classed  as  moral  and 
immoral. 

§  42.  The  mental  process  by   which,   in   any  case,  the 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  105 

adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  is  effected,  and  which,  under 
its  higher  forms,  becomes  the  subject-matter  of  ethical 
judgments,  is,  as  above  implied,  divisible  into  the  rise  of  a 
feeling  or  feelings  constituting  the  motive,  and  the  thought 
or  thoughts  through  which  the  motive  is  shaped  and  finally 
issues  in  action.  The  first  of  these  elements,  originally  an 
excitement,  becomes  a  simple  sensation ;  then  a  compound 
sensation ;  then  a  cluster  of  partially  presentative  and 
partially  representative  sensations,  forming  an  incipient 
emotion ;  then  a  cluster  of  exclusively  ideal  or  representa- 
tive sensations,  forming  an  emotion  proper ;  then  a  cluster 
of  such  clusters,  forming  a  compound  emotion ;  and  even- 
tually becomes  a  still  more  involved  emotion  composed  of 
the  ideal  forms  of  such  compound  emotions.  The  other 
element,  beginning  with  that  immediate  passage  of  a  single 
stimulus  into  a  single  motion,  called  reflex  action,  presently 
comes  to  be  a  set  of  associated  discharges  of  stimuli  pro- 
ducing associated  motions,  constituting  instinct.  Step  by 
step  arise  more  entangled  combinations  of  stimuli,  somewhat 
variable  in  their  modes  of  union,  leading  to  complex  motions 
similarly  variable  in  their  adjustments ;  whence  occasional 
hesitations  in  the  sensori-motor  processes.  Presently  is 
reached  a  stage  at  which  the  combined  clusters  of  impres- 
sions, not  all  present  together,  issue  in  actions  not  all  simul- 
taneous; implying  representation  of  results,  or  thought. 
Afterwards  follow  stages  in  which  various  thoughts  have 
time  to  pass  before  the  composite  motives  produce  the  appro- 
priate actions.  Until  at  last  arise  those  long  deliberations 
during  which  the  probabilities  of  various  consequences  are 
estimated,  and  the  promptings  of  the  correlative  feelings 
balanced ;  constituting  calm  judgment.  That  under  either 
of  its  aspects  the  later  forms  of  this  mental  process  are  the 
higher,  ethically  considered  as  well  as  otherwise  considered, 
will  be  readily  seen. 

For  from  the  first,  complication  of  sentiency  has  accom- 
panied better  and  more  numerous  adjustments  of  acts  to 


106  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ends  ;  as  also  has  complication  of  movement,  and  complica- 
tion of  the  co-ordinating  or  intellectual  process  uniting  the 
two.  Whence  it  follows  that  the  acts  characterized  by  the 
more  complex  motives  and  the  more  involved  thoughts,  have 
all  along  been  of  higher  authority  for  guidance.  Some  ex- 
amples will  make  this  clear. 

Here  is  an  aquatic  creature  guided  by  the  odour  of 
organic  matter  towards  things  serving  for  food  ;  but  a 
creature  which,  lacking  any  other  guidance,  is  at  the  mercy 
of  larger  creatures  coming  near.  Here  is  another  which, 
also  guided  to  food  by  odour,  possesses  rudimentary  vision  ; 
and  so  is  made  to  start  spasmodically  away  from  a  moving 
body  which  diffuses  this  odour,  in  those  cases  where  it  is 
large  enough  to  produce  sudden  obscuration  of  light — usually 
an  enemy.  Evidently  life  will  frequently  be  saved  by  con- 
forming to  the  later  and  higher  stimulus,  instead  of  to  the 
earlier  and  lower.  Observe  at  a  more  advanced  stage 

a  parallel  conflict.  This  is  a  beast  which  pursues  others  for 
prey,  and,  either  lacking  experience  or  prompted  by  raging 
hunger,  attacks  one  more  powerful  than  itself  and  gets 
destroyed.  Conversely,  that  is  a  beast  which,  prompted  by 
a  hunger  equally  keen,  but  either  by  individual  experience 
or  effects  of  inherited  experience,  made  conscious  of  evil 
by  the  aspect  of  one  more  powerful  than  itself,  is  deterred 
from  attacking,  and  saves  its  life  by  subordinating  the 
primary  motive,  consisting  of  craving  sensations,  to  the 
secondary  motive,  consisting  of  ideal  feelings,  distinct  or 
vague.  Ascending  at  once  from  these  examples  of 

conduct  in  animals  to  examples  of  human  conduct,  we  shall 
see  that  the  contrasts  between  inferior  and  superior  have 
habitually  the  same  traits.  The  savage  of  lowest  type  de- 
vours all  the  food  captured  by  to-day's  chase  ;  and,  hungry, 
on  the  morrow,  has  perhaps  for  days  to  bear  the  pangs  of 
starvation.  The  superior  savage,  conceiving  more  vividly 
the  entailed  sufferings  if  no  game  is  to  be  found,  is  deterred 
by  his  complex  feeling  from  giving  way  entirely  to  his 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  107 

simple  feeling.  Similarly  are  the  two  contrasted  in  the 
inertness  which  goes  along  with  lack  of  forethought,  and 
the  activity  which  due  forethought  produces.  The  primi- 
tive man,  idly  inclined,  and  ruled  by  the  sensation  of  the 
moment,  will  not  exert  himself  until  actual  pains  have  to 
be  escaped ;  but  the  man  somewhat  advanced,  able  more 
distinctly  to  imagine  future  gratifications  and  sufferings,  is 
prompted  by  the  thought  of  these  to  overcome  his  love  of 
ease :  decrease  of  misery  and  mortality  resulting  from  this 
predominance  of  the  representative  feelings  over  the  pre- 
sentative  feelings.  Without  dwelling  on  the  fact 

that  among  the  civilized,  those  who  lead  the  life  of  the 
senses  are  contrasted  in  the  same  way  with  those  whose 
lives  are  largely  occupied  with  pleasures  not  of  a  sensual 
kind,  let  me  point  out  that  there  are  analogous  contrasts 
between  guidance  by  the  less  complex  representative  feel- 
ings, or  lower  emotions,  and  guidance  by  the  more  complex 
representative  feelings,  or  higher  emotions.  When  led  by 
his  acquisitiveness — a  re-representative  feeling  which,  acting 
under  due  control,  conduces  to  welfare — the  thief  takes 
another  man's  property  ;  his  act  is  determined  by  certain 
imagined  proximate  pleasures  of  relatively  simple  kinds, 
rather  than  by  less-clearly  imagined  possible  pains  that  are 
more  remote  and  of  relatively  involved  kinds.  But  in  the 
conscientious  man,  there  is  an  adequate  restraining  motive, 
still  more  re-representative  in  its  nature,  including  not  only 
ideas  of  punishment,  and  not  only  ideas  of  lost  reputation 
and  ruin,  but  including  ideas  of  the  claims  of  the  person 
owning  the  property,  and  of  the  pains  which  loss  of  it  will 
entail  on  him  ;  all  joined  with  a  general  aversion  to  acts  in- 
jurious to  others,  which  arises  from  the  inherited  effects  of 
experience.  And  here  at  the  end  we  see,  as  we  saw  at  the 
beginning,  that  guidance  by  the  more  complex  feeling,  on 
the  average  conduces  to  welfare  more  than  does  guidance  by 
the  simpler  feeling. 

The  like  holds  with  the  intellectual  co-ordinations  through 


103  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

which  stimuli  issue  in  motions.  The  lowest  actions,  called 
reflex,  in  which  an  impression  made  on  an  afferent 
nerve  causes  by  discharge  through  an  efferent  nerve  a 
contraction,  shows  us  a  very  limited  adjustment  of  acts  to 
ends  :  the  impression  being  simple,  and  the  resulting 
motion  simple,  the  internal  co-ordination  is  also  simple. 
Evidently  when  there  are  several  senses  which  can  be 
together  affected  by  an  outer  object ;  and  when,  according 
as  such  object  is  discriminated  as  of  one  or  other  kind, 
the  movements  made  in  response  are  combined  in  one  or 
other  way ;  the  intermediate  co-ordinations  are  necessarily 
more  involved.  And  evidently  each  further  step  in  the 
evolution  of  intelligence,  always  instrumental  to  better 
self-preservation,  exhibits  this  same  general  trait.  The  ad- 
justments by  which  the  more  involved  actions  are  made 
appropriate  to  the  more  involved  circumstances,  imply  more 
intricate,  and  consequently  more  deliberate  and  conscious, 
co-ordinations ;  until,  when  we  come  to  civilized  men,  who 
in  their  daily  business  taking  into  account  many  data  and 
conditions  adjust  their  proceedings  to  various  consequences, 
we  see  that  the  intellectual  actions,  becoming  of  the  kind 
we  call  judicial,  are  at  once  very  elaborate  and  very  delib- 
erate. 

Observe,  then,  what  follows  respecting  the  relative 
authorities  of  motives.  Throughout  the  ascent  from  low 
creatures  up  to  man,  and  from  the  lowest  types  of  man 
up  to  the  highest,  self-preservation  has  been  increased 
by  the  subordination  of  simple  excitations  to  compound 
excitations — the  subjection  of  immediate  sensations  to  the 
ideas  of  sensations  to  come — the  over-ruling  of  presenta- 
tive  feelings  by  representative  feelings,  and  of  representa- 
tive feelings  by  re-representative  feelings.  As  life  has 
advanced,  the  accompanying  sentiency  has  become  increas- 
ingly ideal  ;  and  among  feelings  produced  by  the  com- 
pounding of  ideas,  the  highest,  and  those  which  have  evolved 
latest,  are  the  re -compounded  or  doubly  ideal.  Hence 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  109 

it  follows  that  as  guides,  the  feelings  have  authorities  pro- 
portionate to  the  degrees  in  which  they  are  removed  by 
their  complexity  and  their  ideality  from  simple  sensations 
and  appetites.  A  further  implication  is  made 

clear  by  studying  the  intellectual  sides  of  these  mental 
processes  by  which  acts  are  adjusted  to  ends.  Where  they 
are  low  and  simple,  these  comprehend  the  guiding  only  of 
immediate  acts  by  immediate  stimuli — the  entire  transaction 
in  each  case,  lasting  but  a  moment,  refers  only  to  a  proxi- 
mate result.  But  with  the  development  of  intelligence  and 
the  growing  ideality  of  the  motives,  the  ends  to  which  the 
acts  are  adjusted  cease  to  be  exclusively  immediate.  The 
more  ideal  motives  concern  ends  that  are  more  distant ;  and 
with  approach  to  the  highest  types,  present  ends  become 
increasingly  subordinate  to  those  future  ends  which  the 
ideal  motives  have  for  their  objects.  Hence  there  arises  a 
certain  presumption  in  favour  of  a  motive  which  refers  to  a 
remote  good,  in  comparison  with  one  which  refers  to  a 
proximate  good. 

§  43.  In  the  last  chapter  I  hinted  that  besides  the  several 
influences  there  named  as  fostering  the  ascetic  belief  that 
doing  things  which  are  agreeable  is  detrimental  while  bear- 
ing disagreeable  things  is  beneficial,  there  remained  to  be 
named  an  influence  of  deeper  origin.  This  is  shadowed 
forth  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs. 

For  the  general  truth  that  guidance  by  such  simple  pleas- 
ures and  pains  as  result  from  fulfilling  or  denying  bodily 
desires,  is,  under  one  aspect,  inferior  to  guidance  by  those 
pleasures  and  pains  which  the  complex  ideal  feelings  yield, 
has  led  to  the  belief  that  the  promptings  of  bodily  desires 
should  be  disregarded.  Further,  the  general  truth  that  pur- 
suit of  proximate  satisfactions  is,  under  one  aspect,  inferior 
to  pursuit  of  ultimate  satisfactions,  has  led  to  the  belief  that 
proximate  satisfactions  must  not  be  valued. 

In  the  early  stages  of  every  science,  the  generalizations 


HO  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

reached  are  not  qualified  enough.  The  discriminating  state- 
ments of  the  truths  formulated,  arise  afterwards,  by  limita- 
tion of  the  undiscrim mating  statements.  As  with  bodily 
vision,  which  at  first  appreciates  only  the  broadest  traits  of 
objects,  and  so  leads  to  rude  classings  which  developed 
vision,  impressible  by  minor  differences,  has  to  correct ;  so 
with  mental  vision  in  relation  to  general  truths,  it  happens 
that  at  first  the  inductions,  wrongly  made  all-embracing, 
have  to  wait  for  scepticism  and  critical  observation  to  re- 
strict them,  by  taking  account  of  unnoticed  differences. 
Hence,  we  may  expect  to  find  the  current  ethical  conclusions 
too  sweeping.  Let  us  note  how,  in  three  ways,  these  domi- 
nant beliefs,  alike  of  professed  moralists  and  of  people  at 
large,  are  made  erroneous  by  lack  of  qualifications. 

In  the  first  place,  the  authority  of  the  lower  feelings  as 
guides  is  by  no  means  always  inferior  to  the  authority  of  the 
higher  feelings,  but  is  often  superior.  Daily  occur  occasions 
on  which  sensations  must  be  obeyed  rather  than  sentiments. 
Let  any  one  think  of  sitting  all  night  naked  in  a  snowstorm, 
or  going  a  week  without  food,  or  letting  his  head  be  held 
under  water  for  ten  minutes,  and  he  will  see  that  the 
pleasures  and  pains  directly  related  to  maintenance  of 
life,  may  not  be  wholly  subordinated  to  the  pleasures 
and  pains  indirectly  related  to  maintenance  of  life. 
Though  in  many  cases  guidance  by  the  simple  feelings 
rather  than  by  the  complex  feelings  is  injurious,  in  other 
cases  guidance  by  the  complex  feelings  rather  than  by  the 
simple  feelings  is  fatal ;  and  throughout  a  wide  range  of 
cases  their  relative  authorities  as  guides  are  indeterminate. 
Grant  that  in  a  man  pursued,  the  protesting  feelings  accom- 
panying intense  and  prolonged  effort,  must,  to  preserve  life, 
be  over-ruled  by  the  fear  of  his  pursuers ;  it  may  yet  hap- 
pen that,  persisting  till  he  drops,  the  resulting  exhaustion 
causes  death,  though,  the  pursuit  having  been  abandoned, 
death  would  not  otherwise  have  resulted.  Grant  that  a 
widow  left  in  poverty,  must  deny  her  appetite  that  she  may 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  Ill 

give  enough  food  to  her  children  to  keep  them  alive ;  yet 
the  denial  of  her  appetite  pushed  too  far,  may  leave  them 
not  only  entirely  without  food  but  without  guardianship. 
Grant  that,  working  his  brain  unceasingly  from  dawn  till 
dark,  the  man  in  pecuniary  difficulties  must  disregard  rebel- 
lious bodily  sensations  in  obedience  to  the  conscientious 
desire  to  liquidate  the  claims  on  him  ;  yet  he  may  carry  this 
subjection  of  simple  feelings  to  complex  feelings  to  the 
extent  of  shattering  his  health,  and  failing  in  that  end 
which,  with  less  of  this  subjection,  he  might  have  achieved. 
Clearly,  then,  the  subordination  of  lower  feelings  must  be  a 
conditional  subordination.  The  supremacy  of  higher  feel- 
ings must  be  a  qualified  supremacy. 

In  another  way  does  the  generalization  ordinarily  made 
err  by  excess.  "With  the  truth  that  life  is  high  in  proportion 
as  the  simple  presentative  feelings  are  under  the  control  of 
the  compound  representative  feelings,  it  joins,  as  though 
they  were  corollaries,  certain  propositions  which  are  not 
corollaries.  The  current  conception  is,  not  that  the  lower 
must  yield  to  the  higher  when  the  two  conflict,  but  that  the 
lower  must  be  disregarded  even  when  there  is  no  conflict. 
This  tendency  which  the  growth  of  moral  ideas  has  gener- 
ated, to  condemn  obedience  to  inferior  feelings  when  supe- 
rior feelings  protest,  has  begotten  a  tendency  to  condemn 
inferior  feelings  considered  intrinsically.  "  I  really  think 
she  does  things  because  she  likes  to  do  them,"  once  said  to 
me  one  lady  concerning  another  :  the  form  of  expression 
and  the  manner  both  implying  the  belief  not  only  that  such 
behaviour  is  wrong,  but  also  that  every  one  must  recognize 
it  as  wrong.  And  there  prevails  widely  a  notion  of  this 
kind.  In  practice,  indeed,  the  notion  is  very  generally  in- 
operative. Though  it  prompts  various  incidental  asceti- 
cisms, as  of  those  who  think  it  alike  manly  and  salutary  to 
go  without  a  great  coat  in  cold  weather,  or  to  persevere 
through  the  winter  in  taking  an  out-of-door  plunge,  yet, 
generally,  the  pleasurable  feelings  accompanying  due  fulfil- 
9 


THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

raent  of  bodily  needs,  are  accepted:  acceptance  being, 
indeed,  sufficiently  peremptory.  But  oblivious  of  these 
contradictions  in  their  practice,  men  commonly  betray  a 
vague  idea  that  there  is  something  degrading,  or  injurious, 
or  both,  in  doing  that  which  is  agreeable  and  avoiding  that 
which  is  disagreeable.  "  Pleasant  but  wrong,"  is  a  phrase 
frequently  used  in  a  way  implying  that  the  two  are  naturally 
connected.  As  above  hinted,  however,  such  beliefs  result 
from  a  confused  apprehension  of  the  general  truth  that  the 
more  compound  and  representative  feelings  are,  on  the  aver- 
age, of  higher  authority  than  the  simple  and  presentative 
feelings.  Apprehended  with  discrimination,  this  truth  im- 
plies that  the  authority  of  the  simple,  ordinarily  less  than 
that  of  the  compound  but  occasionally  greater,  is  habitually 
to  be  accepted  when  the  compound  do  not  oppose. 

In  yet  a  third  way  is  this  principle  of  subordination  mis- 
conceived. One  of  the  contrasts  between  the  earlier-evolved 
feelings  and  the  later-evolved  feelings,  is  that  they  refer 
respectively  to  the  more  immediate  effects  of  actions  and 
to  the  more  remote  effects ;  and  speaking  generally,  guid- 
ance by  that  which  is  near  is  inferior  to  guidance  by  that 
which  is  distant.  Hence  has  resulted  the  belief  that,  irre- 
spective of  their  kinds,  the  pleasures  of  the  present  must  be 
sacrificed  to  the  pleasures  of  the  future.  We  see  this  in  the 
maxim  often  impressed  on  children  when  eating  their  meals, 
that  they  should  reserve  the  nicest  morsel  till  the  last :  the 
check  on  improvident  yielding  to  immediate  impulse,  being 
here  joined  with  the  tacit  teaching  that  the  same  gratifica- 
tion becomes  more  valuable  as  it  becomes  more  distant. 
Such  thinking  is  traceable  throughout  daily  conduct ;  by  no 
means  indeed  in  all,  but  in  those  who  are  distinguished  as 
prudent  and  well  regulated  in  their  conduct.  Hurrying 
over  his  breakfast  that  he  may  catch  the  train,  snatching  a 
sandwich  in  the  middle  of  the  day,  and  eating  a  late  dinner 
when  he  is  so  worn  out  that  he  is  incapacitated  for  evening 
recreation,  the  man  of  business  pursues  a  life  in  which  not 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  113 

only  the  satisfactions  of  bodily  desires,  but  'also  those  of 
higher  tastes  and  feelings,  are,  as  far  as  may  be,  disregarded, 
that  distant  ends  may  be  achieved  ;  and  yet  if  you  ask  what 
are  these  distant  ends,  you  find  (in  cases  where  there  are  no 
parental  responsibilities)  that  they  are  included  under  the 
conception  of  more  comfortable  living  in  time  to  come.  So 
ingrained  is  this  belief  that  it  is  wrong  to  seek  immediate 
enjoyments  and  right  to  seek  remote  ones  only,  that  you 
may  hear  from  a  busy  man  who  has  been  on  a  pleasure 
excursion,  a  kind  of  apology  for  his  conduct.  He  depre- 
cates the  unfavourable  judgments  of  his  friends  by  explain- 
ing that  the  state  of  his  health  had  compelled  him  to  take  a 
holiday.  Nevertheless,  if  you  sound  him  with  respect  to  his 
future,  you  find  that  his  ambition  is  by-and-by  to  retire  and 
devote  himself  wholly  to  the  relaxations  which  he  is  now 
somewhat  ashamed  of  taking. 

The  general  truth  disclosed  by  the  study  of  evolving  con- 
duct, sub-human  and  human,  that  for  the  better  preservation 
of  life  the  primitive,  simple,  presentative  feelings  must  be 
controlled  by  the  later-evolved,  compound,  and  representative 
feelings,  has  thus  come,  in  the  course  of  civilization,  to  be 
recognized  by  men ;  but  necessarily  at  first  in  too  indis- 
criminate a  way.  The  current  conception,  while  it  errs  by 
implying  that  the  authority  of  the  higher  over  the  lower  is 
unlimited,  errs  also  by  implying  that  the  rule  of  the  lower 
must  be  resisted  even  when  it  does  not  conflict  with  the  rule 
of  the  higher,  and  further  errs  by  implying  that  a  gratifica- 
tion which  forms  a  proper  aim  if  it  is  remote,  forms  an  im- 
proper aim  if  it  is  proximate. 

§  44.  Without  explicitly  saying  so,  we  have  been  here 
tracing  the  genesis  of  the  moral  consciousness.  For  unques- 
tionably the  essential  trait  in  the  moral  consciousness,  is  the 
control  of  some  feeling  or  feelings  by  some  other  feeling  or 
feelings. 

Among  the  higher  animals  we  may  see,  distinctly  enough, 


THE   DATA   OF   ETBICS. 

the  conflict  of  feelings  and  the  subjection  of  simpler  to 
more  compound;  as  when  a  dog  is  restrained  from 
snatching  food  by  fear  of  the  penalties  which  may  come  if 
he  yields  to  his  appetite ;  or  as  when  he  desists  from  scratch- 
ing at  a  hole  lest  he  should  lose  his  master,  who  has  walked 
on.  Here,  however,  though  there  is  subordination,  there 
is  not  conscious  subordination — there  is  no  introspection  re- 
vealing the  fact  that  one  feeling  has  yielded  to  another.  So 
is  it  even  with  human  beings  when  little  developed  mentally. 
The  pre-social  man,  wandering  about  in  families  and  ruled 
by  such  sensations  and  emotions  as  are  caused  by  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  moment,  though  occasionally  subject  to 
conflicts  of  motives,  meets  with  comparatively  few  cases  in 
which  the  advantage  of  postponing  the  immediate  to  the 
remote  is  forced  on  his  attention ;  nor  has  he  the  intelligence 
requisite  for  analyzing  and  generalizing  such  of  these  cases 
as  occur.  Only  as  social  evolution  renders  the  life  more 
complex,  the  restraints  many  and  strong,  the  evils  of  im- 
pulsive conduct  marked,  and  the  comforts  to  be  gained  by 
providing  for  the  future  tolerably  certain,  can  there  come 
experiences  numerous  enough  to  make  familiar  the  benefit 
of  subordinating  the  simpler  feelings  to  the  more  complex 
ones.  Only  then,  too,  does  there  arise  a  sufficient  intellectual 
power  to  make  an  induction  from  these  experiences,  followed 
by  a  sufficient  massing  of  individual  inductions  into  a  public 
and  traditional  induction  impressed  on  each  generation  as  it 
grows  up. 

And  here  we  are  introduced  to  certain  facts  of  profound 
significance.  This  conscious  relinquishment  of  immediate 
and  special  good  to  gain  distant  and  general  good,  while 
it  is  a  cardinal  trait  of  the  self-restraint  called  moral, 
is  also  a  cardinal  trait  of  self-restraints  other  than  those 
called  moral — the  restraints  that  originate  from  fear  of  the 
visible  ruler,  of  the  invisible  ruler,  and  of  society  at  large. 
Whenever  the  individual  refrains  from  doing  that  which 
the  passing  desire  prompts,  lest  he  should  afterwards  suffer 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  115 

legal  punishment,  or  divine  vengeance,  or  public  reproba- 
tion, or  all  of  them,  he  surrenders  the  near  and  definite 
pleasure  rather  than  risk  the  remote  and  greater,  though 
less  definite,  pains,  which  taking  it  may  bring  on  him  ;  and, 
conversely,  when  he  undergoes  some  present  pain,  that  he 
may  reap  some  probable  future  pleasure,  political,  religious, 
or  social.  But  though  all  these  four  kinds  of  internal  con- 
trol have  the  common  character  that  the  simpler  and  less 
ideal  feelings  are  consciously  over-ruled  by  the  more  com- 
plex and  ideal  feelings ;  and  though,  at  first,  they  are  practi- 
cally co-extensive  and  undistinguished  ;  yet,  in  the  course  of 
social  evidence  they  differentiate ;  and,  eventually,  the  moral 
control  with  its  accompanying  conceptions  and  sentiments, 
emerges  as  independent.  Let  us  glance  at  the  leading  aspects 
of  the  process. 

While,  as  in  the  rudest  groups,  neither  political  nor 
religious  rule  exists,  the  leading  check  to  the  immediate 
satisfaction  of  each  desire  as  it  arises,  is  consciousness  of 
the  evils  which  the  anger  of  fellow  savages  may  entail,  if 
satisfaction  of  the  desire  is  obtained  at  their  cost.  In  this 
early  stage  the  imagined  pains  which  constitute  the 
governing  motive,  are  those  apt  to  be  inflicted  by  beings 
of  like  nature,  undistinguished  in  power :  the  political, 
religious,  and  social  restraints,  are  as  yet  represented  only 
by  this  mutual  dread  of  vengeance.  When  special 

strength,  skill,  or  courage,  makes  one  of  them  a  leader  in 
battle,  he  necessarily  inspires  greater  fear  than  any  other ; 
and  there  comes  to  be  a  more  decided  check  on  such  satis- 
factions of  the  desires  as  will  injure  or  offend  him.  Gradu- 
ally as,  by  habitual  war,  chieftainship  is  established,  the 
evils  thought  of  as  likely  to  arise  from  angering  the  chief, 
not  only  by  aggression  upon  him  but  by  disobedience 
to  him,  become  distinguishable  both  from  the  smaller 
evils  which  other  personal  antagonisms  cause,  and  from 
the  more  diffused  evils  thought  of  as  arising  from  social 
reprobation.  That  is,  political  control  begins  to  dif- 


116  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ferentiate  from  the  more  indefinite  control  of  mntual 
dread.  Meanwhile  there  has  been  developing  the 

ghost-theory.  In  all  but  the  rudest  groups,  the  double 
of  a  deceased  man,  propitiated  at  death  and  afterwards,  is 
conceived  as  able  to  injure  the  survivors.  Consequently, 
as  fast  as  the  ghost-theory  becomes  established  and  defi- 
nite, there  grows  up  another  kind  of  check  on  immediate 
satisfaction  of  the  desires — a  check  constituted  by  ideas 
of  the  evils  which  ghosts  may  inflict  if  offended ;  and 
when  political  headships  get  settled,  and  the  ghosts  of 
dead  chiefs,  thought  of  as  more  powerful  and  more  re- 
lentless than  other  ghosts,  are  especially  dreaded,  there 
begins  to  take  shape  the  form  of  restraint  distinguished  as 
religious.  For  a  long  time  these  three  sets  of 

restraints,  with  their  correlative  sanctions,  though  becom- 
ing separate  in  consciousness,  remain  co-extensive ;  and  do 
so  because  they  mostly  refer  to  one  end — success  in  war. 
The  duty  of  blood-revenge  is  insisted  on  even  while  yet 
nothing  to  be  called  social  organization  exists.  As  the 
chief  gains  predominance,  the  killing  of  enemies  becomes  a 
political  duty ;  and  as  the  anger  of  the  dead  chief  comes  to 
be  dreaded,  the  killing  of  enemies  becomes  a  religious  duty. 
Loyalty  to  the  ruler  while  he  lives  and  after  he  dies,  is 
increasingly  shown  by  holding  life  at  his  disposal  for  pur- 
poses of  war.  The  earliest  enacted  punishments  are  those 
for  insubordination  and  for  breaches  of  observances  which 
express  subordination — all  of  them  militant  in  origin.  While 
the  divine  injunctions,  originally  traditions  of  the  dead  king's 
will,  mainly  refer  to  the  destruction  of  peoples  with  whom  he 
was  at  enmity ;  and  divine  anger  or  approval  are  conceived 
as  determined  by  the  degrees  in  which  subjection  to  him  is 
shown,  directly  by  worship  and  indirectly  by  fulfilling  these 
injunctions.  The  Fijian,  who  is  said  on  entering  the  other 
world  to  commend  himself  by  narrating  his  successes  in 
battle,  and  who,  when  alive,  is  described  as  sometimes  greatly 
distressed  if  he  thinks  he  has  not  killed  enemies  enough  to 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  117 

please  his  gods,  shows  us  the  resulting  ideas  and  feelings ; 
and  reminds  us  of  kindred  ideas  and  feelings  betrayed  by 
ancient  races.  To  all  which  add  that  the  control 

of  social  opinion,  besides  being  directly  exercised,  as  in  the 
earliest  stage,  by  praise  of  the  brave  and  blame  of  the  cow- 
ardly, comes  to  be  indirectly  exercised,  with  a  kindred 
general  effect  by  applause  of  loyalty  to  the  ruler  and  piety 
to  the  god.  So  that  the  three  differentiated  forms  of  control 

o 

which  grow  up  along  with  militant  organization  and  action, 
while  enforcing  kindred  restraints  and  incentives,  also  en- 
force one  another ;  and  their  separate  and  joint  disciplines 
have  the  common  character  that  they  involve  the  sacrifice 
of  immediate  special  benefits  to  obtain  more  distant  and 
general  benefits. 

At  the  same  time  there  have  been  developing  under  the 
same  three  sanctions,  restraints  and  incentives  of  another 
order,  similarly  characterized  by  subordination  of  the  proxi- 
mate to  the  remote.  Joint  aggressions  upon  men  outside 
the  society,  cannot  prosper  if  there  are  many  aggressions  of 
man  on  man  within  the  society.  War  implies  co-operation  ; 
and  co-operation  is  prevented  by  antagonisms  among  those 
who  are  to  co-operate.  "We  saw  that  in  the  primitive  un- 
governed  group,  the  main  check  on  immediate  satisfaction 
of  his  desires  by  each  man,  is  the  fear  of  other  men's  ven- 
geance if  they  are  injured  by  taking  the  satisfaction  ;  and 
through  early  stages  of  social  development,  this  dread  of 
retaliation  continues  to  be  the  chief  motive  to  such  forbear- 
ance as  exists.  But  though  long  after  political  authority  has 
become  established  the  taking  of  personal  satisfaction  for 
injuries  persists,  the  growth  of  political  authority  gradually 
checks  it.  The  fact  that  success  in  war  is  endangered  if  his 
followers  fight  among  themselves,  forces  itself  on  the  atten- 
tion of  the  ruler.  He  has  a  strong  motive  for  restraining 
quarrels,  and  therefore  for  preventing  the  aggressions  which 
cause  quarrels  ;  and  as  his  power  becomes  greater  he  forbids 
the  aggressions  and  inflicts  punishments  for  disobedience. 


THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

Presently,  political  restraints  of  this  class,  like  those  of  the 
preceding  class,  are  enforced  by  religious  restraints.  The 
sagacious  chief,  succeeding  in  war  partly  because  he  thus 
enforces  order  among  his  followers,  leaves  behind  him  a 
tradition  of  the  commands  he  habitually  gave.  Dread  of  his 
ghost  tends  to  produce  regard  for  these  commands;  and 
they  eventually  acquire  sacredness.  With  further  social 
evolution  come,  in  like  manner,  further  interdicts,  checking 
aggressions  of  less  serious  kinds;  until  eventually  there 
grows  up  a  body  of  civil  laws.  And  then  in  the  way  shown, 
arise  beliefs  concerning  the  divine  disapproval  of  these 
minor,  as  well  as  of  the  major,  civil  offences :  ending,  occa- 
sionally, in  a  set  of  religious  injunctions  harmonizing  with, 
and  enforcing,  the  political  injunctions.  While  simultane- 
ously there  develops,  as  before,  a  social  sanction  for  these 
rules  of  internal  conduct,  strengthening  the  political  and 
religious  sanctions. 

But  now  observe  that  while  these  three  controls,  political, 
religious,  and  social,  severally  lead  men  to  subordinate  proxi- 
mate satisfactions  to  remote  satisfactions ;  and  while  they 
are  in  this  respect  like  the  moral  control,  which  habitually 
requires  the  subjection  of  simple  presentative  feelings  to 
complex  representative  feelings  and  postponement  of  present 
to  future  ;  yet  they  do  not  constitute  the  moral  control,  but 
are  only  preparatory  to  it — are  controls  within  which  the 
moral  control  evolves.  The  command  of  the  political  ruler 
is  at  first  obeyed,  not  because  of  its  perceived  rectitude  ;  but 
simply  because  it  is  his  command,  which  there  will  be  a  penalty 
for  disobeying.  The  check  is  not  a  mental  representation  of 
the  evil  consequences  which  the  forbidden  act  will,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  cause ;  but  it  is  a  mental  representation 
of  the  factitious  evil  consequences.  Down  to  our  own  time 
we  trace  in  legal  phrases,  the  original  doctrine  that  the 
aggression  of  one  citizen  on  another  is  wrong,  and  will 
be  punished,  not  so  much  because  of  the  injury  done  him, 
as  because  of  the  implied  disregard  of  the  king's  will. 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  119 

Similarly,  the  sinfulness  of  breaking  a  divine  injunction 
was  universally  at  one  time,  and  is  still  by  many,  held  to 
consist  in  the  disobedience  to  God,  rather  than  in  the 
deliberate  entailing  of  injury  ;  and  even  now  it  is  a  common 
belief  that  acts  are  right  only  if  performed  in  conscious 
fulfilment  of  the  divine  will :  nay,  are  even  wrong  if  other- 
wise performed.  The  like  holds,  too,  with  that  further 
control  exercised  by  public  opinion.  On  listening  to  the 
remarks  made  respecting  conformity  to  social  rules,  it  is 
noticeable  that  breach  of  them  is  condemned  not  so  much 
because  of  any  essential  impropriety  as  because  the  world's 
authority  is  ignored.  How  imperfectly  the  truly  moral 
control  is  even  now  differentiated  from  these  controls  within 
which  it  has  been  evolving,  we  see  in  the  fact  that  the  sys- 
tems of  morality  criticized  at  the  outset,  severally  identify 
moral  control  with  one  or  other  of  them.  For  moralists 
of  one  class  derive  moral  rules  from  the  commands  of  a 
supreme  political  power.  Those  of  another  class  recognize 
no  other  origin  for  them  than  the  revealed  divine  will. 
And  though  men  who  take  social  prescription  for  their 
guide  do  not  formulate  their  doctrine,  yet  the  belief,  fre- 
quently betrayed,  that  conduct  which  society  permits  is  not 
blameworthy,  implies  that  there  are  those  who  think  right 
and  wrong  can  be  made  such  by  public  opinion. 

Before  taking  a  further  step  we  must  put  together  the 
results  of  this  analysis.  The  essential  truths  to  be  carried 
with  us  respecting  these  three  forms  of  external  control  to 
which  the  social  unit  is  subject,  are  these : — First,  that  they 
have  evolved  with  the  evolution  of  society,  as  means  to 
social  self-preservation,  necessary  under  the  conditions  ;  and 
that,  by  implication,  they  are  in  the  main  congruous  with 
one  another.  Second,  that  the  correlative  internal  restraints 
generated  in  the  social  unit,  are  representations  of  remote 
results  which  are  incidental  rather  than  necessary — a  legal 
penalty,  a  supernatural  punishment,  a  social  reprobation. 
Third,  that  these  results,  simpler  and  more  directly  wrought 


120  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

by  personal  agencies,  can  be  more  vividly  conceived  than 
can  the  results  which,  in  the  course  of  things,  actions  natu- 
rally entail ;  and  the  conceptions  of  them  are  therefore  more 
potent  over  undeveloped  minds.  Fourth,  that  as  with  the 
restraints  thus  generated  is  always  joined  the  thought  of  ex- 
ternal coercion,  there  arises  the  notion  of  obligation  ;  which 
so  becomes  habitually  associated  with  the  surrender  of  imme- 
diate special  benefits  for  the  sake  of  distant  and  general 
benefits.  Fifth,  that  the  moral  control  corresponds  in  large 
measure  with  the  three  controls  thus  originating,  in  respect 
of  its  injunctions ;  and  corresponds,  too,  in  the  general 
nature  of  the  mental  processes  producing  conformity  to 
those  injunctions  ;  but  differs  in  their  special  nature. 

§  45.  For  now  we  are  prepared  to  see  that  the  restraints 
properly  distinguished  as  moral,  are  unlike  these  restraints 
out  of  which  they  evolve,  and  with  which  they  are  long 
confounded,  in  this — they  refer  not  to  the  extrinsic  effects 
of  actions  but  to  their  intrinsic  effects.  The  truly  moral  de- 
terrent from  murder,  is  not  constituted  by  a  representation 
of  hanging  as  a  consequence,  or  by  a  representation  of  tor- 
tures in  hell  as  a  consequence,  or  by  a  representation  of  the 
horror  and  hatred  excited  in  fellow  men  ;  but  by  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  necessary  natural  results — the  infliction  of 
death-agony  on  the  victim,  the  destruction  of  all  his  possi- 
bilities of  happiness,  the  entailed  sufferings  to  his  belong- 
ings. Neither  the  thought  of  imprisonment,  nor  of  divine 
anger,  nor  of  social  disgrace,  is  that  which  constitutes  the 
moral  check  on  theft ;  but  the  thought  of  injury  to  the  per- 
son robbed,  joined  with  a  vague  consciousness  of  the  general 
evils  caused  by  disregard  of  proprietary  rights.  Those  who 
reprobate  the  adulterer  on  moral  grounds,  have  their  minds 
filled,  not  with  ideas  of  an  action  for  damages,  or  of  future 
punishment  following  the  breach  of  a  commandment,  or  of 
loss  of  reputation  ;  but  they  are  occupied  with  ideas  of  un- 
happiness  entailed  on  the  aggrieved  wife  or  husband,  the 


THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  121 

damaged  lives  of  children,  and  the  diffused  mischiefs  which 
go  along  with  disregard  of  the  marriage  tie.  Conversely, 
the  man  who  is  moved  by  a  moral  feeling  to  help  another  in 
difficulty,  does  not  picture  to  himself  any  reward  here  or 
hereafter ;  but  pictures  only  the  better  condition  he  is  try- 
ing to  bring  about.  One  who  is  morally  prompted  to  fight 
against  a  social  evil,  has  neither  material  benefit  nor  popular 
applause  before  his  mind  ;  but  only  the  mischiefs  he  seeks 
to  remove  and  the  increased  well-being  which  will  follow 
their  removal.  Throughout,  then,  the  moral  motive  differs 
from  the  motives  it  is  associated  with  in  this,  that  instead 
of  being  constituted  by  representations  of  incidental,  collat- 
eral, non-necessary  consequences  of  acts,  it  is  constituted 
by  representations  of  consequences  which  the  acts  naturally 
produce.  These  representations  are  not  all  distinct,  though 
some  of  such  are  usually  present ;  but  they  form  an  assem- 
blage of  indistinct  representations  accumulated  by  experi- 
ence of  the  results  of  like  acts  in  the  life  of  the  individual, 
super-posed  on  a  still  more  indistinct  but  voluminous  con- 
sciousness due  to  the  inherited  effects  of  such  experiences  in 
progenitors  :  forming  a  feeling  that  is  at  once  massive  and 
vague. 

And  now  we  see  why  the  moral  feelings  and  corre- 
lative restraints  have  arisen  later  than  the  feelings  and 
restraints  that  originate  from  political,  religious,  and  social 
authorities  ;  and  have  so  slowly,  and  even  yet  so  incom- 
pletely, disentangled  themselves.  For  only  by  these  lower 
feelings  and  restraints  could  be  maintained  the  conditions 
under  which  the  higher  feelings  and  restraints  evolve.  It  is 
thus  alike  with  the  self-regarding  feelings  and  with  the 
other-regarding  feelings.  The  pains  which  improvidence 
will  bring,  and  the  pleasures  to  be  gained  by  storing  up 
things  for  future  use  and  by  labouring  to  get  such  things, 
can  be  habitually  contrasted  in  thought,  only  as  fast  as 
settled  social  arrangements  make  accumulation  possible ; 
and  that  there  may  arise  such  settled  arrangements,  fear  of 


122  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

the  seen  ruler,  of  the  unseen  ruler,  and  of  public  opinion, 
must  come  into  play.  Only  after  political,  religious,  and 
social  restraints  have  produced  a  stable  community,  can 
there  be  sufficient  experience  of  the  pains,  positive  and 
negative,  sensational  and  emotional,  which  crimes  of  aggres- 
sion cause,  as  to  generate  that  moral  aversion  to  them 
constituted  by  consciousness  of  their  intrinsically  evil 
results.  And  more  manifest  still  is  it  that  such  a  moral 
sentiment  as  that  of  abstract  equity,  which  is  offended  not 
only  by  material  injuries  done  to  men  but  also  by  political 
arrangements  that  place  them  at  a  disadvantage,  can  evolve 
only  after  the  social  stage  reached  gives  familiar  experience 
both  of  the  pains  flowing  directly  from  injustices  and  also  of 
those  flowing  indirectly  from  the  class-privileges  which  make 
injustices  easy. 

That  the  feelings  called  moral  have  the  nature  and  origin 
alleged,  is  further  shown  by  the  fact  that  we  associate  the 
name  with  them  in  proportion  to  the  degree  in  which  they 
have  these  characters — firstly  of  being  re-representative; 
secondly  of  being  concerned  with  indirect  rather  than  with 
direct  effects,  and  generally  with  remote  rather  than  imme- 
diate ;  and  thirdly  of  referring  to  effects  that  are  mostly  gen- 
eral rather  than  special.  Thus,  though  we  condemn  one 
man  for  extravagance  and  approve  the  economy  shown  by 
another  man,  we  do  not  class  their  acts  as  respectively  vi- 
cious and  virtuous  :  these  words  are  too  strong  :  the  present 
and  future  results  here  differ  too  little  in  concreteness  and 
ideality  to  make  the  words  fully  applicable.  Suppose,  how- 
ever, that  the  extravagance  necessarily  brings  distress  on  wife 
and  children — brings  pains  diffused  over  the  lives  of  others 
as  well  as  of  self,  and  the  viciousness  of  the  extravagance 
becomes  clear.  Suppose,  further,  that  prompted  by  the  wish 
to  relieve  his  family  from  the  misery  he  has  brought  on 
them,  the  spendthrift  forges  a  bill  or  commits  some  other 
fraud.  Though,  estimated  apart,  we  characterize  his  over- 
ruling emotion  as  moral,  and  make  allowance  for  him  in 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  123 

consideration  of  it,  yet  his  action  taken  as  a  whole  we 
condemn  as  immoral :  we  regard  as  of  superior  authority, 
the  feelings  which  respond  to  men's  proprietary  claims — 
feelings  which  are  re-representative  in  a  higher  degree 
and  refer  to  more  remote  diffused  consequences.  The 
difference,  habitually  recognized,  between  the  relative 
elevations  of  justice  and  generosity,  well  illustrates 
this  truth.  The  motive  causing  a  generous  act  has 
reference  to  effects  of  a  more  concrete,  special,  and  proxi- 
mate kind,  than  has  the  motive  to  do  justice ;  which, 
beyond  the  proximate  effects,  usually  themselves  less  con- 
crete than  those  that  generosity  contemplates,  includes  a 
consciousness  of  the  distant,  involved,  diffused  effects  of 
maintaining  equitable  relations.  And  justice  we  hold  to  be 
higher  generosity. 

Comprehension  of  this  long  argument  will  be  aided  by  here 
quoting  a  further  passage  from  the  before-named  letter  to 
Mr.  Mill,  following  the  passage  already  quoted  from  it. 

"  To  make  any  position  fully  understood,  it  seems  needful  to  add  that,  corre- 
sponding to  the  fundamental  propositions  of  a  developed  Moral  Science,  there 
have  been,  and  still  are,  developing  in  the  race,  certain  fundamental  moral  intui- 
tions ;  and  that,  though  these  moral  intuitions  are  the  results  of  accumulated 
experiences  of  Utility,  gradually  organized  and  inherited,  they  have  come  to  be 
quite  independent  of  conscious  experience.  Just  in  the  same  way  that  I 
believe  the  intuition  of  space,  possessed  by  any  living  individual,  to  have  arisen 
from  organized  and  consolidated  experiences  of  all  antecedent  individuals  who 
bequeathed  to  him  their  slowly-developed  nervous  organizations — just  as  I  believe 
that  this  intuition,  requiring  only  to  be  made  definite  and  complete  by  personal 
experiences,  has  practically  become  a  form  of  thought,  apparently  quite  inde- 
pendent of  experience  ;  so  do  I  believe  that  the  experiences  of  utility  organized 
and  consolidated  through  all  past  generations  of  the  human  race,  have  been 
producing  corresponding  nervous  modifications,  which,  by  continued  transmis- 
sion and  accumulation,  have  become  in  us  certain  faculties  of  moral  intuition — 
certain  emotions  responding  to  right  and  wrong  conduct,  which  have  no  appar- 
ent basis  in  the  individual  experiences  of  utility.  I  also  hold  that  just  as  the 
space-intuition  responds  to  the  exact  demonstrations  of  Geometry,  and  has  its 
rough  conclusions  interpreted  and  verified  by  them ;  so  will  moral  intuitions 
respond  to  the  demonstrations  of  Moral  Science,  and  will  have  their  rough  con- 
clusions interpreted  and  verified  by  them." 

To  this,  in  passing,  I  will  add  only  that  the  evolution- 


124  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

hypothesis  thus  enables  us  to  reconcile  opposed  moral 
theories,  as  it  enables  us  to  reconcile  opposed  theories  of 
knowledge.  For  as  the  doctrine  of  innate  forms  of  intel- 
lectual intuition  falls  into  harmony  with  the  experiential 
doctrine,  when  we  recognize  the  production  of  intellectual 
faculties  by  inheritance  of  effects  wrought  by  experience ; 
so  the  doctrine  of  innate  powers  of  moral  perception  becomes 
congruous  with  the  utilitarian  doctrine,  when  it  is  seen  that 
preferences  and  aversions  are  rendered  organic  by  inherit- 
ance of  the  effects  of  pleasurable  and  painful  experiences  in 
progenitors. 

§  46.  One  further  question  has  to  be  answered — How 
does  there  arise  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation  in  general  ? 
Whence  comes  the  sentiment  of  duty,  considered  as  distinct 
from  the  several  sentiments  which  prompt  temperance,  provi- 
dence, kindness,  justice,  truthfulness,  &c.  ?  The  answer  is 
that  it  is  an  abstract  sentiment  generated  in  a  manner  analo- 
gous to  that  in  which  abstract  ideas  are  generated. 

The  idea  of  each  colour  had  originally  entire  concreteness 
given  to  it  by  an  object  possessing  the  colour ;  as  some  of 
the  unmodified  names,  such  as  orange  and  violet,  show  us. 
The  dissociation  of  each  colour  from  the  object  specially 
associated  with  it  in  thought  at  the  outset,  went  on  as  fast 
as  the  colour  came  to  be  associated  in  thought  with  objects 
unlike  the  first,  and  unlike  one  another.  The  idea  of  orange 
was  conceived  in  the  abstract  more  fully  in  proportion  as  the 
varous  orange-coloured  objects  remembered,  cancelled  one 
another's  diverse  attributes,  and  left  outstanding  their  com- 
mon attribute.  So  is  it  if  we  ascend  a  stage  and 
note  how  there  arises  the  abstract  idea  of  colour  apart  from 
particular  colours.  Were  all  things  red  the  conception  of 
colour  in  the  abstract  could  not  exist.  Imagine  that  every 
object  was  either  red  or  green,  and  it  is  manifest  that  the 
mental  habit  would  be  to  think  of  one  or  other  of  these  two 
colours  in  connexion  with  anything  named.  But  multiply 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  125 

the  colours  so  that  thought  rambles  undecidedly  among  the 
ideas  of  them  that  occur  along  with  any  object  named,  and 
there  results  the  notion  of  indeterminate  colour — the  com- 
mon property  which  objects  possess  of  affecting  us  by  light 
from  their  surfaces,  as  well  as  by  their  forms.  For  evi- 
dently the  notion  of  this  common  property  is  that  which 
remains  constant  while  imagination  is  picturing  every  pos- 
sible variety  of  colour.  It  is  the  uniform  trait  in  all  coloured 
things ;  that  is — colour  in  the  abstract.  "Words 

referring  to  quantity  furnish  cases  of  more  marked  dis- 
sociation of  abstract  from  concrete.  Grouping  various 
things  as  small  in  comparison  either  with  those  of  their 
kind  or  with  those  of  other  kinds ;  and  similarly  grouping 
some  objects  as  comparatively  great;  we  get  the  opposite 
abstract  notions  of  smallness  and  greatness.  Applied  as 
these  are  to  innumerable  very  diverse  things — not  objects 
only,  but  forces,  times,  numbers,  values, — they  have  become 
so  little  connected  with  concretes,  that  their  abstract 
meanings  are  very  vague.  Further,  we  must 

note  that  an  abstract  idea  thus  formed  often  acquires  an 
illusive  independence;  as  we  may  perceive  in  the  case  of 
motion,  which,  dissociated  in  thought  from  all  particular 
bodies  and  velocities  and  directions,  is  sometimes  referred 
to  as  though  it  could  be  conceived  apart  from  something 
moving.  Now  all  this  holds  of  the  subjective  as 

well  as  of  the  objective;  and  among  other  states  of  con- 
sciousness, holds  of  the  emotions  as  known  by  introspection. 
By  the  grouping  of  those  re-representative  feelings  above 
described,  which,  differing  among  themselves  in  other  re- 
spects have  a  component  in  common  ;  and  by  the  consequent 
mutual  cancelling  of  their  diverse  components ;  this  common 
component  is  made  relatively  appreciable,  and  becomes  an 
abstract  feeling.  Thus  is  produced  the  sentiment  of  moral 
obligation  or  duty.  Let  us  observe  its  genesis. 

"We    have   seen   that  during    the   progress    of    animate 
existence,  the  later-evolved,  more  compound  and  more  re- 


126  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

presentative  feelings,  serving  to  adjust  the  conduct  to  more 
distant  and  general  needs,  have  all  along  bad  an  authority 
as  guides  superior  to  that  of  the  earlier  and  simpler  feelings 
— excluding  cases  in  which  these  last  are  intense.  This 
superior  authority,  unrecognizable  by  lower  types  of  crea- 
tures which  cannot  generalize,  and  little  recognizable  by 
primitive  men,  who  have,  but  feeble  powers  of  generaliza- 
tion, has  become  distinctly  recognized  as  civilization  and 
accompanying  mental  development  have  gone  on.  Accumu- 
lated experiences  have  produced  the  consciousness  that  guid- 
ance by  feelings  which  refer  to  remote  and  general  results, 
is  usually  more  conducive  to  welfare  than  guidance  by  feel- 
ings to  be  immediately  gratified.  For  what  is  the  common 
character  of  the  feelings  that  prompt  honesty,  truthfulness, 
diligence,  providence,  &c.,  which  men  habitually  find  to  be 
better  prompters  than  the  appetites  and  simple  impulses? 
They  are  all  complex,  re-representative  feelings,  occupied 
with  the  future  rather  than  the  present.  The  idea  of  authori- 
tativeness  has  therefore  come  to  be  connected  with  feelings 
having  these  traits :  the  implication  being  that  the  lower  and 
simpler  feelings  are  without  authority.  And  this  idea  of 
authoritativeness  is  one  element  in  the  abstract  consciousness 
of  duty. 

But  there  is  another  element — the  element  of  coercive- 
ness.  This  originates  from  experience  of  those  several 
forms  of  restraint  that  have,  as  above  described,  established 
themselves  in  the  course  of  civilization — the  political,  re- 
ligious, and  social.  To  the  effects  of  punishments  inflicted 
by  law  and  public  opinion  on  conduct  of  certain  kinds, 
Dr.  Bain  ascribes  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation.  And  I 
agree  with  him  to  the  extent  of  thinking  that  by  them  is 
generated  the  sense  of  compulsion  which  the  consciousness 
of  duty  includes,  and  which  the  word  obligation  indicates. 
The  existence  of  an  earlier  and  deeper  element,  gene- 
rated as  above  described,  is,  however,  I  think,  implied 
by  the  fact  that  certain  of  the  higher  self-regarding 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  127 

feelings,  instigating  prudence  and  economy,  have  a  moral 
authority  in  opposition  to  the  simpler  self-regarding  feel- 
ings :  showing  that  apart  from  any  thought  of  factitious 
penalties  on  improvidence,  the  feeling  constituted  by  repre- 
sentation of  the  natural  penalties  has  acquired  an  acknowl- 
edged superiority.  But  accepting  in  the  main  the  view  that 
fears  of  the  political  and  social  penalties  (to  which,  I  think, 
the  religious  must  be  added)  have  generated  that  sense  of 
coerciveness  which  goes  along  with  the  thought  of  post- 
poning present  to  future  and  personal  desires  to  the  claims 
of  others,  it  here  chiefly  concerns  us  to  note  that  this  sense 
of  coerciveness  becomes  indirectly  connected  with  the  feel- 
ings distinguished  as  moral.  For  since  the  political,  reli- 
gious, and  social  restraining  motives,  are  mainly  formed  of 
represented  future  results ;  and  since  the  moral  restraining 
motive  is  mainly  formed  of  represented  future  results ;  it 
happens  that  the  representations,  having  much  in  common, 
and  being  often  aroused  at  the  same  time,  the  fear  joined 
with  three  sets  of  them  becomes,  by  association,  joined  with 
the  fourth.  Thinking  of  the  extrinsic  effects  of  a  forbidden 
act,  excites  a  dread  which  continues  present  while  the  in- 
trinsic effects  of  the  act  are  thought  of;  and  being  thus 
linked  with  these  intrinsic  effects  causes  a  vague  sense  of 
moral  compulsion.  Emerging  as  the  moral  motive  does  but 
slowly  from  amidst  the  political,  religious,  and  social  mo- 
tives, it  long  participates  in  that  consciousness  of  subordina- 
tion to  some  external  agency  which  is  joined  with  them  ; 
and  only  as  it  becomes  distinct  and  predominant  does  it  lose 
this  associated  consciousness — only  then  does  the  feeling  of 
obligation  fade. 

This  remark  implies  the  tacit  conclusion,  which  will  be  to 
most  very  startling,  that  the  sense  of  duty  or  moral  obli- 
gation is  transitory,  and  will  diminish  as  fast  as  moralization 
increases.  Startling  though  it  is,  this  conclusion  may  be 
satisfactorily  defended.  Even  now  progress  towards  the 
implied  ultimate  state  is  traceable.  The  observation  is  not 
10 


128  THE  DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

infrequent  that  persistence  in  performing  a  duty  ends  in 
making  it  a  pleasure;  and  this  amounts  to  the  admission 
that  while  at  first  the  motive  contains  an  element  of  coer- 
cion, at  last  this  element  of  coercion  dies  out,  and  the  act  is 
performed  without  any  consciousness  of  being  obliged  to 
perform  it.  The  contrast  between  the  youth  on  whom  dili- 
gence is  enjoined,  and  the  man  of  business  so  absorbed  in 
affairs  that  he  cannot  be  induced  to  relax,  shows  us  how  the 
doing  of  work,  originally  under  the  consciousness  that  it 
ought  to  be  done,  may  eventually  cease  to  have  any  such  ac- 
companying consciousness.  Sometimes,  indeed,  the  relation 
comes  to  be  reversed ;  and  the  man  of  business  persists  in 
work  from  pure  love  of  it  when  told  that  he  ought  not. 
Nor  is  it  thus  with  self-regarding  feelings  only.  That  the 
maintaining  and  protecting  of  wife  by  husband  often  result 
solely  from  feelings  directly  gratified  by  these  actions,  with- 
out any  thought  of  must ;  and  that  the  fostering  of  children 
by  parents  is  in  many  cases  made  an  absorbing  occupation- 
without  any  coercive  feeling  of  ought;  are  obvious  truths 
which  show  us  that  even  now,  with  some  of  the  fundamental 
other-regarding  duties,  the  sense  of  obligation  has  retreated 
into  the  background  of  the  mind.  And  it  is  in  some  degree 
so  with  other-regarding  duties  of  a  higher  kind.  Con- 
scientiousness has  in  many  out-grown  that  stage  in  which  the 
sense  of  a  compelling  power  is  joined  with  rectitude  of  ac- 
tion. The  truly  honest  man  here  and  there  to  be  found,  is 
not  only  without  thought  of  legal,  religious,  or  social  com- 
pulsion, when  he  discharges  an  equitable  claim  on  him  ;  but 
he  is  without  thought  of  self-compulsion.  He  does  the  right 
thing  with  a  simple  feeling  of  satisfaction  in  doing  it ;  and 
is,  indeed,  impatient  if  anything  prevents  him  from  having 
the  satisfaction  of  doing  it. 

Evidently,  then,  with  complete  adaptation  to  the  social 
state,  that  element  in  the  moral  consciousness  which  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  word  obligation,  will  disappear.  The  higher 
actions  required  for  the  harmonious  carrying  on  of  life, 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  129 

will  be  as  much  matters  of  course  as  are  these  lower  actions 
which  the  simple  desires  prompt.  In  their  proper  times 
and  places  and  proportions,  the  moral  sentiments  will  guide 
men  just  as  spontaneously  and  adequately  as  now  do  the 
sensations.  And  though,  joined  with  their  regulating  in- 
fluence when  this  is  called  for,  will  exist  latent  ideas  of  the 
evils  which  nonconformity  would  bring ;  these  will  occupy 
the  mind  no  more  than  do  ideas  of  the  evils  of  starvation 
at  the  time  when  a  healthy  appetite  is  being  satisfied  by  a 
meal. 

§  47.  This  elaborate  exposition,  which  the  extreme  com- 
plexity of  the  subject  has  necessitated,  may  have  its  leading 
ideas  re-stated  thus  : — 

Symbolizing  by  a  and  J,  related  phenomena  in  the  envi- 
ronment, which  in  some  way  concern  the  welfare  of  the 
organism  ;  and  symbolizing  by  c  and  d,  the  impressions,  sim- 
ple or  compound,  which  the  organism  receives  from  the  one, 
and  the  motions,  single  or  combined,  by  which  its  acts  are 
adapted  to  meet  the  other ;  we  saw  that  psychology  in  gen- 
eral is  concerned  with  the  connexion  between  the  relation  a  5 
and  the  relation  c  d.  Further,  we  saw  that  by  implication 
the  psychological  aspect  of  Ethics,  is  that  aspect  under  which 
the  adjustment  of  c  d  to  a  5,  appears,  not  as  an  intellectual 
co-ordination  simply,  but  as  a  co-ordination  in  which  pleas- 
ures and  pains  are  alike  factors  and  results. 

It  was  shown  that  throughout  Evolution,  motive  and  act 
become  more  complex,  as  the  adaptation  of  inner  related 
actions  to  outer  related  actions  extends  in  range  and  variety. 
"Whence  followed  the  corollary  that  the  later-evolved  feelings, 
more  representative  and  re-representative  in  their  constitu- 
tion, and  referring  to  remoter  and  wider  needs,  have,  on  the 
average,  an  authority  as  guides  greater  than  have  the  earlier 
and  simpler  feelings. 

After  thus  observing  that  even  an  inferior  creature  is 
ruled  by  a  hierarchy  of  feelings  so  constituted  that  general 


130  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

welfare  depends  on  a  certain  subordination  of  lower  to 
higher,  we  saw  that  in  man,  as  he  passes  into  the  social 
state,  there  arises  the  need  for  sundry  additional  subordina- 
tions of  lower  to  higher :  co-operation  being  made  possible 
only  by  them.  To  the  restraints  constituted  by  mental  repre- 
sentations of  the  intrinsic  effects  of  actions,  which,  in  their 
simpler  forms,  have  been  evolving  from  the  beginning,  are 
added  the  restraints  caused  by  mental  representations  of 
extrinsic  effects,  in  the  shape  of  political,  religious,  and  social 
penalties. 

With  the  evolution  of  society,  made  possible  by  institu- 
tions maintaining  order,  and  associating  in  men's  minds  the 
sense  of  obligation  with  prescribed  acts  and  with  desistances 
from  forbidden  acts,  there  arose  opportunities  for  seeing  the 
bad  consequences  naturally  flowing  from  the  conduct  inter- 
dicted and  the  good  consequences  from  the  conduct  required. 
Hence  eventually  grew  up  moral  aversions  and  approvals  : 
experience  of  the  intrinsic  effects  necessarily  here  coming 
later  than  experience  of  the  extrinsic  effects,  and  therefore 
producing  its  results  later. 

The  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  these  moral  aver- 
sions and  approvals,  being  all  along  closely  connected  with 
the  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  fears  of  political, 
religious,  and  social  penalties,  necessarily  came  to  participate 
in  the  accompanying  sense  of  obligation.  The  coercive  ele- 
ment in  the  consciousness  of  duties  at  large,  evolved  by  con- 
verse with  external  agencies  which  enforce  duties,  diffused 
itself  by  association  through  that  consciousness  of  duty,  pro- 
perly called  moral,  which  is  occupied  with  intrinsic  results 
instead  of  extrinsic  results. 

But  this  self-compulsion,  which  at  a  relatively-high  stage 
becomes  more  and  more  a  substitute  for  compulsion  from 
without,  must  itself,  at  a  still  higher  stage,  practically  dis- 
appear. If  some  action  to  which  the  special  motive  is  insuf- 
ficient, is  performed  in  obedience  to  the  feeling  of  moral 
obligation,  the  fact  proves  that  the  special  faculty  concerned 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  131 

is  not  yet  equal  to  its  function — has  not  acquired  such 
strength  that  the  required  activity  has  become  its  normal 
activity,  yielding  its  due  amount  of  pleasure.  "With  complete 
evolution  then,  the  sense  of  obligation,  not  ordinarily  present 
in  consciousness,  will  be  awakened  only  on  those  extraordi- 
nary occasions  that  prompt  breach  of  the  laws  otherwise  spon- 
taneously conformed  to. 

And  this  brings  us  to  the  psychological  aspect  of  that  con- 
clusion which,  in  the  last  chapter,  was  reached  under  its  bio- 
logical aspect.  The  pleasures  and  pains  which  the  moral 
sentiments  originate,  will,  like  bodily  pleasures  and  pains, 
become  incentives  and  deterrents  so  adjusted  in  their 
strengths  to  the  needs,  that  the  moral  conduct  will  be  the 
natural  conduct. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

§  48.  Not  for  the  human  race  only,  but  for  every  race, 
there  are  laws  of  right  living.  Given  its  environment  and 
its  structure,  and  there  is  for  each  kind  of  creature  a 
set  of  actions  adapted  in  their  kinds,  amounts,  and  combi- 
nations, to  secure  the  highest  conservation  its  nature 
permits.  The  animal,  like  the  man,  has  needs  for  food, 
warmth,  activity,  rest,  and  so  forth ;  which  must  be  fulfilled 
in  certain  relative  degrees  to  make  its  life  whole.  Main- 
tenance of  its  race  implies  satisfaction  of  special  desires, 
sexual  and  philoprogenitive,  in  due  proportions.  Hence 
there  is  a  supposable  formula  for  the  activities  of  each 
species,  which,  could  it  be  drawn  out,  would  constitute  a 
system  of  morality  for  that  species.  But  such  a  system 
of  morality  would  have  little  or  no  reference  to  the  wel- 
fare of  others  than  self  and  offspring.  Indifferent  to  indi- 
viduals of  its  own  kind,  as  an  inferior  creature  is,  and 
habitually  hostile  to  individuals  of  other  kinds,  the  formula 
for  its  life  could  take  no  cognizance  of  the  lives  of  those  with 
which  it  came  in  contact ;  or  rather,  such  formula  would 
imply  that  maintenance  of  its  life  was  at  variance  with  main- 
tenance of  their  lives. 

But  on  ascending  from  beings  of  lower  kinds  to  the  high- 
est kind  of  being,  man  ;  or,  more  strictly,  on  ascending  from 

132 


THE    SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  133 

man  in  his  pre-SQcial  stage  to  man  in  his  social  stage ;  the 
formula  has  to  include  an  additional  factor.  Though  not 
peculiar  to  human  life  under  its  developed  form,  the  presence 
of  this  factor  is  still,  in  the  highest  degree,  characteristic  of 
it.  Though  there  are  inferior  species  displaying  considera- 
ble degrees  of  sociality  ;  and  though  the  formulas  for  their 
complete  lives  would  have  to  take  account  of  the  relations 
arising  from  union  ;  yet  our  own  species  is,  on  the  whole,  to 
be  distinguished  as  having  a  formula  for  complete  life  which 
specially  recognizes  the  relations  of  each  individual  to  others, 
in  presence  of  whom,  and  in  co-operation  with  whom,  he  has 
to  live. 

This  additional  factor  in  the  problem  of  complete  living, 
is,  indeed,  so  important  that  the  necessitated  modifications 
of  conduct  have  come  to  form  a  chief  part  of  the  code  of 
conduct.  Because  the  inherited  desires  which  directly  refer 
to  the  maintenance  of  individual  life,  are  fairly  adjusted  to 
the  requirements,  there  has  been  no  need  to  insist  on  that 
conformity  to  them  which  furthers  self-conservation.  Con- 
versely, because  these  desires  prompt  activities  that  often 
conflict  with  the  activities  of  others ;  and  because  the  senti- 
ments responding  to  other's  claims  are  relatively  weak ; 
moral  codes  emphasize  those  restraints  on  conduct  which  the 
presence  of  fellow  men  entails. 

From  the  sociological  point  of  view,  then,  Ethics  becomes 
nothing  else  than  a  definite  account  of  the  forms  of  conduct 
that  are  fitted  to  the  associated  state,  in  such  wise  that  the 
lives  of  each  and  all  may  be  the  greatest  possible,  alike  in 
length  and  breadth. 

§  49.  But  here  we  are  met  by  a  fact  which  forbids  us  thus 
to  put  in  the  foreground  the  welfares  of  citizens,  individually 
considered,  and  requires  us  to  put  in  the  foreground  the 
welfare  of  the  society  as  a  whole.  The  life  of  the  social 
organism  must,  as  an  end,  rank  above  the  lives  of  its  units. 
These  two  ends  are  not  harmonious  at  the  outset ;  and 


134  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

though  the  tendency  is  towards  harmonization  of  them,  they 
are  still  partially  conflicting. 

As  fast  as  the  social  state  establishes  itself,  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  society  becomes  a  means  of  preserving  its  units. 
Living  together  arose  because,  on  the  average,  it  proved 
more  advantageous  to  each  than  living  apart ;  and  this  im- 
plies that  maintenance  of  combination  is  maintenance  of  the 
conditions  to  more  satisfactory  living  than  the  combined 
persons  would  otherwise  have.  Hence,  social  self-preserva- 
tion becomes  a  proximate  aim  taking  precedence  of  the  ulti- 
mate aim,  individual  self-preservation. 

This  subordination  of  personal  to  social  welfare  is,  how- 
ever, contingent :  it  depends  on  the  presence  of  antagonistic 
societies.  So  long  as  the  existence  of  a  community  is  en- 
dangered by  the  actions  of  communities  around,  it  must 
remain  true  that  the  interests  of  individuals  must  be  sacri- 
ficed to  the  interests  of  the  community,  as  far  as  is  needful 
for  the  community's  salvation.  But  if  this  is  manifest,  it  is, 
by  implication,  manifest,  that  when  social  antagonisms  cease, 
this  need  for  sacrifice  of  private  claims  to  public  claims 
ceases  also ;  or  rather,  there  cease  to  be  any  public  claims  at 
variance  with  private  claims.  All  along,  furtherance  of  indi- 
vidual lives  has  been  the  ultimate  end  ;  and  if  this  ultimate 
end  has  been  postponed  to  the  proximate  end  of  preserving 
the  community's  life,  it  has  been  so  only  because  this  proxi- 
mate end  was  instrumental  to  the  ultimate  end.  When  the 
aggregate  is  no  longer  in  danger,  the  final  object  of  pursuit, 
the  welfare  of  the  units,  no  longer  needing  to  be  postponed, 
becomes  the  immediate  object  of  pursuit. 

Consequently,  unlike  sets  of  conclusions  respecting  human 
conduct  emerge,  according  as  we  are  concerned  with  a  state 
of  habitual  or  occasional  war,  or  are  concerned  with  a  state 
of  permanent  and  general  peace.  Let  us  glance  at  these 
alternative  states  and  the  alternative  implications. 

§  50.  At  present  the  individual  man  has  to  carry  on  his 


THE    SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  135 

life  with  due  regard  to  the  lives  of  others  belonging  to  the 
same  society ;  while  he  is  sometimes  called  on  to  be  regard- 
less of  the  lives  of  those  belonging  to  other  societies.  The 
same  mental  constitution  having  to  fulfil  both  these  require- 
ments, is  necessarily  incongruous ;  and  the  correlative  con- 
duct, adjusted  first  to  the  one  need  and  then  to  the  other, 
cannot  be  brought  within  any  consistent  ethical  system. 

Hate  and  destroy  your  fellow  man,  is  now  the  command ; 
and  then  the  command  is,  love  and  aid  your  fellow  man.  Use 
every  means  to  deceive,  says  the  one  code  of  conduct ;  while 
the  other  code  says,  be  truthful  in  word  and  deed.  Seize 
what  property  you  can  and  burn  all  you  cannot  take  away, 
are  injunctions  which  the  religion  of  enmity  countenances ; 
while  by  the  religion  of  amity,  theft  and  arson  are  con- 
demned as  crimes.  And  as  conduct  has  to  be  made  up  of 
parts  thus  at  variance  with  one  another,  the  theory  of 
conduct  remains  confused.  There  co-exists  a 

kindred  irreconcilability  between  the  sentiments  answering 
to  the  forms  of  co-operation  required  for  militancy  and 
industrialism  respectively.  While  social  antagonisms  are 
habitual,  and  while,  for  efficient  action  against  other  societies, 
there  needs  great  subordination  to  men  who  command,  the 
virtue  of  loyalty  and  the  duty  of  implicit  obedience  have  to 
be  insisted  on  :  disregard  of  the  ruler's  will  is  punished  with 
death.  But  when  war  ceases  to  be  chronic,  and  growing 
industrialism  habituates  men  to  maintaining  their  own 
claims  while  respecting  the  claims  of  others,  loyalty  becomes 
less  profound,  the  authority  of  the  ruler  is  questioned  or 
denied  in  respect  of  various  private  actions  and  beliefs. 
State-dictation  is  in  many  directions  successfully  defied, 
and  the  political  independence  of  the  citizen  comes  to  be 
regarded  as  a  claim  which  it  is  virtuous  to  maintain  and 
vicious  to  yield  up.  Necessarily  during  the  transition,  these 
opposite  sentiments  are  incongruously  mingled.  So 

is  it,  too,  with  domestic  institutions  under  the  two  regimes. 
While  the  first  is  dominant,  ownership  of  a  slave  is  honour- 


136  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

able,  and  in  the  slave  submission  is  praiseworthy ;  but  as 
the  last  grows  dominant,  slave-owning  becomes  a  crime  and 
servile  obedience  excites  contempt.  Nor  is  it  otherwise 
in  the  family.  The  subjection  of  women  to  men,  complete 
while  war  is  habitual  but  qualified  as  fast  as  peaceful  occu- 
pations replace  it,  comes  eventually  to  be  thought  wrong ; 
and  equality  before  the  law  is  asserted.  At  the  same  time 
the  opinion  concerning  paternal  power  changes.  The  once 
unquestioned  right  of  the  father  to  take  his  children's  lives 
is  denied ;  and  the  duty  of  absolute  submission  to  him,  long 
insisted  on,  is  changed  into  the  duty  of  obedience  within 
reasonable  limits. 

Were  the  ratio  between  the  life  of  antagonism  with  alien 
societies,  and  the  life  of  peaceful  co-operation  within  each 
society,  a  constant  ratio,  some  permanent  compromise  be- 
tween the  conflicting  rules  of  conduct  appropriate  to  the 
two  lives  might  be  reached.  But  since  this  ratio  is  a  vari- 
able one,  the  compromise  can  never  be  more  than  temporary. 
Ever  the  tendency  is  towards  congruity  between  beliefs  and 
requirements.  Either  the  social  arrangements  are  gradually 
changed  until  they  come  into  harmony  with  prevailing  ideas 
and  sentiments ;  or,  if  surrounding  conditions  prevent 
change  in  the  social  arrangements,  the  necessitated  habits 
of  life  modify  the  prevailing  ideas  and  sentiments  to  the 
requisite  extent.  Hence,  for  each  kind  and  degree  of  social 
evolution  determined  by  external  conflict  and  internal  friend- 
ship, there  is  an  appropriate  compromise  between  the  moral 
code  of  enmity  and  the  moral  code  of  amity :  not,  indeed,  a 
definable,  consistent  compromise,  but  a  compromise  fairly 
well  understood. 

This  compromise,  vague,  ambiguous,  illogical,  though  it 
may  be,  is  nevertheless  for  the  time  being  authoritative. 
For  if,  as  above  shown,  the  welfare  of  the  society  must 
take  precedence  of  the  welfares  of  its  component  indi- 
viduals, during  those  stages  in  which  the  individuals  have 
to  preserve  themselves  by  preserving  their  society;  then 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  137 

such  temporary  compromise  between  the  two  codes  of  con- 
duct as  duly  regards  external  defence,  while  favouring  inter- 
nal co-operation  to  the  greatest  extent  practicable,  subserves 
the  maintenance  of  life  in  the  highest  degree  ;  and  thus 
gains  the  ultimate  sanction.  So  that  the  perplexed  and  in- 
consistent moralities  of  which  each  society  and  each  age 
shows  us  a  more  or  less  different  one,  are  severally  justified 
as  being  approximately  the  best  under  the  circumstances. 

But  such  moralities  are,  by  their  definitions,  shown  to 
belong  to  incomplete  conduct ;  not  to  conduct  that  is  fully 
evolved.  We  saw  that  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which, 
while  constituting  the  external  manifestations  of  life  con- 
duce to  the  continuance  of  life,  have  been  rising  to  a  certain 
ideal  form  now  approached  by  the  civilized  man.  But  this 
form  is  not  reached  so  long  as  there  continue  aggressions  of 
one  society  upon  another.  Whether  the  hindrances  to  com- 
plete living  result  from  the  trespasses  of  fellow-citizens,  or 
from  the  trespasses  of  aliens,  matters  not :  if  they  occur  there 
does  not  yet  exist  the  state  defined.  The  limit  to  the  evolu- 
tion of  conduct  is  arrived  at  by  the  members  of  each  society 
only  when,  being  arrived  at  by  members  of  other  societies 
also,  the  causes  of  international  antagonism  end  simultane- 
ously with  the  causes  of  antagonism  between  individuals. 

And  now  having  from  the  sociological  point  of  view 
recognized  the  need  for,  and  authority  of,  these  changing 
systems  of  ethics,  proper  to  changing  ratios  between  warlike 
activities  and  peaceful  activities,  we  have,  from  the  same 
point  of  view,  to  consider  the  system  of  ethics  proper  to  the 
state  in  which  peaceful  activities  are  undisturbed. 

§  51.  If,  excluding  all  thought  of  dangers  or  hindrances 
from  causes  external  to  a  society,  we  set  ourselves  to  specify 
those  conditions  under  which  the  life  of  each  person,  and 
therefore  of  the  aggregate,  may  be  the  greatest  possible ;  we 
come  upon  certain  simple  ones  which,  as  here  stated,  assume 
the  form  of  truisms. 


138  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

For,  as  we  have  seen,  the  definition  of  that  highest  life 
accompanying  completely-evolved  conduct,  itself  excludes 
all  acts  of  aggression— not  only  murder,  assault,  robbery 
and  the  major  offences  generally,  but  minor  offences,  such 
as  libel,  injury  to  property  and  so  forth.  While  directly 
deducting  from  individual  life,  these  indirectly  cause  per- 
turbations of  social  life.  Trespasses  against  others  rouse 
antagonisms  in  them  ;  and  if  these  are  numerous  the  group 
loses  coherence.  Hence,  whether  the  integrity  of  the  group 
itself  is  considered  as  the  end  ;  or  whether  the  end  con- 
sidered is  the  benefit  ultimately  secured  to  its  units  by 
maintaining  its  integrity  ;  or  whether  the  immediate  benefit 
of  its  units  taken  separately,  is  considered  the  end  ;  the 
implication  is  the  same :  such  acts  are  at  variance  with 
achievement  of  the  end.  That  these  inferences  are  self- 
evident  and  trite  (as  indeed  the  first  inferences  drawn  from 
the  data  of  every  science  that  reaches  the  deductive  stage 
naturally  are)  must  not  make  us  pass  lightly  over  the  all- 
important  fact  that,  from  the  sociological  point  of  view, 
the  leading  moral  laws  are  seen  to  follow  as  corollaries 
from  the  definition  of  complete  life  carried  on  under  social 
conditions. 

Respect  for  these  primary  moral  laws  is  not  enough,  how- 
ever. Associated  men  pursuing  their  several  lives  without 
injuring  one  another  but  without  helping  one  another,  reap 
no  advantages  from  association  beyond  those  of  companion- 
ship. If,  while  there  is  no  co-operation  for  defensive  pur- 
poses (which  is  here  excluded  by  the  hypothesis)  there  is 
also  no  co-operation  for  satisfying  wants,  the  social  state 
loses  its  raison  d'etre — almost,  if  not  entirely.  There 
are,  indeed,  people  who  live  in  a  condition  little  removed 
from  this ;  as  the  Esquimaux.  But  though  these,  exhibit- 
ing none  of  the  co-operation  necessitated  by  war,  which 
is  unknown  to  them,  lead  lives  such  that  each  family  is 
substantially  independent  of  others,  occasional  co-operation 
occurs.  And,  indeed,  that  families  should  live  in  com- 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  139 

pany   without  ever  yielding  mutual   aid,  is   scarcely   con- 
ceivable. 

Nevertheless,  whether  actually  existing  or  only  approached, 
we  must  here  recognize  as  hypothetically  possible,  a  state  in 
which  these  primary  moral  laws  alone  are  conformed  to ;  for 
the  purpose  of  observing,  in  their  uncomplicated  forms, 
what  are  the  negative  conditions  to  harmonious  social  life. 
Whether  the  members  of  a  social  group  do  or  do  not  co- 
operate, certain  limitations  to  their  individual  activities  are 
necessitated  by  their  association  ;  and  after  recognizing  these 
as  arising  in  the  absence  of  co-operation,  we  shall  be  the 
better  prepared  to  understand  how  conformity  to  them  is 
effected  when  co-operation  begins. 

§  52.  For  whether  men  live  together  in  quite  independ- 
ent ways,  careful  only  to  avoid  aggressing ;  or  whether, 
advancing  from  passive  association  to  active  association, 
they  co-operate ;  their  conduct  must  be  such  that  the 
achievement  of  ends  by  each  shall  at  least  not  be  hindered. 
And  it  becomes  obvious  that  when  they  co-operate,  there 
must  not  only  be  no  resulting  hindrance  but  there  must  be 
facilitation  ;  since  in  the  absence  of  facilitation  there  can  be 
no  motive  to  co-operate.  What  shape,  then,  must  the  mutual 
restraints  take  when  co-operation  begins  ?  or  rather — What, 
in  addition  to  the  primary  mutual  restraints  already  specified, 
are  those  secondary  mutual  restraints  required  to  make  co- 
operation possible  ? 

One  who,  living  in  an  isolated  way,  expends  effort  in 
pursuit  of  an  end,  gets  compensation  for  the  effort  by  secur- 
ing the  end  ;  and  so  achieves  satisfaction.  If  he  expends  the 
effort  without  achieving  the  end,  there  results  dissatisfac- 
tion. The  satisfaction  and  the  dissatisfaction,  are  measures 
of  success  and  failure  in  life-sustaining  acts ;  since  that 
which  is  achieved  by  effort  is  something  which  directly  or 
indirectly  furthers  life,  and  so  pays  for  the  cost  of  the 
effort ;  while  if  the  effort  fails  there  is  nothing  to  pay  for 


140  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

the  cost  of  it,  and  so  much  life  is  wasted.  What  must  result 
from  this  when  men's  efforts  are  joined  ?  The  reply  will  be 
made  clearer  if  we  take  the  successive  forms  of  co-operation 
in  the  order  of  ascending  complexity.  We  may  distinguish 
as  homogeneous  co-operation,  (1),  that  in  which  like  efforts 
are  joined  for  like  ends  that  are  simultaneously  enjoyed.  As 
co-operation  that  is  not  completely  homogeneous,  we  may 
distinguish,  (2),  that  in  which  like  efforts  are  joined  for  like 
ends  that  are  not  simultaneously  enjoyed.  A  co-operation  of 
which  the  heterogeneity  is  more  distinct  is,  (3),  that  in  which 
unlike  efforts  are  joined  for  like  ends.  And  lastly  comes  the 
decidedly  heterogeneous  co-operation,  (4),  that  in  which  un- 
like efforts  are  joined  for  unlike  ends. 

The  simplest  and  earliest  of  these,  in  which  men's  powers, 
similar  in  kind  and  degree,  are  united  in  pursuit  of  a  benefit 
which,  when  obtained,  they  all  participate  in,  is  most  fami- 
liarly exemplified  in  the  catching  of  game  by  primitive  men  : 
this  simplest  and  earliest  form  of  industrial  co-operation 
being  also  that  which  is  least  differentiated  from  militant  co- 
operation ;  for  the  co-operators  are  the  same,  and  the  pro- 
cesses, both  destructive  of  life,  are  carried  on  in  analogous 
ways.  The  condition  under  which  such  co-operation  may 
be  successfully  carried  on,  is  that  the  co-operators  shall 
share  alike  in  the  produce.  Each  thus  being  enabled  to 
repay  himself  in  food  for  the  expended  effort,  and  being 
further  enabled  to  achieve  other  such  desired  ends  as  main- 
tenance of  family,  obtains  satisfaction  :  there  is  no  aggression 
of  one  on  another,  and  the  co-operation  is  harmonious.  Of 
course  the  divided  produce  can  be  but  roughly  proportioned 
to  the  several  efforts  joined  in  obtaining  it ;  but  there  is 
actually  among  savages,  as  we  see  that  for  harmonious  co- 
operation there  must  be,  a  recognition  of  the  principle  that 
efforts  when  combined  shall  severally  bring  equivalent  bene- 
fits, as  they  would  do  if  they  were  separate.  Moreover, 
beyond  the  taking  equal  shares  in  return  for  labours  that 
are  approximately  equal,  there  is  generally  an  attempt  at 


THE    SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW. 

proportioning  benefit  to  achievement,  by  assigning  some- 
thing extra,  in  the  shape  of  the  best  part  of  the  trophy,  to 
the  actual  slayer  of  the  game.  And  obviously,  if  there  is  a 
wide  departure  from  this  system  of  sharing  benefits  when 
there  has  been  a  sharing  of  efforts,  the  co-operation  will  cease. 
Individual  hunters  will  prefer  to  do  the  best  they  can  for 
themselves  separately. 

Passing  from  this  simplest  case  of  co-operation  to  a  case 
not  quite  so  simple — a  case  in  which  the  homogeneity  is 
incomplete — let  us  ask  how  a  member  of  the  group  may  be 
led  without  dissatisfaction  to  expend  effort  in  achieving  a 
benefit  which,  when  achieved,  is  enjoyed  exclusively  by 
another?  Clearly  he  may  do  this  on  condition  that  the 
other  shall  afterwards  expend  a  like  effort,  the  beneficial 
result  of  which  shall  be  similarly  rendered  up  by  him  in 
return.  This  exchange  of  equivalents  of  effort  is  the  form 
which  social  co-operation  takes  while  yet  there  is  little  or  no 
division  of  labour  save  that  between  the  sexes.  For  example, 
the  Bodo  and  Dhimals  "  mutually  assist  each  other  for  the 
nonce,  as  well  in  constructing  their  houses  as  in  clearing 
their  plots  for  cultivation."  And  this  principle — I  will  help 
you  if  you  will  help  me — common  in  simple  communities 
where  the  occupations  are  alike  in  kind,  and  occasionally 
acted  upon  in  more  advanced  communities,  is  one  under 
which  the  relation  between  effort  and  benefit,  no  longer 
directly  maintained,  is  maintained  indirectly.  For  whereas 
when  men's  activities  are  carried  on  separately,  or  are  joined 
in  the  way  exemplified  above,  effort  is  immediately  paid  for 
by  benefit,  in  this  form  of  co-operation  the  benefit  achieved 
by  effort  is  exchanged  for  a  like  benefit  to  be  afterwards 
received  when  asked  for.  And  in  this  case  as  in  the  preced- 
ing case,  co-operation  can  be  maintained  only  by  fulfilment 
of  the  tacit  agreements.  For  if  they  are  habitually  not  ful- 
filled, there  will  commonly  be  refusal  to  give  aid  when  asked ; 
and  each  man  will  be  left  to  do  the  best  he  can  by  himself. 
All  those  advantages  to  be  gained  by  union  of  efforts  in 


142  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

doing  things  that  are  beyond  the  powers  of  the  single  indi- 
vidual, will  be  unachievable.  At  the  outset,  then,  fulfilment 
of  contracts  that  are  implied  if  not  expressed,  becomes  a  con- 
dition to  social  co-operation  ;  and  therefore  to  social  develop- 
ment. 

From  these  simple  forms  of  co-operation  in  which  the 
labours  men  carry  on  are  of  like  kinds,  let  us  turn  to  the 
more  complex  forms  in  which  they  carry  on  labours  of  unlike 
kinds.  Where  men  mutually  aid  in  building  huts  or  felling 
trees,  the  number  of  days'  work  now  given  by  one  to 
another,  is  readily  balanced  by  an  equal  number  of  days' 
work  afterwards  given  by  the  other  to  him.  And  no  esti- 
mation of  the  relative  values  of  the  labours  being  required,  a 
definite  understanding  is  little  needed.  But  when  division  of 
labour  arises — when  there  come  transactions  between  one 
who  makes  weapons  and  another  who  dresses  skins  for  cloth- 
ing, or  between  a  grower  of  roots  and  a  catcher  of  fish — 
neither  the  relative  amounts  nor  the  relative  qualities  of  their 
labours  admit  of  easy  measure ;  and  with  the  multiplication 
of  businesses,  implying  numerous  kinds  of  skill  and  power, 
there  ceases  to  be  anything  like  manifest  equivalence  between 
either  the  bodily  and  mental  efforts  set  against  one  another, 
or  between  their  products.  Hence  the  arrangement  cannot 
now  be  taken  for  granted,  as  while  the  things  exchanged  are 
like  in  kind  :  it  has  to  be  stated.  If  A  allows  B  to  appro- 
priate a  product  of  his  special  skill,  on  condition  that  he  is 
allowed  to  appropriate  a  different  product  of  B's  special 
skill,  it  results  that  as  equivalence  of  the  two  products  cannot 
be  determined  by  direct  comparison  of  their  quantities  and 
qualities,  there  must  be  a  distinct  understanding  as  to  how 
much  of  the  one  may  be  taken  in  consideration  of  so  much 
of  the  other. 

Only  under  voluntary  agreement,  then,  no  longer  tacit 
and  vague  but  overt  and  definite,  can  co  operation  be  har- 
moniously carried  on  when  division  of  labour  becomes  estab- 
lished. And  as  in  the  simplest  co-operation,  where  like 


THE    SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  143 

efforts  are  joined  to  secure  a  common  good,  the  dissatisfac- 
tion caused  in  those  who,  having  expended  their  labours  do 
not  get  their  shares  of  the  good,  prompts  them  to  cease 
co-operating  ;  as  in  the  more  advanced  co-operation,  achieved 
by  exchanging  equal  labours  of  like  kind  expended  at  differ- 
ent times,  aversion  to  co-operate  is  generated  if  the  expected 
equivalent  of  labour  is  not  rendered ;  so  in  this  developed 
co-operation,  the  failure  of  either  to  surrender  to  the  other 
that  which  was  avowedly  recognized  as  of  like  value  with 
the  labour  or  product  given,  tends  to  prevent  co-opera- 
tion by  exciting  discontent  with  its  results.  And  evi- 
dently, while  antagonisms  thus  caused  impede  the  lives  of 
the  units,  the  life  of  the  aggregate  is  endangered  by  dimin- 
ished cohesion. 

§  53.  Beyond  these  comparatively  direct  mischiefs,  special 
and  general,  there  have  to  be  noted  indirect  mischiefs.  As 
already  implied  by  the  reasoning  in  the  last  paragraph,  not 
only  social  integration  but  also  social  differentiation,  is  hin- 
dered by  breach  of  contract. 

In  Part  II  of  the  Principles  of  Sociology,  it  was  shown 
that  the  fundamental  principles  of  organization  are  the  same 
for  an  individual  organism  and  for  a  social  organism ;  because 
both  consist  of  mutually-dependent  parts.  In  the  one  case 
as  in  the  other,  the  assumption  of  unlike  activities  by  the 
component  members,  is  possible  only  on  condition  that  they 
severally  benefit  in  due  degrees  by  one  another's  activities. 
That  we  may  the  better  see  what  are  the  implications  in  re- 
spect of  social  structures,  let  us  first  note  the  implications  in 
respect  of  individual  structures. 

The  welfare  of  a  living  body  implies  an  approximate 
equilibrium  between  waste  and  repair.  If  the  activities 
involve  an  expenditure  not  made  good  by  nutrition, 
dwindling  follows.  If  the  tissues  are  enabled  to  take  up 
from  the  blood  enriched  by  food,  fit  substances  enough  to 
replace  those  used  up  in  efforts  made,  the  weight  may  be 
11 


144:  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

maintained.    And   if   the   gain   exceeds    the    loss,  growth 
results.  That  which  is  true  of  the  whole  in  its 

relations  to  the  external  world,  is  no  less  true  of  the  parts 
in  their  relations  to  one  another.  Each  organ,  like  the 
entire  organism,  is  wasted  by  performing  its  function,  and 
has  to  restore  itself  from  the  materials  brought  to  it.  If 
the  quantity  of  materials  furnished  by  the  joint  agency  of 
the  other  organs  is  deficient,  the  particular  organ  dwindles. 
If  they  are  sufficient,  it  can  maintain  its  integrity.  If  they 
are  in  excess,  it  is  enabled  to  increase.  To  say  that  this 
arrangement  constitutes  the  physiological  contract,  is  to 
use  a  metaphor  which,  though  not  true  in  aspect  is  true 
in  essence.  For  the  relations  of  structures  are  actually  such 
that,  by  the  help  of  a  central  regulative  system,  each 
organ  is  supplied  with  blood  in  proportion  to  the  work  it 
does.  As  was  pointed  out  (Principles  of  Sociology,  §  254) 
well-developed  animals  are  so  constituted  that  each  muscle 
or  viscus,  when  called  into  action,  sends  to  the  vaso-motor 
centres  through  certain  nerve-fibres,  an  impulse  caused  by 
its  action ;  whereupon  through  other  nerve-fibres,  there 
comes  an  impulse  causing  dilatation  of  its  blood-vessels. 
That  is  to  say,  all  other  parts  of  the  organism  when  they 
jointly  require  it  to  labour,  forthwith  begin  to  pay  it  in 
blood.  During  the  ordinary  state  of  physiological  equilib- 
rium, the  loss  and  the  gain  balance,  and  the  organ  does  not 
sensibly  change.  If  the  amount  of  its  function  is  increased 
within  such  moderate  limits  that  the  local  blood-vessels  can 
bring  adequately-increased  supplies,  the  organ  grows:  be- 
yond replacing  its  losses  by  its  gains,  it  makes  a  profit  on  its 
extra  transactions ;  so  being  enabled  by  extra  structures  to 
meet  extra  demands.  But  if  the  demands  made  on  it  be- 
come so  great  that  the  supply  of  materials  cannot  keep  pace 
with  the  expenditure,  either  because  the  local  blood-vessels 
are  not  large  enough  or  for  any  other  reason  ;  then  the  organ 
begins  to  decrease  from  excess  of  waste  over  repair :  there 
sets  in  what  is  known  as  atrophy.  Now  since  each  of  the 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  145 

organs  has  thus  to  be  paid  in  nutriment  for  its  services  by  the 
rest ;  it  follows  that  the  due  balancing  of  their  respective 
claims  and  payments  is  requisite,  directly  for  the  welfare  of 
each  organ,  and  indirectly  for  the  welfare  of  the  organism. 
For  in  a  whole  formed  of  mutually-dependent  parts,  any- 
thing which  prevents  due  performance  of  its  duty  by  one  part 
reacts  injuriously  on  all  the  parts. 

With  change  of  terms  these  statements  and  inferences 
hold  of  a  society.  That  social  division  of  labour  which 
parallels  in  so  many  other  respects  the  physiological 
division  of  labour,  parallels  it  in  this  respect  also.  As 
was  shown  at  large  in  the  Principles  of  Sociology,  Part  II, 
each  order  of  functionaries  and  each  group  of  pro- 
ducers, severally  performing  some  action  or  making 
some  article  not  for  direct  satisfaction  of  their  own 
needs  but  for  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  fellow-citizens 
in  general,  otherwise  occupied,  can  continue  to  do  this 
only  so  long  as  the  expenditures  of  effort  and  returns 
of  profit  are  approximately  equivalent.  Social  organs 
like  individual  organs  remain  stationary  if  there  come 
to  them  normal  proportions  of  the  commodities  produced 
by  the  society  as  a  whole.  If  because  the  demands 
made  on  an  industry  or  profession  are  unusually  great, 
those  engaged  in  it  make  excessive  profits,  more  citizens 
flock  to  it  and  the  social  structure  constituted  by  its 
members  grows ;  while  decrease  of  the  demands  and 
therefore  of  the  profits,  either  leads  its  members  to 
choose  other  careers  or  stops  the  accessions  needful  to 
replace  those  who  die,  and  the  structure  dwindles.  Thus 
is  maintained  that  proportion  among  the  powers  of  the 
component  parts  which  is  most  conducive  to  the  welfare  of 
the  whole. 

And  now  mark  that  the  primary  condition  to  achieve- 
ment of  this  result  is  fulfilment  of  contract.  If  from  the 
members  of  any  part  payment  is  frequently  withUeld,  or 
falls  short  of  the  promised  amount,  then,  through  ruin  of 


146  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

some  and  abandonment  of  the  occupation  by  others,  the  part 
diminishes ;  and  if  it  was  before  not  more  than  competent 
to  its  duty,  it  now  becomes  incompetent,  and  the  society 
suffers.  Or  if  social  needs  throw  on  some  part  great  in- 
crease of  function,  and  the  members  of  it  are  enabled  to 
get  for  their  services  unusually  high  prices;  fulfilment  of 
the  agreements  to  give  them  these  high  prices,  is  the  only  way 
of  drawing  to  the  part  such  additional  number  of  members 
as  will  make  it  equal  to  the  augmented  demands.  For  citi- 
zens will  not  come  to  it  if  they  find  the  high  prices  agreed 
upon  are  not  paid. 

Briefly,  then,  the  universal  basis  of  co-operation  is  the 
proportioning  of  benefits  received  to  services  rendered. 
Without  this  there  can  be  no  physiological  division  of  labour ; 
without  this  there  can  be  no  sociological  division  of  labour. 
And  since  division  of  labour,  physiological  or  sociological, 
profits  the  whole  and  each  part ;  it  results  that  on  mainte- 
nance of  the  arrangements  necessary  to  do  it,  depend  both 
special  and  general  welfare.  In  a  society  such  arrangements 
are  maintained  only  if  bargains,  overt  or  tacit,  are  carried 
out.  So  that  beyond  the  primary  requirement  to  harmonious 
co-existence  in  a  society,  that  its  units  shall  not  directly  ag- 
gress on  one  another ;  there  comes  this  secondary  require- 
ment, that  they  shall  not  indirectly  aggress  by  breaking 
agreements. 

§  54.  But  now  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that  complete 
fulfilment  of  these  conditions,  original  and  derived,  is  not 
enough.  Social  co-operation  may  be  such  that  no  one  is  im- 
peded in  the  obtainment  of  the  normal  return  for  effort, 
but  contrariwise  is  aided  by  equitable  exchange  of  services ; 
and  yet  much  may  remain  to  be  achieved.  There  is  a  theo- 
retically-possible form  of  society,  purely  industrial  in  its  ac- 
tivities, which,  though  approaching  nearer  to  the  moral  idea 
in  its  cv)de  of  conduct  than  any  society  not  purely  industrial, 
does  not  fully  reach  it. 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  147 

For  while  industrialism  requires  the  life  of  each  citizen 
to  be  such  that  it  may  be  carried  on  without  direct  or 
indirect  aggressions  on  other  citizens,  it  does  not  require 
his  life  to  be  such  that  it  shall  directly  further  the  lives 
of  other  citizens.  It  is  not  a  necessary  implication  of 
industrialism,  as  thus  far  defined,  that  each,  beyond  the 
benefits  given  and  received  by  exchange  of  services,  shall 
give  and  receive  other  benefits.  A  society  is  conceivable 
formed  of  men  leading  perfectly  inoffensive  lives,  scrupu- 
lously fulfilling  their  contracts,  and  efficiently  rearing  their 
offspring,  who  yet,  yielding  to  one  another  no  advantages 
beyond  those  agreed  upon,  fall  short  of  that  highest  degree 
of  life  which  the  gratuitous  rendering  of  services  makes 
possible.  Daily  experiences  prove  that  every  one  would 
suffer  many  evils  and  lose  many  goods,  did  none  give  him 
unpaid  assistance.  The  life  of  each  would  be  more  or  less 
damaged  had  he  to  meet  all  contingencies  single-handed. 
Further,  if  no  one  did  for  his  fellows  anything  more  than 
was  required  by  strict  performance  of  contract,  private 
interests  would  suffer  from  the  absence  of  attention  to  public 
interests.  The  limit  of  evolution  of  conduct  is  consequent- 
ly not  reached,  until,  beyond  avoidance  of  direct  and  indi- 
rect injuries  to  others,  there  are  spontaneous  efforts  to  fur- 
ther the  welfare  of  others. 

It  may  be  shown  that  the  form  of  nature  which  thus  to 
justice  adds  beneficence,  is  one  which  adaptation  to  the 
social  state  produces.  The  social  man  has  not  reached  that 
harmonization  of  constitution  with  conditions  forming  the 
limit  of  evolution,  so  long  as  there  remains  space  for  the 
growth  of  faculties  which,  by  their  exercise,  bring  positive 
benefit  to  others  and  satisfaction  to  self.  If  the  presence 
of  fellow-men,  while  putting  certain  limits  to  each  man's 
sphere  of  activity,  opens  certain  other  spheres  of  activity 
in  which  feelings  while  achieving  their  gratifications,  do 
not  diminish  but  add  to  the  gratifications  of  others,  then 
such  spheres  will  inevitably  be  occupied.  Recognition  of 


148  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

this  truth  does  not,  however,  call  on  us  to  qualify  greatly 
that  conception  of  the  industrial  state  above  set  forth ; 
since  sympathy  is  the  root  of  both  justice  and  beneficence. 

§  55.  Thus  the  sociological  view  of  Ethics  supplements 
the  physical,  the  biological,  and  the  psychological  views,  by 
disclosing  those  conditions  under  which  only  associated 
activities  can  be  so  carried  on,  that  the  complete  living  of 
each  consists  with,  and  conduces  to,  the  complete  living 
of  all. 

At  first  the  welfare  of  social  groups,  habitually  in  antago- 
nism with  other  groups,  takes  precedence  of  individual  wel- 
fare ;  and  the  rules  of  conduct  which  are  authoritative  for 
the  time  being,  involve  incompleteness  of  individual  life  that 
the  general  life  may  be  maintained.  At  the  same  time  the 
rules  have  to  enforce  the  claims  of  individual  life  as  far  as 
may  be ;  since  on  the  welfare  of  the  units  the  welfare  of  the 
aggregate  largely  depends. 

In  proportion  as  societies  endanger  one  another  less,  the 
need  for  subordinating  individual  lives  to  the  general  life, 
decreases ;  and  with  approach  to  a  peaceful  state,  the  general 
life,  having  from  the  beginning  had  furtherance  of  individual 
lives  as  its  ultimate  purpose,  comes  to  have  this  as  its  proxi- 
mate purpose. 

During  the  transitional  stages  there  are  necessitated  suc- 
cessive compromises  between  the  moral  code  which  asserts 
the  claims  of  the  society  versus  those  of  the  individual,  and 
the  moral  code  which  asserts  the  claims  of  the  individual 
ver#u#  those  of  the  society.  And  evidently  each  such  com- 
promise, though  for  the  time  being  authoritative,  admits  of 
no  consistent  or  definite  expression. 

But  gradually  as  war  declines — gradually  as  the  compulso- 
ry co-operation  needful  in  dealing  with  external  enemies  be- 
comes unnecessary,  and  leaves  behind  the  voluntary  co-oper- 
ation which  effectually  achieves  internal  sustentation  ;  there 
grows  increasingly  clear  the  code  of  conduct  which  voluntary 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  149 

co-operation  implies.  And  this  final  permanent  code  alone 
admits  of  being  definitely  formulated,  and  so  constituting 
ethics  as  a  science  in  contrast  with  empirical  ethics. 

The  leading  traits  of  a  code  under  which  complete  living 
through  voluntary  co-operation  is  secured,  may  be  simply 
stated.  The  fundamental  requirement  is  that  the  life-sus- 
taining actions  of  each  shall  severally  bring  him  the  amounts 
and  kinds  of  advantage  naturally  achieved  by  them ;  and  this 
implies  firstly  that  he  shall  suffer  no  direct  aggressions  on 
his  person  or  property,  and  secondly  that  he  shall  suffer  no 
indirect  aggressions  by  breach  of  contract.  Observance  of 
these  negative  conditions  to  voluntary  co-operation  having 
facilitated  life  to  the  greatest  extent  by  exchange  of  services 
under  agreement,  life  is  to  be  further  facilitated  by  exchange 
of  services  beyond  agreement :  the  highest  life  being  reached 
only  when,  besides  helping  to  complete  one  another's  lives 
by  specified  reciprocities  of  aid,  men  otherwise  help  to  com- 
plete one  another's  lives. 


CHAPTEK  IX. 

CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS. 

§  56.  Comparisons  of  the  foregoing  chapters  with  one 
another,  suggest  sundry  questions  which  must  be  answered 
partially,  if  not  completely,  before  anything  can  be  done 
towards  reducing  ethical  principles  from  abstract  forms  to 
concrete  forms. 

We  have  seen  that  to  admit  the  desirableness  of  conscious 
existence,  is  to  admit  that  conduct  should  be  such  as  will 
produce  a  consciousness  which  is  desirable — a  consciousness 
which  is  as  much  pleasurable  and  as  little  painful  as  may  be. 
We  have  also  seen  that  this  necessary  implication  corre- 
sponds with  the  a  priori  inference,  that  the  evolution  of  life 
has  been  made  possible  only  by  the  establishment  of  con- 
nexions between  pleasures  and  beneficial  actions  and  between 
pains  and  detrimental  actions.  But  the  general  conclusion 
reached  in  both  of  these  ways,  though  it  covers  the  area 
within  which  our  special  conclusions  must  fall,  does  not  help 
us  to  reach  those  special  conclusions. 

Were  pleasures  all  of  one  kind,  differing  only  in  degree  ; 
were  pains  all  of  one  kind,  differing  only  in  degree  ;  and 
could  pleasures  be  measured  against  pains  with  definite  re- 
sults ;  the  problems  of  conduct  would  be  greatly  simplified. 
Were  the  pleasures  and  pains  serving  as  incentives  and  de- 
terrents, simultaneously  present  to  consciousness  with  like 
vividness,  or  were  they  all  immediately  impending,  or  were 
they  all  equi-distant  in  time  ;  the  problems  would  be  further 

150 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  151 

simplified.  And  they  would  be  still  further  simplified  if  the 
pleasures  and  pains  were  exclusively  those  of  the  actor.  But 
both  the  desirable  and  the  undesirable  feelings  are  of  various 
kinds,  making  quantitative  comparisons  difficult ;  some  are 
present  and  some  are  future,  increasing  the  difficulty  of 
quantitative  comparison  ;  some  are  entailed  on  self  and  some 
are  entailed  on  others ;  again  increasing  the  difficulty.  So 
that  the  guidance  yielded  by  the  primary  principle  reached, 
is  of  little  service  unless  supplemented  by  the  guidance  of 
secondary  principles. 

Already,  in  recognizing  the  needful  subordination  of 
presentative  feelings  to  representative  feelings,  and  the 
implied  postponement  of  present  to  future  throughout  a 
wide  range  of  cases,  some  approach  towards  a  secondary 
principle  of  guidance  has  been  made.  Already,  too,  in 
recognizing  the  limitations  which  men's  associated  state 
puts  to  their  actions,  with  the  implied  need  for  restraining 
feelings  of  some  kinds  by  feelings  of  other  kinds,  we  have 
come  in  sight  of  another  secondary  principle  of  guidance. 
Still,  there  remains  much  to  be  decided  respecting  the 
relative  claims  of  these  guiding  principles,  general  and 
special. 

Some  elucidation  of  the  questions  involved,  will  be  ob- 
tained by  here  discussing  certain  views  and  arguments  set 
forth  by  past  and  present  moralists. 

§  57.  Using  the  name  hedonism  for  that  ethical  theory 
which  makes  happiness  the  end  of  action ;  and  distinguish- 
ing hedonism  into  the  two  kinds,  egoistic  and  universalistic, 
according  as  the  happiness  sought  is  that  of  the  actor  him- 
self or  is  that  of  all,  Mr.  Sidgwick  alleges  its  implied  belief 
to  be  that  pleasures  and  pains  are  commensurable.  In  his 
criticism  on  (empirical)  egoistic  hedonism  he  says  : — 

"  The  fundamental  assumption  of  Hedonism,  clearly  stated,  is  that  all  feel- 
ings considered  merely  as  feelings  can  be  arranged  in  a  certain  scale  of  desira- 
bility, so  that  the  desirability  or  pleasantness  of  each  bears  a  definite  ratio  to 
that  of  all  the  others." — Methods  of  Ethics,  2nd  ed.  p.  115. 


152  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

And  asserting  this  to  be  its  assumption,  he  proceeds  to  point 
out  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  hedonistic  calculation  ;  ap- 
parently for  the  purpose  of  implying  that  these  difficulties 
tell  against  the  hedonistic  theory. 

Now  though  it  may  be  shown  that  by  naming  the  inten- 
sity, the  duration,  the  certainty,  and  the  proximity,  of  a 
pleasure  or  a  pain,  as  traits  entering  into  the  estimation  of 
its  relative  value,  Bentham  has  committed  himself  to  the 
specified  assumption  ;  and  though  it  is  perhaps  reasonably 
taken  for  granted  that  hedonism,  as  represented  by  him,  is 
identical  with  hedonism  at  large ;  yet  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
hedonist,  empirical  or  other,  is  not  necessarily  committed  to 
this  assumption.  That  the  greatest  surplus  of  pleasures 
over  pains  ought  to  be  the  end  of  action,  is  a  belief  which 
he  may  still  consistently  hold  after  admitting  that  the  valua- 
tions of  pleasures  and  pains  are  commonly  vague  and  often 
erroneous.  He  may  say  that  though  indefinite  things  do 
not  admit  of  definite  measurements,  yet  approximately  true 
estimates  of  their  relative  values  may  be  made  when  they 
differ  considerably  ;  and  he  may  further  say  that  even  when 
their  relative  values  are  not  determinable,  it  remains  true 
that  the  most  valuable  should  be  chosen.  .  Let  us  listen  to 
him. 

"  A  debtor  who  cannot  pay  me,  offers  to  compound  for  his 
debt  by  making  over  one  of  sundry  things  he  possesses — 
a  diamond  ornament,  a  silver  vase,  a  picture,  a  carriage. 
Other  questions  being  set  aside,  I  assert  it  to  be  my  pecu- 
niary interest  to  choose  the  most  valuable  of  these ;  but 
I  cannot  say  which  is  the  most  valuable.  Does  the  pro- 
position that  it  is  my  pecuniary  interest  to  choose  the  most 
valuable  therefore  become  doubtful  ?  Must  I  not  choose  as 
well  as  I  can  ;  and  if  I  choose  wrongly  must  I  give  up  my 
ground  of  choice  ?  Must  I  infer  that  in  matters  of  business 
I  may  not  act  on  the  principle  that,  other  things  equal,  the 
more  profitable  transaction  is  to  be  preferred  ;  because  in 
many  cases  I  cannot  say  which  is  the  more  profitable,  and 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  153 

have  often  chosen  the  less  profitable?  Because  I  believe 
that  of  many  dangerous  courses  I  ought  to  take  the  least 
dangerous,  do  I  make  'the  fundamental  assumption'  that 
courses  can  be  arranged  according  to  a  scale  of  dangerous- 
ness  ;  and  must  I  abandon  my  belief  if  I  cannot  so  arrange 
them  ?  If  I  am  not  by  consistency  bound  to  do  this,  then  I 
am  no  more  by  consistency  bound  to  give  up  the  principle 
that  the  greatest  surplus  of  pleasures  over  pains  should  be 
the  end  of  action,  because  the  '  commensurability  of  pleasures 
and  pains '  cannot  be  asserted." 

At  the  close  of  his  chapters  on  empirical  hedonism,  Mr. 
Sidgwick  himself  says  he  does  "  not  think  that  the  common 
experience  of  mankind,  impartially  examined,  really  sustains 
the  view  that  Egoistic  Hedonism  is  necessarily  suicidal ; " 
adding,  however,  that  the  "  uncertainty  of  hedonistic  calcu- 
lation cannot  be  denied  to  have  great  weight."  But  here 
the  fundamental  assumption  of  hedonism,  that  happiness  is 
the  end  of  action,  is  still  supposed  to  involve  the  assumption 
that  "  feelings  can  be  arranged  in  a  certain  scale  of  desira- 
bility." This  we  have  seen  it  does  not:  its  fundamental 
assumption  is  in  no  degree  invalidated  by  proof  that  such 
arrangement  of  them  is  impracticable. 

To  Mr.  Sidgwick's  argument  there  is  the  further  objec- 
tion, no  less  serious,  that  to  whatever  degree  it  tells  against 
egoistic  hedonism,  it  tells  in  a  greater  degree  against  uni- 
versalistic  hedonism,  or  utilitarianism.  He  admits  that  it 
tells  as  much ;  saying  "  whatever  weight  is  to  be  attached 
to  the  objections  brought  against  this  assumption  [the  com- 
mensurability of  pleasures  and  pains]  must  of  course  tell 
against  the  present  method."  Not  only  does  it  tell,  but  it 
tells  in  a  double  way.  I  do  not  mean  merely  that,  as  he 
points  out,  the  assumption  becomes  greatly  complicated  if 
we  take  all  sentient  beings  into  account,  and  if  we  include 
posterity  along  with  existing  individuals.  I  mean  that, 
taking  as  the  end  to  be  achieved  the  greatest  happiness  of 
the  existing  individuals  forming  a  single  community,  the  set 


154  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

of  difficulties  standing  in  the  way  of  egoistic  hedonism,  is 
compounded  with  another  set  of  difficulties  no  less  great, 
when  we  pass  from  it  to  universalistic  hedonism.  For  if  the 
dictates  of  universalistic  hedonism  are  to  be  fulfilled,  it 
must  be  under  the  guidance  of  individual  judgments,  or  of 
corporate  judgments,  or  of  both.  Now  any  one  of  such 
judgments  issuing  from  a  single  mind,  or  from  any  aggregate 
of  minds,  necessarily  embodies  conclusions  respecting  the 
happin esses  of  other  persons  ;  few  of  them  known,  and  the 
great  mass  never  seen.  All  these  persons  have  natures 
differing  in  countless  ways  and  degrees  from  the  natures  of 
those  who  form  the  judgments ;  and  the  happinesses  of 
which  they  are  severally  capable  differ  from  one  another, 
and  differ  from  the  happinesses  of  those  who  form  the  judg- 
ments. Consequently,  if  against  the  method  of  egoistic 
hedonism  there  is  the  objection  that  a  man's  own  pleasures 
and  pains,  unlike  in  their  kinds,  intensities,  and  times  of 
occurrence,  are  incommensurable  ;  then  against  the  method 
of  universalistic  hedonism  it  may  be  urged  that  to  the  in- 
commensurability of  each  judge's  own  pleasures  and  pains 
(which  he  must  use  as  standards)  has  now  to  be  added  the 
much  more  decided  incommensurability  of  the  pleasures  and 
pains  which  he  conceives  to  be  experienced  by  innumerable 
other  persons,  all  differently  constituted  from  himself  and 
from  one  another. 

Nay  more — there  is  a  triple  set  of  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  universalistic  hedonism.  To  the  double  indeterminate- 
ness  of  the  end  has  to  be  added  the  indeterminateness  of  the 
means.  If  hedonism,  egoistic  or  universalistic,  is  to  pass 
from  dead  theory  into  living  practice,  acts  of  one  or  other 
kind  must  be  decided  on  to  achieve  proposed  objects ;  and 
in  estimating  the  two  methods  we  have  to  consider  how  far 
the  fitness  of  the  acts  respectively  required  can  be  judged. 
If,  in  pursuing  his  own  ends,  the  individual  is  liable  to 
be  led  by  erroneous  opinions  to  adjust  his  acts  wrongly, 
much  more  liable  is  he  to  be  led  by  erroneous  opinions  to 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  155 

adjust  wrongly  more  complex  acts  to  the  more  complex  ends 
constituted  by  other  men's  welfares.  It  is  so  if  he  operates 
singly  to  benefit  a  few  others;  and  it  is  still  more  so  if 
he  co-operates  with  many  to  benefit  all.  Making  general 
happiness  the  immediate  object  of  pursuit,  implies  numerous 
and  complicated  instrumentalities  officered  by  thousands  of 
unseen  and  unlike  persons,  and  working  on  millions  of 
other  persons  unseen  and  unlike.  Even  the  few  factors  in 
this  immense  aggregate  of  appliances  and  processes  which 
are  known,  are  very  imperfectly  known  ;  and  the  great  mass 
of  them  are  unknown.  So  that  even  supposing  valuation 
of  pleasures  and  pains  for  the  community  at  large  is  more 
practicable  than,  or  even  as  practicable  as,  valuation  of  his 
own  pleasures  and  pains  by  the  individual ;  yet  the  ruling  of 
conduct  with  a  view  to  the  one  end  is  far  more  difficult  than 
the  ruling  of  it  with  a  view  to  the  other.  Hence  if  the 
method  of  egoistic  hedonism  is  unsatisfactory,  far  more  un- 
satisfactory for  the  same  and  kindred  reasons,  is  the  method 
of  universalistic  hedonism,  or  utilitarianism. 

And  here  we  come  in  sight  of  the  conclusion  which  it 
has  been  the  purpose  of  the  foregoing  criticism  to  bring 
into  view.  The  objection  made  to  the  hedonistic  method 
contains  a  truth,  but  includes  with  it  an  untruth.  For 
while  the  proposition  that  happiness,  whether  individual  or 
general,  is  the  end  of  action,  is  not  invalidated  by  proof  that 
it  cannot  under  either  form  be  estimated  by  measurement 
of  its  components ;  yet  it  may  be  admitted  that  guidance 
in  the  pursuit  of  happiness  by  a  mere  balancing  of  pleasures 
and  pains,  is,  if  partially  practicable  throughout  a  certain 
range  of  conduct,  futile  throughout  a  much  wider  range.  It 
is  quite  consistent  to  assert  that  happiness  is  the  ultimate 
aim  of  action,  and  at  the  same  time  to  deny  that  it  can  be 
reached  by  making  it  the  immediate  aim.  I  go  with  Mr. 
Sidgwick  as  far  as  the  conclusion  that "  we  must  at  least  admit 
the  desirability  of  confirming  or  correcting  the  results  of 
such  comparisons  [of  pleasures  and  pains]  by  any  other 


156  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

method  upon  which  we  may  find  reason  to  rely ; "  and  I 
then  go  further,  and  say  that  throughout  a  large  part  of  con- 
duct  guidance  by  such  comparisons  is  to  be  entirely  set  aside 
and  replaced  by  other  guidance. 

§  58.  The  antithesis  here  insisted  upon  between  the 
hedonistic  and  considered  in  the  abstract,  and  the  method 
which  current  hedonism,  whether  egoistic  or  universalistic, 
associates  with  that  end  ;  and  the  joining  acceptance  of  the 
one  with  rejection  of  the  other ;  commits  us  to  an  overt  dis- 
cussion of  these  two  cardinal  elements  of  ethical  theory.  I 
may  conveniently  initiate  this  discussion  by  criticizing  another 
of  Mr.  Sidgwick's  criticisms  on  the  method  of  hedonism. 

Though  we  can  give  no  account  of  those  simple  pleasures 
which  the  senses  yield,  because  they  are  undecomposable,  yet 
we  distinctly  know  their  characters  as  states  of  consciousness. 
Conversely,  the  complex  pleasures  formed  by  compounding 
and  re-compounding  the  ideas  of  simple  pleasures,  though 
theoretically  resolvable  into  their  components,  are  not  easy 
to  resolve ;  and  in  proportion  as  they  are  heterogeneous  in 
composition,  the  difficulty  of  framing  intelligible  conceptions 
of  them  increases.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the 
pleasures  which  accompany  our  sports.  Treating  of  these, 
along  with  the  pleasures  of  pursuit  in  general,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  that  "  in  order  to  get  them  one  must  forget 
them,"  Mr.  Sidgwick  remarks : — 

"  A  man  who  maintains  throughout  an  epicurean  mood,  fixing  his  aim  on 
his  own  pleasure,  does  not  catch  the  full  spirit  of  the  chase ;  his  eagerness 
never  gets  just  the  sharpness  of  edge  which  imparts  to  the  pleasure  its  highest 
zest  and  flavour.  Here  comes  into  view  what  we  may  call  the  fundamental 
paradox  of  Hedonism,  that  the  impulse  towards  pleasure,  if  too  predominant, 
defeats  its  own  aim.  This  effect  is  not  visible,  or  at  any  rate  is  scarcely  visible, 
in  the  case  of  passive  sensual  pleasures.  But  our  active  employments  gene- 
rally, whether  the  activities  on  which  they  attend  are  classed  as  '  bodily '  or  as 
'  intellectual '  (as  well  as  of  many  emotional  pleasures),  it  may  certainly  be  said 
that  we  cannot  attain  them,  at  least  in  their  best  form,  so  long  as  we  concen- 
trate our  aim  on  them." — Methods  of  Ethics,  2nd  ed.  p.  41. 

Now  I  think  we  shall  not  regard  this  truth  as  paradoxical 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  157 

after  we  have  duly  analyzed  the  pleasure  of  pursuit.  The 
chief  components  of  this  pleasure  are ; — first,  a  renewed 
consciousness  of  personal  efficiency  (made  vivid  by  actual 
success  and  partially  excited  by  impending  success)  which 
consciousness  of  personal  efficiency,  connected  in  expe- 
rience with  achieved  ends  of  every  kind,  arouses  a  vague 
but  massive  consciousness  of  resulting  gratifications;  and, 
second,  a  representation  of  the  applause  which  recognition 
of  this  efficiency  by  others  has  before  brought,  and  will 
again  bring.  Games  of  skill  show  us  this  clearly.  Con- 
sidered as  an  end  in  itself,  the  good  cannon  which  a  billiard 
player  makes  yields  no  pleasure.  Whence  then  does  the 
pleasure  of  making  it  arise  ?  Partly  from  the  fresh  proof 
of  capability  which  the  player  gives  to  himself,  and  partly 
from  the  imagined  admiration  of  those  who  witness  the 
proof  of  his  capability  :  the  last  being  the  chief,  since  he 
soon  tires  of  making  cannons  in  the  absence  of  witnesses. 
When  from  games  which,  yielding  the  pleasures  of  success, 
yield  no  pleasure  derived  from  the  end  considered  intrinsi- 
cally, we  pass  to  sports  in  which  the  end  has  intrinsic 
value  as  a  source  of  pleasure,  we  see  substantially  the  same 
thing.  Though  the  bird  which  the  sportsman  brings  down 
is  useful  as  food,  yet  his  satisfaction  arises  mainly  from 
having  made  a  good  shot,  and  from  having  added  to  the 
bag  which  will  presently  bring  praise  of  his  skill.  The 
gratification  of  self-esteem  he  immediately  experiences  ;  and 
the  gratification  of  receiving  applause  he  experiences,  if  not 
immediately  and  in  full  degree,  yet  by  representation ;  for 
the  ideal  pleasure  is  nothing  else  than  a  faint  revival  of  the 
real  pleasure.  These  two  kinds  of  agreeable  excitement 
present  in  the  sportsman  during  the  chase,  constitute  the 
mass  of  the  desires  stimulating  him  to  continue  it ;  for  all 
desires  are  nascent  forms  of  the  feelings  to  be  obtained  by 
the  efforts  they  prompt.  And  though  while  seeking  more 
birds  these  representative  feelings  are  not  so  vividly  excited 
as  by  success  just  achieved,  yet  they  are  excited  by  im- 


158  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

aginations  of  further  successes ;  and  so  make  enjoyable  the 
activities  constituting  the  pursuit.  Recognizing,  then,  the 
truth  that  the  pleasures  of  pursuit  are  much  more  those  de- 
rived from  the  efficient  use  of  means  than  those  derived  from 
the  end  itself,  we  see  that  "the  fundamental  paradox  of 
hedonism"  disappears. 

These  remarks  concerning  end  and  means,  and  the  pleas- 
ure accompanying  use  of  the  means  as  added  to  the  pleasure 
derived  from  the  end,  I  have  made  for  the  purpose  of  draw- 
ing attention  to  a  fact  of  profound  significance.  During 
evolution  there  has  been  a  superposing  of  new  and  more 
complex  sets  of  means  upon  older  and  simpler  sets  of  means ; 
and  a  superposing  of  the  pleasures  accompanying  the  uses  of 
these  successive  sets  of  means ;  with  the  result  that  each  of 
these  pleasures  has  itself  eventually  become  an  end.  We 
begin  with  a  simple  animal  which,  without  ancillary  appli- 
ances, swallows  such  food  as  accident  brings  in  its  way ;  and 
so,  as  we  may  assume,  stills  some  kind  of  craving.  Here  we 
have  the  primary  end  of  nutrition  with  its  accompanying 
satisfaction,  in  their  simple  forms.  "We  pass  to  higher  types 
having  jaws  for  seizing  and  biting — jaws  which  thus,  by  their 
actions,  facilitate  achievement  of  the  primary  end.  On  ob- 
serving animals  furnished  with  these  organs,  we  get  evi- 
dence that  the  use  of  them  becomes  in  itself  pleasurable 
irrespective  of  the  end  :  instance  a  squirrel,  which,  apart 
from  food  to  be  so  obtained,  delights  in  nibbling  everything 
it  gets  hold  of.  Turning  from  jaws  to  limbs  we  see  that 
these,  serving  some  creatures  for  pursuit  and  others  for 
escape,  similarly  yield  gratification  by  their  exercise ;  as  in 
lambs  which  skip  and  horses  which  prance.  How  the  com- 
bined use  of  limbs  and  jaws,  originally  subserving  the  satis- 
faction of  appetite,  grows  to  be  in  itself  pleasurable,  is  daily 
illustrated  in  the  playing  of  dogs.  For  that  throwing  down 
and  worrying  which,  when  prey  is  caught,  precedes  eating,  is, 
in  their  mimic  fights,  carried  by  each  as  far  as  he  dares. 
Coming  to  means  still  more  remote  from  the  end,  namely, 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  159 

those  by  which  creatures  chased  are  caught,  we  are 
again  shown  by  dogs  that  when  no  creature  is  caught  there 
is  still  a  gratification  in  the  act  of  catching.  The  eager- 
ness with  which  a  dog  runs  after  stones,  or  dances  and 
barks  in  anticipation  of  jumping  into  the  water  after  a 
stick,  proves  that  apart  from  the  satisfaction  of  appetite,  and 
apart  even  from  the  satisfaction  of  killing  prey,  there  is  a 
satisfaction  in  the  successful  pursuit  of  a  moving  ob- 
ject. Throughout,  then,  we  see  that  the  pleasure  attend- 
ant on  the  use  of  means  to  achieve  an  end,  itself  becomes 
an  end. 

Now  if  we  contemplate  these  as  phenomena  of  conduct  in 
general,  some  facts  worthy  of  note  may  be  discerned — facts 
which,  if  we  appreciate  their  significance,  will  aid  us  in 
developing  our  ethical  conceptions.  One  of  them 

is  that  among  the  successive  sets  of  means,  the  later  are 
the  more  remote  from  the  primary  end ;  are,  as  co-ordinat- 
ing earlier  and  simpler  means,  the  more  complex ;  and 
are  accompanied  by  feelings  which  are  more  representa- 
tive. Another  fact  is  that  each  set  of  means,  with 
its  accompanying  satisfactions,  eventually  becomes  in  its  turn 
dependent  on  one  originating  later  than  itself.  Before  the 
gullet  swallows,  the  jaws  must  lay  hold  ;  before  the  jaws  tear 
out  and  bring  within  the  grasp  of  the  gullet  a  piece  fit  for 
swallowing,  there  must  be  that  co-operation  of  limbs  and 
senses  required  for  killing  the  prey ;  before  this  co-operation 
can  take  place,  there  needs  the  much  longer  co-operation  con- 
stituting the  chase  ;  and  even  before  this  there  must  be  per- 
sistent activities  of  limbs,  eyes,  and  nose,  in  seeking  prey. 
The  pleasure  attending  each  set  of  acts,  while  making  possi- 
ble the  pleasure  attending  the  set  of  acts  which  follows,  is 
joined  with  a  representation  of  this  subsequent  set  of  acts 
and  its  pleasure,  and  of  the  others  which  succeed  in  order ; 
so  that  along  with  the  feelings  accompanying  the  search  for 
prey,  are  partially  aroused  the  feelings  accompanying  the 
actual  chase,  the  actual  destruction,  the  actual  devouring,  and 
12 


160  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

the  eventual  satisfaction  of  appetite.  A  third  fact 

is  that  the  use  of  each  set  of  means  in  due  order,  consti- 
tutes an  obligation.  Maintenance  of  its  life  being  regarded 
as  the  end  of  its  conduct,  the  creature  is  obliged  to  use  in 
succession  the  means  of  finding  prey,  the  means  of  catch, 
ing  prey,  the  means  of  killing  prey,  the  means  of  devour- 
ing prey.  Lastly,  it  follows  that  though  the  assuag- 
ing of  hunger,  directly  associated  with  sustentation, 
remains  to  the  last  the  ultimate  end  ;  yet  the  successful 
use  of  each  set  of  means  in  its  turn  is  the  proximate  end 
— the  end  which  takes  temporary  precedence  in  authoritative- 
ness. 

§  59.  The  relations  between  means  and  ends  thus  traced 
throughout  the  earlier  stages  of  evolving  conduct,  are  trace- 
able throughout  later  stages ;  and  hold  true  of  human  conduct, 
up  even  to  its  highest  forms.  As  fast  as,  for  the  better  main- 
tenance of  life,  the  simpler  sets  of  means  and  the  pleasures 
accompanying  the  uses  of  them,  come  to  be  supplemented  by 
the  more  complex  sets  of  means  and  their  pleasures,  these  be- 
gin to  take  precedence  in  time  and  in  imperativeness.  To 
use  effectually  each  more  complex  set  of  means  becomes  the 
proximate  end,  and  the  accompanying  feeling  becomes  the 
immediate  gratification  sought ;  though  there  may  be,  and 
habitually  is,  an  associated  consciousness  of  the  remoter  ends 
and  remoter  gratifications  to  be  obtained.  An  example  will 
make  clear  the  parallelism. 

Absorbed  in  his  business  the  trader,  if  asked  what  is  his 
main  end,  will  say — making  money.  He  readily  grants  that 
achievement  of  this  end  is  desired  by  him  in  furtherance  of 
ends  beyond  it.  He  knows  that  in  directly  seeking  money 
he  is  indirectly  seeking  food,  clothes,  house-room,  and  the 
comforts  of  life  for  self  and  family.  But  while  admitting 
that  money  is  but  a  means  to  these  ends,  he  urges  that  the 
money-getting  actions  precede  in  order  of  time  and  obliga- 
tion, the  various  actions  and  concomitant  pleasures  subserved 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  161 

by  them  ;  and  he  testifies  to  the  fact  that  making  money  has 
become  itself  an  end,  and  success  in  it  a  source  of  satis- 
faction, apart  from  these  more  distant  ends.  Again, 
on  observing  more  closely  the  trader's  proceedings,  we  find 
that  though  to  the  end  of  living  comfortably  he  gets  money, 
and  though  to  the  end  of  getting  money  he  buys  and  sells 
at  a  profit,  which  so  becomes  a  means  more  immediately 
pursued,  yet  he  is  chiefly  occupied  with  means  still  more  re- 
mote  from  ultimate  ends,  and  in  relation  to  which  even  the 
selling  at  a  profit  becomes  an  end.  For  leaving  to  subor- 
dinates the  actual  measuring  out  of  goods  and  receiving  of 
proceeds,  he  busies  himself  mainly  with  his  general  affairs — 
inquiries  concerning  markets,  judgments  of  future  prices, 
calculations,  negotiations,  correspondence  :  the  anxiety  from 
hour  to  hour  being  to  do  well  each  one  of  these  things  in- 
directly conducive  to  the  making  of  profits.  And  these 
ends  precede  in  time  and  obligation  the  effecting  of  profit- 
able sales,  just  as  the  effecting  of  profitable  sales  precedes 
the  end  of  money-making,  and  just  as  the  end  of  money- 
making  precedes  the  end  of  satisfactory  living.  His 
bookkeeping  best  exemplifies  the  principle  at  large.  Entries 
to  the  debtor  or  creditor  sides  are  being  made  all  through 
the  day ;  the  items  are  classified  and  arranged  in  such  way 
that  at  a  moment's  notice  the  state  of  each  account  may  be 
ascertained  ;  and  then,  from  time  to  time,  the  books  are 
balanced,  and  it  is  required  that  the  result  shall  come  right 
to  a  penny  :  satisfaction  following  proved  correctness,  and 
annoyance  being  caused  by  error.  If  you  ask  why  all  this 
elaborate  process,  so  remote  from  the  actual  getting  of 
money,  and  still  more  remote  from  the  enjoyments  of  life, 
the  answer  is  that  keeping  accounts  correctly  is  fulfilling  a 
condition  to  the  end  of  money-making,  and  becomes  in 
itself  a  proximate  end — a  duty  to  be  discharged,  that  there 
may  be  discharged  the  duty  of  getting  an  income,  that 
there  may  be  discharged  the  duty  of  maintaining  self,  wife, 
and  children. 


1(52  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

Approaching  as  we  here  do  to  moral  obligation,  are  we 
not  shown  its  relations  to  conduct  at  large  ?  Is  it  not  clear 
that  observance  of  moral  principles  is  fulfilment  of  certain 
general  conditions  to  the  successful  carrying  on  of  special 
activities  ?  That  the  trader  may  prosper,  he  must  not  only 
keep  his  books  correctly,  but  must  pay  those  he  employs 
according  to  agreement,  and  must  meet  his  engagements 
with  creditors.  May  we  not  say,  then,  that  conformity  to 
the  second  and  third  of  these  requirements  is,  like  conform- 
ity to  the  first,  an  indirect  means  to  effectual  use  of  the 
more  direct  means  of  achieving  welfare  ?  May  we  not  say, 
too,  that  as  the  use  of  each  more  indirect  means  in  due 
order  becomes  itself  an  end,  and  a  source  of  gratification ;  so, 
eventually,  becomes  the  use  of  this  most  indirect  means? 
And  may  we  not  infer  that  though  conformity  to  moral 
requirements  precedes  in  imperativeness  conformity  to  other 
requirements ;  yet  that  this  imperativeness  arises  from  the 
fact  that  fulfilment  of  the  other  requirements,  by  self  or 
others  or  both,  is  thus  furthered  ? 

§  60.  This  question  brings  us  round  to  another  side  of  the 
issue  before  raised.  "When  alleging  that  empirical  utili- 
tarianism is  but  introductory  to  rational  utilitarianism,  I 
pointed  out  that  the  last  does  not  take  welfare  for  its  imme- 
diate object  of  pursuit,  but  takes  for  its  immediate  object  of 
pursuit  conformity  to  certain  principles  which,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  causally  determine  welfare.  And  now  we  see 
that  this  amounts  to  recognition  of  that  law,  traceable 
throughout  the  evolution  of  conduct  in  general,  that  each 
later  and  higher  order  of  means  takes  precedence  in  time 
and  authoritativeness  of  each  earlier  and  lower  order  of 
means.  The  contrast  between  the  ethical  methods  thus  dis- 
tinguished, made  tolerably  clear  by  the  above  illustrations, 
will  be  made  still  clearer  by  contemplating  the  two  as  put  in 
opposition  by  the  leading  exponent  of  empirical  utilitarian- 
ism. Treating  of  legislative  aims,  Bentham  writes : — 


CRITICISMS   AND    EXPLANATIONS.  163 

"  But  justice,  what  is  it  that  we  are  to  understand  by  justice :  and  why  not 
happiness  but  justice  ?  What  happiness  is,  every  man  knows,  because,  what 
pleasure  is,  every  man  knows,  and  what  pain  is,  every  man  knows.  But  what 
justice  is, — this  is  what  on  every  occasion  is  the  subject-matter  of  dispute.  Be 
the  meaning  of  the  word  justice  what  it  will,  what  regard  is  it  entitled  to  other- 
wise than  as  a  means  of  happiness."  * 

Let  us  first  consider  the  assertion  here  made  respecting 
the  relative  intelligibilities  of  these  two  ends;  and  let  us 
afterwards  consider  what  is  implied  by  the  choice  of  happi- 
ness instead  of  justice. 

Bentham's  positive  assertion  that  "  what  happiness  is 
every  man  knows,  because,  what  pleasure  is,  every  man 
knows,''  is  met  by  counter-assertions  equally  positive. 
"  "Who  can  tell,"  asks  Plato,  "  what  pleasure  really  is,  or 
know  it  in  its  essence,  except  the  philosopher,  who  alone 
is  conversant  with  realities."  f  Aristotle,  too,  after  com- 
menting on  the  different  opinions  held  by  the  vulgar,  by 
the  political,  by  the  contemplative,  sa}7s  of  happiness  that 
"  to  some  it  seems  to  be  virtue,  to  others  prudence,  and  to 
others  a  kind  of  wisdom  :  to  some  again,  these,  or  some  one 
of  these,  with  pleasure,  or  at  least,  not  without  pleasure  ; 
others  again  include  external  prosperity."  £  And  Aristotle, 
like  Plato,  comes  to  the  remarkable  conclusion  that  the 
pleasures  of  the  intellect,  reached  by  the  contemplative 
life,  constitute  the  highest  happiness  !  §  How 

disagreements  concerning  the  nature  of  happiness  and 
the  relative  values  of  pleasures,  thus  exhibited  in  ancient 
times,  continue  down  to  modern  times,  is  shown  in  Mr. 
Sidgwick's  discussion  of  egoistic  hedonism,  above  com- 
mented upon.  Further,  as  was  pointed  out  before,  the 
indefiniteness  attending  the  estimations  of  pleasures  and 
pains,  which  stands  in  the  way  of  egoistic  hedonism  as 
ordinarily  conceived,  is  immensely  increased  on  passing  to 
universalistic  hedonism  as  ordinarily  conceived  ;  since  its 

*  Constitutional  Code,  chap,  xvi,  Supreme  Legislative — Section  Ti,  Omni- 
competence. 

f  Republic,  Bk.  ix.     \  NicomacJiean  Ethics,  Bk.  i.  chap.  8.     §  Bk.  x.  chap.  7. 


164  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

theory  implies  that  the  imagined  pleasures  and  pains  of 
others  are  to  be  estimated  by  the  help  of  these  pleasures 
and  pains  of  self,  already  so  difficult  to  estimate.  And  that 
anyone  after  observing  the  various  pursuits  into  which  some 
eagerly  enter  but  which  others  shun,  and  after  listening  to 
the  dilt'erent  opinions  concerning  the  likeableness  of  this  or 
that  occupation  or  amusement,  expressed  at  every  table,  should 
assert  that  the  nature  of  happiness  can  be  fully  agreed  upon, 
so  as  to  render  it  a  fit  end  for  direct  legislative  action,  is 
surprising. 

The  accompanying  proposition  that  justice  is  unintel- 
ligible as  an  end,  is  no  less  surprising.  Though  primitive 
men  have  no  words  for  either  happiness  or  justice ;  yet 
even  among  them  an  approach  to  the  conception  of  justice 
is  traceable.  The  law  of  retaliation,  requiring  that  a 
death  inflicted  by  one  tribe  on  another,  shall  be  balanced 
by  the  death  either  of  the  murderer  or  some  member  of 
his  tribe,  shows  us  in  a  vague  shape  that  notion  of  equal- 
ness  of  treatment  which  forms  an  essential  element  in 
it.  When  we  come  to  early  races  who  have 

given  their  thoughts  and  feelings  literary  form,  we  find  this 
conception  of  justice,  as  involving  equalness  of  action,  be- 
coming distinct.  Among  the  Jews,  David  expressed  in 
words  this  association  of  ideas  when,  praying  to  God  to 
"  hear  the  right,"  he  said — "  Let  my  sentence  come  forth 
from  thy  presence  ;  let  thine  eyes  behold  the  things  that  are 
equal ;"  as  also,  among  early  Christians,  did  Paul  when  to 
the  Colossians  he  wrote — "  Masters,  give  unto  your  servants 
that  which  is  just  and  equal."  Commenting  on  the  different 
meanings  of  justice,  Aristotle  concludes  that  "  the  just  will 
therefore  be  the  lawful  and  the  equal ;  and  the  unjust  the 
unlawful  and  the  unequal.  But  since  the  unjust  man  is  also 
one  who  takes  more  than  his  share,"  &c.  And  that  justice 
was  similarly  conceived  by  the  Eomans  they  proved  by  in- 
cluding under  it  such  meanings  as  exact,  proportionate,  im- 
partial, severally  implying  fairness  of  division;  and  still 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  165 

better  by  identification  of  it  with  equity,  which  is  a  deriva- 
tive of  cequus :  the  word  cequus  itself  having  for  one  of  its 
meanings  just  or  impartial.  This  coincidence  of 

view  among  ancient  peoples  respecting  the  nature  of  justice, 
has  extended  to  modern  peoples  ;  who  by  a  general  agree- 
ment in  certain  cardinal  principles  which  their  systems  of 
law  embody,  forbidding  direct  aggressions,  which  are  forms 
of  unequal  actions,  and  forbidding  indirect  aggressions  by 
breaches  of  contract,  which  are  other  forms  of  unequal 
actions,  one  and  all  show  us  the  identification  of  justice  with 
equalness.  Bentham,  then,  is  wrong  when  he  says — "But 
what  justice  is, — this  is  what  on  every  occasion  is  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  dispute."  He  is  more  wrong,  indeed,  than 
has  thus  far  appeared.  For,  in  the  first  place,  he  misrepre- 
sents utterly  by  ignoring  the  fact  that  in  ninety-nine  out  of 
every  hundred  daily  transactions  between  men,  no  dispute 
about  justice  arises ;  but  the  business  done  is  recognized  on 
both  sides  as  justly  done.  And  in  the  second  place  if, 
with  respect  to  the  hundredth  transaction  there  is  a  dis- 
pute, the  subject  matter  of  it  is  not  "  what  justice  is,"  for 
it  is  admitted  to  be  equity  or  equalness ;  but  the  subject 
matter  of  dispute  always  is — what,  under  these  particular 
circumstances,  constitutes  equalness  ? — a  widely  different 
question. 

It  is  not  then  self-evident,  as  Bentham  alleges,  that 
happiness  is  an  intelligible  end  while  justice  is  not ;  but, 
contrariwise,  examination  makes  evident  the  greater  in- 
telligibility of  justice  as  an  end.  And  analysis  shows  why 
it  is  the  more  intelligible.  For  justice,  or  equity,  or  equal- 
ness,  is  concerned  exclusively  with  quantity  under  stated 
conditions;  whereas  happiness  is  concerned  with  both 
quantity  and  quality  under  conditions  not  stated.  When, 
as  in  case  of  theft,  a  benefit  is  taken  while  no  equivalent 
benefit  is  yielded — when,  as  in  case  of  adulterated  goods 
bought  or  base  coin  paid,  that  which  is  agreed  to  be 
given  in  exchange  as  of  equal  value  is  not  given,  but  some- 


166  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

thing  of  less  value — when,  as  in  case  of  broken  contract,  the 
obligation  on  one  side  has  been  discharged  while  there  has 
been  no  discharge,  or  incomplete  discharge,  of  the  obligation 
on  the  other ;  we  see  that,  the  circumstances  being  specified, 
the  injustice  complained  of  refers  to  the  relative  amounts 
of  actions,  or  products,  or  benefits,  the  natures  of  which 
are  recognized  only  so  far  as  is  needful  for  saying  whether 
as  much  has  been  given,  or  done,  or  allowed,  by  each 
concerned,  as  was  implied  by  tacit  or  overt  understanding 
to  be  an  equivalent.  But  when  the  end  proposed  is  happi- 
ness, the  circumstances  remaining  unspecified,  the  problem 
is  that  of  estimating  both  quantities  and  qualities,  un- 
helped  by  any  such  definite  measures  as  acts  of  exchange 
imply,  or  as  contracts  imply,  or  as  are  implied  by  the 
differences  between  the  doings  of  one  aggressing  and 
one  aggressed  upon.  The  mere  fact  that  Bentham  himself 
includes  as  elements  in  the  estimation  of  each  pleasure 
or  pain,  its  intensity,  duration,  certainty,  and  proximity, 
suffices  to  show  how  difficult  is  this  problem.  And  when 
it  is  remembered  that  all  pleasures  and  pains,  not  felt  in 
particular  cases  only  but  in  the  aggregate  of  cases,  and 
severally  regarded  under  these  four  aspects,  have  to  be 
compared  with  one  another  and  their  relative  values  deter- 
mined, simply  by  introspection  ;  it  will  be  manifest  both 
that  the  problem  is  complicated  by  the  addition  of  indefinite 
judgments  of  qualities  to  indefinite  measures  of  quantities, 
and  that  it  is  further  complicated  by  the  multitudinous* 
ness  of  these  vague  estimations  to  be  gone  through  and 
summed  up. 

But  now  passing  over  this  assertion  of  Bentham  that 
happiness  is  a  more  intelligible  end  than  justice,  which  we 
find  to  be  the  reverse  of  truth,  let  us  note  the  several  implica- 
tions of  the  doctrine  that  the  supreme  legislative  body  ought 
to  make  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number  its  im- 
mediate aim. 

It  implies,  in  the  first  place,  that  happiness  may  be  com- 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  167 

passed  by  methods  framed  directly  for  the  purpose,  without 
any  previous  inquiry  respecting  the  conditions  that  must  be 
fulfilled  ;  and  this  pre-supposes  a  belief  that  there  are  no  such 
conditions.  For  if  there  are  any  conditions  without  fulfil- 
ment of  which  happiness  cannot  be  compassed,  then  the  first 
step  must  be  to  ascertain  these  conditions  with  a  view  to  ful- 
filling them  ;  and  to  admit  this  is  to  admit  that  not  happiness 
itself  must  be  the  immediate  end,  but  fulfilment  of  the  con- 
ditions to  its  attainment  must  be  the  immediate  end.  The 
alternatives  are  simple  : — Either  the  achievement  of  happi- 
ness is  not  conditional,  in  which  case  one  mode  of  action  is  as 
good  as  another,  or  it  is  conditional,  in  which  case  the  re- 
quired mode  of  action  must  be  the  direct  aim  and  not  the 
happiness  to  be  achieved  by  it. 

Assuming  it  conceded,  as  it  will  be,  that  there  exist  condi- 
tions which  must  be  fulfilled  before  happiness  can  be  attained, 
let  us  next  ask  what  is  implied  by  proposing  modes  of  so  con- 
trolling conduct  as  to  further  happiness,  without  previously 
inquiring  whether  any  such  modes  are  already  known  ?  The 
implication  is  that  human  intelligence  throughout  the  past, 
operating  on  experiences,  has  failed  to  discover  any  such 
modes  ;  whereas  present  human  intelligence  may  be  expected 
forthwith  to  discover  them.  Unless  this  be  asserted,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  certain  conditions  to  the  achievement  of 
happiness  have  already  been  partially,  if  not  wholly,  ascer- 
tained ;  and  if  so,  our  first  business  should  be  to  look  for 
them.  Having  found  them,  our  rational  course  is  to  bring 
existing  intelligence  to  bear  on  these  products  of  past  intel- 
ligence, with  the  expectation  that  it  will  verify  the  substance 
of  them  while  possibly  correcting  the  form.  But  to  sup- 
pose that  no  regulative  principles  for  the  conduct  of  associ- 
ated human  beings  have  thus  far  been  established,  and 
that  they  are  now  to  be  established  de  novo,  is  to  suppose 
that  man  as  he  is  differs  from  man  as  he  was  in  an  incredible 
degree. 

Beyond  ignoring  the  probability,  or  rather  the  certainty, 


168  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

that  past  experience  generalized  by  past  intelligence,  must 
by  this  time  have  disclosed  partially,  if  not  wholly,  some  of 
the  essential  conditions  to  the  achievement  of  happiness, 
Bentham's  proposition  ignores  the  formulated  knowledge  of 
them  actually  existing.  For  whence  come  the  conception 
of  justice  and  the  answering  sentiment.  He  will  scarcely 
say  that  they  are  meaningless,  although  his  proposition  im- 
plies as  much  ;  and  if  he  admits  that  they  have  meanings, 
he  must  choose  between  two  alternatives  either  of  which  is 
fatal  to  his  hypothesis.  Are  they  supernaturally-caused 
modes  of  thinking  and  feeling,  tending  to  make  men  ful- 
fil the  conditions  to  happiness  ?  If  so  their  authority  is  per- 
emptory. Are  they  modes  of  thinking  and  feeling  naturally 
caused  in  men  by  experience  of  these  conditions  ?  If  so, 
their  authority  is  no  less  peremptory.  Not  only,  then,  does 
Bentham  fail  to  infer  that  certain  principles  of  guidance 
must  by  this  time  have  been  ascertained,  but  he  refuses  to 
recognize  these  principles  as  actually  reached  and  present 
to  him. 

And  then  after  all,  he  tacitly  admits  that  which  he  overtly 
denies,  by  saying  that — "Be  the  meaning  of  the  word 
justice  what  it  will,  what  regard  is  it  entitled  to  otherwise 
than  as  a  means  to  happiness  ?  "  For  if  justice  is  a  means 
having  happiness  as  its  end,  then  justice  must  take  prece- 
dence of  happiness,  as  every  other  means  takes  precedence 
of  every  other  end.  Bentham's  own  elaborate  polity  is  a 
means  having  happiness  as  its  end,  as  justice  is,  by  his 
own  admission,  a  means  having  happiness  as  an  end.  If, 
then,  we  may  properly  skip  justice,  and  go  directly  to  the 
end  happiness,  we  may  properly  skip  Bentham's  polity, 
and  go  directly  to  the  end  happiness.  In  short,  we  are 
led  to  the  remarkable  conclusion  that  in  all  cases  we 
must  contemplate  exclusively  the  end  and  must  disregard 
the  means. 

§  61.  This  relation  of  ends  to  means,  underlying  all  ethical 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  169 

speculation,  will  be  further  elucidated  if  we  join  with  some 
of  the  above  conclusions,  certain  conclusions  drawn  in  the 
last  chapter.  We  shall  see  that  while  greatest  happiness  may 
vary  widely  in  societies  which,  though  ideally  constituted  are 
subject  to  unlike  physical  circumstances,  certain  fundamental 
conditions  to  the  achievement  of  this  greatest  happiness,  are 
common  to  all  such  societies. 

Given  a  people  inhabiting  a  tract  which  makes  nomadic 
habits  necessary,  and  the  happiness  of  each  individual  will 
be  greatest  when  his  nature  is  so  moulded  to  the  require- 
ments of  his  life,  that  all  his  faculties  find  their  due  activities 
in  daily  driving  and  tending  cattle,  milking,  migrating,  and 
so  forth.  The  members  of  a  community  otherwise  similar, 
which  is  permanently  settled,  will  severally  achieve  their 
greatest  happiness  when  their  natures  have  become  such  that 
a  fixed  habitat,  and  the  occupations  necessitated  by  it,  supply 
the  spheres  in  which  each  instinct  and  emotion  is  exercised 
and  brings  the  concomitant  pleasure.  The  citizens  of  a  large 
nation  industrially  organized,  have  reached  their  possible 
ideal  of  happiness,  when  the  producing,  distributing,  and 
other  activities,  are  such  in  their  kinds  and  amounts,  that  each 
citizen  finds  in  them  a  place  for  all  his  energies  and  aptitudes, 
while  he  obtains  the  means  of  satisfying  all  his  desires. 
Once  more  we  may  recognize  as  not  only  possible  but  prob- 
able, the  eventual  existence  of  a  community,  also  industrial, 
the  members  of  which,  having  natures  similarly  responding 
to  these  requirements,  are  also  characterized  by  dominant 
aesthetic  faculties,  and  achieve  complete  happiness  only  when 
a  large  part  of  life  is  filled  with  aesthetic  activities.  Evident- 
ly these  different  types  of  men,  with  their  different  standards 
of  happiness,  each  finding  the  possibility  of  that  happiness  in 
his  own  society,  would  not  find  it  if  transferred  to  any  of  the 
other  societies.  Evidently  though  they  might  have  in  com- 
mon such  kinds  of  happiness  as  accompany  the  satisfaction 
of  vital  needs,  they  would  not  have  in  common  sundry  other 
kinds  of  happiness. 


170  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

But  now  mark  that  while,  to  achieve  greatest  happiness 
in  each  of  such  societies,  the  special  conditions  to  be  fulfilled 
must  differ  from  those  to  be  fulfilled  in  the  other  societies, 
certain  general  conditions  must  be  fulfilled  in  all  the  societies. 
Harmonious  co-operation,  by  which  alone  in  any  of  them  the 
greatest  happiness  can  be  attained,  is,  as  we  saw,  made  pos- 
sible only  by  respect  for  one  another's  claims :  there  must  be 
neither  those  direct  aggressions  which  we  class  as  crimes 
against  person  and  property,  nor  must  there  be  those  indirect 
aggressions  constituted  by  breaches  of  contracts.  So  that 
maintenance  of  equitable  relations  between  men,  is  the  con- 
dition to  attainment  of  greatest  happiness  in  all  societies ; 
however  much  the  greatest  happiness  attainable  in  each  may 
differ  in  nature,  or  amount,  or  both. 

And  here  a  physical  analogy  may  fitly  be  used  to  give  the 
greatest  definiteness  to  this  cardinal  truth.  A  mass  of 
matter  of  whatever  kind,  maintains  its  state  of  internal  equi- 
librium, so  long  as  its  component  particles  severally  stand 
towards  their  neighbours  in  equi-distant  positions.  Accept- 
ing the  conclusions  of  modern  physicists,  which  imply 
that  each  molecule  moves  rhythmically,  then  a  balanced 
state  implies  that  each  performs  its  movements  within  a 
space  bounded  by  the  like  spaces  required  for  the  move- 
ments of  those  around.  If  the  molecules  have  been  so 
aggregated  that  the  oscillations  of  some  are  more  restrained 
than  the  oscillations  of  others,  there  is  a  proportionate  insta- 
bility. If  the  number  of  them  thus  unduly  restrained  is 
considerable,  the  instability  is  such  that  the  cohesion  in  some 
part  is  liable  to  fail,  and  a  crack  results.  If  the  excesses  of 
restraint  are  great  and  multitudinous,  a  trifling  disturbance 
causes  the  mass  to  break  up  into  small  fragments.  To 
which  add  that  the  recognized  remedy  for  this  unstable 
state,  is  an  exposure  to  such  physical  condition  (ordinarily 
high  temperature)  as  enables  the  molecules  so  to  change 
their  relative  positions  that  their  mutual  restraints  become 
equal  on  all  sides.  And  now  observe  that  this  holds  what- 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  171 

ever  be  the  natures  of  the  molecules.  They  may  be  simple ; 
they  may  be  compound  ;  they  may  be  composed  of  this  or 
that  matter  in  this  or  that  way.  In  other  words,  the  special 
activities  of  each  molecule,  constituted  by  the  relative  move- 
ments of  its  units,  may  be  various  in  their  kinds  and  de- 
grees ;  and  yet,  be  they  what  they  may,  it  remains  true  that 
to  preserve  internal  equilibrium  throughout  the  mass  of 
molecules,  the  mutual  limitations  of  their  activities  must  be 
everywhere  alike. 

And  this  is  the  above-described  pre-requisite  to  social 
equilibrium,  whatever  the  special  natures  of  the  associated 
persons.  Assuming  that  within  each  society  such  persons  are 
of  the  same  type,  needing  for  the  fulfilment  of  their  several 
lives  kindred  activities,  and  though  these  activities  may  be 
of  one  kind  in  one  society  and  of  another  kind  in  another, 
so  admitting  of  indefinite  variation,  this  condition  to  social 
equilibrium  does  not  admit  of  variation.  It  must  be  fulfilled 
before  complete  life,  that  is  greatest  happiness,  can  be 
attained  in  any  society ;  be  the  particular  quality  of  that  lif  e, 
or  that  happiness,  what  it  may.* 

§  62.  After  thus  observing  how  means  and  ends  in  con- 
duct stand  to  one  another,  and  how  there  emerge  certain 
conclusions  respecting  their  relative  claims,  we  may  see  a 
way  to  reconcile  sundry  conflicting  ethical  theories.  These 
severally  embody  portions  of  the  truth  ;  and  simply  require 
combining  in  proper  order  to  embody  the  whole  truth. 

The  theological  theory  contains  a  part.  If  for  the  divine 
will,  supposed  to  be  supernaturally  revealed,  we  substitute 
the  naturally-revealed  end  towards  which  the  Power  mani- 
fested throughout  Evolution  works;  then,  since  Evolution 
has  been,  and  is  still,  working  towards  the  highest  life,  it 
follows  that  conforming  to  those  principles  by  which  the 
highest  life  is  achieved,  is  furthering  that  end.  The  doctrine 

*  This  universal  requirement  it  was  which  I  had  in  view  when  choosing  for 
my  first  work,  published  in  1850,  the  title  Social  Statics. 


172  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

that  perfection  or  excellence  of  nature  should  be  the  object 
of  pursuit,  is  in  one  sense  true ;  for  it  tacitly  recognizes 
that  ideal  form  of  being  which  the  highest  life  implies,  and 
to  which  Evolution  tends.  There  is  a  truth,  also,  in  the  doc- 
trine that  virtue  must  be  the  aim  ;  for  this  is  another  form 
of  the  doctrine  that  the  aim  must  be  to  fulfil  the  conditions 
to  achievement  of  the  highest  life.  That  the  intuitions  of  a 
moral  faculty  should  guide  our  conduct,  is  a  proposition  in 
which  a  truth  is  contained ;  for  these  intuitions  are  the 
slowly  organized  results  of  experiences  received  by  the  race 
while  living  in  presence  of  these  conditions.  And  that  hap- 
piness is  the  supreme  end  is  beyond  question  true ;  for  this 
is  the  concomitant  of  that  highest  life  which  every  theory  of 
moral  guidance  has  distinctly  or  vaguely  in  view. 

So  understanding  their  relative  positions,  those  ethical 
systems  which  make  virtue,  right,  obligation,  the  cardinal 
aims,  are  seen  to  be  complementary  to  those  ethical  systems 
which  make  welfare,  pleasure,  happiness,  the  cardinal  aims. 
Though  the  moral  sentiments  generated  in  civilized  men  by 
daily  conduct  with  social  conditions  and  gradual  adaptation 
to  them,  are  indispensable  as  incentives  and  deterrents; 
and  though  the  intuitions  corresponding  to  these  senti- 
ments, have,  in  virtue  of  their  origin,  a  general  authority  to 
be  reverently  recognized ;  yet  the  sympathies  and  antipathies 
hence  originating,  together  with  the  intellectual  expressions 
of  them,  are,  in  their  primitive  forms,  necessarily  vague. 
To  make  guidance  by  them  adequate  to  all  requirements, 
their  dictates  have  to  be  interpreted  and  made  definite  by 
science;  to  which  end  there  must  be  analysis  of  those 
conditions  to  complete  living  which  they  respond  to,  and 
from  converse  with  which  they  have  arisen.  And  such 
analysis  necessitates  the  recognition  of  happiness  for  each 
and  all,  as  the  end  to  be  achieved  by  fulfilment  of  these 
conditions. 

Hence,  recognizing  in  due  degrees  all  the  various  ethical 
theories,  conduct  in  its  highest  form  will  take  as  guides, 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  173 

innate  perceptions  of  right  duly  enlightened  and  made 
precise  by  an  analytic  intelligence ;  while  conscious  that 
these  guides  are  proximately  supreme  solely  because  they 
lead  to  the  ultimately  supreme  end,  happiness  special  and 
general. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  RELATIVITY   OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES. 

§  63.  A  truth  of  cardinal  importance  as  a  datum  of  Ethics,, 
which  was  incidentally  referred  to  in  the  last  chapter,  must 
here  be  set  forth  at  full  length.  I  mean  the  truth  that  not 
only  men  of  different  races,  but  also  different  men  of  the  same 
race,  and  even  the  same  men  at  different  periods  of  life, 
have  different  standards  of  happiness.  Though  there  is 
some  recognition  of  this  by  moralists,  the  recognition  is 
inadequate ;  and  the  far-reaching  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
when  the  relativity  of  happiness  is  fully  recognized,  are 
scarcely  suspected. 

It  is  a  belief  universal  in  early  life — a  belief  which  in 
most  people  is  but  partially  corrected  in  later  life,  and  in 
very  few  wholly  dissipated — that  there  is  something  intrin- 
sic in  the  pleasantness  of  certain  things,  while  other  things 
are  intrinsically  unpleasant.  The  error  is  analogous  to,  and 
closely  allied  with,  the  error  crude  realism  makes.  Just 
as  to  the  uncultured  mind  it  appears  self-evident  that  the 
sweetness  of  sugar  is  inherent  in  sugar,  that  sound  as  we 
perceive  it  is  sound  as  it  exists  in  the  external  world, 
and  that  the  warmth  from  a  fire  is  in  itself  what  it 
seems ;  so  does  it  appear  self-evident  that  the  sweetness 
of  sugar  is  necessarily  grateful,  that  there  is  in  a  beautiful 
sound  something  that  must  be  beautiful  to  all  creatures, 
and  that  the  agreeable  feeling  produced  by  warmth  is 

174 


THE   RELATIVITY   OF   PAINS   AND   PLEA8UKES.  175 

a  feeling  which  every  other  consciousness  must  find  agree- 
able. 

But  as  criticism  proves  the  one  set  of  conclusions  to 
be  wrong,  so  does  it  prove  to  be  wrong  the  other  set. 
Not  only  are  the  qualities  of  external  things  as  intellectu- 
ally apprehended  by  us,  relative  to  our  own  organisms ;  but 
the  pleasurableness  or  painfulness  of  the  feelings  which  we 
associate  with  such  qualities,  are  also  relative  to  our  own 
organisms.  They  are  so  in  a  double  sense — they  are  rela- 
tive to  its  structures,  and  they  are  relative  to  the  states  of 
its  structures. 

That  we  may  not  rest  in  a  mere  nominal  acceptance  of 
these  general  truths,  but  may  so  appreciate  them  as  to  see 
their  full  bearings  on  ethical  theory,  we  must  here  glance  at 
them  as  exemplified  by  animate  creatures  at  large.  For 
after  contemplating  the  wide  divergences  of  sentiency  ac- 
companying the  wide  divergences  of  organization  which 
evolution  in  general  has  brought  about,  we  shall  be  enabled 
the  better  to  see  the  divergences  of  sentiency  to  be  expected 
from  the  further  evolution  of  humanity. 

§  64.  Because  they  can  be  most  quickly  disposed  of,  let  us 
first  deal  with  pains :  a  further  reason  for  first  dealing  with 
pains  being  that  we  may  thus  forthwith  recognize,  and  then 
leave  out  of  consideration,  those  sentient  states  the  qualities 
of  which  may  be  regarded  as  absolute  rather  than  relative. 

The  painfulness  of  the  feelings  produced  by  forces  which 
tend  to  destroy  organic  structures,  wholly  or  in  part,  is  of 
course  common  to  all  creatures  capable  of  feeling.  We  saw 
it  to  be  inevitable  that  during  evolution  there  must  every- 
where be  established  such  connexions  between  external 
actions  and  the  modes  of  consciousness  they  cause,  that  the 
injurious  ones  are  accompanied  by  disagreeable  feelings  and 
the  beneficial  ones  by  agreeable  feelings.  Consequently, 
pressures  or  strains  which  tear  or  bruise,  and  heats  which 
burn  or  scald,  being  in  all  cases  partially  or  wholly  destruc- 
13 


176  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

tive,  are  in  all  cases  painful.  But  even  here  the  rela- 

tivity of  the  feelings  may  in  one  sense  be  asserted.  For  the 
effect  of  a  force  of  given  quantity  or  intensity,  varies  partly 
with  the  size  and  partly  with  the  structure  of  the  creature 
exposed  to  it.  The  weight  which  is  scarcely  felt  by  a  large 
animal  crushes  a  small  one  ;  the  blow  which  breaks  the  limb 
of  a  mouse  produces  little  effect  on  a  horse ;  the  weapon 
which  lacerates  a  horse  leaves  a  rhinoceros  uninjured.  And 
with  these  differences  of  injuriousness  doubtless  go  differ- 
ences of  feeling.  Merely  glancing  at  the  illustrations  of  this 
truth  furnished  by  sentient  beings  in  general,  let  us  consider 
the  illustrations  mankind  furnish. 

Comparisons  of  robust  labouring  men  with  women  or 
children,  show  us  that  degrees  of  mechanical  stress  which 
the  first  bear  with  impunity,  produce  on  the  others  injuries 
and  accompanying  pains.  The  blistering  of  a  tender  skin 
by  an  amount  of  friction  which  does  not  even  redden  a 
coarse  one,  or  the  bursting  of  superficial  blood-vessels,  and 
consequent  discolouration,  caused  in  a  person  of  lax  tissues 
by  a  blow  which  leaves  in  well-toned  tissues  no  trace,  will 
sufficiently  exemplify  this  contrast.  Not  only,  how- 

ever, are  the  pains  due  to  violent  incident  forces,  relative 
to  the  characters  or  constitutional  qualities  of  the  parts 
directly  affected,  but  they  are  relative  in  equally  marked 
ways,  or  even  in  more  marked  ways,  to  the  characters  of  the 
nervous  structures.  The  common  assumption  is  that  equal 
bodily  injuries  excite  equal  pains.  But  this  is  a  mistake. 
Pulling  out  a  tooth  or  cutting  off  a  limb,  gives  to  different 
persons  widely  different  amounts  of  suffering :  not  the  en- 
durance only,  but  the  feeling  to  be  endured,  varies  greatly  ; 
and  the  variation  largely  depends  on  the  degree  of  nervous 
development.  This  is  well  shown  by  the  great  insensibility 
of  idiots— blows,  cuts,  and  extremes  of  heat  and  cold,  being 
borne  by  them  with  indifference.*  The  relation  thus  shown 
in  the  most  marked  manner  where  the  development  of  the 

*  On  Idiocy  and  Imbecility,  by  William  W.  Ireland,  M.  D.,  p.  255-6. 


THE   RELATIVITY   OF   PAINS   AND   PLEASURES.  177 

central  nervous  system  is  abnormally  low,  is  shown  in  a 
less  marked  manner  where  the  development  of  the  central 
nervous  system  is  normally  low  ;  namely,  among  inferior 
races  of  men.  Many  travellers  have  commented  on  the 
strange  callousness  shown  by  savages  who  have  been  man- 
gled in  battle  or  by  accident ;  and  surgeons  in  India  say 
that  wounds  and  operations  are  better  borne  by  natives 
than  by  Europeans.  Further,  there  comes  the  converse 
fact  that  among  the  higher  types  of  men,  larger-brained  and 
more  sensitive  to  pain  than  the  lower,  the  most  sensitive  are 
those  whose  nervous  developments,  as  shown  by  their  mental 
powers,  are  the  highest :  part  of  the  evidence  being  the  rela- 
tive intolerance  of  disagreeable  sensations  common  among 
men  of  genius,*  and  the  general  irritability  characteristic  of 
them. 

That  pain  is  relative  not  to  structures  only,  but  to  their 
states  as  well,  is  also  manifest — more  manifest  indeed. 
The  sensibility  of  an  external  part  depends  on  its  temper- 
ature. Cool  it  below  a  certain  point  and  it  becomes,  as  we 
say,  numb  ;  and  if  by  ether-spray  it  is  made  very  cold,  it 
may  be  cut  without  any  feeling  being  produced.  Con- 
versely, heat  the  part  so  that  its  blood-vessels  dilate,  and 
the  pain  which  any  injury  or  irritation  causes  is  greater  than 
usual.  How  largely  the  production  of  pain  depends  on 
the  condition  of  the  part  affected,  we  see  in  the  extreme 
tenderness  of  an  inflamed  surface — a  tenderness  such  that 
a  slight  touch  causes  shrinking,  and  such  that  rays  from 
the  fire  which  ordinarily  would  be  indifferent  become  in- 
tolerable. Similarly  with  the  special  senses.  A  light 
which  eyes  that  are  in  good  order  bear  without  disagreeable 
feeling,  cannot  be  borne  by  inflamed  eyes.  And  beyond 
the  local  state,  the  state  of  the  system  as  a  whole,  and  the 
state  of  the  nervous  centres,  are  both  factors.  Those  en- 
feebled by  illness  are  distressed  by  noises  which  those  in 
health  bear  with  equanimity ;  and  men  with  overwrought 

*  For  instances  see  FortnigMly  Review,  Vol.  XXIV  (New  Series),  p.  712. 


178  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

brains  are  irritated  in  unusual  degrees  by  annoyances,  both 
physical  and  moral.  Further,  the  temporary  con- 

dition known  as  exhaustion  enters  into  the  relation.  Limbs 
over-worn  by  prolonged  exertion,  cannot  without  aching 
perform  acts  which  would  at  other  times  cause  no  appre- 
ciable feeling.  After  reading  continuously  for  very  many 
hours,  even  strong  eyes  begin  to  smart.  And  noises  that 
can  be  listened  to  for  a  short  time  with  indifference,  become, 
if  there  is  no  cessation,  causes  of  suffering. 

So  that  though  there  is  absoluteness  in  the  relation  be- 
tween positive  pains  and  actions  that  are  positively  injurious, 
in  so  far  that  wherever  there  is  sentiency  it  exists  ;  yet  even 
here  partial  relativity  may  be  asserted.  For  there  is  no 
fixed  relation  between  the  acting  force  and  the  produced 
feeling.  The  amount  of  feeling  varies  with  the  size  of  the 
organism,  with  the  character  of  its  outer  structures,  with  the 
character  of  its  nervous  system ;  and  also  with  the  temporary 
states  of  the  part  affected,  of  the  body  at  large,  and  of  the 
nervous  centres. 

§  65.  The  relativity  of  pleasures  is  far  more  conspicuous  ; 
and  the  illustrations  of  it  furnished  by  the  sentient  world  at 
large  are  innumerable. 

It  needs  but  to  glance  round  at  the  various  things  which 
different  creatures  are  prompted  by  their  desires  to  eat  and 
are  gratified  in  eating — flesh  for  predaceous  animals,  grass 
for  the  herbivora,  worms  for  the  mole,  flies  for  the  swallow, 
seeds  for  the  finch,  honey  for  the  bee,  a  decaying  car- 
case for  the  maggot — to  be  reminded  that  the  tastes  for 
foods  are  relative  to  the  structures  of  the  creatures.  And 
this  truth,  made  conspicuous  by  a  survey  of  animals  in 
general,  is  forced  on  our  attention  even  by  a  survey  of 
different  races  of  men.  Here  human  flesh  is  abhorred,  and 
there  regarded  as  the  greatest  delicacy  ;  in  this  country 
roots  are  allowed  to  putrefy  before  they  are  eaten,  and  in 
that  the  taint  of  decay  produces  disgust ;  the  whale's 


THE   EELATIVITY   OF   PAINS   AND   PLEASURES.  179 

blubber  which  one  race  devours  with  avidity,  will  in  another 
by  its  very  odour  produce  nausea.  Nay,  without  looking 
abroad  we  may,  in  the  common  saying  that  "one  man's 
meat  is  another  man's  poison,"  see  the  general  admission 
that  members  of  the  same  society  so  far  differ,  that  a  taste 
which  is  to  these  pleasurable  is  to  those  displeasurable.  So 
is  it  with  the  other  senses.  Assafoatida,  which  by  us  is 
singled  out  as  typical  of  the  disgusting  in  odour,  ranks 
among  the  Esthonians  as  a  favourite  perfume  ;  and  even 
those  around  us  vary  so  far  in  their  likings  that  the  scents 
of  flowers  grateful  to  some  are  repugnant  to  others.  Analo- 
gous differences  in  the  preferences  for  colours,  we  daily  hear 
expressed.  And  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  the  like  holds 
with  all  sensations,  down  even  to  those  of  touch  :  the  feeling 
yielded  by  velvet,  which  is  to  most  agreeable,  setting  the 
teeth  on  edge  in  some. 

It  needs  but  to  name  appetite  and  satiety  to  suggest 
multitudinous  facts  showing  that  pleasures  are  relative  not 
only  to  the  organic  structures  but  also  to  their  states.  The 
food  which  yields  keen  gratification  when  there  is  great 
hunger  ceases  to  be  grateful  when  hunger  is  satisfied  ;  and 
if  then  forced  on  the  eater  is  rejected  with  aversion.  So, 
too,  a  particular  kind  of  food,  seeming  when  first  tasted  so 
delicious  that  daily  repetition  would  be  a  source  of  endless 
enjoyment,  becomes,  in  a  few  days,  not  only  unenjoyable  but 
repugnant.  Brilliant  colours  which,  falling  on  unaccustomed 
eyes  give  delight,  pall  on  the  sense  if  long  looked  at ;  and 
there  is  relief  in  getting  away  from  the  impressions  they 
yield.  Sounds  sweet  in  themselves  and  sweet  in  their  com- 
binations, which  yield  to  unfatigued  ears  intense  pleasure, 
become,  at  the  end  of  a  long  concert,  not  only  wearisome 
but,  if  there  is  no  escape  from  them,  causes  of  irritation. 
The  like  holds  down  even  to  such  simple  sensations  as  those 
of  heat  and  cold.  The  fire  go  delightful  on  a  winter's  day 
is,  in  hot  weather,  oppressive  ;  and  pleasure  is  then  taken  in 
the  cold  water  from  which,  in  winter,  there  would  be 


180  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

shrinking.  Indeed,  experiences  lasting  over  but  a  few 
moments  suffice  to  show  how  relative  to  the  states  of  the 
structures  are  pleasurable  sensations  of  these  kinds ;  for  it 
is  observable  that  on  dipping  the  cold  hand  into  hot  water, 
the  agreeable  feeling  gradually  diminishes  as  the  hand 
warms. 

These  few  instances  will  carry  home  the  truth,  manifest 
enough  to  all  who  observe,  that  the  receipt  of  each  agreeable 
sensation  depends  primarily  on  the  existence  of  a  structure 
which  is  called  into  play  ;  and,  secondarily,  on  the  condition 
of  that  structure,  as  fitting  it  or  unfitting  it  for  activity. 

§  66.  The  truth  that  emotional  pleasures  are  made  possible, 
partly  by  the  existence  of  correlative  structures  and  partly  by 
the  states  of  those  structures,  is  equally  undeniable. 

Observe  the  animal  which,  leading  a  life  demanding  soli- 
tary habits,  has  an  adapted  organization,  and  it  gives  no  sign 
of  need  for  the  presence  of  its  kind.  Observe,  conversely,  a 
gregarious  animal  separated  from  the  herd,  and  you  see 
marks  of  unhappiness  while  the  separation  continues,  and 
equally  distinct  marks  of  joy  on  joining  its  companions.  In 
the  one  case  there  is  no  nervous  structure  which  finds  its 
sphere  of  action  in  the  gregarious  state ;  and  in  the  other 
case  such  a  structure  exists.  As  was  implied  by  instances 
cited  in  the  last  chapter  for  another  purpose,  animals  leading 
lives  involving  particular  kinds  of  activities,  have  become  so 
constituted  that  pursuance  of  those  activities,  exercising 
the  correlative  structures,  yields  the  associated  pleasures. 
Beasts  of  prey  confined  in  dens,  show  us  by  their  pacings 
from  side  to  side  the  endeavour  to  obtain,  as  well  as  they 
can,  the  satisfactions  that  accompany  roaming  about  in 
their  natural  habitats ;  and  that  gratification  in  the  ex- 
penditure of  their  locomotive  energies  shown  us  by  por- 
poises playing  round  a  vessel,  is  shown  us  by  the  similarly- 
unceasing  excursions  from  end  to  end  of  its  cell  which  a 
captured  porpoise  makes.  The  perpetual  hoppings  of  the 


THE   RELATIVITY   OF   PAINS   AND   PLEASURES.  181 

canary  from  bar  to  bar  of  its  cage,  and  the  ceaseless  use  of 
claws  and  bill  in  climbing  about  its  perch  by  the  parrot,  are 
other  activities  which,  severally  related  to  the  needs  of  the 
species,  have  severally  themselves  become  sources  of  agree- 
able feelings.  Still  more  clearly  are  we  shown  by  the 
efforts  which  a  caged  beaver  makes  to  build  with  such 
sticks  and  pieces  of  wood  as  are  at  hand,  how  dominant 
in  its  nature  has  become  the  building  instinct ;  and  how, 
apart  from  any  advantage  gained,  it  gets  gratification  by 
repeating,  as  well  as  it  can,  the  processes  of  construction  it 
is  organized  to  carry  on.  The  cat  which,  lacking  something 
to  tear  with  her  claws,  pulls  at  .the  mat  with  them,  the  con- 
fined giraffe  which,  in  default  of  branches  to  lay  hold  of 
wears  out  the  upper  angles  of  the  doors  to  its  house  by 
continually  grasping  them  with  its  prehensile  tongue,  the 
rhinoceros  which,  having  no  enemy  to  fight,  ploughs  up 
the  ground  with  his  horn,  all  yield  us  analogous  evidence. 
Clearly,  these  various  actions  performed  by  these  various 
creatures  are  not  intrinsically  pleasurable ;  for  they  dif- 
fer more  or  less  in  each  species  and  are  often  utterly 
unlike.  The  pleasurableness  is  simply  in  the  exercise  of 
nervo-muscular  structures  adapted  to  the  performance  of  the 
actions. 

Though  races  of  men  are  contrasted  with  one  another  so 
much  less  than  genera  and  orders  of  animals  are,  yet,  as  we 
saw  in  the  last  chapter,  along  with  visible  differences  there 
go  invisible  differences,  with  accompanying  likings  for  dif- 
ferent modes  of  life.  Among  some,  as  the  Mantras,  the  love 
of  unrestrained  action  and  the  disregard  of  companionship, 
are  such  that  they  separate  if  they  quarrel,  and  hence  live 
scattered ;  while  among  others,  as  the  Damaras,  there  is  little 
tendency  to  resist,  but  instead,  an  admiration  for  any  one  who 
assumes  power  over  them.  Already  when  exemplifying  the 
indefiniteness  of  happiness  as  an  end  of  action,  I  have  referred 
to  the  unlike  ideals  of  life  pursued  by  the  nomadic  and  the 
settled,  the  warlike  and  the  peaceful, — unlike  ideals  which 


182  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

imply  unlikenesses  of  nervous  structures  caused  by  the  in- 
herited effects  of  unlike  habits  accumulating  through  genera- 
tions. These  contrasts,  various  in  their  kinds  and  degrees 
among  the  various  types  of  mankind,  everyone  can  supple- 
ment by  analogous  contrasts  observable  among  those  around. 
The  occupations  some  delight  in  are  to  those  otherwise  con- 
stituted intolerable  ;  and  men's  hobbies,  severally  appearing 
to  themselves  quite  natural,  often  appear  to  their  friends 
ludicrous  and  almost  insane  :  facts  which  alone  might  make 
us  see  that  the  pleasurableness  of  actions  of  this  or 
that  kind,  is  due  not  to  anything  in  the  natures  of  the 
actions  but  to  the  existence  of  faculties  -which  find  exercise 
in  them. 

It  must  be  added  that  each  pleasurable  emotion,  like  each 
pleasurable  sensation,  is  relative  not  only  to  a  certain  struct- 
ure but  also  to  the  state  of  that  structure.  The  parts  called 
into  action  must  have  had  proper  rest — must  be  in  a  con- 
dition fit  for  action  ;  not  in  the  condition  which  prolonged 
action  produces.  Be  the  order  of  emotion  what  it  may,  an 
unbroken  continuity  in  the  receipt  of  it  eventually  brings 
satiety.  The  pleasurable  consciousness  becomes  less  and  less 
vivid,  and  there  arises  the  need  for  a  temporary  cessation  dur- 
ing which  the  parts  that  have  been  active  may  recover  their 
fitness  for  activity ;  and  during  which  also,  the  activities  of 
other  parts  and  receipt  of  the  accompanying  emotions  may 
find  due  place. 

§  67.  I  have  insisted  on  these  general  truths  with  perhaps 
needless  iteration,  to  prepare  the  reader  for  more  fully  recog- 
nizing a  corollary  that  is  practically  ignored.  Abundant 
and  clear  as  is  the  evidence,  and  forced  though  it  is  daily 
on  everyone's  attention,  the  conclusions  respecting  life  and 
conduct  which  should  be  drawn,  are  not  drawn  ;  and  so 
much  at  variance  are  these  conclusions  with  current  beliefs, 
that  enunciation  of  them  causes  a  stare  of  incredulity. 
Pervaded  as  all  past  thinking  has  been,  and  as  most  pres- 


THE   RELATIVITY   OF   PAINS   AND    PLEASURES.  183 

ent  thinking  is,  by  the  assumption  that  the  nature  of 
every  creature  has  been  specially  created  for  it,  and  that 
human  nature,  also  specially  created,  is,  like  other  natures, 
fixed — pervaded  too  as  this  thinking  has  been,  and  is.  by 
the  allied  assumption  that  the  agreeableness  of  certain 
actions  depends  on  their  essential  qualities,  while  other 
actions  are  by  their  essential  qualities  made  disagreeable  ; 
it  is  difficult  to  obtain  a  hearing  for  the  doctrine  that  the 
kinds  of  action  which  are  now  pleasurable  will,  under 
conditions  requiring  the  change,  cease  to  be  pleasurable, 
while  other  kinds  of  action  will  become  pleasurable.  Even 
those  who  accept  the  doctrine  of  Evolution  mostly  hear 
with  scepticism,  or  at  best  with  nominal  faith,  the  infer- 
ences to  be  drawn  from  it  respecting  the  humanity  of  the 
future. 

And  yet  as  shown  in  myriads  of  instances  indicated 
by  the  few  above  given,  those  natural  processes  which 
have  produced  multitudinous  forms  of  structure  adapted  to 
multitudinous  forms  of  activity,  have  simultaneously  made 
these  forms  of  activity  pleasurable.  And  the  inevitable 
implication  is  tha't  within  the  limits  imposed  by  physical 
laws,  there  will  be  evolved,  in  adaptation  to  any  new 
sets  of  conditions  that  may  be  established,  appropriate 
structures  of  which  the  functions  will  yield  their  respective 
gratifications. 

"When  we  have  got  rid  of  the  tendency  to  think  that 
certain  modes  of  activity  are  necessarily  pleasurable  because 
they  give  us  pleasure,  and  that  other  modes  which  do  not 
please  us  are  necessarily  unpleasing ;  we  shall  see  that  the 
re-moulding  of  human  nature  into  fitness  for  the  require- 
ments of  social  life,  must  eventually  make  all  needful 
activities  pleasurable,  while  it  makes  displeasurable  all 
activities  at  variance  with  these  requirements.  When  we 
have  come  fully  to  recognize  the  truth  that  there  is  nothing 
intrinsically  more  gratifying  in  the  efforts  by  which  wild 
animals  are  caught,  than  in  the  efforts  expended  in  rearing 


184  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

plants,  and  that  the  combined  actions  of  muscles  and 
senses  in  rowing  a  boat  are  not  by  their  essential  natures 
more  productive  of  agreeable  feeling  than  those  gone 
through  in  reaping  corn,  but  that  everything  depends  on 
the  co-operating  emotions,  which  at  present  are  more  in 
accordance  with  the  one  than  with  the  other ;  we  shall  infer 
that  along  with  decrease  of  those  emotions  for  which  the 
social  state  affords  little  or  no  scope,  and  increase  of  those 
which  it  persistently  exercises,  the  things  now  done  with  dis- 
like from  a  sense  of  obligation  will  be  done  with  immediate 
liking,  and  the  things  desisted  from  as  a  matter  of  duty  will 
be  desisted  from  because  they  are  repugnant. 

This  conclusion,  alien  to  popular  beliefs  and  in  ethical 
speculation  habitually  ignored,  or  at  most  recognized  but 
partially  and  occasionally,  will  be  thought  by  the  majority 
so  improbable  that  I  must  give  further  justification  of  it : 
enforcing  the  d  priori  argument  by  an  a  posteriori  one. 
Small  as  is  the  attention  given  to  the  fact,  yet  is  the  fact 
conspicuous  that  the  corollary  above  drawn  from  the  doctrine 
of  Evolution  at  large,  coincides  with  the  corollary  which  past 
and  present  changes  in  human  nature  force  on  us.  The 
leading  contrasts  of  character  between  savage  and  civilized, 
are  just  those  contrasts  to  be  expected  from  the  process  of 
adaptation. 

The  life  of  the  primitive  man  is  passed  mainly  in  the 
pursuit  of  beasts,  birds,  and  fish,  which  yields  him  a 
gratifying  excitement ;  but  though  to  the  civilized  man  the 
chase  gives  gratification,  this  is  neither  so  persistent  nor  so 
general.  There  are  among  us  keen  sportsmen ;  but  there 
are  many  to  whom  shooting  and  fishing  soon  become  weari- 
some ;  and  there  are  not  a  few  to  whom  they  are  altogether 
indifferent  or  even  distasteful.  Conversely,  the  power 

of  continued  application  which  in  the  primitive  man  is  very 
small,  has  among  ourselves  become  considerable.  It  is 
true  that  most  are  coerced  into  industry  by  necessity; 
but  there  are  sprinkled  throughout  society  men  to  whom 


THE   RELATIVITY   OF   PAINS   AND   PLEASURES.  185 

active  occupation  is  a  need — men  who  are  restless  when 
away  from  business  and  miserable  when  they  eventually 
give  it  up ;  men  to  whom  this  or  that  line  of  investigation 
is  so  attractive,  that  they  devote  themselves  to  it  day  after 
day,  year  after  year ;  men  who  are  so  deeply  interested  in 
public  affairs  that  they  pass  lives  of  labour  in  achieving 
political  ends  they  think  advantageous,  hardly  giving  them- 
selves the  rest  necessary  for  health.  Yet  again,  and 
still  more  strikingly,  does  the  change  become  manifest  when 
we  compare  undeveloped  with  developed  humanity  in  respect 
of  the  conduct  prompted  by  fellow  feeling.  Cruelty  rather 
than  kindness  is  characteristic  of  the  savage,  and  is  in  many 
cases  a  source  of  marked  gratification  to  him ;  but  though 
among  the  civilized  are  some  in  whom  this  trait  of  the 
savage  survives,  yet  a  love  of  inflicting  pain  is  not  general, 
and  besides  numbers  who  show  benevolence,  there  are  those 
who  devote  their  whole  time  and  much  of  their  money  to 
philanthropic  ends,  without  thought  of  reward  either  here 
or  hereafter.  Clearly  these  major,  along  with  many 
minor,  changes  of  nature,  conform  to  the  law  set  forth. 
Activities  appropriate  to  their  needs  which  give  pleasures  to 
savages  have  ceased  to  be  pleasurable  to  many  of  the  civilized ; 
while  the  civilized  have  acquired  capacities  for  other  appro- 
priate activities  and  accompanying  pleasures  which  savages 
had  no  capacities  for. 

Now,  not  only  is  it  rational  to  infer  that  changes  like  those 
which  have  been  going  on  during  civilization,  will  continue 
to  go  on,  but  it  is  irrational  to  do  otherwise.  Not  he  who 
believes  that  adaptation  will  increase  is  absurd,  but  he  who 
doubts  that  it  will  increase  is  absurd.  Lack  of  faith  in  such 
further  evolution  of  humanity  as  shall  harmonize  its  nature 
with  its  conditions,  adds  but  another  to  the  countless  illus- 
trations of  inadequate  consciousness  of  causation.  One  who, 
leaving  behind  both  primitive  dogmas  and  primitive  ways 
of  looking  at  things,  has,  while  accepting  scientific  conclu- 
sions acquired  those  habits  of  thought  which  science  gener- 


186  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ates,  will  regard  the  conclusion  above  drawn  as  inevitable. 
He  will  find  it  impossible  to  believe  that  the  processes  which 
have  heretofore  so  moulded  all  beings  to  the  requirements 
of  their  lives  that  they  get  satisfactions  in  fulfilling  them, 
will  not  hereafter  continue  so  moulding  them.  He  will  infer 
that  the  type  of  nature  to  which  the  highest  social  life  affords 
a  sphere  such  that  every  faculty  has  its  due  amount,  and 
no  more  than  the  due  amount,  of  function  and  accompany- 
ing gratification,  is  the  type  of  nature  towards  which  prog- 
ress cannot  cease  till  it  is  reached.  Pleasure  being  pro- 
ducible by  the  exercise  of  any  structure  which  is  adjusted 
to  its  special  end,  he  will  see  the  necessary  implication  to 
be  that,  supposing  it  consistent  with  the  maintenance  of 
life,  there  is  no  kind  of  activity  which  will  not  become  a 
source  of  pleasure  if  continued ;  and  that  therefore  pleasure 
will  eventually  accompany  every  mode  of  action  demanded 
by  social  conditions. 

This  corollary  I  here  emphasize  because  it  will  presently 
play  an  important  part  in  the  argument. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

EGOISM    rERSUS  ALTRUISM. 

§  68.  If  insistence  on  them  tends  to  unsettle  established 
systems  of  unbelief,  self-evident  truths  are  by  most  people 
silently  passed  over  ;  or  else  there  is  a  tacit  refusal  to  draw 
from  them  the  most  obvious  inferences. 

Of  self-evident  truths  so  dealt  with,  the  one  which  here 
concerns  us  is  that  a  creature  must  live  before  it  can  act. 
From  this  it  is  a  corollary  that  the  acts  by  which  each  main- 
tains his  own  life  must,  speaking  generally,  precede  in  im- 
perativeness all  other  acts  of  which  he  is  capable.  For  if  it 
be  asserted  that  these  other  acts  must  precede  in  impera- 
tiveness the  acts  which  maintain  life  ;  and  if  this,  accepted 
as  a  general  law  of  conduct,  is  conformed  to  by  all ;  then 
by  postponing  the  acts  which  maintain  life  to  the  other 
acts  which  life  makes  possible,  all  must  lose  their  lives. 
That  is  to  say,  Ethics  has  to  recognize  the  truth,  recog- 
nized in  unethical  thought,  that  egoism  comes  before  altru- 
ism. The  acts  required  for  continued  self-preservation, 
including  the  enjoyment  of  benefits  achieved  by  such  acts, 
are  the  first  requisites  to  universal  welfare.  Unless  each 
duly  cares  for  himself,  his  care  for  all  others  is  ended  by 
death  ;  and  if  each  thus  dies,  there  remain  no  others  to  be 
cared  for. 

This  permanent  supremacy  of  egoism  over  altruism,  made 

" 


188  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

manifest  by  contemplating  existing  life,  is  further  made 
manifest  by  contemplating  life  in  course  of  evolution. 

§  69.  Those  who  have  followed  with  assent  the  recent 
course  of  thought,  do  not  need  telling  that  throughout  past 
eras,  the  life,  vast  in  amount  and  varied  in  kind,  which  has 
overspread  the  Earth,  has  progressed  in  subordination  to 
the  law  that  every  individual  shall  gain  by  whatever  aptitude 
it  has  for  fulfilling  the  conditions  to  its  existence.  The 
uniform  principle  has  been  that  better  adaptation  shall  bring 
greater  benefit ;  which  greater  benefit,  while  increasing  the 
prosperity  of  the  better  adapted,  shall  increase  also  its  ability 
to  leave  offspring  inheriting  more  or  less  its  better  adapta- 
tion. And,  by  implication,  the  uniform  principle  has  been 
that  the  ill-adapted,  disadvantaged  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, shall  bear  the  consequent  evils :  either  disappearing 
when  its  imperfections  are  extreme,  or  else  rearing  fewer  off- 
spring, which,  inheriting  its  imperfections,  tend  to  dwindle 
away  in  posterity. 

It  has  been  thus  with  innate  superiorities  ;  it  has  been 
thus  also  with  acquired  ones.  All  along  the  law  has  been 
that  increased  function  brings  increased  power ;  and  that 
therefore  such  extra  activities  as  aid  welfare  in  any  member 
of  a  race,  produce  in  its  structures  greater  ability  to  carry 
on  such  extra  activities :  the  derived  advantages  being  en- 
joyed by  it  to  the  heightening  and  lengthening  of  its  life. 
Conversely,  as  lessened  function  ends  in  lessened  structure, 
the  dwindling  of  unused  faculties  has  ever  entailed  loss  of 
power  to  achieve  the  correlative  ends  :  the  result  of  inade- 
quate fulfilment  of  the  ends  being  diminished  ability  to 
maintain  life.  And  by  inheritance,  such  functionally-pro- 
duced modifications  have  respectively  furthered  or  hindered 
survival  in  posterity. 

As  already  said,  the  law  that  each  creature  shall  take  the 
benefits  and  the  evils  of  its  own  nature,  be  they  those 
derived  from  ancestry  or  those  due  to  self-produced  modifi- 


EGOISM  VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  189 

cations,  has  been  the  law  under  which  life  has  evolved  thus 
far ;  and  it  must  continue  to  be  the  law  however  much 
further  life  maj  evolve.  Whatever  qualifications  this  natu- 
ral course  of  action  may  now  or  hereafter  undergo,  are 
qualifications  that  cannot,  without  fatal  results,  essentially 
change  it.  Any  arrangements  which  in  a  considerable  de- 
gree prevent  superiority  from  profiting  by  the  rewards  of 
superiority,  or  shield  inferiority  from  the  evils  it  entails — 
any  arrangements  which  tend  to  make  it  as  well  to  be  in- 
ferior as  to  be  superior;  are  arrangements  diametrically 
opposed  to  the  progress  of  organization  and  the  reaching  of 
a  higher  life. 

But  to  say  that  each  individual  shall  reap  the  benefits 
brought  to  him  by  his  own  powers,  inherited  and  acquired, 
is  to  enunciate  egoism  as  an  ultimate  principle  of  conduct. 
It  is  to  say  that  egoistic  claims  must  take  precedence  of 
altruistic  claims. 

§  70.  Under  its  biological  aspect  this  proposition  cannot 
be  contested  by  those  who  agree  in  the  doctrine  of  Evolu- 
tion ;  but  probably  they  will  not  at  once  allow  that  admission 
of  it  under  its  ethical  aspect  is  equally  unavoidable.  While, 
as  respects  development  of  life,  the  well-working  of  the 
universal  principle  described  is  sufficiently  manifest ;  the 
well-working  of  it  as  respects  increase  of  happiness  may  not 
be  seen  at  once.  But  the  two  cannot  be  disjoined. 

Incapacity  of  every  kind  and  of  whatever  degree,  causes 
unhappiness  directly  and  indirectly — directly  by  the  pain 
consequent  on  the  over-taxing  of  inadequate  faculty,  and 
indirectly  by  the  non-fulfilment,  or  imperfect  fulfilment,  of 
certain  conditions  to  welfare.  Conversely,  capacity  of  every 
kind  sufficient  for  the  requirement,  conduces  to  happiness 
immediately  and  remotely — immediately  by  the  pleasure 
accompanying  the  normal  exercise  of  each  power  that  is  up 
to  its  work,  and  remotely  by  the  pleasures  which  are  fur- 
thered by  the  ends  achieved.  A  creature  that  is  weak  or 


190  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

slow  of  foot,  and  so  gets  food  only  by  exhausting  efforts  or 
escapes  enemies  with  difficulty,  suffers  the  pains  of  over- 
strained powers,  of  unsatisfied  appetites,  of  distressed  emo- 
tions ;  while  the  strong  and  swift  creature  of  the  same 
species  delights  in  its  efficient  activities,  gains  more  fully  the 
satisfactions  yielded  by  food  as  well  as  the  renewed  vivacity 
this  gives,  and  has  to  bear  fewer  and  smaller  pains  in  defend- 
ing itself  against  foes  or  escaping  from  them.  Similarly 
with  duller  and  keener  senses,  or  higher  and  lower  degrees 
of  sagacity.  The  mentally-inferior  individual  of  any  race 
suffers  negative  and  positive  miseries ;  while  the  mentally- 
superior  individual  receives  negative  and  positive  gratifica- 
tions. Inevitably,  then,  this  law  in  conformity  with  which 
each  member  of  a  species  takes  the  consequences  of  its  own 
nature ;  and  in  virtue  of  which  the  progeny  of  each  member, 
participating  in  its  nature,  also  takes  such  consequences ;  is 
one  that  tends  ever  to  raise  the  aggregate  happiness  of  the 
species,  by  furthering  the  multiplication  of  the  happier  and 
hindering  that  of  the  less  happy. 

All  this  is  true  of  human  beings  as  of  other  beings.  The 
conclusion  forced  on  us  is  that  the  pursuit  of  individual 
happiness  within  those  limits  prescribed  by  social  conditions, 
is  the  first  requisite  to  the  attainment  of  the  greatest  general 
happiness.  To  see  this  it  needs  but  to  contrast  one  whose 
self-regard  has  maintained  bodily  well-being,  with  one  whose 
regardlessness  of  self  has  brought  its  natural  results ;  and 
then  to  ask  what  must  be  the  contrast  between  two  societies 
formed  of  two  such  kinds  of  individuals. 

Bounding  out  of  bed  after  an  unbroken  sleep,  singing  or 
whistling  as  he  dresses,  coming  down  with  beaming  face 
ready  to  laugh  on  the  smallest  provocation,  the  healthy  man 
of  high  powers,  conscious  of  past  successes  and  by  his 
energy,  quickness,  resource,  made  confident  of  the  future, 
enters  on  the  day's  business  not  with  repugnance  but  with 
gladness ;  and  from  hour  to  hour  experiencing  satisfac- 
tions from  work  effectually  done,  comes  home  with  an 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  191 

abundant  surplus  of  energy  remaining  for  hours  of  relax- 
ation. Far  otherwise  is  it  with  one  who  is  enfeebled  by 
great  neglect  of  self.  Already  deficient,  his  energies  are 
made  more  deficient  by  constant  endeavours  to  execute 
tasks  that  prove  beyond  his  strength,  and  by  the  resulting 
discouragement.  Besides  the  depressing  consciousness  of 
the  immediate  future,  there  is  the  depressing  consciousness 
of  the  remoter  future,  with  its  probability  of  accumulated 
difficulties  and  diminished  ability  to  meet  them.  Hours 
of  leisure  which,  rightly  passed,  bring  pleasures  that  raise 
the  tide  of  life  and  renew  the  powers  of  work,  cannot  be 
utilized :  there  is  not  vigour  enough  for  enjoyments  in- 
volving action,  and  lack  of  spirits  prevents  passive  enjoy- 
ments from  being  entered  upon  with  zest.  In  brief,  life 
becomes  a  burden.  Now  if,  as  must  be  admitted,  in  a 
community  composed  of  individuals  like  the  first  the  hap- 
piness will  be  relatively  great,  while  in  one  composed  of 
individuals  like  the  last  there  will  be  relatively  little  happi- 
ness, or  rather  much  misery ;  it  must  be  admitted  that 
conduct  causing  the  one  result  is  good  and  conduct  causing 
the  other  is  bad. 

But  diminutions  of  general  happiness  are  produced  by 
inadequate  egoism  in  several  other  ways.  These  we  will 
successively  glance  at. 

§  71.  If  there  were  no  proofs  of  heredity — if  it  were 
the  rule  that  the  strong  are  usually  begotten  by  the  weak 
while  the  weak  usually  descend  from  the  strong,  that  viva- 
cious children  form  the  families  of  melancholy  parents  while 
fathers  and  mothers  with  overflowing  spirits  mostly  have 
dull  progeny,  that  from  stolid  peasants  there  ordinarily  come 
sons  of  high  intelligence  while  the  sons  of  the  cultured  are 
commonly  fit  for  nothing  but  following  the  plough — if  there 
were  no  transmission  of  gout,  scrofula,  insanity,  and  did  the 
diseased  habitually  give  birth  to  the  healthy  and  the  healthy 
to  the  diseased,  writers  on  Ethics  might  be  justified  in  ignor- 
14 


192  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ing  those  effects  of  conduct  which  are  felt  by  posterity 
through  the  natures  they  inherit. 

As  it  is,  however,  the  current  ideas  concerning  the 
relative  claims  of  egoism  and  altruism  are  vitiated  by  the 
omission  of  this  all-important  factor.  For  if  health,  strength 
and  capacity,  are  usually  transmitted  ;  and  if  disease,  feeble- 
ness, stupidity,  generally  reappear  in  descendants ;  then  a 
rational  altruism  requires  insistance  on  that  egoism  which 
is  shown  by  receipt  of  the  satisfactions  accompanying 
preservation  of  body  and  mind  in  the  best  state.  The 
necessary  implication  is  that  blessings  are  provided  for 
offspring  by  due  self-regard,  while  disregard  of  self  carried 
too  far  provides  curses.  When,  indeed,  we  remember  how 
commonly  it  is  remarked  that  high  health  and  overflowing 
spirits  render  any  lot  in  life  tolerable,  while  chronic 
ailments  make  gloomy  a  life  most  favourably  circum- 
stanced, it  becomes  amazing  that  both  the  world  at  large 
and  writers  who  make  conduct  their  study,  should 
ignore  the  terrible  evils  which  disregard  of  personal  well- 
being  inflicts  on  the  unborn,  and  the  incalculable  good 
laid  up  for  the  unborn  by  attention  to  personal  well- 
being.  Of  all  bequests  of  parents  to  children  the  most 
valuable  is  a  sound  constitution.  Though  a  man's  body  is 
not  a  property  that  can  be  inherited,  yet  his  constitution 
may  fitly  be  compared  to  an  entailed  estate ;  and  if  he  right- 
ly understands  his  duty  to  posterity,  he  will  see  that  he  is 
bound  to  pass  on  that  estate  uninjured  if  not  improved. 
To  say  this  is  to  say  that  he  must  be  egoistic  to  the 
extent  of  satisfying  all  those  desires  associated  with  the 
due  performance  of  functions.  Nay,  it  is  to  say  more.  It 
is  to  say  that  he  must  seek  in  due  amounts  the  various 
pleasures  which  life  offers.  For  beyond  the  effect  these 
have  in  raising  the  tide  of  life  and  maintaining  constitu- 
tional vigour,  there  is  the  effect  they  have  in  preserving  and 
increasing  a  capacity  of  receiving  enjoyment.  Endowed 
with  abundant  energies  and  various  tastes,  some  can  get 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM. 

gratifications  of  many  kinds  on  opportunities  hourly  occur- 
ring ;  while  others  are  so  inert,  and  so  uninterested  in  things 
around,  that  they  cannot  even  take  the  trouble  to  amuse 
themselves.  And  unless  heredity  be  denied,  the  inference 
must  be  that  due  acceptance  of  the  miscellaneous  pleasures 
life  offers,  conduces  to  the  capacity  for  enjoyment  in  pos- 
terity; and  that  persistence  in  dull  monotonous  lives  by 
parents,  diminishes  the  ability  of  their  descendants  to  make 
the  best  of  what  gratifications  fall  to  them. 

§  72.  Beyond  the  decrease  of  general  happiness  which 
results  in  this  indirect  way  if  egoism  is  unduly  subordinated, 
there  is  a  decrease  of  general  happiness  which  results  in  a 
direct  way.  He  who  carries  self-regard  far  enough  to  keep 
himself  in  good  health  and  high  spirits,  in  the  first  place 
thereby  becomes  an  immediate  source  of  happiness  to  those 
around,  and  in  the  second  place  maintains  the  ability  to  in- 
crease their  happiness  by  altruistic  actions.  But  one  whose 
bodily  vigour  and  mental  health  are  undermined  by  self- 
sacrifice  carried  too  far,  in  the  first  place  becomes  to  those 
around  a  cause  of  depression,  and  in  the  second  place  ren- 
ders himself  incapable,  or  less  capable,  of  actively  furthering 
their  welfare. 

In  estimating  conduct  we  must  remember  that  there 
are  those  who  by  their  joyousness  beget  joy  in  others, 
and  that  there  are  those  who  by  their  melancholy  cast  a 
gloom  on  every  circle  they  enter.  And  we  must  remember 
that  by  display  of  overflowing  happiness  a  man  of  the  one 
kind  may  add  to  the  happiness  of  others  more  than  by 
positive  efforts  to  benefit  them  ;  and  that  a  man  of  the  other 
kind  may  decrease  their  happiness  more  by  his  presence 
than  he  increases  it  by  his  actions.  Full  of  vivacity,  the  one 
is  ever  welcome.  For  his  wife  he  has  smiles  and  jocose 
speeches ;  for  his  children  stores  of  fun  and  play ;  for  his 
friends  pleasant  talk  interspersed  with  the  sallies  of  wit  that 
come  from  buoyancy.  Contrariwise,  the  other  is  shunned. 


194  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

The  irritability  resulting  now  from  ailments,  now  from 
failures  caused  by  feebleness,  his  family  has  daily  to  bear. 
Lacking  adequate  energy  for  joining  in  them,  he  has  at  best 
but  a  tepid  interest  in  the  amusements  of  his  children  ;  and 
he  is  called  a  wet  blanket  by  his  friends.  Little  account  as 
our  ethical  reasonings  take  note  of  it,  yet  is  the  fact  obvious 
that  since  happiness  and  misery  are  infectious,  such  regard 
for  self  as  conduces  to  health  and  high  spirits  is  a  benefac- 
tion to  others,  and  such  disregard  of  self  as  brings  on  suffer- 
ing, bodily  or  mental,  is  a  malefaction  to  others.  The 
duty  of  making  one's  self  agreeable  by  seeming  to  be 
pleased,  is,  indeed,  often  urged ;  and  thus  to  gratify  friends 
is  applauded  so  long  as  self-sacrificing  effort  is  implied. 
But  though  display  of  real  happiness  gratifies  friends  far 
more  than  display  of  sham  happiness,  and  has  no  drawback 
in  the  shape  either  of  hypocrisy  or  strain,  yet  it  is  not 
thought  a  duty  to  fulfil  the  conditions  which  favour  the  dis- 
play of  real  happiness.  Nevertheless,  if  quantity  of  happi- 
ness produced  is  to  be  the  measure,  the  last  is  more  impera- 
tive than  the  first. 

And  then,  as  above  indicated,  beyond  this  primary  series 
of  effects  produced  on  others  there  is  a  secondary  series  of 
effects.  The  adequately  egoistic  individual  retains  those 
powers  which  make  altruistic  activities  possible.  The  indi- 
vidual who  is  inadequately  egoistic,  loses  more  or  less  of  his 
ability  to  be  altruistic.  The  truth  of  the  one  proposition  is 
self-evident ;  and  the  truth  of  the  other  is  daily  forced  on  us 
by  examples.  Note  a  few  of  them.  Here  is  a  mother 

who,  brought  up  in  the  insane  fashion  usual  among  the  cul- 
tivated, has  a  physique  not  strong  enough  for  suckling  her 
infant,  but  who,  knowing  that  its  natural  food  is  the  best, 
and  anxious  for  its  welfare,  continues  to  give  it  milk  for  a 
longer  time  than  her  system  will  bear.  Eventually  the  accu- 
mulating reaction  tells.  There  comes  exhaustion  running, 
it  may  be,  into  illness  caused  by  depletion ;  occasionally  end- 
ing in  death,  and  often  entailing  chronic  weakness.  She 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  195 

becomes,  perhaps  for  a  time,  perhaps  permanently,  incapable 
of  carrying  on  household  affairs ;  her  other  children  suffer 
from  the  loss  of  maternal  attention ;  and  where  the  income 
is  small,  payments  for  nurse  and  doctor  tell  injuriously  on 
the  whole  family.  Instance,  again,  what  not  unfre- 

quently  happens  with  the  father.  Similarly  prompted  by 
a  high  sense  of  obligation,  and  misled  by  current  moral 
theories  into  the  notion  that  self-denial  may  rightly  be 
carried  to  any  extent,  he  daily  continues  his  office-work  for 
long  hours  regardless  of  hot  head  and  cold  feet ;  and  debars 
himself  of  social  pleasures,  for  which  he  thinks  he  can 
afford  neither  time  nor  money.  What  comes  of  this  entirely 
unegoistic  course  ?  Eventually  a  sudden  collapse,  sleepless- 
ness, inability  to  work.  That  rest  which  he  would  not  give 
himself  when  his  sensations  prompted,  he  has  now  to  take 
in  long  measure.  The  extra  earnings  laid  by  for  the  benefit 
of  his  family,  are  quickly  swept  away  by  costly  journeys  in 
aid  of  recovery,  and  by  the  many  expenses  which  ill- 
ness entails.  Instead  of  increased  ability  to  do  his  duty  by 
his  offspring,  there  comes  now  inability.  Life-long  evils 
on  them  replace  hoped-for  goods.  And  so  is  it,  too, 

with  the  social  effects  of  inadequate  egoism.  All  grades 
furnish  examples  of  the  mischiefs,  positive  and  negative, 
inflicted  on  society  by  excessive  neglect  of  self.  Now  the 
case  is  that  of  a  labourer  who,  conscientiously  continuing 
his  work  under  a  broiling  sun,  spite  of  violent  protest  from 
his  feelings,  dies  of  sunstroke ;  and  leaves  his  family  a  burden 
to  the  parish.  Now  the  case  is  that  of  a  clerk  whose  eyes 
permanently  fail  from  over-straining,  or  who,  daily  writing 
for  hours  after  his  fingers  are  painfully  cramped,  is  attacked 
with  "  scrivener's  palsy,"  and,  unable  to  write  at  all,  sinks 
with  aged  parents  into  poverty  which  friends  are  called  on 
to  mitigate.  And  now  the  case  is  that  of  a  man  devoted 
to  public  ends  who,  shattering  his  health  by  ceaseless  appli- 
cation, fails  to  achieve  all  he  might  have  achieved  by  a  more 


196  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

reasonable  apportionment  of   his  time  between  labour  on 
behalf  of  others  and  ministration  to  his  own  needs. 

§  73.  In  one  further  way  is  the  undue  subordination  of 
egoism  to  altruism  injurious.  Both  directly  and  indirectly 
unselfishness  pushed  to  excess  generates  selfishness. 

Consider  first  the  immediate  effects.  That  one  man  may 
yield  up  to  another  a  gratification,  it  is  needful  that  the 
other  shall  accept  it ;  and  where  the  gratification  is  of  a 
kind  to  which  their  respective  claims  are  equal,  or  which  is 
no  more  required  by  the  one  than  by  the  other,  acceptance 
implies  a  readiness  to  get  gratification  at  another's  cost. 
The  circumstances  and  needs  of  the  two  being  alike,  the 
transaction  involves  as  much  culture  of  egoism  in  the 
last  as  it  involves  culture  of  altruism  in  the  first.  It  is  true 
that  not  unfrequently,  difference  between  their  means  or 
difference  between  their  appetites  for  a  pleasure  which  the 
one  has  had  often  and  the  other  rarely,  divests  the  accept- 
ance of  this  character;  and  it  is  true  that  in  other  cases 
the  benefactor  manifestly  takes  so  much  pleasure  in  giving 
pleasure,  that  the  sacrifice  is  partial,  and  the  reception  of  it 
not  wholly  selfish.  But  to  see  the  effect  above  indicated  we 
must  exclude  such  inequalities,  and  consider  what  happens 
where  wants  are  approximately  alike  and  where  the  sacri- 
fices, not  reciprocated  at  intervals,  are  perpetually  on  one 
side.  So  restricting  the  inquiry  all  can  name  instances 
verifying  the  alleged  result.  Everyone  can  remember 
circles  in  which  the  daily  surrender  of  benefits  by  the  gene- 
rous to  the  greedy,  has  caused  increase  of  greediness ;  until 
there  has  been  produced  an  unscrupulous  egoism  intolerable 
to  all  around.  There  are  obvious  social  effects  of  kindred 
nature.  Most  thinking  people  now  recognize  the  demorali- 
zation caused  by  indiscriminate  charity.  They  see  how  in 
the  mendicant  there  is,  besides  destruction  of  the  normal 
relation  between  labour  expended  and  benefit  obtained,  a 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  197 

genesis  of  the  expectation  that  others  shall  minister  to  his 
needs  ;  showing  itself  sometimes  in  the  venting  of  curses  on 
those  who  refuse. 

Next  consider  the  remote  results.  When  the  egoistic 
claims  are  so  much  subordinated  to  the  altruistic  as  to  pro- 
duce physical  mischief,  the  tendency  is  towards  a  relative 
decrease  in  the  number  of  the  altruistic,  and  therefore  an 
increased  predominance  of  the  egoistic.  Pushed  to  extremes, 
sacrifice  of  self  for  the  benefit  of  others,  leads  occasionally  to 
death  before  the  ordinary  period  of  marriage ;  leads  some- 
times to  abstention  from  marriage,  as  in  sisters  of  charity  ; 
leads  sometimes  to  an  ill-health  or  a  loss  of  attractiveness 
which  prevents  marriage  ;  leads  sometimes  to  non-acquire- 
ment of  the  pecuniary  means  needed  for  marriage  ;  and  in 
all  these  cases,  therefore,  the  unusually  altruistic  leave  no  de- 
scendants. Where  the  postponement  of  personal  welfare  to 
the  welfare  of  others  has  not  been  carried  so  far  as  to  pre- 
vent marriage,  it  yet  not  unfrequently  occurs  that  the  phys- 
ical degradation  resulting  from  years  of  self-neglect  causes 
infertility ;  so  that  again  the  most  altruistically-natured  leave 
no  like-natured  posterity.  And  then  in  less  marked  and 
more  numerous  cases,  the  resulting  enfeeblement  shows  itself 
by  the  production  of  relatively  weak  offspring ;  of  whom 
some  die  early,  while  the  rest  are  less  likely  than  usual  to 
transmit  the  parental  type  to  future  generations.  Inevitably, 
then,  by  this  dying  out  of  the  especially  unegoistic,  there  is 
prevented  that  desirable  mitigation  of  egoism  in  the  average 
nature  which  would  else  have  taken  place.  Such  disregard 
of  self  as  brings  down  bodily  vigour  below  the  normal  level, 
eventually  produces  in  the  society  a  counterbalancing  excess 
of  regard  for  self. 

§  74.  That  egoism  precedes  altruism  in  order  of  imperative- 
ness, is  thus  clearly  shown.  The  acts  which  make  continued 
life  possible,  must,  on  the  average,  be  more  peremptory  than 
all  those  other  acts  which  life  makes  possible ;  including  the 


198  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

acts  which  benefit  others.  Turning  from  life  as  existing  to 
life  as  evolving,  we  are  equally  shown  this.  Sentient  beings 
have  progressed  from  low  to  high  types,  under  the  law  that 
the  superior  shall  profit  by  their  superiority  and  the  inferior 
shall  suffer  from  their  inferiority.  Conformity  to  this  law 
has  been,  and  is  still,  needful,  not  only  for  the  continuance  of 
life  but  for  the  increase  of  happiness  ;  since  the  superior  are 
those  having  faculties  better  adjusted  to  the  requirements — 
faculties,  therefore,  which  bring  in  their  exercise  greater 
pleasure  and  less  pain. 

More  special  considerations  join  these  more  general  ones 
in  showing  us  this  truth.  Such  egoism  as  preserves  a  viva- 
cious mind  in  a  vigorous  body  furthers  the  happiness  of  de- 
scendants, whose  inherited  constitutions  make  the  labours  of 
life  easy  and  its  pleasures  keen  ;  while,  conversely,  unhappi- 
ness  is  entailed  on  posterity  by  those  who  bequeath  them 
constitutions  injured  by  self-neglect.  Again,  the  individual 
whose  well-conserved  life  shows  itself  in  overflowing  spirits, 
becomes,  by  his  mere  existence,  a  source  of  pleasure  to  all 
around  ;  while  the  depression  which  commonly  accompanies 
ill-health  diffuses  itself  through  family  and  among  friends. 
A  further  contrast  is  that  whereas  one  who  has  been  duly  re- 
gardful of  self  retains  the  power  of  being  helpful  to  others, 
there  results  from  self-abnegation  in  excess,  not  only  an  ina- 
bility to  help  others  but  the  infliction  of  positive  burdens  on 
them.  Lastly,  we  come  upon  the  truth  that  undue  altruism 
increases  egoism  ;  both  directly  in  contemporaries  and  indi- 
rectly in  posterity. 

And  now  observe  that  though  the  general  conclusion  en- 
forced by  these  special  conclusions,  is  at  variance  with  nomi- 
nally-accepted beliefs,  it  is  not  at  variance  with  actually-ac- 
cepted beliefs.  While  opposed  to  the  doctrine  which  men 
are  taught  should  be  acted  upon,  it  is  in  harmony  with  the 
doctrine  which  they  do  act  upon  and  dimly  see  must  be  acted 
upon.  For  omitting  such  abnormalities  of  conduct  as  are 
instanced  above,  everyone,  alike  by  deed  and  word,  implies 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  199 

that  in  the  business  of  life  personal  welfare  is  the  primary 
consideration.  The  labourer  looking  for  wages  in  return  for 
work  done,  no  less  than  the  merchant  who  sells  goods  at  a 
profit,  the  doctor  who  expects  fees  for  advice,  the  priest  who 
calls  the  scene  of  his  ministrations  "  a  living,"  assumes  as 
beyond  question  the  truth  that  selfishness,  carried  to  the  ex- 
tent of  enforcing  his  claims  and  enjoying  the  returns  his 
efforts  bring,  is  not  only  legitimate  but  essential.  Even  per- 
sons who  avow  a  contrary  conviction  prove  by  their  acts 
that  it  is  inoperative.  Those  who  repeat  with  emphasis  the 
maxim — "  Love  your  neighbour  as  yourself,"  do  not  render 
up  what  they  possess  so  as  to  satisfy  the  desires  of  all  as 
much  as  they  satisfy  their  own  desires.  Nor  do  those 
whose  extreme  maxim  is — "  Live  for  others,"  differ  appre- 
ciably from  people  around  in  their  regards  for  personal  wel- 
fare, or  fail  to  appropriate  their  shares  of  life's  pleasures. 
In  short,  that  which  is  above  set  forth  as  the  belief  to 
which  scientific  ethics  leads  us,  is  that  which  men  do  really 
believe,  as  distinguished  from  that  which  they  believe  they 
believe. 

Finally  it  may  be  remarked  that  a  rational  egoism,  so  far 
from  implying  a  more  egoistic  human  nature,  is  consistent 
with  a  human  nature  that  is  less  egoistic.  For  excesses  in 
one  direction  do  not  prevent  excesses  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion ;  but  rather,  extreme  deviations  from  the  mean  on  one 
side  lead  to  extreme  deviations  on  the  other  side.  A  society 
in  which  the  most  exalted  principles  of  self-sacrifice  for  the 
benefit  of  neighbours  are  enunciated,  may  be  a  society  in 
which  unscrupulous  sacrifice  of  alien  fellow-creatures  is  not 
only  tolerated  but  applauded.  Along  with  professed  anxiety 
to  spread  these  exalted  principles  among  heathens,  there  may 
go  the  deliberate  fastening  of  a  quarrel  upon  them  with  a 
view  to  annexing  their  territory.  Men  who  every  Sunday 
have  listened  approvingly  to  injunctions  carrying  the  regard 
for  other  men  to  an  impracticable  extent,  may  yet  hire  them- 
selves out  to  slay,  at  the  word  of  command,  any  people  in 


200  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

any  part  of  the  world,  utterly  indifferent  to  the  right  or 
wrong  of  the  matter  fought  about.  And  as  in  these  cases 
transcendent  altruism  in  theory  co-exists  with  brutal  egoism 
in  practice,  so,  conversely,  a  more  qualified  altruism  may 
have  for  its  concomitant  a  greatly  moderated  egoism.  For 
asserting  the  due  claims  of  self,  is,  by  implication,  drawing 
a  limit  beyond  which  the  claims  are  undue;  and  is,  by 
consequence,  bringing  into  greater  clearness  the  claims  of 
others. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

ALTRUISM   VERSUS  EGOISM. 

§  75.  If  we  define  altruism  as  being  all  action  which, 
in  the  normal  course  of  things,  benefits  others  instead  of 
benefiting  self,  then,  from  the  dawn  of  life,  altruism  has 
been  no  less  essential  than  egoism.  Though  primarily  it  is 
dependent  on  egoism,  yet  secondarily  egoism  is  dependent 
on  it. 

Under  altruism  in  this  comprehensive  sense,  I  take  in 
the  acts  by  which  offspring  are  preserved  and  the  species 
maintained.  Moreover,  among  these  acts  must  be  included 
not  such  only  as  are  accompanied  by  consciousness,  but  also 
such  as  conduce  to  the  welfare  of  offspring  without  mental 
representation  of  the  welfare — acts  of  automatic  altruism  as 
we  may  call  them.  Nor  must  there  be  left  out  those  lowest 
altruistic  acts  which  subserve  race-maintenance  without  im- 
plying even  automatic  nervous  processes — acts  not  in  the 
remotest  sense  psychical,  but  in  a  literal  sense  physical. 
Whatever  action,  unconscious  or  conscious,  involves  expendi- 
ture of  individual  life  to  the  end  of  increasing  life  in  other 
individuals,  is  unquestionably  altruistic  in  a  sense,  if  not  in 
the  usual  sense ;  and  it  is  here  needful  to  understand  it  in 
this  sense  that  we  may  see  how  conscious  altruism  grows 
out  of  unconscious  altruism. 

The  simplest  beings  habitually  multiply  by  spontaneous 

201 


202  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

fission.  Physical  altruism  of  the  lowest  kind,  differentiating 
from  physical  egoism,  may  in  this  case  be  considered  as  not 
yet  independent  of  it.  For  since  the  two  halves  which 
before  fission  constituted  the  individual,  do  not  on  dividing 
disappear,  we  must  say  that  though  the  individuality  of  the 
parent  infusorium  or  other  protozoon  is  lost  in  ceasing  to  be 
single,  yet  the  old  individual  continues  to  exist  in  each  of 
the  new  individuals.  When,  however,  as  happens  generally 
with  these  smallest  animals,  an  interval  of  quiescence  ends  in 
the  breaking  up  of  the  whole  body  into  minute  parts,  eacli 
of  which  is  the  germ  of  a  young  one,  we  see  the  parent 
entirely  sacrificed  in  forming  progeny. 

Here  might  be  described  how  among  creatures  of  higher 
grades,  by  fission  or  gemmation,  parents  bequeath  parts  of 
their  bodies,  more  or  less  organized,  to  form  offspring  at  the 
cost  of  their  own  individualities.  Numerous  examples  might 
also  be  given  of  the  ways  in  which  the  development  of  ova 
is  carried  to  the  extent  of  making  the  parental  body  little 
more  than  a  receptacle  for  them :  the  implication  being  that 
•the  accumulations  of  nutriment  which  parental  activities 
have  laid  up,  are  disposed  of  for  the  benefit  of  posterity. 
And  then  might  be  dwelt  on  the  multitudinous  cases  where, 
as  generally  throughout  the  insect-world,  maturity  having 
been  reached  and  a  new  generation  provided  for,  life  ends : 
death  follows  the  sacrifices  made  for  progeny. 

But  leaving  these  lower  types  in  which  the  altruism  is 
physical  only,  or  in  which  it  is  physical  and  automatically- 
psychical  only,  let  us  ascend  to  those  in  which  it  is  also,  to 
a  considerable  degree,  conscious.  Though  in  birds  and 
mammals  such  parental  activities  as  are  guided  by  instinct, 
are  accompanied  by  either  no  representations  or  but  vague 
representations  of  the  benefits  which  the  young  receive ; 
yet  there  are  also  in  them  actions  which  we  may  class  as 
altruistic  in  the  higher  sense.  The  agitation  which  creatures 
of  these  classes  show  when  their  young  are  in  danger,  joined 
often  with  efforts  on  their  behalf,  as  well  as  the  grief  dis- 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  203 

played  after  loss  of  their  young,  make  it  manifest  that  in 
them  parental  altruism  has  a  concomitant  of  emotion. 

Those  who  understand  by  altruism  only  the  conscious 
sacrifice  of  self  to  others  among  human  beings,  will  think  it 
strange,  or  even  absurd,  to  extend  its  meaning  so  widely. 
But  the  justification  for  doing  this  is  greater  than  has  thus 
far  appeared.  I  do  not  mean  merely  that  in  the  course  of 
evolution,  there  has  been  a  progress  through  infinitesimal 
gradations  from  purely  physical  and  unconscious  sacrifices  of 
the  individual  for  the  welfare  of  the  species,  up  to  sacrifices 
consciously  made.  I  mean  that  from  first  to  last  the  sacri- 
fices are,  when  reduced  to  their  lowest  terms,  of  the  same 
essential  nature :  to  the  last,  as  at  first,  there  is  involved  a 
loss  of  bodily  substance.  When  a  part  of  the  parental  body 
is  detached  in  the  shape  of  gemmule,  or  egg,  or  foetus,  the 
material  sacrifice  is  conspicuous ;  and  when  the  mother 
yields  milk  by  absorbing  which  the  young  one  grows,  it 
cannot  be  questioned  that  there  is  also  a  material  sacrifice. 
But  though  a  material  sacrifice  is  not  manifest  when  the 
young  are  benefited  by  activities  on  their  behalf  ;  yet,  as  no 
effort  can  be  made  without  an  equivalent  waste  of  tissue, 
and  as  the  bodily  loss  is  proportionate  to  the  expenditure 
that  takes  place  without  reimbursement  in  food  consumed,  it 
follows  that  efforts  made  in  fostering  offspring  do  really 
represent  a  part  of  the  parental  substance ;  which  is  now 
given  indirectly  instead  of  directly. 

Self-sacrifice,  then,  is  no  less  primordial  than  self-preser- 
vation. Being  in  its  simple  physical  form  absolutely  neces- 
sary for  the  continuance  of  life  from  the  beginning ;  and 
being  extended  under  its  automatic  form,  as  indispensable 
to  maintenance  of  race  in  types  considerably  advanced  ;  and 
being  developed  to  its  semi-conscious  and  conscious  forms, 
along  with  the  continued  and  complicated  attendance  by 
which  the  offspring  of  superior  creatures  are  brought  to 
maturity ;  altruism  has  been  evolving  simultaneously  with 
egoism.  As  was  pointed  out  in  an  early  chapter,  the  same 


204  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

superiorities  which  have  enabled  the  individual  to  preserve 
itself  better,  have  enabled  it  better  to  preserve  the  individ- 
uals derived  from  it ;  and  each  higher  species,  using  its  im- 
proved faculties  primarily  for  egoistic  benefit,  has  spread 
in  proportion  as  it  has  used  them  secondarily  for  altruistic 
benefit. 

The  imperativeness  of  altruism  as  thus  understood,  is, 
indeed,  no  less  than  the  imperativeness  of  egoism  was  shown 
to  be  in  the  last  chapter.  For  while,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
falling  short  of  normal  egoistic  acts  entails  enfeeblement  or 
loss  of  life,  and  therefore  loss  of  ability  to  perform  altruistic 
acts ;  on  the  other  hand,  such  defect  of  altruistic  acts  as 
causes  death  of  offspring  or  inadequate  development  of  them, 
involves  disappearance  from  future  generations  of  the  nature 
that  is  not  altruistic  enough — so  decreasing  the  average  ego- 
ism. In  short,  every  species  is  continually  purifying  itself 
from  the  unduly  egoistic  individuals,  while  there  are  being 
lost  to  it  the  unduly  altruistic  individuals. 

§  76.  As  there  has  been  an  advance  by  degrees  from  un- 
conscious parental  altruism  to  conscious  parental  altruism  of 
the  highest  kind,  so  has  there  been  an  advance  by  degrees 
from  the  altruism  of  the  family  to  social  altruism. 

A  fact  to  be  first  noted  is  that  only  where  altruistic  rela- 
tions in  the  domestic  group  have  reached  highly-developed 
forms,  do  there  arise  conditions  making  possible  full  deve- 
lopment of  altruistic  relations  in  the  political  group.  Tribes 
in  which  promiscuity  prevails  or  in  which  the  marital  rela- 
tions are  transitory,  and  tribes  in  which  polyandry  entails 
in  another  way  indefinite  relationships,  are  incapable  of 
much  organization.  Nor  do  peoples  who  are  habitually 
polygamous,  show  themselves  able  to  take  on  those  high 
forms  of  social  co-operation  which  demand  due  subordina- 
tion of  self  to  others.  Only  where  monogamic  marriage 
has  become  general  and  eventually  universal — only  where 
there  have  consequently  been  established  the  closest  ties 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  205 

of  blood — only  where  family  altruism  has  been  most  fos- 
tered, has  social  altruism  become  conspicuous.  It  needs 
but  to  recall  the  compound  forms  of  the  Aryan  family  as 
described  by  Sir  Henry  Maine  and  others,  to  see  that  family 
feeling,  first  extending  itself  to  the  gens  and  the  tribe, 
and  afterwards  to  the  society  formed  of  related  tribes,  pre- 
pared the  way  for  fellow  feeling  among  citizens  not  of  the 
same  stock. 

Recognizing  this  natural  transition,  we  are  here  chiefly 
concerned  to  observe  that  throughout  the  latter  stages  of 
the  progress,  as  throughout  the  former,  increase  of  egoistic 
satisfactions  has  depended  on  growth  of  regard  for  the 
satisfactions  of  others.  On  contemplating  a  line  of  succes- 
sive parents  and  offspring,  we  see  that  each,  enabled  while 
young  to  live  by  the  sacrifices  predecessors  make  for  it,  itself 
makes,  when  adult,  equivalent  sacrifices  for  successors ;  and 
that  in  default  of  this  general  balancing  of  benefits  received 
by  benefits  given,  the  line  dies  out.  Similarly,  it  is  manifest 
that  in  a  society  each  generation  of  members,  indebted  for 
such  benefits  as  social  organization  yields  them  to  pre- 
ceding generations,  who  have  by  their  sacrifices  elaborated 
this  organization,  are  called  on  to  make  for  succeeding 
generations  such  kindred  sacrifices  as  shall  at  least  main- 
tain this  organization,  if  they  do  not  improve  it :  the  alter- 
native being  decay  and  eventual  dissolution  of  the  society, 
implying  gradual  decrease  in  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  its 
members. 

And  now  we  are  prepared  to  consider  the  several  ways  in 
which,  under  social  conditions,  personal  welfare  depends  on 
due  regard  for  the  welfare  of  others.  Already  the  conclu- 
sions to  be  drawn  have  been  foreshadowed.  As  in  the 
chapter  on  the  biological  view  were  implied  the  inferences 
definitely  set  forth  in  the  last  chapter  ;  so  in  the  chapter  on 
the  sociological  view  were  implied  the  inferences  to  be  defi- 
nitely set  forth  here.  Sundry  of  these  are  trite  enough ;  but 


206  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

they  must  nevertheless  be  specified,  since  the  statement  would 
be  incomplete  without  them. 

§  77.  First  to  be  dealt  with  comes  that  negative  altruism 
implied  by  such  curbing  of  the  egoistic  impulses  as  prevents 
direct  aggression. 

As  before  shown,  if  men  instead  of  living  separately  are 
to  unite  for  defence  or  for  other  purposes,  they  must  seve- 
rally reap  more  good  than  evil  from  the  union.  On  the 
average,  each  must  lose  less  from  the  antagonisms  of  those 
with  whom  he  is  associated,  than  he  gains  by  the  associa- 
tion. At  the  outset,  therefore,  that  increase  of  egoistic  satis- 
factions which  the  social  state  brings,  can  be  purchased  only 
by  altruism  sufficient  to  cause  some  recognition  of  others' 
claims:  if  not  a  voluntary  recognition,  still,  a  compulsory 
recognition. 

While  the  recognition  is  but  of  that  lowest  kind  due  to 
dread  of  retaliation,  or  of  prescribed  punishment,  the 
egoistic  gain  from  association  is  small;  and  it  becomes 
considerable  only  as  the  recognition  becomes  voluntary — 
that  is,  more  altruistic.  Where,  as  among  some  of  the 
wild  Australians,  there  exists  no  limit  to  the  right  of  the 
strongest,  and  the  men  fight  to  get  possession  of  women 
while  the  wives  of  one  man  fight  among  themselves  about 
him,  the  pursuit  of  egoistic  satisfactions  is  greatly  impeded. 
Besides  the  bodily  pain  occasionally  given  to  each  by  conflict, 
and  the  more  or  less  of  subsequent  inability  to  achieve 
personal  ends,  there  is  the  waste  of  energy  entailed  in 
maintaining  readiness  for  self-defence,  and  there  is  the 
accompanying  occupation  of  consciousness  by  emotions  that 
are  on  the  average  of  cases  disagreeable.  Moreover,  the 
primary  end  of  safety  in  presence  of  external  foes  is  ill- 
attained  in  proportion  as  there  are  internal  animosities; 
such  furtherance  of  satisfactions  as  industrial  co-operation 
brings  cannot  be  had ;  and  there  is  little  motive  to  labour 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  207 

for  extra  benefits  when  the  products  of  labour  are  insecure. 
And  from  this  early  stage  to  comparatively  late  stages,  we 
may  trace  in  the  wearing  of  arms,  in  the  carrying  on  of 
family  feuds,  and  in  the  taking  of  daily  precautions  for  safety, 
the  ways  in  which  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  each  are  dimin- 
ished by  deficiency  of  that  altruism  which  checks  overt  injury 
of  others. 

The  private  interests  of  the  individual  are  on  the  average 
better  subserved,  not  only  in  proportion  as  he  himself 
refrains  from  direct  aggression,  but  also,  on  the  average,  in 
proportion  as  he  suceeds  in  diminishing  the  aggression  of 
his  fellows  on  one  another.  The  prevalence  of  antagonisms 
among  those  around,  impedes  the  activities  carried  on  by 
each  in  pursuit  of  satisfactions ;  and  by  causing  disorder 
makes  the  beneficial  results  of  activities  more  doubtful. 
Hence,  each  profits  egoistically  from  the  growth  of  an 
altruism  which  leads  each  to  aid  in  preventing  or  diminish- 
ing others'  violence. 

The  like  holds  when  we  pass  to  that  altruism  which  re- 
strains the  undue  egoism  displayed  in  breaches  of  contract. 
General  acceptance  of  the  maxim  that  honesty  is  the  best 
policy,  implies  general  experience  that  gratification  of  the 
self-regarding  feelings  is  eventually  furthered  by  such  check- 
ing of  them  as  maintains  equitable  dealings.  And  here, 
as  before,  each  is  personally  interested  in  securing  good 
treatment  of  his  fellows  by  one  another.  For  in  countless 
ways  evils  are  entailed  on  each  by  the  prevalence  of  fraudu- 
lent transactions.  As  everyone  knows,  the  larger  the  num- 
ber of  a  shopkeeper's  bills  left  unpaid  by  some  customers, 
the  higher  must  be  the  prices  which  other  customers  pay. 
The  more  manufacturers  lose  by  defective  raw  materials  or 
by  carelessness  of  workmen,  the  more  must  they  charge 
for  their  fabrics  to  buyers.  The  less  trustworthy  people 
are,  the  higher  rises  the  rate  of  interest,  the  larger  becomes 
the  amount  of  capital  hoarded,  the  greater  are  the  impedi- 
ments to  industry.  The  further  traders  and  people  in 
15 


208  THE  DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

general  go  beyond  their  means,  and  hypothecate  the  prop- 
erty of  others  in  speculation,  the  more  serious  are  those 
commercial  panics  which  bring  disasters  on  multitudes  and 
injuriously  affect  all. 

This  introduces  us  to  yet  a  third  way  in  which  such  per- 
sonal welfare  as  results  from  the  proportioning  of  benefits 
gained  to  labours  given,  depends  on  the  making  of  certain 
sacrifices  for  social  welfare.  The  man  who,  expending  his 
energies  wholly  on  private  affairs  refuses  to  take  trouble 
about  public  affairs,  pluming  himself  on  his  wisdom  in  mind- 
ing his  own  business,  is  blind  to  the  fact  that  his  own  busi- 
ness is  made  possible  only  by  maintenance  of  a  healthy  social 
state,  and  that  he  loses  all  round  by  defective  governmental 
arrangements.  Where  there  are  many  like-minded  with  him- 
self— where,  as  a  consequence,  offices  come  to  be  filled  by 
political  adventurers  and  opinion  is  swayed  by  demagogues 
— where  bribery  vitiates  the  administration  of  the  law  and 
makes  fradulent  State-transactions  habitual ;  heavy  penalties 
fall  on  the  community  at  large,  and,  among  others,  on  those 
who  have  thus  done  everything  for  self  and  nothing  for 
society.  Their  investments  are  insecure ;  recovery  of  their 
debts  is  difficult ;  and  even  their  lives  are  less  safe  than  they 
would  otherwise  have  been. 

So  that  on  such  altruistic  actions  as  are  implied,  firstly  in 
being  just,  secondly  in  seeing  justice  done  between  others, 
and  thirdly  in  upholding  and  improving  the  agencies  by 
which  justice  is  administered,  depend,  in  large  measure,  the 
egoistic  satisfactions  of  each. 

§  78.  But  the  identification  of  personal  advantage  with  the 
advantage  of  fellow-citizens  is  much  wider  than  this.  In 
various  other  ways  the  well-being  of  each  rises  and  falls  with 
the  well-being  of  all. 

A  weak  man  left  to  provide  for  his  own  wants,  suffers  by 
getting  smaller  amounts  of  food  and  other  necessaries  than 
he  might  get  were  he  stronger.  In  a  community  formed  of 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  209 

weak  men,  who  divide  their  labours  and  exchange  the  pro- 
ducts, all  suffer  evils  from  the  weakness  of  their  fellows. 
The  quantity  of  each  kind  of  product  is  made  deficient  by 
the  deficiency  of  labouring  power  ;  and  the  share  each  gets 
for  such  share  of  his  own  product  as  he  can  afford  to  give, 
is  relatively  small.  Just  as  the  maintenance  of  paupers,  hos- 
pital patients,  inmates  of  asylums,  and  others  who  consume 
but  do  not  produce,  leaves  to  be  divided  among  producers 
a  smaller  stock  of  commodities  than  would  exist  were  there 
no  incapables ;  so  must  there  be  left  a  smaller  stock  of  com- 
modities to  be  divided,  the  greater  the  number  of  inefiicient 
producers,  or  the  greater  the  average  deficiency  of  produ- 
cing power.  Hence,  whatever  decreases  the  strength  of  men 
in  general  restricts  the  gratifications  of  each  by  making  the 
means  to  them  dearer. 

More  directly,  and  more  obviously,  does  the  bodily  well- 
being  of  his  fellows  concern  him  ;  for  their  bodily  ill-being, 
when  it  takes  certain  shapes,  is  apt  to  bring  similar  bodily 
ill-being  on  him.  If  he  is  not  himself  attacked  by  cholera, 
or  small-pox,  or  typhus,  when  it  invades  his  neighbourhood, 
he  often  suffers  a  penalty  through  his  belongings.  Under 
conditions  spreading  it,  his  wife  catches  diphtheria,  or  his 
servant  is  laid  up  with  scarlet  fever,  or  his  children  take  now 
this  and  now  that  infectious  disorder.  Add  together  the  im- 
mediate and  remote  evils  brought  on  him  year  after  year  by 
epidemics,  and  it  becomes  manifest  that  his  egoistic  satisfac- 
tions are  greatly  furthered  by  such  altruistic  activities  as  ren- 
der disease  less  prevalent. 

With  the  mental,  as  well  as  with  the  bodily,  states  of  fel- 
low-citizens, his  enjoyments  are  in  multitudinous  ways  bound 
up.  Stupidity  like  weakness  raises  the  cost  of  commodities. 
"Where  farming  is  unimproved,  the  prices  of  food  are  higher 
than  they  would  else  be  ;  where  antiquated  routine  maintains 
itself  in  trade,  the  needless  expense  of  distribution  weighs  on 
all ;  where  there  is  no  inventiveness,  everyone  loses  the  bene- 
fits which  improved  appliances  diffuse.  Other  than  economic 


210  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

evils  come  from  the  average  unintelligence — periodically 
through  the  manias  and  panics  that  arise  because  traders  rush 
in  herds  all  to  buy  or  all  to  sell ;  and  habitually  through  the 
mal-administration  of  justice,  which  people  and  rulers  alike 
disregard  while  pursuing  this  or  that  legislative  will-o'-the- 
wisp.  Closer  and  clearer  is  the  dependence  of  his  personal 
satisfactions  on  others'  mental  states,  which  each  experiences 
in  his  household.  Unpunctuality  and  want  of  system  are 
perpetual  sources  of  annoyance.  The  unskilfulness  of  the 
cook  causes  frequent  vexation  and  occasional  indigestion. 
Lack  of  forethought  in  the  housemaid  leads  to  a  fall  over  a 
bucket  in  a  dark  passage.  And  inattention  to  a  message  or 
forgetfulness  in  delivering  it,  entails  failure  in  an  important 
engagement.  Each,  therefore,  benefits  egoistically  by  such 
altruism  as  aids  in  raising  the  average  intelligence.  I  do  not 
mean  such  altruism  as  taxes  ratepayers  that  children's  minds 
may  be  filled  with  dates,  and  names,  and  gossip  about  kings, 
and  narratives  of  battles,  and  other  useless  information,  no 
amount  of  which  will  make  them  capable  workers  or  good 
citizens  ;  but  I  mean  such  altruism  as  helps  to  spread  a 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things  and  to  cultivate  the  power 
of  applying  that  knowledge. 

Yet  again,  each  has  a  private  interest  in  public  morals  and 
profits  by  improving  them.  Not  in  large  ways  only,  by 
aggressions  and  breaches  of  contract,  by  adulterations  and 
short  measures,  does  each  suffer  from  the  general  unconsci- 
entiousness ;  but  in  more  numerous  small  ways.  Now  it  is 
through  the  untruthfulness  of  one  who  gives  a  good  character 
to  a  bad  servant ;  now  it  is  by  the  recklessness  of  a  laundress 
who,  using  bleaching  agents  to  save  trouble  in  washing,  de- 
stroys his  linen  ;  now  it  is  by  the  acted  falsehood  of  railway 
passengers  who,  by  dispersed  coats,  make  him  believe  that 
•all  the  seats  in  a  compartment  are  taken  when  they  are 
not.  Yesterday  the  illness  of  his  child  due  to  foul  gases^ 
led  to  the  discovery  of  a  drain  that  had  become  choked 
because  it  was  ill-made  by  a  dishonest  builder  under  super- 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  211 

vision  of  a  careless  or  bribed  surveyor.  To-day  work- 
men employed  to  rectify  it  bring  on  him  cost  and  incon- 
venience by  dawdling;  and  their  low  standard  of  work, 
determined  by  the  unionist  principle  that  the  better 
workers  must  not  discredit  the  worse  by  exceeding 
them  in  efficiency,  he  may  trace  to  the  immoral  belief 
that  the  unworthy  should  fare  as  well  as  the  worthy. 
To-morrow  it  turns  out  that  business  for  the  plumber 
has  been  provided  by  damage  which  the  bricklayers  have 
done. 

Thus  the  improvement  of  others,  physically,  intellectually, 
and  morally,  personally  concerns  each  ;  since  their  imperfec- 
tions tell  in  raising  the  cost  of  all  the  commodities  he  buys, 
in  increasing  the  taxes  and  rates  he  pays,  and  in  the  losses  of 
time,  trouble,  and  money,  daily  brought  on  him  by  others' 
carelessness,  stupidity,  or  unconscientiousness. 

§  79.  Yery  obvious  are  certain  more  immediate  connexions 
between  personal  welfare  and  ministration  to  the  welfare  of 
those  around.  The  evils  suffered  by  those  whose  behaviour 
is  unsympathetic,  and  the  benefits  to  self  which  unselfish  con- 
duct brings,  show  these. 

That  anyone  should  have  formulated  his  experience  by  say- 
ing that  the  conditions  to  success  are  a  hard  heart  and  a  sound 
digestion,  is  marvellous  considering  the  many  proofs  that 
success,  even  of  a  material  kind,  greatly  depending  as  it  does 
on  the  good  offices  of  others,  is  furthered  by  whatever  creates 
goodwill  in  others.  The  contrast  between  the  prosperity  of 
those  who  to  but  moderate  abilities  join  natures  which  beget 
friendships  by  their  kindliness,  and  the  adversity  of  those 
who,  though  possessed  of  superior  faculties  and  greater 
acquirements,  arouse  dislikes  by  their  hardness  or  indiffer- 
ence, should  force  upon  all  the  truth  that  egoistic  enjoyments 
are  aided  by  altruistic  actions. 

This  increase  of  personal  benefit  achieved  by  benefiting 
others,  is  but  partially  achieved  where  a  selfish  motive 


212  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

prompts  the  seemingly-unselfish  act :  it  is  fully  achieved  only 
where  the  act  is  really  unselfish.  Though  services  rendered 
with  the  view  of  some  time  profiting  by  reciprocated  services, 
answer  to  a  certain  extent ;  yet,  ordinarily,  they  answer  only 
to  the  extent  of  bringing  equivalents  of  reciprocated  services. 
Those  which  bring  more  than  equivalents  are  those  not 
prompted  by  any  thoughts  of  equivalents.  For  obviously 
it  is  the  spontaneous  outflow  of  good  nature,  not  in  the 
larger  acts  of  life  only  but  in  all  its  details,  which  generates 
in  those  around  the  attachments  prompting  unstinted  benevo- 
lence. 

Besides  furthering  prosperity,  other-regarding  actions 
conduce  to  self-regarding  gratifications  by  generating  a 
genial  environment.  "With  the  sympathetic  being  everyone 
feels  more  sympathy  than  with  others.  All  conduct  them- 
selves with  more  than  usual  amiability  to  a  person  who 
hourly  discloses  a  lovable  nature.  Such  a  one  is  practically 
surrounded  by  a  world  of  better  people  than  one  who  is 
less  attractive.  If  we  contrast  the  state  of  a  man  pos- 
sessing all  the  material  means  to  happiness,  but  isolated 
by  his  absolute  egoism,  with  the  state  of  an  altruistic 
man  relatively  poor  in  means  but  rich  in  friends,  we  may 
see  that  various  gratifications  not  to  be  purchased  by  money, 
come  in  abundance  to  the  last  and  are  inaccessible  to  the 
first. 

While,  then,  there  is  one  kind  of  other-regarding  action, 
furthering  the  prosperity  of  fellow-citizens  at  large,  which 
admits  of  being  deliberately  pursued  from  motives  that  are 
remotely  self-regarding — the  conviction  being  that  personal 
well-being  depends  in  large  measure  on  the  well-being  of 
society — there  is  an  additional  kind  of  other-regarding  action 
having  in  it  no  element  of  conscious  self-regard,  which  never- 
theless conduces  greatly  to  egoistic  satisfactions. 

§  80.  Yet  other  modes  exist  in  which  egoism  unqualified 
by  altruism  habitually  fails.  It  diminishes  the  totality  of 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS    EGOISM.  213 

egoistic  pleasure  by  diminishing  in  several  directions  the  ca- 
pacity for  pleasure. 

Self-gratifications,  considered  separately  or  in  the  aggre- 
gate, lose  their  intensities  by  that  too  great  persistence  in 
them  which  results  if  they  are  made  the  exclusive  objects 
of  pursuit.  The  law  that  function  entails  waste,  and  that 
faculties  yielding  pleasure  by  their  action  cannot  act  inces- 
santly without  exhaustion  and  accompanying  satiety,  has  the 
implication  that  intervals  during  which  altruistic  activities 
absorb  the  energies,  are  intervals  during  which  the  capacity 
for  egoistic  pleasure  is  recovering  its  full  degree.  The  sen- 
sitiveness to  purely  personal  enjoyments  is  maintained  at  a 
higher  pitch  by  those  who  minister  to  the  enjoyment  of 
others,  than  it  is  by  those  who  devote  themselves  wholly  to 
personal  enjoyments. 

This  which  is  manifest  even  while  the  tide  of  life  is  high, 
becomes  still  more  manifest  as  life  ebbs.  It  is  in  maturity 
and  old  age  that  we  especially  see  how,  as  egoistic  pleasures 
grow  faint,  altruistic  actions  come  in  to  revive  them  in  new 
forms.  The  contrast  between  the  child's  delight  in  the 
novelties  daily  revealed,  and  the  indifference  which  comes 
as  the  world  around  grows  familiar,  until  in  adult  life  there 
remain  comparatively  few  things  that  are  greatly  enjoyed, 
draws  from  all  the  reflection  that  as  years  go  by  pleasures 
pall.  And  to  those  who  think,  it  becomes  clear  that  only 
through  sympathy  can  pleasures  be  indirectly  gained  from 
things  that  have  ceased  to  yield  pleasures  directly.  In  the 
gratifications  derived  by  parents  from  the  gratifications  of 
their  offspring,  this  is  conspicuously  shown.  Trite  as  is  the 
remark  that  men  live  afresh  in  their  children,  it  is  needful 
here  to  set  it  down  as  reminding  us  of  the  way  in  which,  as 
the  egoistic  satisfactions  in  life  fade,  altruism  renews  them 
while  it  transfigures  them. 

We  are  thus  introduced  to  a  more  general  consideration — 
the  egoistic  aspect  of  altruistic  pleasure.  Not,  indeed,  that 
this  is  the  place  for  discussing  the  question  whether  the 


214  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

egoistic  element  can  be  excluded  from  altruism  ;  nor  is  it 
the  place  for  distinguishing  between  the  altruism  which  is 
pursued  with  a  foresight  of  the  pleasurable  feeling  to  be 
achieved  through  it,  and  the  altruism  which,  though  it 
achieves  this  pleasurable  feeling,  does  not  make  pursuit  of 
it  a  motive.  Here  we  are  concerned  with  the  fact  that, 
whether  knowingly  or  unknowingly  gained,  the  state  of 
mind  accompanying  altruistic  action,  being  a  pleasurable 
state,  is  to  be  counted  in  the  sum  of  pleasures  which  the 
individual  can  receive  ;  and  in  this  sense  cannot  be  other 
than  egoistic.  That  we  must  so  regard  it  is  proved  on  ob- 
serving that  this  pleasure,  like  pleasures  in  general,  conduces 
to  the  physical  prosperity  of  the  ego.  As  every  other  agree- 
able emotion  raises  the  tide  of  life,  so  does  the  agreeable 
emotion  which  accompanies  a  benevolent  deed.  As  it  can- 
not be  denied  that  the  pain  caused  by  the  sight  of  suffering, 
depresses  the  vital  functions — sometimes  even  to  the  extent 
of  arresting  the  heart's  action,  as  in  one  who  faints  on  see- 
ing a  surgical  operation ;  so  neither  can  it  be  denied  that 
the  joy  felt  in  witnessing  others'  joy  exalts  the  vital  func- 
tions. Hence,  however  much  we  may  hesitate  to  class 
altruistic  pleasure  as  a  higher  kind  of  egoistic  pleasure,  we 
are  obliged  to  recognize  the  fact  that  its  immediate  effects  in 
augmenting  life  and  so  furthering  personal  well-being,  are 
like  those  of  pleasures  that  are  directly  egoistic.  And  the 
corollary  drawn  must  be  that  pure  egoism  is,  even  in  its 
immediate  results,  less  successfully  egoistic  than  is  the 
egoism  duly  qualified  by  altruism,  which,  besides  achieving 
additional  pleasures,  achieves  also,  through  raised  vitality, 
a  greater  capacity  for  pleasures  in  general. 

That  the  range  of  aesthetic  gratifications  is  wider  for  the 
altruistic  nature  than  for  the  egoistic  nature,  is  also  a  truth 
not  to  be  overlooked.  The  joys  and  sorrows  of  human 
beings  form  a  chief  element  in  the  subject-matter  of  art; 
and  evidently  the  pleasures  which  art  gives  increase  as  the 
fellow-feeling  with  these  joys  and  sorrows  strengthens.  If 


ALTKUISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  215 

we  contrast  early  poetry  occupied  mainly  with  war  and 
gratifying  the  savage  instincts  by  descriptions  of  bloody 
victories,  with  the  poetry  of  modern  times,  in  which  the 
sanguinary  forms  but  a  small  part  while  a  large  part,  deal- 
ing with  the  gentler  affections,  enlists  the  feelings  of  readers 
on  behalf  of  the  weak  ;  we  are  shown  that  with  the  develop- 
ment of  a  more  altruistic  nature,  there  has  been  opened  a 
sphere  of  enjoyment  inaccessible  to  the  callous  egoism  of 
barbarous  times.  So,  too,  between  the  fiction  of  the  past 
and  the  fiction  of  the  present,  there  is  the  difference  that 
while  the  one  was  almost  exclusively  occupied  with  the 
doings  of  the  ruling  classes,  and  found  its  plots  in  their  an- 
tagonisms and  deeds  of  violence,  the  other,  chiefly  taking 
stories  of  peaceful  life  for  its  subjects,  and  to  a  considerable 
extent  the  life  of  the  humbler  classes,  discloses  a  new  world 
of  interest  in  the  every-day  pleasures  and  pains  of  ordinary 
people.  A  like  contrast  exists  between  early  and  late  forms 
of  plastic  art.  When  not  representing  acts  of  worship,  the 
wall-sculptures  and  wall-paintings  of  the  Assyrians  and 
Egyptians,  or  the  decorations  of  temples  among  the  Greeks, 
represented  deeds  of  conquest ;  whereas  in  modern  times, 
while  the  works  which  glorify  destructive  activities  are  less 
numerous,  there  are  an  increasing  number  of  works  gratify- 
ing to  the  kindlier  sentiments  of  spectators.  To  see  that 
those  who  care  nothing  about  the  feelings  of  other  beings 
are,  by  implication,  shut  out  from  a  wide  range  of  aesthetic 
pleasures,  it  needs  but  to  ask  whether  men  who  delight  in 
dog-fights  may  be  expected  to  appreciate  Beethoven's  Ade- 
laida,  or  whether  Tennyson's  In  Memoriam  would  greatly 
move  a  gang  of  convicts. 

§  81.  From  the  dawn  of  life,  then,  egoism  has  been  de- 
pendent upon  altruism  as  altruism  has  been  dependent  upon 
egoism ;  and  in  the  course  of  evolution  the  reciprocal  serv- 
ices of  the  two  have  been  increasing. 

The  physical  and  unconscious  self-sacrifice  of  parents  to 


216  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

form  offspring,  which  the  lowest  living  things  display  from 
hour  to  hour,  shows  us  in  its  primitive  form  the  altruism 
which  makes  possible  the  egoism  of  individual  life  and 
growth.  As  we  ascend  to  higher  grades  of  creatures,  this 
parental  altruism  becomes  a  direct  yielding  up  of  only  part 
of  the  body,  joined  with  an  increasing  contribution  from  the 
remainder  in  the  shape  of  tissue  wasted  in  efforts  made  on 
behalf  of  progeny.  This  indirect  sacrifice  of  substance,  re- 
placing more  and  more  the  direct  sacrifice  as  parental  altru- 
ism becomes  higher,  continues  to  the  last  to  represent  also 
altruism  which  is  other  than  parental ;  since  this,  too,  implies 
loss  of  substance  in  making  efforts  that  do  not  bring  their 
return  in  personal  aggrandisement. 

After  noting  how  among  mankind  parental  altruism  and 
family  altruism  pass  into  social  altruism,  we  observed  that  a 
society,  like  a  species,  survives  only  on  condition  that  each 
generation  of  its  members  shall  yield  to  the  next,  benefits 
equivalent  to  those  it  has  received  from  the  last.  And  this 
implies  that  care  for  the  family  must  be  supplemented  by 
care  for  the  society. 

Fulness  of  egoistic  satisfactions  in  the  associated  state, 
depending  primarily  on  maintenance  of  the  normal  relation 
between  efforts  expended  and  benefits  obtained,  which 
underlies  all  life,  implies  an  altruism  which  both  prompts 
equitable  conduct  and  prompts  the  enforcing  of  equity.  The 
well-being  of  each  is  involved  with  the  well-being  of  all  in 
sundry  other  ways.  Whatever  conduces  to  their  vigour 
concerns  him ;  for  it  diminishes  the  cost  of  everything  he 
buys.  Whatever  conduces  to  their  freedom  from  disease 
concerns  him  ;  for  it  diminishes  his  own  liability  to  disease. 
Whatever  raises  their  intelligence  concerns  him  ;  for  incon- 
veniences are  daily  entailed  on  him  by  others'  ignorance  or 
folly.  Whatever  raises  their  moral  characters  concerns 
him  ;  for  at  every  turn  he  suffers  from  the  average  uncon- 
scientiousness. 

Much  more  directly  do  his  egoistic  satisfactions  depend 


AT.TKUISM   VEKSUS   EGOISM.  217 

on  those  altruistic  activities  which  enlist  the  sympathies  of 
others.  By  alienating  those  around,  selfishnesses  loses  the 
unbought  aid  they  can  render ;  shuts  out  a  wide  range  of 
social  enjoyments ;  and  fails  to  receive  those  exaltations  of 
pleasure  and  mitigations  of  pain,  which  come  from  men's 
fellow-feeling  with  those  they  like. 

Lastly,  undue  egoism  defeats  itself  by  bringing  on  an 
incapacity  for  happiness.  Purely  egoistic  gratifications  are 
rendered  less  keen  by  satiety,  even  in  the  earlier  part  of  life, 
and  almost  disappear  in  the  later ;  the  less  satiating  gratifica- 
tions of  altruism  are  missed  throughout  life,  and  especially 
in  that  latter  part  when  they  largely  replace  egoistic  gratifi- 
cations; and  there  is  a  lack  of  susceptibility  to  aesthetic 
pleasures  of  the  higher  orders. 

An  indication  must  be  added  of  the  truth,  scarcely  at  all 
recognized,  that  this  dependence  of  egoism  upon  altruism 
ranges  beyond  the  limits  of  each  society,  and  tends  ever 
towards  universality.  That  within  each  society  it  becomes 
greater  as  social  evolution,  implying  increase  of  mutual 
dependence,  progresses,  needs  not  be  shown ;  and  it  is  a 
corollary  that  as  fast  as  the  dependence  of  societies  on  one 
another  is  increased  by  commercial  intercourse,  the  internal 
welfare  of  each  becomes  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  others. 
That  the  impoverishment  of  any  country,  diminishing  both 
its  producing  and  consuming  powers,  tells  detrimentally  on 
the  people  of  countries  trading  with  it,  is  a  commonplace  of 
political  economy.  Moreover,  we  have  had  of  late  years, 
abundant  experience  of  the  industrial  derangements  through 
which  distress  is  brought  on  nations  not  immediately  con- 
cerned, by  wars  between  other  nations.  And  if  each  com- 
munity has  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  its  members  dimin- 
ished by  aggressions  of  neighbouring  communities  on  one 
another,  still  more  does  it  have  them  diminished  by  its  own 
aggressions.  One  who  marks  how,  in  various  parts  of  the 
world,  the  unscrupulous  greed  of  conquest  cloaked  by  pre- 
tences of  spreading  the  blessings  of  British  rule  and  British 


218  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

religion,  is  now  reacting  to  the  immense  detriment  of  the 
industrial  classes  at  home,  alike  by  increasing  expenditure 
and  paralyzing  trade,  may  see  that  these  industrial  classes, 
absorbed  in  questions  about  capital  and  labour,  and  thinking 
themselves  unconcerned  in  our  doings  abroad,  are  suffering 
from  lack  of  that  wide-reaching  altruism  which  should  in- 
sist on  just  dealings  with  other  peoples,  civilized  or  savage. 
And  he  may  also  see  that  beyond  these  immediate  evils,  they 
will  for  a  generation  to  come  suffer  the  evils  that  must  flow 
from  resuscitating  the  type  of  social  organization  which 
aggressive  activities  produce,  and  from  the  lowered  moral 
tone  which  is  its  accompaniment. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

TEIAL  AND   COMPEOMISE. 

§  82.  In  the  foregoing  two  chapters  the  case  on  behalf  of 
Egoism  and  the  case  on  behalf  of  Altruism  have  been  stated. 
The  two  conflict ;  and  we  have  now  to  consider  what  verdict 
ought  to  be  given. 

If  the  opposed  statements  are  severally  valid,  or  even 
if  each  of  them  is  valid  in  part,  the  influence  must  be  that 
pure  egoism  and  pure  altruism  are  both  illegitimate.  If  the 
maxim — "  Live  for  self,"  is  wrong,  so  also  is  the  maxim — 
"  Live  for  others."  Hence  a  compromise  is  the  only  pos- 
sibility. 

This  conclusion,  though  already  seeming  unavoidable,  I  do 
not  here  set  down  as  proved.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter 
is  to  justify  it  in  full ;  and  I  enunciate  it  at  the  outset  be- 
cause the  arguments  used  will  be  better  understood,  if  the 
conclusion  to  which  they  converge  is  in  the  reader's  view. 

How  shall  we  so  conduct  the  discussion  as  most  clearly 
to  bring  out  this  necessity  for  a  compromise?  Perhaps 
the  best  way  will  be  that  of  stating  one  of  the  two  claims 
in  its  extreme  form,  and  observing  the  implied  absurdities. 
To  deal  thus  with  the  principle  of  pure  selfishness,  would 
be  to  waste  space.  Every  one  sees  that  an  unchecked 
satisfaction  of  personal  desires  from  moment  to  moment,  in 
absolute  disregard  of  all  other  beings,  would  cause  universal 
conflict  and  social  dissolution.  The  principle  of  pure  un- 

219 


220  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

selfishness,  less  obviously  mischievous,  may  therefore  better 
be  chosen. 

There  are  two  aspects  under  which  the  doctrine  that  others' 
happiness  is  the  true  ethical  aim  presents  itself.  The 
"  others  "  may  be  conceived  personally,  as  individuals  with 
whom  we  stand  in  direct  relations ;  or  they  may  be  conceived 
impersonally,  as  constituting  the  community.  In  so  far  as 
the  self-abnegation  implied  by  pure  altruism  is  concerned,  it 
matters  not  in  which  sense  "  others  "  is  used.  But  criticism 
will  be  facilitated  by  distinguishing  between  these  two  forms 
of  it.  We  will  take  the  last  form  first. 

§  83.  This  commits  us  to  an  examination  of  "  the  greatest 
happiness  principle,"  as  enunciated  by  Bentham  and  his 
followers.  The  doctrine  that  "the  general  happiness" 
ought  to  be  the  object  of  pursuit,  is  not,  indeed,  overtly 
identified  with  pure  altruism.  But  as.  if  general  happiness 
is  the  proper  end  of  action,  the  individual  actor  must  regard 
his  own  share  of  it  simply  as  a  unit  in  the  aggregate,  no 
more  to  be  valued  by  him  than  any  other  unit,  it  results 
that  since  this  unit  is  almost  infinitesimal  in  comparison 
with  the  aggregate,  his  action,  if  directed  exclusively  to 
achievement  of  general  happiness,  is,  if  not  absolutely  altru- 
istic, as  nearly  so  as  may  be.  Hence  the  theory  which 
makes  general  happiness  the  immediate  object  of  pursuit, 
may  rightly  be  taken  as  one  form  of  the  pure  altruism  to  be 
here  criticized. 

Both  as  justifying  this  interpretation  and  as  furnishing  a 
definite  proposition  with  which  to  deal,  let  me  set  out  by 
quoting  a  passage  from  Mr.  Mill's  Utilitarianism. 

"  The  Greatest-Happiness  Principle,"  he  says,  "  is  a  mere  form  of  words 
without  rational  signification,  unless  one  person's  happiness,  supposed  equal  in 
degree  (with  the  proper  allowance  made  for  kind),  is  counted  for  exactly  as 
much  as  another's.  Those  conditions  being  supplied,  Bentham's  dictum, '  every- 
body to  count  for  one,  cobody  for  more  than  one,'  might  be  written  under  the 
principle  of  utility  as  an  explanatory  commentary  "  (p.  91.) 

Now  though  the  meaning  of  "  greatest  happiness  "  as  an 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  221 

end,  is  here  to  a  certain  degree  defined,  the  need  for 
further  definition  is  felt  the  moment  we  attempt  to  decide 
on  ways  of  regulating  conduct  so  as  to  attain  the  end.  The 
first  question  which  arises  is — Must  we  regard  this  "  greatest 
happiness  principle"  as  a  principle  of  guidance  for  the 
community  in  its  corporate  capacity,  or  as  a  principle  of 
guidance  for  its  members  separately  considered,  or  both? 
If  the  reply  is  that  the  principle  must  be  taken  as  a  guide 
for  governmental  action  rather  than  for  individual  action, 
we  are  at  once  met  by  the  inquiry, — What  is  to  be  the 
guide  for  individual  action  ?  If  individual  action  is  not 
to  be  regulated  solely  for  the  purpose  of  achieving  "the 
greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number,"  some  other 
principle  of  regulation  for  individual  action  is  required  ; 
and  "  the  greatest  happiness  principle "  fails  to  furnish  the 
needful  ethical  standard.  Should  it  be  rejoined  that  the 
individual  in  his  capacity  of  political  unit,  is  to  take  further- 
ance of  general  happiness  as  his  end,  giving  his  vote  or 
otherwise  acting  on  the  legislature  with  a  view  to  this  end, 
and  that  in  so  far  guidance  is  supplied  to  him,  there  comes 
the  further  inquiry — Whence  is  to  come  guidance  for 
the  remainder  of  individual  conduct,  constituting  by  far 
the  greater  part  of  it  ?  If  this  private  part  of  individual 
conduct  is  not  to  have  general  happiness  as  its  direct  aim, 
then  an  ethical  standard  other  than  that  offered  has  still  to 
be  found. 

Hence,  unless  pure  altruism  as  thus  formulated  confesses 
its  inadequacy,  it  must  justify  itself  as  a  sufficient  rule 
for  all  conduct,  individual  and  social.  We  will  first  deal 
with  it  as  the  alleged  right  principle  of  public  policy ;  and 
then  as  the  alleged  right  principle  of  private  action. 

§  84.  On  trying  to  understand  precisely  the  statement 
that  when  taking  general  happiness  as  an  end,  the  rule 
must  be — "everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more 
than  one,"  there  arises  the  idea  of  distribution.  We  can 


222  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

form  no  idea  of  distribution  without  thinking  of  something 
distributed  and  recipients  of  this  something.  That  we 
may  clearly  conceive  the  proposition  we  must  clearly 
conceive  both  these  elements  of  it.  Let  us  take  first  the 
recipients. 

"  Everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more  than  one." 
Does  this  mean  that,  in  respect  of  whatever  is  portioned  out, 
each  is  to  have  the  same  share  whatever  his  character,  what- 
ever his  conduct  ?  Shall  he  if  passive  have  as  much  as  if 
active  ?  Shall  he  if  useless  have  as  much  as  if  useful  ?  Shall 
he  if  criminal  have  as  much  as  if  virtuous  ?  If  the  distribu- 
tion is  to  be  made  without  reference  to  the  natures  and  deeds 
of  the  recipients,  then  it  must  be  shown  that  a  system  which 
equalizes,  as  far  as  it  can,  the  treatment  of  good  and  bad,  will 
be  beneficial.  If  the  distribution  is  not  to  be  indiscriminate, 
then  the  formula  disappears.  The  something  distributed 
must  be  apportioned  otherwise  than  by  equal  division.  There 
must  be  adjustment  of  amounts  to  deserts ;  and  we  are  left 
in  the  dark  as  to  the  mode  of  adjustment — we  have  to  find 
other  guidance. 

Let  us  next  ask  what  is  the  something  to  be  distributed  ? 
The  first  idea  which  occurs  is  that  happiness  itself  must  be 
divided  out  among  all.  Taken  literally,  the  notions  that  the 
greatest  happiness  should  be  the  end  sought,  and  that  in  ap- 
portioning it  everybody  should  count  for  one  and  nobody  for 
more  than  one,  imply  that  happiness  is  something  that  can 
be  cut  up  into  parts  and  handed  round.  This,  however,  is  an 
impossible  interpretation.  But  after  recognizing  the  impossi- 
bility of  it,  there  returns  the  question — What  is  it  in  respect 
of  which  everybody  is  to  count  for  one  and  nobody  for  more 
than  one  ? 

Shall  the  interpretation  be  that  the  concrete  means  to 
happiness  are  to  be  equally  divided  ?  Is  it  intended  that 
there  shall  be  distributed  to  all  in  equal  portions  the  neces- 
saries of  life,  the  appliances  to  comfort,  the  facilities  for 
amusement  ?  As  a  conception  simply,  this  is  more  defensi- 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  223 

ble.  But  passing  over  the  question  of  policy — passing  over 
the  question  whether  greatest  happiness  would  ultimately  be 
secured  by  such  a  process  (which  it  obviously  would  not)  it 
turns  out  on  examination  that  greatest  happiness  could 
not  even  proximatety  be  so  secured.  Differences  of  age,  of 
growth,  of  constitutional  need,  differences  of  activity  and 
consequent  expenditure,  differences  of  desires  and  tastes, 
would  entail  the  inevitable  result  that  the  material  aids  to 
happiness  which  each  received  would  be  more  or  less  un- 
adapted  to  his  requirements.  Even  if  purchasing  power 
were  equally  divided,  the  greatest  happiness  would  not  be 
achieved  if  everybody  counted  for  one  and  nobody  for  more 
than  one ;  since,  as  the  capacities  for  utilizing  the  purchased 
means  to  happiness  would  vary  both  with  the  constitution 
and  the  stage  of  life,  the  means  which  would  approximately 
suffice  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  one  would  be  extremely  insuf- 
ficient to  satisfy  the  wants  of  another,  and  so  the  greatest 
total  of  happiness  would  not  be  obtained :  means  might  be 
unequally  apportioned  in  a  way  that  would  produce  a  greater 
total. 

But  now  if  happiness  itself  cannot  be  cut  up  and  dis- 
tributed equally,  and  if  equal  division  of  the  material  aids 
to  happiness  would  not  produce  greatest  happiness,  what 
is  the  thing  to  be  thus  apportioned  ? — what  is  it  in  re- 
spect of  which  everybody  is  to  count  for  one  and  nobody 
for  more  than  one  ?  There  seems  but  a  single  possibility. 
There  remain  to  be  equally  distributed  nothing  but  the  con- 
ditions under  which  each  may  pursue  happiness.  The  limi- 
tations to  action — the  degrees  of  freedom  and  restraint,  shall 
be  alike  for  all.  Each  shall  have  as  much  liberty  to  pursue 
his  ends  as  consists  with  maintaining  like  liberties  to  pursue 
their  ends  by  others ;  and  one  as  much  as  another  shall 
have  the  enjoyment  of  that  which  his  efforts,  carried  on 
within  these  limits,  obtain.  But  to  say  that  in  respect  of 
these  conditions  everybody  shall  count  for  one  and  nobody 
for  more  than  one,  is  simply  to  say  that  equity  shall  be  enforced. 
16 


224  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

Thus,  considered  as  a  principle  of  public  policy,  Benthara's 
principle,  when  analyzed,  transforms  itself  into  the  principle 
he  slights.  Not  general  happiness  becomes  the  ethical  stand- 
ard by  which  legislative  action  is  to  be  guided,  but  universal 
justice.  And  so  the  altruistic  theory  under  this  form  col- 
lapses. 

§  85.  From  examining  the  doctrine  that  general  happiness 
should  be  the  end  of  public  action,  we  pass  now  to  examine 
the  doctrine  that  it  should  be  the  end  of  private  action. 

It  is  contended  that  from  the  stand-point  of  pure  reason, 
the  happiness  of  others  has  no  less  a  claim  as  an  object  of 
pursuit  for  each  than  personal  happiness.  Considered  as 
parts  of  a  total,  happiness  felt  by  self  and  like  happiness  felt 
by  another,  are  of  equal  values ;  and  hence  it  is  inferred 
that,  rationally  estimated,  the  obligation  to  expend  effort  for 
others'  benefit,  is  as  great  as  the  obligation  to  expend  effort 
for  one's  own  benefit.  Holding  that  the  utilitarian  system 
of  morals,  rightly  understood,  harmonizes  with  the  Christian 
maxim — "  Love  your  neighbour  as  yourself,"  Mr.  Mill  says 
that  "  as  between  his  own  happiness  and  that  of  others,  utili- 
tarianism requires  him  to  be  as  strictly  impartial  as  a  disin- 
terested and  benevolent  spectator."  (p.  24.)  Let  us  consider 
the  alternative  interpretations  which  may  be  given  to  this 
statement. 

Suppose,  first,  that  a  certain  quantum  of  happiness  has  in 
some  way  become  available,  without  the  special  instrumen- 
tality of  A,  B,  C,  or  D,  constituting  the  group  concerned. 
Then  the  proposition  is  that  each  shall  be  ready  to  have  this 
quantum  of  happiness  as  much  enjoyed  by  one  or  more  of 
the  others  as  by  himself.  The  disinterested  and  benevolent 
spectator  would  clearly,  in  such  a  case,  rule  that  no  one 
ought  to  have  more  of  the  happiness  than  another.  But 
here,  assuming  as  we  do  that  the  quantum  of  happiness 
has  become  available  without  the  agency  of  any  among 
the  group,  simple  equity  dictates  as  much.  No  one 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  225 

having  in  any  way  established  a  claim  different  from  the 
claims  of  others,  their  claims  are  equal ;  and  due  regard 
for  justice  by  each  will  not  permit  him  to  monopolize  the 
happiness. 

Now  suppose  a  different  case.  Suppose  that  the  quantum 
of  happiness  has  been  made  available  by  the  efforts  of  one 
member  of  the  group.  Suppose  that  A  has  acquired  by 
labour  some  material  aid  to  happiness.  He  decides  to  act 
as  the  disinterested  and  benevolent  spectator  would  direct. 
What  will  he  decide  ? — what  would  the  spectator  direct  ? 
Let  us  consider  the  possible  suppositions ;  taking  first  the 
least  reasonable. 

The  spectator  may  be  conceived  as  deciding  that  the 
labour  expended  by  A  in  acquiring  this  material  aid  to 
happiness,  originates  no  claim  to  special  use  of  it ;  but 
that  it  ought  to  be  given  to  B,  C,  or  D,  or  that  it  ought 
to  be  divided  equally  among  B,  C,  and  D,  or  that  it  ought 
to  be  divided  equally  among  all  members  of  the  group, 
including  A  who  has  laboured  for  it.  And  if  the  spectator 
is  conceived  as  deciding  thus  to-day,  he  must  be  conceived 
as  deciding  thus  day  after  day  ;  with  the  result  that  one  of 
the  group  expends  all  the  effort,  getting  either  none  of  the 
benefit  or  only  his  numerical  share,  while  the  others  get 
their  shares  of  the  benefit  without  expending  any  efforts. 
That  A  might  conceive  the  disinterested  and  benevolent 
spectator  to  decide  in  this  way,  and  might  feel  bound  to 
act  in  conformity  with  the  imagined  decision,  is  a  strong 
supposition ;  and  probably  it  will  be  admitted  that  such 
kind  of  impartiality,  so  far  from  being  conducive  to  the 
general  happiness,  would  quickly  be  fatal  to  everyone.  But 
this  is  not  all.  Action  in  pursuance  of  such  a  decision 
would  in  reality  be  negatived  by  the  very  principle  enun- 
ciated. For  not  only  A,  but  also  B,  C,  and  D,  have  to  act  on 
this  principle.  Each  of  them  must  behave  as  he  conceives 
an  impartial  spectator  would  decide.  Does  B  conceive  the 
impartial  spectator  as  awarding  to  him,  B,  the  product  of 


226  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

A's  labour  ?  Then  the  assumption  is  that  B  conceives  the 
impartial  spectator  as  favouring  himself,  B,  more  than  A 
conceives  him  as  favouring  himself,  A;  which  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  hypothesis.  Does  B,  in  conceiving  the  im- 
partial spectator,  exclude  his  own  interests  as  completely  as 
A  does  ?  Then  how  can  he  decide  so  much  to  his  own  ad- 
vantage, so  partially,  as  to  allow  him  to  take  from  A  an 
equal  share  of  the  benefit  gained  by  A's  labour,  towards 
which  he  and  the  rest  have  done  nothing  ? 

Passing  from  this  conceivable,  though  not  credible,  deci- 
sion of  the  spectator,  here  noted  for  the  purpose  of  observ- 
ing that  habitual  conformity  to  it  would  be  impossible,  there 
remains  to  be  considered  the  decision  which  a  spectator 
really  impartial  would  give.  He  would  say  that  the  happi- 
ness, or  material  aid  to  happiness,  which  had  been  purchased 
by  A's  labour,  was  to  be  taken  by  A.  He  would  say  that 
B,  C,  and  D  had  no  claims  to  it,  but  only  to  such  happiness, 
or  aids  to  happiness,  as  their  respective  labours  had  pur- 
chased. Consequently,  A,  acting  as  the  imaginary  impartial 
spectator  would  direct,  is,  by  this  test,  justified  in  appro- 
priating such  happiness  or  aid  to  happiness  as  his  own 
efforts  have  achieved. 

And  so  under  its  special  form  as  under  its  general  form, 
the  principle  is  true  only  in  so  far  as  it  embodies  a  disguised 
justice.  Analysis  again  brings  out  the  result  that  making 
"  general  happiness  "  the  end  of  action,  really  means  main- 
taining what  we  call  equitable  relations  among  individuals. 
Decline  to  accept  in  its  vague  form  "  the  greatest-happiness 
principle,"  and  insist  on  knowing  what  is  the  implied  con- 
duct, public  or  private,  and  it  turns  out  that  the  principle  is 
meaningless  save  as  indirectly  asserting  that  the  claims  of 
each  should  be  duly  regarded  by  all.  The  utilitarian  altruism 
becomes  a  duly  qualified  egoism. 

§  86.  Another  point  of  view  from  which  to  judge  tha 
altruistic  theory  may  now  be  taken.  If,  assuming  the  proper 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  227 

object  of  pursuit  to  be  general  happiness,  we  proceed  ration- 
ally, we  must  ask  in  what  different  ways  the  aggregate,  gen- 
eral happiness,  may  be  composed  ;  and  must  then  ask  what 
composition  of  it  will  yield  the  largest  sum. 

Suppose  that  each  citizen  pursues  his  own  happiness  inde- 
pendently, not  to  the  detriment  of  others  but  without  active 
concern  for  others  ;  then  their  united  happinesses  constitute 
a  certain  sum — a  certain  general  happiness.  Now  suppose 
that  each,  instead  of  making  his  own  happiness  the  object  of 
pursuit,  makes  the  happiness  of  others  the  object  of  pursuit ; 
then,  again,  there  results  a  certain  sum  of  happiness.  This 
sum  must  be  less  than,  or  equal  to,  or  greater  than,  the 
first.  If  it  is  admitted  that  this  sum  is  either  less  than 
the  first  or  only  equal  to  it,  the  altruistic  course  of  action  is 
confessedly  either  worse  than,  or  no  better  than,  the  ego- 
istic. The  assumption  must  be  that  the  sum  of  happiness 
obtained  is  greater.  Let  us  observe  what  is  involved  in  this 
assumption. 

If  each  pursues  exclusively  the  happiness  of  others ;  and 
if  each  is  also  a  recipient  of  happiness  (which  he  must  be, 
for  otherwise  no  aggregate  happiness  can  be  formed  out  of 
their  individual  happinesses) ;  then  the  implication  is  that 
each  gains  the  happiness  due  to  altruistic  action  exclusively ; 
and  that  in  each  this  is  greater  in  amount  than  the  egoistic 
happiness  obtainable  by  him,  if  he  devoted  himself  to  pur- 
suit of  it.  Leaving  out  of  consideration  for  a  moment  these 
relative  amounts  of  the  two,  let  us  note  the  conditions  to  the 
receipt  of  altruistic  happiness  by  each.  The  sympathetic 
nature  gets  pleasure  by  giving  pleasure  ;  and  the  proposition 
is  that  if  the  general  happiness  is  the  object  of  pursuit,  each 
will  be  made  happy  by  witnessing  others'  happiness.  But 
what  in  such  case  constitutes  the  happiness  of  others  ?  These 
others  are  also,  by  the  hypothesis,  pursuers  and  receivers  of 
altruistic  pleasure.  The  genesis  of  altruistic  pleasure  in 
each  is  to  depend  on  the  display  of  pleasures  by  others ; 
which  is  again  to  depend  on  the  display  of  pleasures  by 


228  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

others  ;  and  so  on  perpetually.  Where,  then,  is  the  pleasure 
to  begin  ?  Obviously  there  must  be  egoistic  pleasure  some- 
where, before  there  can  be  the  altruistic  pleasure  caused  by 
sympathy  with  it.  Obviously,  therefore,  each  must  be  ego- 
istic in  due  amount,  even  if  only  with  the  view  of  giving 
others  the  possibility  of  being  altruistic.  So  far  from  the 
sum  of  happiness  being  made  greater  if  all  make  greatest 
happiness  the  exclusive  end,  the  sum  disappears  entirely. 

How  absurd  is  the  supposition  that  the  happiness  of  all 
can  be  achieved  without  each  pursuing  his  own  happiness, 
will  be  best  shown  by  a  physical  simile.  Suppose  a  cluster 
of  bodies,  each  of  which  generates  heat ;  and  each  of  which 
is,  therefore,  while  a  radiator  of  heat  to  those  around,  also  a 
receiver  of  heat  from  them.  Manifestly  each  will  have  a 
certain  proper  heat  irrespective  of  that  which  it  gains  from 
the  rest ;  and,  each  will  have  a  certain  heat  gained  from  the 
rest  irrespective  of  its  proper  heat.  What  will  happen  ?  So 
long  as  each  of  the  bodies  continues  to  be  a  generator  of 
heat,  each  continues  to  maintain  a  temperature  partly  de- 
rived from  itself  and  partly  derived  from  others.  But  if 
each  ceases  to  generate  heat  for  itself  and  depends  on  the 
heat  radiated  to  it  by  the  rest,  the  entire  cluster  becomes 
cold.  Well,  the  self -generated  heat  stands  for  egoistic  pleas- 
ure ;  the  heat  radiated  and  received  stands  for  sympathetic 
pleasure  ;  and  the  disappearance  of  all  heat  if  each  ceases  to 
be  an  originator  of  it,  corresponds  to  the  disappearance  of 
all  pleasure  if  each  ceases  to  originate  it  egoistically. 

A  further  conclusion  may  be  drawn.  Besides  the  im- 
plication that  before  altruistic  pleasure  can  exist,  egoistic 
pleasure  must  exist,  and  that  if  the  rule  of  conduct  is  to  be 
the  same  for  all,  each  must  be  egoistic  in  due  degree  ;  there 
is  the  implication  that,  to  achieve  the  greatest  sum  of  hap- 
piness, each  must  be  more  egoistic  than  altruistic.  For, 
speaking  generally,  sympathetic  pleasures*  must  ever  con- 
tinue less  intense  than  the  pleasures  with  which  there  is 
sympathy..  Other  things  equal,  ideal  feelings  cannot  be  as 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  229 

vivid  as  real  feelings.  It  is  true  that  those  having  strong 
imaginations  may,  especially  in  cases  where  the  affections 
are  engaged,  feel  the  moral  pain  if  not  the  physical  pain  of 
another,  as  keenly  as  the  actual  sufferer  of  it,  and  may  par- 
ticipate with  like  intensity  in  another's  pleasure  :  sometimes 
even  mentally  representing  the  received  pleasure  as  greater 
than  it  really  is,  and  so  getting  reflex  pleasure  greater  than 
the  recipients'  direct  pleasure.  Such  cases,  however,  and 
cases  in  which  even  apart  from  exaltation  of  sympathy 
caused  by  attachment,  there  is  a  body  of  feeling  sympatheti- 
cally aroused  equal  in  amount  to  the  original  feeling,  if  not 
greater,  are  necessarily  exceptional.  For  in  such  cases  the 
total  consciousness  includes  many  other  elements  besides 
the  mentally-represented  pleasure  or  pain — notably  the 
luxury  of  pity  and  the  luxury  of  goodness ;  and  genesis 
of  these  can  occur  but  occasionally :  they  could  not  be 
habitual  concomitants  of  sympathetic  pleasures  if  all  pur- 
sued these  from  moment  to  moment.  In  estimating  the 
possible  totality  of  sympathetic  pleasures,  we  must  include 
nothing  beyond  the  representations  of  the  pleasures  others 
experience.  And  unless  it  be  asserted  that  we  can  have 
other's  states  of  consciousness  perpetually  re-produced  in  us 
more  vividly  than  the  kindred  states  of  consciousness  are 
aroused  in  ourselves  by  their  proper  personal  causes,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  totality  of  altruistic  pleasures  cannot 
become  equal  to  the  totality  of  egoistic  pleasures.  Hence, 
beyond  the  truth  that  before  there  can  be  altruistic  pleasures 
there  must  be  the  egoistic  pleasures  from  sympathy  with 
which  they  arise,  there  is  the  truth  that,  to  obtain  the  great- 
est sum  of  altruistic  pleasures,  there  must  be  a  greater  sum 
of  egoistic  pleasures. 

§  87.  That  pure  altruism  is  suicidal  may  be  yet  other- 
wise demonstrated.  A  perfectly  moral  law  must  be  one 
which  becomes  perfectly  practicable  as  human  nature  be- 
comes perfect.  If  its  practicableness  decreases  as  human 


230  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

nature   improves  ;    and   if  an  ideal  human    nature  neces- 
sitates  its   impracticability;    it  cannot  be  the   moral   law 

sought. 

Now  opportunities  for  practising  altruism  are  numerous 
and  great  in  proportion  as  there  is  weakness,  or  incapacity, 
or  imperfection.  If  we  pass  beyond  the  limits  of  the  family, 
in  which  a  sphere  for  self-sacrificing  activities  must  be  pre- 
served as  long  as  offspring  have  to  be  reared ;  and  if  we  ask 
how  there  can  continue  a  social  sphere  for  self-sacrificing 
activities ;  it  becomes  obvious  that  the  continued  existence 
of  serious  evils,  caused  by  prevalent  defects  of  nature,  is 
implied.  As  fast  as  men  adapt  themselves  to  the  require- 
ments of  social  life,  so  fast  will  the  demands  for  efforts  on 
their  behalf  diminish.  And  with  arrival  at  finished  adapta- 
tion, when  all  persons  are  at  once  completely  self-conserved 
and  completely  able  to  fulfil  the  obligations  which  society 
imposes  on  them,  those  occasions  for  postponement  of 
self  to  others  which  pure  altruism  contemplates,  dis- 
appear. 

Such  self-sacrifices  become,  indeed,  doubly  impracticable. 
Carrying  on  successfully  their  several  lives,  men  not  only 
cannot  yield  to  those  around  the  opportunities  for  giving  aid, 
but  aid  cannot  ordinarily  be  given  them  without  interfering 
with  their  normal  activities,  and  so  diminishing  their  plea- 
sures. Like  every  inferior  creature,  led  by  its  innate  desires 
spontaneously  to  do  all  that  its  life  requires,  man,  when  com- 
pletely moulded  to  the  social  state,  must  have  desires  so  ad- 
justed to  his  needs  that  he  fulfils  the  needs  in  gratifying 
the  desires.  And  if  his  desires  are  severally  gratified  by 
the  performance  of  required  acts,  none  of  these  can  be  per- 
formed for  him  without  balking  his  desires.  Acceptance 
from  others  of  the  results  of  their  activities  can  take  place 
only  on  condition  of  relinquishing  the  pleasures  derived 
from  his  own  activities.  Diminution  rather  than  increase 
of  happiness  would  result,  could  altruistic  action  in  such  case 
be  enforced. 


TKIAL  AND   COMPROMISE.  231 

And  here,  indeed,  we  are  introduced  to  another  baseless 
assumption  which  the  theory  makes. 

§  88.  The  postulate  of  utilitarianism  as  formulated  in  the 
statements  above  quoted,  and  of  pure  altruism  as  otherwise 
expressed,  involves  the  belief  that  it  is  possible  for  happi- 
ness, or  the  means  to  happiness,  or  the  conditions  to  happi- 
ness, to  be  transferred.  Without  any  specified  limitation 
the  proposition  taken  for  granted  is,  that  happiness  in  gen- 
eral admits  of  detachment  from  one  and  attachment  to 
another — that  surrender  to  any  extent  is  possible  by  one  and 
appropriation  to  any  extent  is  possible  by  another.  But  a 
moment's  thought  shows  this  to  be  far  from  the  truth.  On 
the  one  hand,  surrender  carried  to  a  certain  point  is  ex- 
tremely mischievous  and  to  a  further  point  fatal ;  and  on 
the  other  hand,  much  of  the  happiness  each  enjoys  is  self- 
generated  and  can  neither  be  given  nor  received. 

To  assume  that  egoistic  pleasures  may  be  relinquished  to 
any  extent,  is  to  fall  into  one  of  those  many  errors  of  ethical 
speculation  which  result  from  ignoring  the  truths  of  biology. 
"When  taking  the  biological  view  of  ethics  we  saw  that  plea- 
sures accompany  normal  amounts  of  functions,  while  pains 
accompany  defects  or  excesses  of  functions  ;  further,  that 
complete  life  depends  on  complete  discharge  of  functions, 
and  therefore  on  receipt  of  the  correlative  pleasures.  Hence, 
to  yield  up  normal  pleasures  is  to  yield  up  so  much  life ;  and 
there  arises  the  question — to  what  extent  may  this  be  done  ? 
If  he  is  to  continue  living,  the  individual  must  take  certain 
amounts  of  those  pleasures  which  go  along  with  fulfilment 
of  the  bodily  functions,  and  must  avoid  the  pains  which 
entire  non-fulfilment  of  them  entails.  Complete  abnegation, 
means  death  ;  excessive  abnegation  means  illness ;  abnega- 
tion less  excessive  means  physical  degradation  and  conse- 
quent loss  of  power  to  fulfil  obligations,  personal  and  other. 
"When,  therefore,  we  attempt  to  specialize  the  proposal  to  live 
not  for  self-satisfaction  but  for  the  satisfaction  of  others,  we 


232  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

meet  with  the  difficulty  that  beyond  a  certain  limit  this  can^ 
not  be  done.  And  when  we  have  decided  what  decrease  of 
bodily  welfare,  caused  by  sacrifice  of  pleasures  and  accept- 
ance of  pains,  it  is  proper  for  the  individual  to  make,  there 
is  forced  on  us  the  fact  that  the  portion  of  happiness,  or 
means  to  happiness,  which  it  is  possible  for  him  to  yield  up 
for  redistribution,  is  a  limited  portion. 

Even  more  rigorous  on  another  side  is  the  restriction  put 
upon  the  transfer  of  happiness,  or  the  means  to  happiness. 
The  pleasures  gained  by  efficient  action — by  successful 
pursuit  of  ends,  cannot  by  any  process  be  parted  with,  and 
cannot  in  any  way  be  appropriated  by  another.  The  habit 
of  arguing  about  general  happiness  sometimes  as  though  it 
were  a  concrete  product  to  be  portioned  out,  and  sometimes 
as  though  it  were  co-extensive  with  the  use  of  those  material 
aids  to  pleasure  which  may  be  given  and  received,  has 
caused  inattention  to  the  truth  that  the  pleasures  of  achieve- 
ment are  not  transferable.  Alike  in  the  boy  who  has  won 
a  game  of  marbles,  the  athlete  who  has  performed  a  feat,  the 
statesman  who  has  gained  a  party  triumph,  the  inventor  who 
has  devised  a  new  machine,  the  man  of  science  who  has 
discovered  a  truth,  the  novelist  who  has  well  delineated 
a  character,  the  poet  who  has  finely  rendered  an  emotion, 
we  see  pleasures  which  must,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be 
enjoyed  exclusively  by  those  to  whom  they  come.  And 
if  we  look  at  all  such  occupations  as  men  are  not  impelled 
to  by  their  necessities — if  we  contemplate  the  various  am- 
bitions which  play  so  large  a  part  in  life  ;  we  are  reminded 
that  so  long  as  the  consciousness  of  efficiency  remains  a 
dominant  pleasure,  there  will  remain  a  dominant  pleasure 
which  cannot  be  pursued  altruistically  but  must  be  pursued 
egoistically. 

Cutting  off,  then,  at  the  one  end,  those  pleasures  which 
are  inseparable  from  maintenance  of  the  physique  in  an  un- 
injured state ;  and  cutting  off  at  the  other  end  the  pleasures 
of  successful  action ;  the  amount  that  remains  is  so  greatly 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  233 

diminished,  as  to  make  untenable  the  assumption  that  happi- 
ness at  large  admits  of  distribution  after  the  manner  which 
utilitarianism  assumes. 

§  89.  In  yet  one  more  way  may  be  shown  the  inconsistency 
of  this  transfigured  utilitarianism  which  regards  its  doctrine 
as  embodying  the  Christian  maxim — "  Love  your  neighbour 
as  yourself,"  and  of  that  altruism  which,  going  still  further, 
enunciates  the  maxim — "  Live  for  others." 

A  right  rule  of  conduct  must  be  one  which  may  with  ad- 
vantage be  adopted  by  all.  "  Act  according  to  that  maxim 
only,  which  you  can  wish,  at  the  same  time,  to  become  a  uni- 
versal law,"  says  Kant.  And  clearly  a  passing  over  needful 
qualifications  of  this  maxim,  we  may  accept  it  to  the  extent 
of  admitting  that  a  mode  of  action  which  becomes  impracti- 
cable as  it  approaches  universality,  must  be  wrong.  Hence, 
if  the  theory  of  pure  altruism,  implying  that  effort  should  be 
expended  for  the  benefit  of  others  and  not  for  personal  bene- 
fit, is  defensible,  it  must  be  shown  that  it  will  produce 
good  results  when  acted  upon  by  all.  Mark  the  consequences 
if  all  are  purely  altruistic. 

First,  an  impossible  combination  of  moral  attributes  is 
implied.  Each  is  supposed  by  the  hypothesis  to  regard  self 
so  little  and  others  so  much,  that  he  willingly  sacrifices  his 
own  pleasures  to  give  pleasures  to  them.  But  if  this  is  a 
universal  trait,  and  if  action  is  universally  congruous  with 
it,  we  have  to  conceive  each  as  being  not  only  a  sacrificer 
but  also  one  who  accepts  sacrifices.  While  he  is  so  unselfish 
as  willingly  to  yield  up  the  benefit  for  which  he  has  laboured, 
he  is  so  selfish  as  willingly  to  let  others  yield  up  to  him  the 
benefits  they  have  laboured  for.  To  make  pure  altruism 
possible  for  all,  each  must  be  at  once  extremely  unegoistic 
and  extremely  egoistic.  As  a  giver,  he  must  have  no  thought 
for  self ;  as  a  receiver,  no  thought  for  others.  Evident- 
ly, this  implies  an  inconceivable  mental  constitution.  The 
sympathy  which  is  so  solicitous  for  others  as  willingly  to 


234  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

injure  self  in  benefiting  them,  cannot  at  the  same  time  be  so 
regardless  of  others  as  to  accept  benefits  which  they  injure 
themselves  in  giving. 

The  incongruities  that  emerge  if  we  assume  pure  altruism 
to  be  universally  practised,  may  be  otherwise  exhibited 
thus.  Suppose  that  each,  instead  of  enjoying  such  pleasures 
as  come  to  him,  or  such  consumable  appliances  to  pleasure  as 
he  has  worked  for,  or  such  occasions  for  pleasure  as  reward 
his  efforts,  relinquishes  these  to  a  single  other,  or  adds  them 
to  a  common  stock  from  which  others  benefit ;  what  will 
result  ?  Different  answers  may  be  given  according  as  we 
assume  that  there  are,  or  are  not,  additional  influences 
brought  into  play.  Suppose  there  are  no  additional 

influences.  Then,  if  each  transfers  to  another  his  happiness, 
or  means  to  happiness,  or  occasions  for  happiness,  while  some 
one  else  does  the  like  to  him,  the  distribution  of  happiness 
is,  on  the  average,  unchanged ;  or  if  each  adds  to  a  common 
stock  his  happiness,  or  means  to  happiness,  or  occasions  for 
happiness,  from  which  common  stock  each  appropriates  his 
portion,  the  average  state  is  still,  as  before,  unchanged. 
The  only  obvious  effect  is  that  transactions  must  be  gone 
through  in  the  redistribution  ;  and  loss  of  time  and  labour 
must  result.  Now  suppose  some  additional  influence 

which  makes  the  process  beneficial ;  what  must  it  be  ?  The 
totality  can  be  increased  only  if  the  acts  of  transfer  in- 
crease the  quantity  of  that  which  is  transferred.  The 
happiness,  or  that  which  brings  it,  must  be  greater  to  one 
who  derives  it  from  another's  efforts,  than  it  would  have 
been  had  his  own  efforts  procured  it;  or  otherwise,  sup- 
posing a  fund  of  happiness,  or  of  that  which  brings  it,  has 
been  formed  by  contributions  from  each,  then  each,  in 
appropriating  his  share,  must  find  it  larger  than  it  would 
have  been  had  no  such  aggregation  and  dispersion  taken 
place.  To  justify  belief  in  such  increase  two  conceivable 
assumptions  may  be  made.  One  is  that  though  the  sum  of 
pleasures,  or  of  pleasure-yielding  things,  remains  the  same 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  235 

yet  the  kind  of  pleasure,  or  of  pleasure-yielding  things,  which 
each  receives  in  exchange  from  another,  or  from  the  aggre- 
gate of  others,  is  one  which  he  appreciates  more  than  that 
for  which  he  laboured.  But  to  assume  this  is  to  assume 
that  each  labours  directly  for  the  thing  which  he  enjoys 
less,  rather  than  for  the  thing  which  he  enjoys  more,  which  is 
absurd.  The  other  assumption  is  that  while  the  exchanged 
or  redistributed  pleasure  of  the  egoistic  kind,  remains  the 
same  in  amount  for  each,  there  is  added  to  it  the  altruistic 
pleasure  accompanying  the  exchange.  But  this  assumption 
is  clearly  inadmissible  if,  as  is  implied,  the  transaction  is 
universal — is  one  through  which  each  becomes  giver  and 
receiver  to  equal  extents.  For  if  the  transfer  of  pleasures, 
or  of  pleasure-yielding  things,  from  one  to  another  or  others, 
is  always  accompanied  by  the  consciousness  that  there  will 
be  received  from  him  or  them  an  equivalent ;  there  results 
merely  a  tacit  exchange,  either  direct  or  roundabout.  Each 
becomes  altruistic  in  no  greater  degree  than  is  implied  by 
being  equitable ;  and  each,  having  nothing  to  exalt  his  happi- 
ness, sympathetically  or  otherwise,  cannot  be  a  source  of 
sympathetic  happiness  to  others. 

§  90.  Thus,  when  the  meanings  of  its  words  are  inquired 
into,  or  when  the  necessary  implications  of  its  theory  are  ex- 
amined, pure  altruism,  in  whatever  form  expressed,  commits 
its  adherents  to  various  absurdities. 

If  "the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number,"  or 
in  other  words,  "  the  general  happiness,"  is  the  proper  end 
of  action,  then  not  only  for  all  public  action  but  for  all 
private  action,  it  must  be  the  end ;  because,  otherwise,  the 
greater  part  of  action  remains  unguided.  Consider  its 
fitness  for  each.  If  corporate  action  isj  to  be  guided 
by  the  principle,  with  its  interpreting  comment — "  every- 
body to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more  than  one" — 
there  must  be  an  ignoring  of  all  differences  of  character 
and  conduct,  merits  and  demerits,  among  citizens,  since 


236  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

no  discrimination  is  provided  for;  and  moreover,  since 
that  in  respect  of  which  all  are  to  count  alike  cannot  be 
happiness  itself,  which  is  mdistributable,  and  since  equal 
sharing  of  the  concrete  means  to  happiness,  besides  failing 
utimately  would  fail  proximately  to  produce  the  greatest 
happiness ;  it  results  that  equal  distribution  of  the  conditions 
nnder  which  happiness  may  be  pursued  is  the  only  tenable 
meaning  :  we  discover  in  the  principle  nothing  but  a  round- 
about insistance  on  equity.  If,  taking  happiness  at  large  as 
the  aim  of  private  action,  the  individual  is  required  to  judge 
between  his  own  happiness  and  that  of  others  as  an  impar- 
tial spectator  would  do,  we  see  that  no  supposition  concern- 
ing the  spectator  save  one  which  suicidally  ascribes  partiality 
to  him,  can  bring  out  any  other  result  than  that  each  shall 
enjoy  such  happiness,  or  appropriate  such  means  to  happi- 
ness, as  his  own  efforts  gain :  equity  is  again  the  sole 
content.  When,  adopting  another  method,  we  consider 
how  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  may  be  composed,  and, 
recognizing  the  fact  that  equitable  egoism  will  produce  a 
certain  sum,  ask  how  pure  altruism  is  to  produce  a  greater 
sum ;  we  are  shown  that  if  all,  exclusively  pursuing  altruis- 
tic pleasures,  are  so  to  produce  a  greater  sum  of  pleasures, 
the  implication  is  that  altruistic  pleasures,  which  arise 
from  sympathy,  can  exist  in  the  absence  of  egoistic  plea- 
sures with  which  there  may  be  sympathy — an  impossibility ; 
and  another  implication  is  that  if,  the  necessity  for  egoistic 
pleasures  being  admitted,  it  is  said  that  the  greatest  sum  of 
happiness  will  be  attained  if  all  individuals  are  more 
altruistic  than  egoistic,  it  is  indirectly  said  that  as  a  general 
truth,  representative  feelings  are  stronger  than  presentative 
feelings — another  impossibility.  Again  the  doctrine  of  pure 
altruism  assumes  that  happiness  may  be  to  any  extent 
transferred  or  redistributed ;  whereas  the  fact  is  that  plea- 
sures of  one  order  cannot  be  transferred  in  large  measure 
without  results  which  are  fatal  or  extremely  injurious,  and 
that  pleasures  of  another  order  cannot  be  transferred  in  any 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  237 

degree.  Further,  pure  altruism  presents  this  fatal  anomaly ; 
that  while  a  right  principle  of  action  must  be  more  and 
more  practised  as  men  improve,  the  altruistic  principle 
becomes  less  and  less  practicable  as  men  approach  an  ideal 
form,  because  the  sphere  for  practising  it  continually  de- 
creases. Finally,  its  self-destructiveness  is  made  manifest 
on  observing  that  for  all  to  adopt  it  as  a  principle  of  action, 
which  they  must  do  if  it  is  a  sound  principle,  implies  that 
all  are  at  once  extremely  unegoistic  and  extremely  egoistic 
— ready  to  injure  self  for  others'  benefit,  and  ready  to  ac- 
cept benefit  at  the  cost  of  injury  to  others  :  traits  which  can- 
not co-exist. 

The  need  for  a  compromise  between  egoism  and  altruism 
is  thus  made  conspicuous.  We  are  forced  to  recognize  the 
claims  which  his  own  well-being  has  on  the  attention  of  each 
by  noting  how,  in  some  directions  we  come  to  a  deadlock,  in 
others  to  contradictions,  and  in  others  to  disastrous  results,  if 
they  are  ignored.  Conversely,  it  is  undeniable  that  disregard 
of  others  by  each,  carried  to  a  great  extent  is  fatal  to  society, 
and  carried  to  a  still  greater  extent  is  fatal  to  the  family,  and 
eventually  to  the  race.  Egoism  and  altruism  are  therefore 
co-essential. 

§  91.  What  form  is  the  compromise  between  egoism  and 
altruism  to  assume  ?  how  are  their  respective  claims  to  be 
satisfied  in  due  degrees  ? 

It  is  a  truth  insisted  on  by  moralists  and  recognized  in 
common  life,  that  the  achievement  of  individual  happiness  is 
not  proportionate  to  the  degree  in  which  individual  happi- 
ness is  made  the  object  of  direct  pursuit ;  but  there  has  not 
yet  become  current  the  belief  that,  in  like  manner,  the 
achievement  of  general  happiness  is  not  proportionate  to  the 
degree  in  which  general  happiness  is  made  the  object  of 
direct  pursuit.  Yet  failure  of  direct  pursuit  in  the  last  case 
is  more  reasonably  to  be  expected  than  in  the  first. 

When  discussing  the  relations  of  means  and  ends,  we  saw 


238  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

that  as  individual  conduct  evolves,  its  principle  becomes 
more  and  more  that  of  making  fulfilment  of  means  the 
proximate  end,  and  leaving  the  ultimate  end,  welfare  or 
happiness,  to  come  as  a  result.  And  we  saw  that  when 
general  welfare  or  happiness  is  the  ultimate  end,  the  same 
principle  holds  even  more  rigorously ;  since  the  ultimate 
end  under  its  impersonal  form,  is  less  determinate  than 
under  its  personal  form,  and  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
achieving  it  by  direct  pursuit  still  greater.  Recognizing, 
then,  the  fact  that  corporate  happiness  still  more  than 
individual  happiness,  must  be  pursued  not  directly  but  in- 
directly, the  first  question  for  us  is — What  must  be  the 
general  nature  of  the  means  through  which  it  is  to  be 
achieved. 

It  is  admitted  that  self -happiness  is,  in  a  measure,  to  be  ob- 
tained by  furthering  the  happiness  of  others.  May  it  not  be 
true  that,  conversely,  general  happiness  is  to  be  obtained  by 
furthering  self-happiness  ?  If  the  well-being  of  each  unit  is 
to  be  reached  partly  through  his  care  for  the  well-being  of 
the  aggregate,  is  not  the  well-being  of  the  aggregate  to  be 
reached  partly  through  the  care  of  each  unit  for  himself  ? 
Clearly,  our  conclusion  must  be  that  general  happiness  is  to 
be  achieved  mainly  through  the  adequate  pursuit  of  their 
own  happinesses  by  individuals ;  while,  reciprocally,  the  hap- 
pinesses of  individuals  are  to  be  achieved  in  part  by  their  pur- 
suit of  the  general  happiness. 

And  this  is  the  conclusion  embodied  in  the  progressing 
ideas  and  usages  of  mankind.  This  compromise  between 
egoism  and  altruism  has  been  slowly  establishing  itself; 
and  towards  recognition  of  its  propriety,  men's  actual 
beliefs,  as  distinguished  from  their  nominal  beliefs,  have 
been  gradually  approaching.  Social  evolution  has  been 
bringing  about  a  state  in  which  the  claims  of  the  individual 
to  the  proceeds  of  his  activities,  and  to  such  satisfactions  as 
they  bring,  are  more  and  more  positively  asserted  ;  at  the 
same  time  that  insistance  on  others'  claims,  and  habitual 


TKTAL  AND   COMPROMISE. 


respect  for  them,  have  been  increasing.  Among  the  rudest 
savages  personal  interests  are  very  vaguely  distinguished 
from  the  interests  of  others.  In  early  stages  of  civiliza- 
tion, the  proportioning  of  benefits  to  efforts  is  extremely 
rude  :  slaves  and  serfs  get  for  work,  arbitrary  amounts  of 
food  and  shelter  :  exchange  being  infrequent,  there  is  little 
to  develop  the  idea  of  equivalence.  But  as  civilization 
advances  and  status  passes  into  contract,  there  comes  daily 
experience  of  the  relation  between  advantages  enjoyed  and 
labour  given  :  the  industrial  system  maintaining,  through 
supply  and  demand,  a  due  adjustment  of  the  one  to  the 
other.  And  this  growth  of  voluntary  co-operation  —  this 
exchange  of  services  under  agreement,  has  been  necessarily 
accompanied  by  decrease  of  aggressions  one  upon  another, 
and  increase  of  sympathy  :  leading  to  exchange  of  services 
beyond  agreement.  That  is  to  say,  the  more  distinct  asser- 
tions of  individual  claims  and  more  rigorous  apportioning 
of  personal  enjoyments  to  efforts  expended,  has  gone  hand 
in  hand  with  growth  of  that  negative  altruism  shown  in 
equitable  conduct  and  that  positive  altruism  shown  in  gratu- 
itous aid. 

A  higher  phase  of  this  double  change  has  in  our  own  times 
becomes  conspicuous.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  we  note  the  strug- 
gles for  political  freedom,  the  contests  between  labour  and 
capital,  the  judicial  reforms  made  to  facilitate  enforcement 
of  rights,  we  see  that  the  tendency  still  is  towards  complete 
appropriation  by  each  of  whatever  benefits  are  due  to  him, 
and  consequent  exclusion  of  his  fellows  from  such  benefits. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  we  consider  what  is  meant  by  the  sur- 
render of  power  to  the  masses,  the  abolition  of  class-privi- 
leges, the  efforts  to  diffuse  knowledge,  the  agitations  to  spread 
temperance,  the  multitudinous  philanthropic  societies  ;  it 
becomes  clear  that  regard  for  the  well-being  of  others  is  in- 
creasing pari  passu  with  the  taking  of  means  to  secure  per- 
sonal well-being. 

"What  holds  of  the  relations  within  each  society  holds  to 
IT 


24:0  THE  DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

some  extent,  if  to  a  less  extent,  of  the  relations  between 
societies.  Though  to  maintain  national  claims,  real  or 
imaginary,  often  of  a  trivial  kind,  the  civilized  still  make 
war  on  one  another ;  yet  their  several  nationalities  are  more 
respected  than  in  past  ages.  Though  by  victors  portions  of 
territory  are  taken  and  money  compensations  exacted ;  yet 
conquest  is  not  now,  as  of  old,  habitually  followed  by  entire 
appropriation  of  territories  and  enslavement  of  peoples. 
The  individualities  of  societies  are  in  a  larger  measure 
preserved.  Meanwhile  the  altruistic  intercourse  is  greater  : 
aid  is  rendered  on  occasions  of  disaster  by  flood,  by  fire,  by 
famine,  or  otherwise.  And  in  international  arbitration  as 
lately  exemplified,  implying  the  recognition  of  claims  by  one 
nation  upon  another,  we  see  a  further  progress  in  this  wider 
altruism.  Doubtless  there  is  much  to  be  said  by  way  of 
set-off ;  for  in  the  dealings  of  the  civilized  with  the  un- 
civilized, little  of  this  progress  can  be  traced.  It  may  be 
urged  that  the  primitive  rule — "  Life  for  life,"  has  been 
developed  by  us  into  the  rule — "  For  one  life  many  lives," 
as  in  the  cases  of  Bishop  Patteson  and  Mr.  Birch ;  but 
then  there  is  the  qualifying  fact  that  we  do  not  torture  our 
prisoners  or  mutilate  them.  If  it  be  said  that  as  the 
Hebrews  thought  themselves  warranted  in  seizing  the  lands 
God  promised  to  them,  and  in  some  cases  exterminating 
the  inhabitants,  so  we,  to  fulfil  the  "  manifest  intention  of 
Providence,"  dispossess  inferior  races  whenever  we  want 
their  territories ;  it  may  be  replied  that  we  do  not  kill 
many  more  than  seems  needful,  and  tolerate  the  existence 
of  those  who  submit.  And  should  any  one  point  out  that  as 
Attila,  while  conquering  or  destroying  peoples  and  nations, 
regarded  himself  as  "the  scourge  of  God,"  punishing  men 
for  their  sins,  so  we,  as  represented  by  a  High  Commis- 
sioner and  a  priest  he  quotes,  think  ourselves  called  on  to 
chastise  with  rifles  and  cannon,  heathens  who  practise  poly- 
gamy ;  there  is  the  rejoinder  that  not  even  the  most  ferocious 
disciple  of  the  teacher  of  mercy  would  carry  his  vengeance 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  241 

BO  far  as  to  depopulate  whole  territories  and  erase  scores  of 
cities.  And  when,  on  the  other  hand,  we  remember  that 
there  is  an  Aborigines  Protection  Society,  that  there  are 
Commissioners  in  certain  colonies  appointed  to  protect  native 
interests,  and  that  in  some  cases  the  lands  of  natives  have 
been  purchased  in  ways  which,  however  unfair,  have  implied 
some  recognition  of  their  claims ;  we  may  say  that  little  as 
the  compromise  between  egoism  and  altruism  has  progressed 
in  international  affairs,  it  has  still  progressed  somewhat  in 
the  direction  indicated. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

CONCILIATION. 

§  92.  As  exhibited  in  the  last  chapter,  the  compromise 
between  the  claims  of  self  and  the  claims  of  others  seems  to 
imply  permanent  antagonism  between  the  two.  The  pursuit 
by  each  of  his  own  happiness  while  paying  due  regard  to  the 
happiness  of  his  fellows,  apparently  necessitates  the  ever- 
recurring  question — how  far  must  the  one  end  be  sought 
and  how  far  the  other  :  suggesting,  if  not  discord  in  the  life 
of  each,  still,  an  absence  of  complete  harmony.  This  is  not 
the  inevitable  inference  however. 

When,  in  the  Principles  of  Sociology,  Part  III,  the 
phenomena  of  race-maintenance  among  living  things  at 
large  were  discussed,  that  the  development  of  the  domestic 
relations  might  be  the  better  understood,  it  was  shown  that 
during  evolution  there  has  been  going  on  a  conciliation 
between  the  interests  of  the  species,  the  interests  of  the 
parents,  and  the  interests  of  the  offspring.  Proof  was 
given  that  as  we  ascend  from  the  lowest  forms  of  life  to 
the  highest,  race-maintenance  is  achieved  with  a  decreasing 
sacrifice  of  life,  alike  of  young  individuals  and  of  adult 
individuals,  and  also  with  a  decreasing  sacrifice  of  parental 
lives  to  the  lives  of  offspring.  We  saw  that,  with  the 
progress  of  civilization,  like  changes  go  on  among  human 
beings ;  and  that  the  highest  domestic  relations  are  those  in 
which  the  conciliation  of  welfare  within  the  family  becomes 

242 


CONCILIATION.  243 

greatest,  while  the  welfare  of  the  society  is  beet  subserved. 
Here  it  remains  to  be  shown  that  a  kindred  conciliation  has 
been,  and  is,  taking  place  between  the  interests  of  each 
citizen  and  the  interests  of  citizens  at  large ;  tending  over 
towards  a  state  in  which  the  two  become  merged  in  one,  and 
in  which  the  feelings  answering  to  them  respectively,  fall 
into  complete  concord. 

In  the  family  group,  even  as  we  observe  it  among  many 
inferior  vertebrates,  we  see  that  the  parental  sacrifice,  now 
become  so  moderate  in  amount  as  to  consist  with  long-con- 
tinued parental  life,  is  not  accompanied  by  consciousness  of 
sacrifice ;  but,  contrariwise,  is  made  from  a  direct  desire  to 
make  it :  the  altruistic  labours  on  behalf  of  young  are  car- 
ried on  in  satisfaction  of  parental  instincts.  If  we  trace 
these  relations  up  through  the  grades  of  mankind,  and  ob- 
serve how  largely  love  rather  than  obligation  prompts  the 
care  of  children,  we  see  the  conciliation  of  interests  to  be 
such  that  achievement  of  parental  happiness  coincides  with 
securing  the  happiness  of  offspring  :  the  wish  for  children 
among  the  childless,  and  the  occasional  adoption  of  children, 
showing  how  needful  for  attainment  of  certain  egoistic  satis- 
factions are  these  altruistic  activities.  And  further  evolu- 
tion, causing  along  with  higher  nature  diminished  fertility, 
and  therefore  smaller  burdens  on  parents,  may  be  expected 
to  bring  a  state  in  which,  far  more  than  now,  the  pleasures 
of  adult  life  will  consist  in  raising  offspring  to  perfection 
while  simultaneously  furthering  the  immediate  happiness  of 
offspring. 

Now  though  altruism  of  a  social  kind,  lacking  certain 
elements  of  parental  altruism,  can  never  attain  the  same 
level ;  yet  it  may  be  expected  to  attain  a  level  at  which  it 
will  be  like  parental  altruism  in  spontaneity — a  level  such 
that  ministration  to  others'  happiness  will  become  a  daily 
need — a  level  such  that  the  lower  egoistic  satisfactions  will 
be  continually  subordinated  to  this  higher  egoistic  satisfac- 
tion, not  by  any  effort  to  subordinate  them,  but  by  the 


244  THE   DATA    OF   ETHICS. 

preference  for  this  higher  egoistic  satisfaction  whenever  it 
can  be  obtained. 

Let  us  consider  how  the  development  of  sympathy,  which 
must  advance  as  fast  as  conditions  permit,  will  bring  about 
this  state. 

§  93.  "We  have  seen  that  during  the  evolution  of  life, 
pleasures  and  pains  have  necessarily  been  the  incentives  to 
and  deterrents  from,  actions  which  the  conditions  of  exist- 
ence demanded  and  negatived.  An  implied  truth  to  be  here 
noted  is,  that  faculties  which,  under  given  conditions,  yield 
partly  pain  and  partly  pleasure,  cannot  develop  beyond  the 
limit  at  which  they  yield  a  surplus  of  pleasure  :  if  beyond 
that  limit  more  pain  than  pleasure  results  from  exercise  of 
them,  their  growth  must  be  arrested. 

Through  sympathy  both  these  forms  of  feeling  are  ex- 
cited. Now  a  pleasurable  consciousness  is  aroused  on  wit- 
nessing pleasure  ;  now  a  painful  consciousness  is  aroused  on 
witnessing  pain.  Hence,  if  beings  around  him  habitually 
manifest  pleasure  and  but  rarely  pain,  sympathy  yields  to 
its  possessor  a  surplus  of  pleasure ;  while,  contrariwise,  if 
little  pleasure  is  ordinarily  witnessed  and  much  pain,  sym- 
pathy yields  a  surplus  of  pain  to  its  possessor.  The  average 
development  of  sympathy  must,  therefore,  be  regulated  by 
the  average  manifestations  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  others. 
If  the  life  usually  led  under  given  social  conditions  is  such 
that  suffering  is  daily  inflicted,  or  is  daily  displayed  by  asso- 
ciates, sympathy  cannot  grow :  to  assume  growth  of  it  is 
to  assume  that  the  constitution  will  modify  itself  in  such 
way  as  to  increase  its  pains  and  therefore  depress  its  ener- 
gies ;  and  is  to  ignore  the  truth  that  bearing  any  kind  of 
pain  gradually  produces  insensibility  to  that  pain,  or  callous- 
ness. On  the  other  hand,  if  the  social  state  is  such  that 
manifestations  of  pleasure  predominate,  sympathy  will  in- 
crease ;  since  sympathetic  pleasures,  adding  to  the  totality  of 
pleasures  enhancing  vitality,  conduce  to  the  physical  pros- 


CONCILIATION.  245 

perity  of  the  most  sympathetic,  and  since  the  pleasures  of 
sympathy  exceeding  its  pains  in  all,  lead  to  an  exercise  of  it 
which  strengthens  it. 

The  first  implication  is  one  already  more  than  once  indi- 
cated. We  have  seen  that  along  with  habitual  militancy 
and  under  the  adapted  type  of  social  organization,  sympathy 
cannot  develop  to  any  considerable  height.  The  destructive 
activities  carried  on  against  external  enemies  sear  it;  the 
state  of  feeling  maintained  causes  within  the  society  itself 
frequent  acts  of  aggression  or  cruelty ;  and  further,  the  com- 
pulsory co-operation  characterizing  the  militant  regime  neces- 
sarily represses  sympathy — exists  only  on  condition  of  an 
unsympathetic  treatment  of  some  by  others. 

But  even  could  the  militant  regime  forthwith  end,  the 
hindrances  to  development  of  sympathy  would  still  be 
great.  Though  cessation  of  war  would  imply  increased 
adaptation  of  man  to  social  life,  and  decrease  of  sundry 
evils,  yet  there  would  remain  much  non-adaptation  and  much 
consequent  unhappiness.  In  the  first  place,  that  form  of 
nature  which  has  generated  and  still  generates  wars,  though 
by  implication  raised  to  a  higher  form,  would  not  at  once 
be  raised  to  so  high  a  form  that  there  would  cease  all  in- 
justices and  the  pains  they  cause.  For  a  considerable  period 
after  predatory  activities  had  ended,  the  defects  of  the  pre- 
datory nature  would  continue :  entailing  their  slowly-dimin- 
ishing evils.  In  the  second  place,  the  ill-adjustment  of  the 
human  constitution  to  the  pursuits  of  industrial  life,  must 
long  persist,  and  may  be  expected  to  survive  in  a  measure 
the  cessation  of  wars :  the  required  modes  of  activity  must 
remain  for  innumerable  generations  in  some  degree  displeas- 
urable.  And  in  the  third  place  deficiencies  of  self-control 
such  as  the  improvident  show  us,  as  well  as  those  many 
failures  of  conduct  due  to  inadequate  foresight  of  conse- 
quences, though  less  marked  than  now,  could  not  fail  still 
to  produce  suffering. 

Nor  would    even    complete    adaptation,   if    limited   to 


24:6  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

disappearance  of  the  non-adaptations  just  indicated,  remove 
all  sources  of  those  miseries  which,  to  the  extent  of  their 
manifestation,  check  the  growth  of  sympathy.  For  while 
the  rate  of  multiplication  continues  so  to  exceed  the  rate  of 
mortality  as  to  cause  pressure  on  the  means  of  subsistence, 
there  must  continue  to  result  much  unhappiness ;  either 
from  balked  affections  or  from  over-work  and  stinted  means. 
Only  as  fast  as  fertility  diminishes,  which  we  have  seen  it 
must  do  along  with  further  mental  development  {Principles 
of  Biology,  §  §  367 — 377),  can  there  go  on  such  diminution 
of  the  labours  required  for  efficiently  supporting  self  and 
family,  that  they  will  not  constitute  a  displeasurable  tax  on 
the  energies. 

Gradually  then,  and  only  gradually,  as  these  various 
causes  of  unhappiness  become  less  can  sympathy  become 
greater.  Life  would  be  intolerable  if,  while  the  causes  of 
misery  remained  as  they  now  are,  all  men  were  not  only  in  a 
high  degree  sensitive  to  the  pains,  bodily  and  mental,  felt  by 
those  around  and  expressed  in  the  faces  of  those  they  met, 
but  were  unceasingly  conscious  of  the  miseries  every- 
where being  suffered  as  consequences  of  war,  crime,  mis- 
conduct, misfortune,  improvidence,  incapacity.  But,  as  the 
moulding  and  re-moulding  of  man  and  society  into  mutual 
fitness  progresses,  and  as  the  pains  caused  by  unfitness 
decrease,  sympathy  can  increase  in  presence  of  the  pleasures 
that  come  from  fitness.  The  two  changes  are  indeed  so 
related  that  each  furthers  the  other.  Such  growth  of 
sympathy  as  conditions  permit,  itself  aids  in  lessening  pain 
and  augmenting  pleasure ;  and  the  greater  surplus  of 
pleasure  that  results  makes  possible  further  growth  of 
sympathy. 

§  94.  The  extent  to  which  sympathy  may  develop  when 
the  hindrances  are  removed,  will  be  better  conceived  after 
observing  the  agencies  through  which  it  is  excited,  and 
setting  down  the  reasons  for  expecting  those  agencies  to 


CONCILIATION.  247 

become  more  efficient.  Two  factors  have  to  be  considered 
— the  natural  language  of  feeling  in  the  being  sympathized 
with,  and  the  power  of  interpreting  that  language  in  the 
being  who  sympathizes.  We  may  anticipate  development 
of  both. 

Movements  of  the  body  and  facial  changes  are  visible 
effects  of  feeling  which,  when  the  feeling  is  strong,  are 
uncontrollable.  When  the  feeling  is  less  strong  however, 
be  it  sensational  or  emotional,  they  may  be  wholly  or  par- 
tially repressed  ;  and  there  is  a  habit,  more  or  less  constant, 
of  repressing  them :  this  habit  being  the  concomitant  of  a 
nature  such  that  it  is  often  undesirable  that  others 
should  see  what  is  felt.  So  necessary  with  our  existing 
characters  and  conditions  are  concealments  thus  prompted, 
that  they  have  come  to  form  a  part  of  moral  duty  ;  and 
concealment  for  its  own  sake  is  often  insisted  upon  as  an 
element  in  good  manners.  All  this  is  caused  by  the  preva- 
lence of  feelings  at  variance  with  social  good — feelings  which 
cannot  be  shown  without  producing  discords  or  estrange- 
ments. But  in  proportion  as  the  egoistic  desires  fall 
more  under  control  of  the  altruistic,  and  there  come  fewer 
and  slighter  impulses  of  a  kind  to  be  reprobated,  the  need 
for  keeping  guard  over  facial  expression  and  bodily  move- 
ment will  decrease,  and  these  will  with  increasing  clearness 
convey  to  spectators  the  mental  state.  Nor  is  this  all. 
Restrained  as  its  use  is,  this  language  of  the  emotions  is  at 
present  prevented  from  growing.  But  as  fast  as  the  emo- 
tions become  such  that  they  may  be  more  candidly  displayed, 
there  will  go,  along  with  the  habit  of  display,  development 
of  the  means  of  display ;  so  that  besides  the  stronger  emo- 
tions, the  more  delicate  shades  and  smaller  degrees  of  emo- 
tion will  visibly  exhibit  themselves :  the  emotional  language 
will  become  at  once  more  copious,  more  varied,  more  defi- 
nite. And  obviously  sympathy  will  be  proportionately 
facilitated. 

An  equally  important,  if  not  a  more  important,  advance 


24r8  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

of  kindred  nature,  is  to  be  anticipated.  The  vocal  signs  of 
sentient  states  will  simultaneously  evolve  further.  Loudness 
of  tone,  pitch  of  tone,  quality  of  tone,  and  change  of  tone, 
are  severally  marks  of  feeling;  and,  combined  in  different 
ways  and  proportions,  serve  to  express  different  amounts  and 
kinds  of  feelings.  As  elsewhere  pointed  out,  cadences  are 
the  comments  of  the  emotions  on  the  propositions  of  the 
intellect.*  Not  in  excited  speech  only,  but  in  ordinary 
speech,  we  show  by  ascending  and  descending  intervals,  by 
degrees  of  deviation  from  the  medium  tone,  as  well  as  by 
place  and  strength  of  emphasis,  the  kind  of  sentiency  which 
accompanies  the  thought  expressed.  Now  the  manifestation 
of  feeling  by  cadence,  like  its  manifestation  by  visible 
changes,  is  at  present  under  restraint;  the  motives  for 
repression  act  in  the  one  case  as  they  act  in  the  other.  A 
double  effect  is  produced.  This  audible  language  of  feeling 
is  not  used  up  to  the  limit  of  its  existing  capacity ;  and  it  is 
to  a  considerable  degree  misused,  so  as  to  convey  other  feel- 
ings than  those  which  are  felt.  The  result  of  this  disuse  and 
misuse  is  to  check  that  evolution  which  normal  use  would 
cause.  We  must  infer,  then,  that  as  moral  adaptation  pro- 
gresses, and  there  is  decreasing  need  for  concealment  of 
the  feelings,  their  vocal  signs  will  develop  much  further. 
Though  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  cadences  will  ever  con- 
vey emotions  as  exactly  as  words  convey  thoughts,  yet  it  is 
quite  possible  that  the  emotional  language  of  the  future  may 
rise  as  much  above  our  present  emotional  language,  as  our 
intellectual  language  has  already  risen  above  the  intellectual 
language  of  the  lowest  races. 

A  simultaneous  increase  in  the  power  of  interpreting  both 
visible  and  audible  signs  of  feeling  must  be  taken  into 
account.  Among  those  around  we  see  differences  both  of 
ability  to  perceive  such  signs  and  of  ability  to  conceive  the 
implied  mental  states  and  their  causes  :  here,  a  stolidity  un- 

*  See  Essay  on  "  The  Origin  and  Function  of  Music." 


CONCILIATION.  249 

impressed  by  a  slight  facial  change  or  altered  tone  of  voice, 
or  else  unable  to  imagine  what  is  felt ;  and  there,  a  quick 
observation  and  a  penetrating  intuition,  making  instantly 
comprehensible  the  state  of  mind  and  its  origin.  If  we 
suppose  both  these  faculties  exalted — both  a  more  delicate 
perception  of  the  signs  and  a  strengthened  constructive 
imagination — we  shall  get  some  idea  of  the  deeper  and 
wider  sympathy  that  will  hereafter  arise.  More  vivid 
representations  of  the  feelings  of  others,  implying  ideal  ex- 
citements of  feelings  approaching  to  real  excitements,  must 
imply  a  greater  likeness  between  the  feelings  of  the  sym- 
pathizer and  those  of  the  sympathized  with ;  coming  near 
to  identity. 

By  simultaneous  increase  of  its  subjective  and  objective 
factors,  sympathy  may  thus,  as  the  hindrances  diminish,  rise 
above  that  now  shown  by  the  sympathetic  as  much  as  in 
them  it  has  risen  above  that  which  the  callous  show. 

§  95.  What  must  be  the  accompanying  evolution  of  con- 
duct ?  What  must  the  relations  between  egoism  and  altru- 
ism become  as  this  form  of  nature  is  neared  ? 

A  conclusion  drawn  in  the  chapter  on  the  relativity  of 
pleasures  and  pains,  and  there  emphasized  as  one  to  be  borne 
in  mind,  must  now  be  recalled.  It  was  pointed  out  that, 
supposing  them  to  be  consistent  with  continuance  of  life, 
there  are  no  activities  which  may  not  become  sources  of 
pleasure,  if  surrounding  conditions  require  persistence  in 
them.  And  here  it  is  to  be  added,  as  a  corollary,  that  if  the 
conditions  require  any  class  of  activities  to  be  relatively 
great,  there  will  arise  a  relatively  great  pleasure  accompany- 
ing that  class  of  activities.  What  bearing  have  these  general 
inferences  on  the  special  question  before  us  ? 

That  alike  for  public  welfare  and  private  welfare  sym- 
pathy is  essential,  we  have  seen.  We  have  seen  that  co- 
operation and  the  benefits  which  it  brings  to  each  and  all, 
become  high  in  proportion  as  the  altruistic,  that  is  the  sym- 


250  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

pathetic,  interests  extend.  The  actions  prompted  by  fellow- 
feeling  are  thus  to  be  counted  among  those  demanded  by 
social  conditions.  They  are  actions  which  maintenance  and 
further  development  of  social  organization  tend  ever  to  in- 
crease ;  and  therefore  actions  with  which  there  will  be 
joined  an  increasing  pleasure.  From  the  laws  of  life  it  must 
be  concluded  that  unceasing  social  discipline  will  so  mould 
human  nature,  that  eventually  sympathetic  pleasures  will  be 
spontaneously  pursued  to  the  fullest  extent  advantageous  to 
each  and  all.  The  scope  for  altruistic  activities  will  not 
exceed  the  desire  for  altruistic  satisfactions. 

In  natures  thus  constituted,  though  the  altruistic  gratifica- 
tions must  remain  in  a  transfigured  sense  egoistic,  yet  they 
will  not  be  egoistically  pursued — will  not  be  pursued  from 
egoistic  motives.  Though  pleasure  will  be  gained  by  giving 
pleasure,  yet  the  thought  of  the  sympathetic  pleasure  to  be 
gained  will  not  occupy  consciousness,  but  only  the  thought 
of  the  pleasure  given.  To  a  great  extent  this  is  so  now.  In 
the  truly  sympathetic,  attention  is  so  absorbed  with  the 
proximate  end,  others'  happiness,  that  there  is  none  given  to 
the  prospective  self-happiness  which  may  ultimately  result. 
An  analogy  will  make  the  relation  clear. 

A  miser  accumulates  money,  not  deliberately  saying  to 
himself — "  I  shall  by  doing  this  get  the  delight  which  pos- 
session gives."  He  thinks  only  of  the  money  and  the 
means  of  getting  it ;  and  he  experiences  incidentally  the 
pleasure  that  comes  from  possession.  Owning  property  is 
that  which  he  revels  in  imagining,  and  not  the  feeling 
which  owning  property  will  cause.  Similarly,  one  who  is 
sympathetic  in  the  highest  sense,  is  mentally  engaged  solely 
in  representing  pleasure  as  experienced  by  another ;  and 
pursues  it  for  the  benefit  of  that  other,  forgetting  any  par- 
ticipation he  will  have  in  it.  Subjectively  considered,  then, 
the  conciliation  of  egoism  and  altruism  will  eventually 
become  such  that  though  the  altruistic  pleasure,  as  being 
a  part  of  the  consciousness  of  one  who  experiences  it,  can 


CONCILIATION.  251 

never  be  other  than   egoistic,  it  will   not  be  consciously 
egoistic. 

Let  us  now  ask  what  must  happen  in  a  society  composed 
of  persons  constituted  in  this  manner. 

§  96.  The  opportunities  for  that  postponement  of  self  to 
others  which  constitutes  altruism  as  ordinarily  conceived, 
must,  in  several  ways,  be  more  and  more  limited  as  the 
highest  state  is  approached. 

Extensive  demands  on  the  benevolent,  presuppose  much 
unhappiness.  Before  there  can  be  many  and  large  calls  on 
some  for  efforts  on  behalf  of  others,  there  must  be  many 
others  in  conditions  needing  help — in  conditions  of  com- 
parative misery.  But,  as  we  have  seen  above,  the  develop- 
ment of  fellow-feeling  can  go  on  only  as  fast  as  misery 
decreases.  Sympathy  can  reach  its  full  height  only  when 
there  have  ceased  to  be  frequent  occasions  for  anything  like 
serious  self-sacrifice. 

Change  the  point  of  view,  and  this  truth  presents  itself 
under  another  aspect.  We  have  already  seen  that  with  the 
progress  of  adaptation  each  becomes  so  constituted  that  he 
cannot  be  helped  without  in  some  way  arresting  a  pleasur- 
able activity.  There  cannot  be  a  beneficial  interference 
between  faculty  and  function  when  the  two  are  adjusted. 
Consequently,  in  proportion  as  mankind  approach  complete 
adjustment  of  their  natures  to  social  needs,  there  must  be 
fewer  and  smaller  opportunities  for  giving  aid. 

Yet  again,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the  last  chapter,  the 
sympathy  which  prompts  efforts  for  others'  welfare  must  be 
gained  by  self-injury  on  the  part  of  others  ;  and  must,  there- 
fore, cause  aversion  to  accept  benefits  derived  from  their 
self-injuries.  What  is  to  be  inferred  ?  While  each  when 
occasion  offers  is  ready,  anxious  even,  to  surrender  egoistic 
satisfactions  ;  others,  similarly-natured,  cannot  but  resist  the 
surrender.  If  anyone,  proposing  to  treat  himself  more 
hardly  than  a  disinterested  spectator  would  direct,  refrains 


252  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

from  appropriating  that  which  is  due,  others,  caring  for  him 
if  he  will  not  care  for  himself,  must  necessarily  insist  that 
he  shall  appropriate  it.  General  altruism  then,  in  its  de- 
veloped form,  must  inevitably  resist  individual  excesses  of 
altruism.  The  relation  at  present  familiar  to  us  will  be 
inverted  ;  and  instead  of  each  maintaining  his  own  claims, 
others  will  maintain  his  claims  for  him :  not,  indeed,  by 
active  efforts,  which  will  be  needless,  but  by  passively  resist- 
ing any  undue  yielding  up  of  them.  There  is  nothing  in 
such  behaviour  which  is  not  even  now  to  be  traced  in  our 
daily  experiences  as  beginning.  In  business  transactions 
among  honourable  men,  there  is  usually  a  desire  on  either 
side  that  the  other  shall  treat  himself  fairly.  Not  unfre- 
quently,  there  is  a  refusal  to  take  something  regarded  as  the 
other's  due,  but  which  the  other  offers  to  give  up.  In  social 
intercourse,  too,  the  cases  are  common  in  which  those  who 
would  surrender  their  shares  of  pleasure  are  not  permitted 
by  the  rest  to  do  so.  Further  development  of  sympathy 
cannot  but  make  this  mode  of  behaving  increasingly  general 
and  increasingly  genuine. 

Certain  complex  restraints  on  excesses  of  altruism  exist, 
which,  in  another  way,  force  back  the  individual  upon  a 
normal  egoism.  Two  may  here  be  noted.  In  the  first 

place,  self-abnegations  often  repeated  imply  on  the  part  of 
the  actor  a  tacit  ascription  of  relative  selfishness  to  others 
who  profit  by  the  self-abnegations.  Even  with  men  as  they 
are,  there  occasionally  arises  a  feeling  among  those  for 
whom  sacrifices  are  frequently  made,  that  they  are  being 
insulted  by  the  assumption  that  they  are  ready  to  receive 
them  ;  and  in  the  mind  of  the  actor  also,  there  sometimes 
grows  up  a  recognition  of  this  feeling  on  their  part,  and  a 
consequent  check  on  his  too  great  or  too  frequent  surrenders 
of  pleasure.  Obviously  in  more  developed  natures,  this  kind 
of  check  must  act  still  more  promptly.  In  the  second 

place,  when,  as  the  hypothesis  implies,  altruistic  pleasures 
have  reached  a  greater  intensity  than  they  now  possess,  each 


CONCILIATION.  253 

person  will  be  debarred  from  undue  pursuit  of  them  by  the 
consciousness  that  other  persons,  too,  desire  them,  and  that 
scope  for  others'  enjoyment  of  them  must  be  left.  Even 
now  may  be  observed  among  groups  of  friends,  where  some 
competition  in  amiability  is  going  on,  relinquishments  of 
opportunities  for  self-abnegation  that  others  may  have  them. 
"  Let  her  give  up  the  gratification,  she  will  like  to  do  so  ; " 
"  Let  him  undertake  the  trouble,  it  will  please  him ; "  are 
suggestions  which  from  time  to  time  illustrate  this  conscious- 
ness. The  most  developed  sympathy  will  care  for  the  sym- 
pathetic satisfactions  of  others  as  well  as  for  their  selfish 
satisfactions.  What  may  be  called  a  higher  equity  will 
refrain  from  trespassing  on  the  spheres  of  others'  altruistic 
Activities,  as  a  lower  equity  refrains  from  trespassing  on  the 
spheres  of  their  egoistic  activities.  And  by  this  checking  of 
what  may  be  called  an  egoistic  altruism,  undue  sacrifices  on 
the  part  of  each  must  be  prevented. 

What  spheres,  then,  will  eventually  remain  for  altruism  as 
it  is  commonly  conceived  3  There  are  three.  One  of  them 
must  to  the  last  continue  large  in  extent;  and  the  others 
must  progressively  diminish,  though  they  do  not  dis- 
appear. The  first  is  that  which  family-life  affords. 
Always  there  must  be  a  need  for  subordination  of  self- 
regarding  feelings  to  other-regarding  feelings  in  the  rearing 
of  children.  Though  this  will  diminish  with  diminution  in 
the  number  to  be  reared,  yet  it  will  increase  with  the  greater 
elaboration  and  prolongation  of  the  activities  on  their  behalf. 
But  as  shown  above,  there  is  even  now  partially  effected  a 
conciliation  such  that  those  egoistic  satisfactions  which  pa- 
renthood yields  are  achieved  through  altruistic  activities — a 
conciliation  tending  ever  towards  completeness.  An  impor- 
tant development  of  family-altruism  must  be  added :  the  re- 
ciprocal care  of  parents  by  children  during  old  age — a  care 
becoming  lighter  and  better  fulfilled,  in  which  a  kindred 
conciliation  may  be  looked  for.  Pursuit  of  social 
welfare  at  large  must  afford  hereafter,  as  it  does  now,  scope 


254  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

for  the  postponement  of  selfish  interests  to  unselfish  inter- 
ests, but  a  continually  lessening  scope  ;  because  as  adaptation 
to  the  social  state  progresses,  the  needs  for  those  regulative 
actions  by  which  social  life  is  made  harmonious  become  less. 
And  here  the  amount  of  altruistic  action  which  each  under- 
takes must  inevitably  be  kept  within  moderate  bounds  by 
others ;  for  if  they  are  similarly  altruistic,  they  will  not 
allow  some  to  pursue  public  ends  to  their  own  considera- 
ble detriment  that  the  rest  may  profit.  In  the 
private  relations  of  men,  opportunities  for  self  sacrifice 
prompted  by  sympathy,  must  ever  in  some  degree,  though 
eventually  in  a  small  degree,  be  afforded  by  accidents,  dis- 
eases, and  misfortunes  in  general ;  since,  however  near  to 
completeness  the  adaptation  of  human  nature  to  the  con- 
ditions of  existence  at  large,  physical  and  social,  may  be- 
come, it  can  never  reach  completeness.  Flood,  fire,  and 
wreck  must  to  the  last  yield  at  intervals  opportunities  for 
heroic  acts ;  and  in  the  motives  to  such  acts,  anxiety  for 
others  will  be  less  alloyed  with  love  of  admiration  than  now. 
Extreme,  however,  as  may  be  the  eagerness  for  altruistic 
action  on  the  rare  occasions  hence  arising,  the  amount  fall- 
ing to  the  share  of  each  must,  for  the  reasons  given,  be  nar- 
rowly limited.  But  though  in  the  incidents  of  ordi- 
nary life,  postponements  of  self  to  others  in  large  ways  must 
become  very  infrequent,  daily  intercourse  will  still  furnish 
multitudinous  small  occasions  for  the  activity  of  fellow  feel- 
ing. Always  each  may  continue  to  further  the  welfare  of 
others  by  warding  off  from  them  evils  they  cannot  see,  and 
by  aiding  their  actions  in  ways  unknown  to  them ;  or,  con- 
versely putting  it,  each  may  have,  as  it  were,  supplementary 
eyes  and  ears  in  other  persons,  which  perceive  for  him  things 
he  cannot  perceive  himself  :  so  perfecting  his  life  in  numer- 
ous details,  by  making  its  adjustments  to  environing  actions 
complete. 

§  97.  Must  it  then  follow  that  eventually,  with  this  dinii- 


CONCILIATION.  255 

nution  of  the  spheres  for  it,  altruism  must  diminish  in  total 
amount  ?  By  no  means.  Such  a  conclusion  implies  a  mis- 
conception. 

Naturally,  under  existing  conditions,  with  suffering  widely 
diffused  and  so  much  of  effort  demanded  from  the  more  for- 
tunate in  succouring  the  less  fortunate,  altruism  is  under- 
stood to  mean  only  self-sacrifice  ;  or,  at  any  rate,  a  mode  of 
action  which,  while  it  brings  some  pleasure,  has  an  accom- 
paniment of  self-surrender  that  is  not  pleasurable.  But  the 
sympathy  which  prompts  denial  of  self  to  please  others,  is  a 
sympathy  which  also  receives  pleasure  from  their  pleasures 
when  they  are  otherwise  originated.  The  stronger  the  fel- 
low-feeling which  excites  efforts  to  make  others  happy,  the 
stronger  is  the  fellow-feeling  with  their  happiness  however 
caused. 

In  its  ultimate  form,  then,  altruism  will  be  the  achieve- 
ment of  gratification  through  sympathy  with  those  gratifica- 
tions of  others  which  are  mainly  produced  by  their  activities 
of  all  kinds  successfully  carried  on — sympathetic  gratifica- 
tion which  costs  the  receiver  nothing,  but  is  a  gratis  addition 
to  his  egoistic  gratifications.  This  power  of  representing  in 
idea  the  mental  states  of  others,  which,  during  the  process  of 
adaptation  has  had  the  function  of  mitigating  suffering, 
must,  as  the  suffering  falls  to  a  minimum,  come  to  have  al- 
most wholly  the  function  of  mutually  exalting  men's  enjoy- 
ments by  giving  everyone  a  vivid  intuition  of  his  neighbour's 
enjoyments.  While  pain  prevails  widely,  it  is  undesirable 
that  each  should  participate  much  in  the  consciousness  of 
others ;  but  with  an  increasing  predominance  of  pleasure, 
participation  in  others'  consciousnesses  becomes  a  gain  of 
pleasure  to  all. 

And  so  there  will  disappear  that  apparently-permanent 
opposition  between  egoism  and  altruism,  implied  by  the  com- 
promise reached  in  the  last  chapter.  Subjectively  looked  at, 
the  conciliation  will  be  such  that  the  individual  will  not  have 
to  balance  between  self-regarding  impulses  and  other-regard- 
18 


256  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ing  impulses;  but,  instead,  those  satisfactions  of  other-regard- 
ing impulses  which  involve  self-sacrifice,  becoming  rare  and 
much  prized,  will  be  so  unhesitatingly  preferred  that  the 
competition  of  self-regarding  impulses  with  them  will 
scarcely  be  felt.  And  the  subjective  conciliation  will  also 
be  such  that  though  altruistic  pleasure  will  be  attained,  yet  / 
the  motive  of  action  will  not  consciously  be  the  attainment 
of  altruistic  pleasure  ;  but  the  idea  present  will  be  the  secur- 
ing of  others'  pleasures.  Meanwhile,  the  conciliation  objec- 
tively considered  will  be  equally  complete.  Though  each, 
no  longer  needing  to  maintain  his  egoistic  claims,  will  tend 
rather  when  occasion  offers  to  surrender  them,  yet  others, 
similarly  natured,  will  not  permit  him  in  any  large  measure 
to  do  this ;  and  that  fulfilment  of  personal  desires  required 
for  completion  of  his  life  will  thus  be  secured  to  him  : 
though  not  now  egoistic  in  the  ordinary  sense,  yet  the  effects 
of  due  egoism  will  be  achieved.  Nor  is  this  all.  As,  at  an 
earlier  stage,  egoistic  competition,  first  reaching  a  compromise 
such  that  each  claims  no  more  than  his  equitable  share,  after- 
wards rises  to  a  conciliation  such  that  each  insists  on 
the  taking  of  equitable  shares  by  others ;  so,  at  the  latest 
stage,  altruistic  competition,  first  reaching  a  compromise 
under  which  each  restrains  himself  from  taking  an  undue 
share  of  altruistic  satisfactions,  eventually  rises  to  a  concilia- 
tion under  which  each  takes  care  that  others  shall  have 
their  opportunities  for  altruistic  satisfactions :  the  highest 
altruism  being  that  which  ministers  not  to  the  egoistic  satis- 
factions of  others  only,  but  also  to  their  altruistic  satisfac- 
tions. 

Far  off  as  seems  such  a  state,  yet  every  one  of  the  factors 
counted  on  to  produce  it  may  already  be  traced  in  opera- 
tion among  those  of  highest  natures.  What  now  in  them 
is  occasional  and  feeble,  may  be  expected  with  further  evo- 
lution to  become  habitual  and  strong ;  and  what  now  char- 
acterizes the  exceptionally  high  may  be  expected  eventually 
to  characterize  all.  For  that  which  the  best  human  na- 


OONCITJATION.  257 

tare  is  capable  of,  is  within  the  reach  of  human  nature  at 
large. 

§  98.  That  these  conclusions  will  meet  with  any  consider- 
able acceptance  is  improbable.  Neither  with  current  ideas 
nor  with  current  sentiments  are  they  sufficiently  congruous. 

Such  a  view  will  not  be  agreeable  to  those  who  lament  the 
spreading  disbelief  in  eternal  damnation ;  nor  to  those  who 
follow  the  apostle  of  brute  force  in  thinking  that  because 
the  rule  of  the  strong  hand  was  once  good  it  is  good  for  all 
time ;  nor  to  those  whose  reverence  for  one  who  told  them 
to  put  up  the  sword,  is  shown  by  using  the  sword  to  spread 
his  doctrine  among  heathens.  From  the  ten  thousand 
priests  of  the  religion  of  love,  who  are  silent  when  the 
nation  is  moved  by  the  religion  of  hate,  will  come  no  sign 
of  assent ;  nor  from  their  bishops  who,  far  from  urging  the 
extreme  precept  of  the  master  they  pretend  to  follow,  to 
turn  the  other  cheek  when  one  is  smitten,  vote  for  acting 
on  the  principle — strike  lest  ye  be  struck.  Nor  will  any 
approval  be  felt  by  legislators  who,  after  praying  to  be 
forgiven  their  trespasses  as  they  forgive  the  trespasses  of 
others,  forthwith  decide  to  attack  those  who  have  not  tres- 
passed against  them ;  and  who,  after  a  Queen's  Speech 
has  invoked  "the  blessing  of  Almighty  God"  on  their 
councils,  immediately  provide  means  for  committing  politi- 
cal burglary. 

But  though  men  who  profess  Christianity  and  practise 
Paganism  can  feel  no  sympathy  with  such  a  view,  there  are 
some,  classed  as  antagonists  to  the  current  creed,  who 
may  not  think  it  absurd  to  believe  that  a  rationalized 
version  of  its  ethical  principles  will  eventually  be  acted 
upon. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS. 

§  99.  As  applied  to  Ethics,  the  word  "  absolute "  will  by 
many  be  supposed  to  imply  principles  of  right  conduct 
that  exist  out  of  relation  to  life  as  conditioned  on  the 
Earth — out  of  relation  to  time  and  place,  and  independent 
of  the  Universe  as  now  visible  to  us — "  eternal "  principles, 
as  they  are  called.  Those,  however,  who  recall  the  doctrine 
set  forth  in  First  Principles,  will  hesitate  to  put  this  inter- 
pretation on  the  word.  Right,  as  we  can  think  it,  necessi- 
tates the  thought  of  not-right,  or  wrong,  for  its  correlative ; 
and  hence,  to  ascribe  Tightness  to  the  acts  of  the  Power 
manifested  through  phenomena,  is  to  assume  the  possibility 
that  wrong  acts  may  be  committed  by  this  Power.  But  how 
come  there  to  exist,  apart  from  this  Power,  conditions  of 
such  kind  that  subordination  of  its  acts  to  them  makes  them 
right  and  insubordination  wrong  ?  How  can  Unconditioned 
Being  be  subject  to  conditions  beyond  itself  ? 

If,  for  example,  any  one  should  assert  that  the  Cause  of 
Things,  conceived  in  respect  of  fundamental  moral  attributes 
as  like  ourselves,  did  right  in  producing  a  Universe  which, 
in  the  course  of  immeasurable  time,  has  given  origin  to 
beings  capable  of  pleasure,  and  would  have  done  wrong  in 
abstaining  from  the  production  of  such  a  Universe ;  then, 
the  comment  to  be  made  is  that,  imposing  the  moral  ideas 

258 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  259 

generated  in  his  finite  consciousness,  upon  the  Infinite 
Existence  which  transcends  consciousness,  he  goes  behind 
that  Infinite  Existence  and  prescribes  for  it  principles  of 
action. 

As  implied  in  foregoing  chapters,  right  and  wrong  as 
conceived  by  us  can  exist  only  in  relation  to  the  actions  of 
creatures  capable  of  pleasures  and  pains ;  seeing  that  analysis 
carries  us  back  to  pleasures  and  pains  as  the  elements  out  of 
which  the  conceptions  are  framed. 

But  if  the  word  "  absolute,"  as  used  above,  does  not  refer 
to  the  Unconditioned  Being — if  the  principles  of  action  dis- 
tinguished as  absolute  and  relative  concern  the  conduct  of 
conditioned  beings ;  in  what  way  are  the  words  to  be  under- 
stood ?  An  explanation  of  their  meanings  will  be  best  con- 
veyed by  a  criticism  on  the  current  conceptions  of  right  and 
wrong. 

§  100.  Conversations  about  the  affairs  of  life  habitually 
imply  the  belief  that  every  deed  named  may  be  placed  under 
the  one  head  or  the  other.  In  discussing  a  political  ques- 
tion, both  sides  take  it  for  granted  that  some  line  of  action 
may  be  chosen  which  is  right,  while  all  other  lines  of  action 
are  wrong.  So,  too,  is  it  with  judgments  on  the  doings  of 
individuals :  each  of  these  is  approved  or  disapproved  on 
the  assumption  that  it  is  definitely  classable  as  good  or  bad. 
Even  where  qualifications  are  admitted,  they  are  admitted 
with  an  implied  idea  that  some  such  positive  characterization 
is  to  be  made. 

Nor  is  it  in  popular  thought  and  speech  only  that  we  see 
this.  If  not  wholly  and  definitely  yet  partially  and  by 
implication,  the  belief  is  expressed  by  moralists.  In  his 
Methods  of  Ethics  (1st  Ed.  p.  6)  Mr.  Sidgwick  says  :— 
"  That  there  is  in  any  given  circumstances  some  one  thing 
which  ought  to  be  done  and  that  this  can  be  known,  is  a 
fundamental  assumption,  made  not  by  philosophers  only, 
but  by  all  men  who  perform  any  processes  of  moral  reason- 


260  THE    DATA   OF    ETHICS. 

ing."*  In  this  sentence  there  is  specifically  asserted  only 
the  last  of  the  above  propositions ;  namely,  that,  in  every 
case,  what  "ought  to  be  done"  "can  be  known."  But 
though  that  "which  ought  to  be  done"  is  not  distinctly 
identified  with  "  the  right,"  it  may  be  inferred,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  indication  to  the  contrary,  that  Mr.  Sidgwick 
regards  the  two  as  identical ;  and  doubtless,  in  so  conceiving 
the  postulates  of  moral  science,  he  is  at  one  with  most,  if 
not  all,  who  have  made  it  a  subject  of  study.  At  first  sight, 
indeed,  nothing  seems  more  obvious  than  that  if  actions 
are  to  be  judged  at  all,  these  postulates  must  be  accepted. 
Nevertheless  they  may  both  be  called  in  question,  and  I 
think  it  may  be  shown  that  neither  of  them  is  tenable. 
Instead  of  admitting  that  there  is  in  every  case  a  right  and 
a  wrong,  it  may  be  contended  that  in  multitudinous  cases 
no  r  ight,  properly  so-called,  can  be  alleged,  but  only  a  least 
wrong ;  and  further,  it  may  be  contended  that  in  many  of 
these  cases  where  there  can  be  alleged  only  a  least  wrong,  it 
is  not  possible  to  ascertain  with  any  precision  which  is  the 
least  wrong. 

A  great  part  of  the  perplexities  in  ethical  speculation 
arise  from  neglect  of  this  distinction  between  right  and  least 
wrong  —  between  the  absolutely  right  and  the  relatively 
right.  And  many  further  perplexities  are  due  to  the  assump- 
tion that  it  can,  in  some  way,  be  decided  in  every  case  which 
of  two  courses  is  morally  obligatory. 

§  101.  The  law  of  absolute  right  can  take  no  cognizance 
of  pain,  save  the  cognizance  implied  by  negation.  Pain  is 
the  correlative  of  some  species  of  wrong — some  kind  of  di- 
vergence from  that  course  of  action  which  perfectly  fulfils 
all  requirements.  If,  as  was  shown  in  an  early  chapter,  the 

*  I  do  not  find  this  passage  in  the  second  edition;  but  the  omission  of 
it  appears  to  have  arisen  not  from  any  change  of  view,  but  because  it  did 
not  naturally  come  into  the  re-cast  form  of  the  argument  which  the  section 
contains. 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  261 

conception  of  good  conduct  always  proves,  when  analyzed, 
to  be  the  conception  of  a  conduct  which  produces  a  surplus 
of  pleasure  somewhere ;  while,  conversely,  the  conduct  con- 
ceived as  bad  proves  always  to  be  that  which  inflicts  some- 
where a  surplus  of  either  positive  or  negative  pain ;  then  the 
absolutely  good,  the  absolutely  right,  in  conduct,  can  be  that 
only  which  produces  pure  pleasure — pleasure  unalloyed  with 
pain  anywhere.  By  implication,  conduct  which  has  any  con- 
comitant of  pain,  or  any  painful  consequence,  is  partially 
wrong ;  and  the  highest  claim  to  be  made  for  such  conduct 
is,  that  it  is  the  least  wrong  which,  under  the  conditions,  is 
possible — the  relatively  right. 

The  contents  of  preceding  chapters  imply  throughout 
that,  considered  from  the  evolution  point  of  view,  the  acts 
of  men  during  the  transition  which  has  been,  is  still,  and 
long  will  be,  in  progress,  must,  in  most  cases,  be  of  the 
kind  here  classed  as  least  wrong.  In  proportion  to  the 
incongruity  between  the  natures  men  inherit  from  the 
'pre-social  state,  and  the  requirements  of  social  life,  must 
be  the  amount  of  pain  entailed  by  their  actions,  either  on 
themselves  or  on  others.  In  so  far  as  pain  is  suffered,  evil 
is  inflicted ;  and  conduct  which  inflicts  any  evil  cannot  be 
absolutely  good. 

To  make  clear  the  distinction  here  insisted  upon  between 
that  perfect  conduct  which  is  the  subject-matter  of  Absolute 
Ethics,  and  that  imperfect  conduct  which  is  the  subject- 
matter  of  Relative  Ethics,  some  illustrations  must  be  given. 

§  102.  Among  the  best  examples  of  absolutely  right 
actions  to  be  named,  are  those  arising  where  the  nature  and 
the  requirements  have  been  moulded  to  one  another  before 
social  evolution  began.  Two  will  here  suffice. 

Consider  the  relation  of  a  healthy  mother  to  a  healthy 
infant.  Between  the  two  there  exists  a  mutual  dependence 
which  is  a  source  of  pleasure  to  both.  In  yielding  its  natural 
food  to  the  child,  the  mother  receives  gratification ;  and  to 


262  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

the  child  there  comes  the  satisfaction  of  appetite — a  satis- 
faction which  accompanies  furtherance  of  life,  growth,  and 
increasing  enjoyment.  Let  the  relation  be  suspended,  and 
on  both  sides  there  is  suffering.  The  mother  experiences 
both  bodily  pain  and  mental  pain ;  and  the  painful  sensation 
borne  by  the  child,  brings  as  its  results  physical  mischief 
and  some  damage  to  the  emotional  nature.  Thus  the 
act  is  one  that  is  to  both  exclusively  pleasurable,  while 
abstention  entails  pain  on  both ;  and  it  is  consequently  of 
the  kind  we  here  call  absolutely  right.  In  the 

parental  relations  of  the  father  we  are  furnished  with  a 
kindred  example.  If  he  is  well  constituted  in  body  and 
mind,  his  boy,  eager  for  play,  finds  in  him  a  sympathetic 
response  ;  and  their  frolics,  giving  mutual  pleasure,  not  only 
further  the  child's  physical  welfare  but  strengthen  that  bond 
of  good  feeling  between  the  two  which  makes  subsequent 
guidance  easier.  And  then  it,  repudiating  the  stupidities 
of  early  education  as  at  present  conceived  and  unhappily 
State-enacted,  he  has  rational  ideas  of  mental  development, 
and  sees  that  the  second-hand  knowledge  gained  through 
books  should  begin  to  supplement  the  first-hand  knowledge 
gained  by  direct  observation,  only  when  a  good  stock  of 
this  has  been  acquired,  he  will,  with  active  sympathy,  aid 
in  that  exploration  of  the  surrounding  world  which  his  boy 
pursues  with  delight;  giving  and  receiving  gratification 
from  moment  to  moment  while  furthering  ultimate  welfare. 
Here,  again,  are  actions  of  a  kind  purely  pleasurable  alike 
in  their  immediate  and  remote  effects — actions  absolutely 
right. 

The  intercourse  of  adults  yields,  for  the  reason  assigned, 
relatively  few  cases  that  fall  completely  within  the  same 
category.  In  their  transactions  from  hour  to  hour,  more 
or  less  of  deduction  from  pure  gratification  is  caused  on  one 
or  other  side  by  imperfect  fitness  to  the  requirements.  The 
pleasures  men  gain  by  labouring  in  their  vocations  and 
receiving  in  one  form  or  other  returns  for  their  services, 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  263 

usually  have  the  drawback  that  the  labours  are  in  a  con- 
siderable degree  displeasurable.  Cases,  however,  do  occur 
where  the  energies  are  so  abundant  that  inaction  is  irksome ; 
and  where  the  daily  work,  not  too  great  in  duration,  is  of  a 
kind  appropriate  to  the  nature ;  and  where,  as  a  consequence, 
pleasure  rather  than  pain  is  a  concomitant.  When  services 
yielded  by  such  a  one  are  paid  for  by  another  similarly 
adapted  to  his  occupation,  the  entire  transaction  is  of  the 
kind  we  are  here  considering :  exchange  under  agreement 
between  two  so  constituted,  becomes  a  means  of  pleasure  to 
both,  with  no  set-off  of  pain.  Bearing  in  mind  the  form  of 
nature  which  social  discipline  is  producing,  as  shown  in  the 
contrast  between  savage  and  civilized,  the  implication  is  that 
ultimately  men's  activities  at  large  will  assume  this  character. 
Remembering  that  in  the  course  of  organic  evolution,  the 
means  to  enjoyment  themselves  eventually  become  sources 
of  enjoyment ;  and  that  there  is  no  form  of  action  which 
may  not  through  the  development  of  appropriate  structures 
become  pleasurable ;  the  inference  must  be  that  industrial 
activities  carried  on  through  voluntary  co-operation,  will  in 
time  acquire  the  character  of  absolute  Tightness  as  here 
conceived.  Already,  indeed,  something  like  such  a  state 
has  been  reached  among  certain  of  those  who  minister  to  our 
aesthetic  gratifications.  The  artist  of  genius — poet,  painter, 
or  musician — is  one  who  obtains  the  means  of  living  by 
acts  that  are  directly  pleasurable  to  him,  while  they  yield, 
immediately  or  remotely,  pleasures  to  others.  Once 

more,  among  absolutely  right  acts  may  be  named  certain  of 
those  which  we  class  as  benevolent.  I  say  certain  of  them, 
because  such  benevolent  acts  as  entail  submission  to  pain, 
positive  or  negative,  that  others  may  receive  pleasure,  are, 
by  the  definition,  excluded.  But  there  are  benevolent  acts 
of  a  kind  yielding  pleasure  solely.  Some  one  who  has 
slipped  is  saved  from  falling  by  a  bystander;  a  hurt  is 
prevented  and  satisfaction  is  felt  by  both.  A  pedestrian 
is  choosing  a  dangerous  route,  or  a  fellow-passenger  is 


264  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

about  to  alight  at  the  wrong  station,  and,  warned  against 
doing  so,  is  saved  from  evil :  each  being,  as  a  consequence, 
gratified.  There  is  a  misunderstanding  between  friends, 
and  one  who  sees  how  it  has  arisen,  explains :  the  result  being 
agreeable  to  all.  Services  to  those  around  in  the  small  affairs 
of  life,  may  be,  and  often  are,  of  a  kind  which  there  is  equal 
pleasure  in  giving  and  receiving.  Indeed,  as  was  urged  in 
the  last  chapter,  the  actions  of  developed  altruism  must 
habitually  have  this  character.  And  so,  in  countless  ways 
suggested  by  these  few,  men  may  add  to  one  another's  happi- 
ness without  anywhere  producing  unhappiness — ways  which 
are  therefore  absolutely  right. 

In  contrast  with  these  consider  the  many  actions  which 
from  hour  to  hour  are  gone  through,  now  with  an  accompani- 
ment of  some  pain  to  the  actor  and  now  bringing  results 
that  are  partially  painful  to  others,  but  which  nevertheless 
are  imperative.  As  implied  by  antithesis  with  cases  above 
referred  to,  the  wearisomeness  of  productive  labour  as 
ordinarily  pursued,  renders  it  in  so  far  wrong;  but  then 
far  greater  suffering  would  result,  both  to  the  labourer  and 
his  family,  and  therefore  far  greater  wrong  would  be  done, 
were  this  wearisomeness  not  borne.  Though  the  pains 
which  the  care  of  many  children  entail  on  a  mother,  form 
a  considerable  set-off  from  the  pleasures  secured  by  them 
to  her  children  and  herself ;  yet  the  miseries,  immediate  and 
remote,  which  neglect  would  entail  so  far  exceed  them,  that 
submission  to  such  pains  up  to  the  limit  of  physical  ability 
to  bear  them,  becomes  morally  imperative  as  being  the  least 
wrong.  A  servant  who  fails  to  fulfil  an  agreement  in  respect 
of  work,  or  who  is  perpetually  breaking  crockery,  or  who 
pilfers,  may  have  to  suffer  pain  from  being  discharged  ;  but 
since  the  evil  is  to  be  borne  by  all  concerned  if  incapacity  or 
misconduct  is  tolerated,  not  in  one  case  only  but  habitually, 
must  be  much  greater,  such  infliction  of  pain  is  warranted 
as  a  means  to  preventing  greater  pain.  Withdrawal  of 
custom  from  a  tradesman  whose  charges  are  too  high,  or 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  265 

whose  commodities  are  inferior,  or  who  gives  short  measure, 
or  who  is  unpunctual,  decreases  his  welfare,  and  perhaps 
injures  his  belongings ;  but  as  saving  him  from  these  evils 
would  imply  bearing  the  evils  his  conduct  causes,  and  as 
such  regard  for  his  well-being  would  imply  disregard  of  the 
well-being  of  some  more  worthy  or  more  efficient  tradesman 
to  whom  the  custom  would  else  go,  and  as,  chiefly,  general 
adoption  of  the  implied  course,  having  the  effect  that  the 
inferior  would  n'ot  suffer  from  their  inferiority  nor  the 
superior  gain  by  their  superiority,  would  produce  universal 
misery,  withdrawal  is  justified — the  act  is  relatively  right. 

§  103.  I  pass  now  to  the  second  of  the  two  propositions 
above  enunciated.  After  recognizing  the  truth  that  a  large 
part  of  human  conduct  is  not  absolutely  right,  but  only  rela- 
tively right,  we  have  to  recognize  the  further  truth  that  in 
many  cases  where  there  is  no  absolutely  right  course,  but 
only  courses  that  are  more  or  less  wrong,  it  is  not  possible 
to  say  which  is  the  least  wrong.  Recurrence  to  the  instances 
just  given  will  show  this. 

There  is  a  point  up  to  which  it  is  relatively  right  for  a 
parent  to  carry  self-sacrifice  for  the  benefit  of  offspring ; 
and  there  is  a  point  beyond  which  self-sacrifice  cannot  be 
pushed  without  bringing,  not  only  on  himself  or  herself  but 
also  on  the  family,  evils  greater  than  those  to  be  prevented 
by  the  self-sacrifice.  Who  shall  say  where  this  point  is  ? 
Depending  on  the  constitutions  and  needs  of  those  con- 
cerned, it  is  in  no  two  cases  the  same,  and  cannot  be  by 
anyone  more  than  guessed.  The  transgressions  or  short- 
comings of  a  servant  vary  from  the  trivial  to  the  grave,  and 
the  evils  which  discharge  may  bring  range  through  count- 
less degrees  from  slight  to  serious.  The  penalty  may  be 
inflicted  for  a  very  small  offence,  and  then  there  is  wrong 
done ;  or  after  numerous  grave  offences  it  may  not  be 
inflicted,  and  again  there  is  wrong  done.  How  shall  be 
determined  the  degree  of  transgression  beyond  which  to 


"2GQ  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

discharge  is  less  wrong  than  not  to  discharge  ?  In  like 
manner  with  the  shopkeeper's  misdemeanours.  No  one  can 
sum  up  either  the  amount  of  positive  and  negative  pain 
which  tolerating  them  involves,  nor  the  amount  of  positive 
and  negative  pain  involved  by  not  tolerating  them  ;  and 
in  medium  cases  no  one  can  say  where  the  one  exceeds  the 
other. 

In  men's  wider  relations  frequently  occur  circumstances 
under  which  a  decision  one  or  other  way  is  imperative,  and 
yet  under  which  not  even  the  most  sensitive  conscience 
helped  by  the  clearest  judgment,  can  decide  which  of 
the  alternatives  is  relatively  right.  Two  examples  will 
suffice.  Here  is  a  merchant  who  loses  by  the  failure 

of  a  man  indebted  to  him.  Unless  he  gets  help  he  himself 
will  fail ;  and  if  he  fails  he  will  bring  disaster  not  only  on 
his  family  but  on  all  who  have  given  him  credit.  Even  if 
by  borrowing  he  is  enabled  to  meet  immediate  engagements, 
he  is  not  safe ;  for  the  time  is  one  of  panic,  and  others 
of  his  debtors  by  going  to  the  wall  may  put  him  in  further 
difficulties.  Shall  he  ask  a  friend  for  a  loan  ?  On  the  one 
hand,  is  it  not  wrong  forthwith  to  bring  on  himself,  his 
family,  and  those  who  have  business  relations  with  him,  the 
evils  of  his  failure  ?  On  the  other  hand,  is  it  not  wrong  to 
hypothecate  the  property  of  his  friend,  and  lead  him  too, 
with  his  belongings  and  dependents,  into  similar  risks  ? 
The  loan  would  probably  tide  him  over  his  difficulty ;  in 
which  case  would  it  not  be  unjust  to  his  creditors  did  he 
refrain  from  asking  it  ?  Contrariwise,  the  loan  would  very 
possibly  fail  to  stave  off  his  bankruptcy ;  in  which  case  is 
not  his  action  in  trying  to  obtain  it,  practically  fraudulent  ? 
Though  in  extreme  cases  it  may  be  easy  to  say  which  course 
is  the  least  wrong,  how  is  it  possible  in  all  those  medium 
cases  where  even  by  the  keenest  man  of  business  the  con- 
tingencies cannot  be  calculated  ?  Take,  again,  the 
difficulties  that  not  unfrequently  arise  from  antagonism 
between  family  duties  and  social  duties.  Here  is  a  tenant 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  267 

farmer  whose  political  principles  prompt  him  to  vote  in 
opposition  to  his  landlord.  If,  being  a  Liberal,  he  votes  for 
a  Conservative,  not  only  does  he  by  his  act  say  that  he 
thinks  what  he  does  not  think,  but  he  may  perhaps  assist 
what  he  regards  as  bad  legislation  :  his  vote  may  by  chance 
turn  the  election,  and  on  a  Parliamentary  division  a  single 
member  may  decide  the  fate  of  a  measure.  Even  neglect- 
ing, as  too  improbable,  such  serious  consequences,  there  is 
the  manifest  truth  that  if  all  who  hold  like  views  with  him- 
self, are  similarly  deterred  from  electoral  expression  of 
them,  there  must  result  a  different  balance  of  power  and  a 
different  national  policy  :  making  it  clear  that  only  by  ad- 
herence of  all  to  their  political  principles,  can  the  policy  he 
thinks  right  be  maintained.  But  now,  on  the  other  hand, 
how  can  he  absolve  himself  from  responsibility  for  the  evils 
which  those  depending  on  him  may  suffer  if  he  fulfils  what 
appears  to  be  a  peremptory  public  duty  ?  Is  not  his  duty  to 
his  children  even  more  peremptory  ?  Does  not  the  family 
precede  the  State ;  and  does  not  the  welfare  of  the  State 
depend  on  the  welfare  of  the  family  ?  May  he,  then,  take  a 
course  which,  if  the  threats  uttered  are  carried  out,  will 
eject  him  from  his  farm  ;  and  so  cause  inability,  perhaps 
temporary  perhaps  prolonged,  to  feed  his  children.  The 
contingent  evils  are  infinitely  varied  in  their  ratios.  In  one 
case  the  imperativeness  of  the  public  duty  is  great  and  the 
evil  that  may  come  on  dependents  small ;  in  another  case  the 
political  issue  is  of  trivial  moment  and  the  possible  injury 
which  the  family  may  suffer  is  great ;  and  between  these 
extremes  there  are  all  gradations.  Further,  the  degrees  of 
probability  of  each  result,  public  and  private,  range  from 
the  nearly  certain  to  the  almost  impossible.  Admitting, 
then,  that  it  is  wrong  to  act  in  a  way  likely  to  injure  the 
State  ;  and  admitting  that  it  is  wrong  to  act  in  a  way  likely 
to  injure  the  family  ;  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that  in 
countless  cases  no  one  can  decide  by  which  of  the  alternative 
courses  the  least  wrong  is  likely  to  be  done. 


268  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

These  instances  will  sufficiently  show  that  in  conduct  at 
large,  including  men's  dealings  with  themselves,  with  their 
families,  with  their  friends,  with  their  debtors  and  creditors, 
and  with  the  public,  it  usually  happens  that  whatever  course 
is  taken  entails  some  pain  somewhere  ;  forming  a  deduction 
from  the  pleasure  achieved,  and  making  the  course  in  so 
far  not  absolutely  right.  Further,  they  will  show  that 
throughout  a  considerable  part  of  conduct,  no  guiding  prin- 
ciple, no  method  of  estimation,  enables  us  to  say  whether  a 
proposed  course  is  even  relatively  right ;  as  causing,  proxi- 
mately  and  remotely,  specially  and  generally,  the  greatest 
surplus  of  good  over  evil. 

§  104.  And  now  we  are  prepared  for  dealing  in  a  syste- 
matic way  with  the  distinction  between  Absolute  Ethics  and 
Kelative  Ethics. 

Scientific  truths,  of  whatever  order,  are  reached  by 
eliminating  perturbing  or  conflicting  factors,  and  recog- 
nizing only  fundamental  factors.  When,  by  dealing  with 
fundamental  factors  in  the  abstract,  not  as  presented  in 
actual  phenomena  but  as  presented  in  ideal  separation, 
general  laws  have  been  ascertained,  it  becomes  possible  to 
draw  inferences  in  concrete  cases  by  taking  into  account 
incidental  factors.  But  it  is  only  by  first  ignoring  these 
and  recognizing  the  essential  elements  alone,  that  we  can 
discover  the  essential  truths  sought.  Take,  in  illustration, 
the  progress  of  mechanics  from  its  empirical  form  to  its 
rational  form. 

All  have  occasional  experience  of  the  fact  that  a  person 
pushed  on  one  side  beyond  a  certain  degree,  loses  his 
balance  and  falls.  It  is  observed  that  a  stone  flung  or 
an  arrow  shot,  does  not  proceed  in  a  straight  line,  but 
comes  to  the  earth  after  pursuing  a  course  which  deviates 
more  and  more  from  its  original  course.  When  trying  to 
break  a  stick  across  the  knee,  it  is  found  that  success  is 
easier  if  the  stick  is  seized  at  considerable  distances  from 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  269 

the  knee  on  each  side  than  if  seized  close  to  the  knee. 
Daily  use  of  a  spear  draws  attention  to  the  truth  that  by 
thrusting  its  point  under  a  stone  and  depressing  the  shaft, 
the  stone  may  be  raised  the  more  readily  the  further  away 
the  hand  is  towards  the  end.  Here,  then,  are  sundry  expe- 
riences, eventually  grouped  into  empirical  generalizations, 
which  serve  to  guide  conduct  in  certain  simple  cases.  How 
does  mechanical  science  evolve  from  these  experiences  ? 
To  reach  a  formula  expressing  the  powers  of  the  lever,  it 
supposes  a  lever  which  does  not,  like  the  stick,  admit  of 
being  bent,  but  is  absolutely  rigid  ;  and  it  supposes  a  ful- 
crum not  having  a  broad  surface,  like  that  of  one  ordinarily 
used,  but  a  fulcrum  without  breadth ;  and  it  supposes  that  the 
weight  to  be  raised  bears  on  a  definite  point,  instead  of 
bearing  over  a  considerable  portion  of  the  lever.  Similarly 
with  the  leaning  body,  which,  passing  a  certain  inclination, 
overbalances.  Before  the  truth  respecting  the  relations  of 
centre  of  gravity  and  base  can  be  formulated,  it  must  be 
assumed  that  the  surface  on  which  the  body  stands  is  un- 
yielding ;  that  the  edge  of  the  body  itself  is  unyielding ; 
and  that  its  mass,  while  made  to  lean  more  and  more,  does 
not  change  its  form — conditions  not  fulfilled  in  the  cases 
commonly  observed.  And  so,  too,  is  it  with  the  projectile  : 
determination  of  its  course  by  deduction  from  mechanical 
laws,  primarily  ignores  all  deviations  caused  by  its  shape 
and  by  the  resistance  of  the  air.  The  science  of  rational 
mechanics  is  a  science  which  consists  of  such  ideal  truths, 
and  can  come  into  existence  only  by  thus  dealing  with  ideal 
cases.  It  remains  impossible  so  long  as  attention  is  restricted 
to  concrete  cases  presenting  all  the  complications  of  friction, 
plasticity,  and  so  forth.  But  now,  after  disen- 

tangling certain  fundamental  mechanical  truths,  it  becomes 
possible  by  their  help  to  guide  actions  better ;  and  it  becomes 
possible  to  guide  them  still  better  when,  as  presently  hap- 
pens, the  complicating  elements  from  which  they  have  been 
disentangled  are  themselves  taken  into  account.  At  an 


270  •       THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

advanced  stage,  the  modifying  effects  of  friction  are  allowed 
for,  and  the  inferences  are  qualified  to  the  requisite  extent. 
The  theory  of  the  pulley  is  corrected  in  its  application  to 
actual  cases  by  recognizing  the  rigidity  of  cordage ;  the 
effects  of  which  are  formulated.  The  stabilities  of  masses, 
determinable  in  the  abstract  by  reference  to  the  centres  of 
gravity  of  the  masses  in  relation  to  the  bases,  come  to  be 
determined  in  the  concrete  by  including  also  their  characters 
in  respect  of  cohesion.  The  courses  of  projectiles  having 
been  theoretically  settled  as  though  they  moved  through  a 
vacuum,  are  afterwards  settled  in  more  exact  correspon- 
dence with  fact  by  taking  into  account  atmospheric  resist- 
ance. And  thus  we  see  illustrated  the  rela- 
tion between  certain  absolute  truths  of  mechanical  science, 
and  certain  relative  truths  which  involve  them.  We  are 
shown  that  no  scientific  establishment  of  relative  truths  is 
possible,  until  the  absolute  truths  have  been  formulated  inde- 
pendently. We  see  that  mechanical  science  fitted  for  deal- 
ing with  the  real,  can  arise  only  after  ideal  mechanical  science 
has  arisen. 

All  this  holds  of  moral  science.  As  by  early  and  rude 
experiences  there  were  inductively  reached,  vague  but  par- 
tially-true notions  respecting  the  overbalancing  of  bodies,  the 
motions  of  missiles,  the  actions  of  levers ;  so  by  early  and 
rude  experiences  there  were  inductively  reached,  vague  but 
partially-true  notions  respecting  the  effects  of  men's  behav- 
iour on  themselves,  on  one  another,  and  on  society  :  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  serving  in  the  last  case,  as  in  the  first,  for  the  guid- 
ance of  conduct.  Moreover,  as  this  rudimentary  mechanical 
knowledge,  though  still  remaining  empirical,  becomes  dur- 
ing early  stages  of  civilization  at  once  more  definite  and 
more  extensive ;  so  during  early  stages  of  civilization  these 
ethical  ideas,  still  retaining  their  empirical  character,  increase 
in  precision  and  multiplicity.  But  just  as  we  have  seen  that 
mechanical  knowledge  of  the  empirical  sort  can  evolve  into 
mechanical  science,  only  by  first  omitting  all  qualifying 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE    ETHICS.  271 

circumstances,  and  generalizing  in  absolute  ways  the  funda- 
mental laws  of  forces  ;  so  here  we  have  to  see  that  empiri- 
cal ethics  can  evolve  into  rational  ethics  only  by  first 
neglecting  all  complicating  incidents,  and  formulating  the 
laws  of  right  action  apart  from,  the  obscuring  effects  of 
special  conditions.  And  the  final  implication  is  that  just 
as  the  system  of  mechanical  truths,  conceived  in  ideal  separa- 
tion as  absolute,  becomes  applicable  to  real  mechanical  prob- 
lems in  such  way  that  making  allowance  for  all  incidental 
circumstances  there  can  be  reached  conclusions  far  nearer 
to  the  truth  than  could  otherwise  be  reached ;  so,  a  system 
of  ideal  ethical  truths,  expressing  the  absolutely  right,  will 
be  applicable  to  the  questions  of  our  transitional  state  in 
such  ways  that,  allowing  for  the  friction  of  an  incomplete 
life  and  the  imperfection  of  existing  natures,  we  may  as- 
certain with  approximate  correctness  what  is  the  relatively 
right. 

§  105.  In  a  chapter  entitled  "  Definition  of  Morality  "  in 
Social  Statics,  I  contended  that  the  moral  law,  properly  so- 
called,  is  the  law  of  the  perfect  man — is  the  formula  of  ideal 
conduct — is  the  statement  in  all  cases  of  that  which  should 
be,  and  cannot  recognize  in  its  propositions  any  elements  im- 
plying existence  of  that  which  should  not  be.  Instancing 
questions  concerning  the  right  course  to  be  taken  in  cases 
where  wrong  has  already  been  done,  I  alleged  that  the  an- 
swers to  such  questions  cannot  be  given  "  on  purely  ethical 
principles."  I  argued  that — 

"  No  conclusions  can  lay  claim  to  absolute  truth,  but  such  as  depend  upon 
truths  that  are  themselves  absolute.  Before  there  can  be  exactness  in  an  infer- 
ence, there  must  be  exactness  in  the  antecedent  propositions.  A  geometrician 
requires  that  the  straight  lines  with  which  he  deals  shall  be  veritably  straight ; 
and  that  his  circles,  and  ellipses,  and  parabolas  shall  agree  with  precise  defini- 
tions— shall  perfectly  and  invariably  answer  to  specified  equations.  If  you  put 
to  him  a  question  in  which  these  conditions  are  not  complied  with,  he  tells  you 
that  it  cannot  be  answered.  So  likewise  is  it  with  the  philosophical  moralist. 
He  treats  solely  of  the  straight  man.  He  determines  the  properties  of  the 
straight  man  ;  describes  how  the  straight  man  comports  himself ;  shows  in  what 
19 


272  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

relationship  he  stands  to  other  straight  men ;  shows  how  a  community  of 
straight  men  is  constituted.  Any  deviation  from  strict  rectitude  he  is  obliged 
wholly  to  ignore.  It  cannot  be  admitted  into  his  premises  without  vitiating  all 
his  conclusions.  A  problem  in  which  a  crooked  man  forms  one  of  the  elements 
isinsoluble  by  him." 

Referring  to  this  view,  specifically  in  the  first  edition  of 
the  Methods  of  Ethics  but  more  generally  in  the  second  edi- 
tion, Mr.  Sidgwick  says  : — 

"  Those  who  take  this  view  adduce  the  analogy  of  Geometry  to  show  that 
Ethics  ought  to  deal  with  ideally  perfect  human  relations,  just  as  Geometry 
treats  of  ideally  perfect  lines  and  circles.  But  the  most  irregular  line  has  defi- 
nite spatial  relations  with  which  Geometry  doesnot  refuse  to  deal :  though  of 
course  they  are  more  complex  than  those  of  a  straight  line.  So  in  Astronomy, 
it  would  be  more  convenient  for  purposes  of  study  if  the  stars  moved  in  circles, 
as  was  once  believed  :  but  the  fact  that  they  move  not  in  circles  but  in  ellipses, 
and  even  in  imperfect  and  perturbed  ellipses,  does  not  take  them  out  of  the 
sphere  of  scientific  investigation :  by  patience  and  industry  we  have  learnt  how 
to  reduce  to  principles  and  calculate  even  these  more  complicated  motions.  It 
is,  no  doubt,  a  convenient  artifice  for  purposes  of  instruction  to  assume  that  the 
planets  move  in  perfect  ellipses  (or  even — at  an  earlier  stage  of  study — in  cir- 
cles) :  we  thus  allow  the  individual's  knowledge  to  pass  through  the  same  grada- 
tions in  accuracy  as  that  of  the  race  has  done.  But  what  we  want,  as  astron- 
omers, to  know  is  the  actual  motion  of  the  stars  and  its  causes :  and  similarly 
as  moralists  we  naturally  inquire  what  ought  to  be  done  in  the  actual  world  in 
which  we  live."  P.  19,  Sec.  Ed. 

Beginning  with  the  first  of  these  two  statements,  which 
concerns  Geometry,  I  must  confess  myself  surprised  to  find 
my  propositions  called  in  question ;  and  after  full  con- 
sideration I  remain  at  a  loss  to  understand  Mr.  Sidgwick's 
mode  of  viewing  the  matter.  When,  in  a  sentence  pre- 
ceding those  quoted  above,  I  remarked  on  the  impossibility 
of  solving  "  mathematically  a  series  of  problems  respecting 
crooked  lines  and  broken-backed  curves,"  it  never  occurred 
to  me  that  I  should  be  met  by  the  direct  assertion  that 
"Geometry  does  not  refuse  to  deal"  with  "the  most 
irregular  line."  Mr.  Sidgwick  states  that  an  irregular  line, 
say  such  as  a  child  makes  in  scribbling,  has  "definite 
spatial  relations."  What  meaning  does  he  here  give 
to  the  word  "definite."  If  he  means  that  its  relations 
to  space  at  large  are  definite  in  the  sense  that  by  an 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  273 

infinite  intelligence  they  would  be  definable ;  the  reply 
is  that  to  an  infinite  intelligence  all  spatial  relations  would 
be  definable :  there  could  be  no  indefinite  spatial  relations — 
the  word  "definite"  thus  ceasing  to  mark  any  distinction. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  when  saying  that  an  irregular  line  has 
"  definite  spatial  relations,"  he  means  relations  knowable 
definitely  by  human  intelligence ;  there  still  comes  the 
question,  how  is  the  word  "definite"  to  be  understood? 
Surely  anything  distinguished  as  definite  admits  of  being 
defined;  but  how  can  we  define  an  irregular  line?  And 
if  we  cannot  define  the  irregular  line  itself,  how  can  we 
know  its  "spatial  relations"  definitely?  And  how,  in  the 
absence  of  definition,  can  Geometry  deal  with  it?  If  Mr. 
Sidgwick  means  that  it  can  be  dealt  with  by  the  "  method  of 
limits,"  then  the  reply  is  that  in  such  case,  not  the  line  itself 
is  dealt  with  geometrically,  but  certain  definite  lines  artifi- 
cially put  in  quasi-definite  relations  to  it :  the  indefinite  be- 
comes cognizable  only  through  the  medium  of  the  hypotheti- 
cally-definite. 

Turning  to  the  second  illustration,  the  rejoinder  to  be 
made  is  that  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  relations  between 
the  ideal  and  the  real,  the  analogy  drawn  does  not  shake 
but  strengthens  my  argument.  For  whether  considered 
under  its  geometrical  or  under  its  dynamical  aspect,  and 
whether  considered  in  the  necessary  order  of  its  develop- 
ment or  in  the  order  historically  displayed,  Astronomy 
shows  us  throughout,  that  truths  respecting  simple,  theo- 
retically-exact relations,  must  be  ascertained  before  truths 
respecting  the  complex  and  practically-inexact  relations 
that  actually  exist,  can  be  ascertained.  As  applied  to  the 
interpretation  of  planetary  movements,  we  see  that  the 
theory  of  cycles  and  epicycles  was  based  on  pre-existing 
knowledge  of  the  circle :  the  properties  of  an  ideal  curve 
having  been  learnt,  a  power  was  acquired  of  giving  some 
expression  to  the  celestial  motions.  We  see  that  the 
Copernican  interpretation  expressed  the  facts  in  terms  of 


274  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

circular  movements  otherwise  distributed  and  combined. 
We  see  that  Kepler's  advance  from  the  conception  of  circu- 
lar movements  to  the  conception  of  elliptic  movements,  was 
made  possible  by  comparing  the  facts  as  they  are  with  the 
facts  as  they  would  be  were  the  movements  circular.  We  see 
that  the  subsequently-learnt  deviations  from  elliptic  move- 
ments, were  learnt  only  through  the  pre-supposition  that  the 
movements  are  elliptical.  And  we  see,  lastly,  that  even  now 
predictions  concerning  the  exact  positions  of  planets,  after 
taking  account  of  perturbations,  imply  constant  references  to 
ellipses  that  are  regarded  as  their  normal  or  average  orbits 
for  the  time  being.  Thus,  ascertainment  of  the  actual  truths 
has  been  made  possible  only  by  pre-ascertainment  of  certain 
ideal  truths.  To  be  convinced  that  by  no  other  course  could 
the  actual  truths  have  been  ascertained,  it  needs  only  to  sup- 
pose any  one  saying  that  it  did  not  concern  him,  as  an 
astronomer,  to  know  anything  about  the  properties  of 
circles  and  ellipses,  but  that  he  had  to  deal  with  the  Solar 
System  as  it  exists,  to  which  end  it  was  his  business  to 
observe  and  tabulate  positions  and  directions  and  to  be 
guided  by  the  facts  as  he  found  them.  So,  too,  is 

it  if  we  look  at  the  development  of  dynamical  astronomy. 
The  first  proposition  in  Newton's  Principia  deals  with  the 
movement  of  a  single  body  round  a  single  centre  of  force ; 
and  the  phenomena  of  central  motion  are  first  formulated  in 
a  case  which  is  not  simply  ideal,  but  in  which  there  is  no 
specification  of  the  force  concerned :  detachment  from  the 
real  is  the  greatest  possible.  Again,  postulating  a  principle 
of  action  conforming  to  an  ideal  law,  the  theory  of  gravita- 
tion deals  with  the  several  problems  of  the  Solar  System  in 
fictitious  detachment  from  the  rest ;  and  it  makes  certain  fic- 
titious assumptions,  such  as  that  the  mass  of  each  body  con- 
cerned is  concentrated  in  its  centre  of  gravity.  Only  later, 
after  establishing  the  leading  truths  by  this  artifice  of  disen- 
tangling the  major  factors  from  the  minor  factors,  is  the 
theory  applied  to  the  actual  problems  in  their  ascending  de- 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  275 

grees  of  complexity ;  taking  in  more  and  more  of  the  minor 
factors.  And  if  we  ask  whether  the  dynamics  of  the  Solar 
System  could  have  been  established  in  any  other  way,  we 
see  that  here,  too,  simple  truths  holding  under  ideal  condi- 
tions, have  to  be  ascertained  before  real  truths  existing  under 
complex  conditions  can  be  ascertained. 


The  alleged  necessary  precedence  of  Absolute  Ethics  over 
Relative  Ethics  is  thus,  I  think,  further  elucidated.  One 
who  has  followed  the  general  argument  thus  far,  will  not 
deny  that  an  ideal  social  being  may  be  conceived  as  so  con- 
stituted that  his  spontaneous  activities  are  congruous  with 
the  conditions  imposed  by  the  social  environment  formed  by 
other  such  beings.  In  many  places,  and  in  various  ways,  I 
have  argued  that  conformably  with  the  laws  of  evolution  in 
general,  and  conformably  with  the  laws  of  organization  in 
particular,  there  has  been,  and  is,  in  progress,  an  adaptation 
of  humanity  to  the  social  state,  changing  it  in  the  direction 
of  such  an  ideal  congruity.  And  the  corollary  before  drawn 
and  here  repeated,  is  that  the  ultimate  man  is  one  in  whom 
this  process  has  gone  so  far  as  to  produce  a  correspondence 
between  all  the  promptings  of  his  nature  and  all  the  require- 
ments of  his  life  as  carried  on  in  society.  If  so,  it  is  a  neces- 
sary implication  that  there  exists  an  ideal  code  of  conduct 
formulating  the  behaviour  of  the  completely  adapted  man  in 
the  completely  evolved  society.  Such  a  code  is  that  here 
called  Absolute  Ethics  as  distinguished  from  Relative  Ethics 
— a  code  the  injunctions  of  which  are  alone  to  be  considered 
as  absolutely  right  in  contrast  with  those  that  are  relatively 
right  or  least  wrong ;  and  which,  as  a  system  of  ideal  con- 
duct, is  to  serve  as  a  standard  for  our  guidance  in  solving,  as 
well  as  we  can,  the  problems  of  real  conduct. 

§  105.  A  clear  conception  of  this  matter  is  so  important 
that  I  must  be  excused  for  bringing  in  aid  of  it  a  further 
illustration,  more  obviously  appropriate  as  being  furnished 
by  organic  science  instead  of  by  inorganic  science.  The 


276  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

relation  between  morality  proper  and  morality  as  commonly 
conceived,  is  analogous  to  the  relation  between  physiology 
and  pathology ;  and  the  course  usually  pursued  by  moralists 
is  much  like  the  course  of  one  who  studies  pathology  with- 
out previous  study  of  physiology. 

Physiology  describes  the  various  functions  which,  as  com- 
bined, constitute  and  maintain  life ;  and  in  treating  of  them 
it  assumes  that  they  are  severally  performed  in  right  ways, 
in  due  amounts,  and  in  proper  order:  it  recognizes  only 
healthy  functions.  If  it  explains  digestion,  it  supposes  that 
the  heart  is  supplying  blood  and  that  the  visceral  nervous 
system  is  stimulating  the  organs  immediately  concerned.  If 
it  gives  a  theory  of  the  circulation,  it  assumes  that  blood  has 
been  produced  by  the  combined  actions  of  the  structures  de- 
voted to  its  production,  and  that  it  is  properly  aerated.  If 
the  relations  between  respiration  and  the  vital  processes  at 
large  are  interpreted,  it  is  on  the  pre-supposition  that  the 
heart  goes  on  sending  blood,  not  only  to  the  lungs  and  to 
certain  nervous  centres,  but  to  the  diaphragm  and  intercostal 
muscles.  Physiology  ignores  failures  in  the  actions  of  these 
several  organs.  It  takes  no  account  of  imperfections,  it 
neglects  derangements,  it  does  not  recognize  pain,  it  knows 
nothing  of  vital  wrong.  It  simply  formulates  that  which 
goes  on  as  a  result  of  complete  adaptation  of  all  parts  to  all 
needs.  That  is  to  say,  in  relation  to  the  inner  actions  consti- 
tuting bodily  life,  physiological  theory  has  a  position  like 
that  which  ethical  theory,  under  its  absolute  form  as  above 
conceived,  has  to  the  outer  actions  constituting  conduct. 
The  moment  cognizance  is  taken  of  excess  of  function,  or 
arrest  of  function,  or  defect  of  function,  with  the  resulting 
evil,  physiology  passes  into  pathology.  We  begin  now  to 
take  account  of  wrong  actions  in  the  inner  life  analogous  to 
the  wrong  actions  in  the  outer  life  taken  account  of  by  ordi- 
nary theories  of  morals. 

The  antithesis  thus  drawn,  however,  is  but  preliminary. 
After  observing  the  fact  that  there  is  a  science  of  vital  ac- 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.         .  277 

tions  normally  carried  on,  which  ignores  abnormal  actions ; 
we  have  more  especially  to  observe  that  the  science  of 
abnormal  actions  can  reach  such  definiteness  as  is  possible 
to  it,  only  on  condition  that  the  science  of  normal  actions 
has  previously  become  definite;  or  rather  let  us  say  that 
pathological  science  depends  for  its  advances  on  previous 
advances  made  by  physiological  science.  The  very  con- 
ception of  disordered  action  implies  a  pre-conception  of 
well-ordered  action.  Before  it  can  be  decided  that  the  heart 
is^eatlng  fasteFor"  slower  than  it  should,  its  healthy  rate  of 
beating  must  be  learnt ;  before  the  pulse  can  be  recognized 
as  too  weak  or  too  strong,  its  proper  strength  must  be  known  ; 
and  so  throughout.  Even  the  rudest  and  most  empirical 
ideas  of  diseases,  pre-suppose  ideas  of  the  healthy  states  from 
which  they  are  deviations ;  and  obviously  the  diagnosis  of 
diseases  can  become  scientific,  only  as  fast  as  there  arises 
scientific  knowledge  of  organic  actions  that  are  undiseased. 

Similarly,  then,  is  it  with  the  relation  between  absolute 
morality,  or  the  law  of  perfect  right  in  human  conduct,  and 
relative  morality  which,  recognizing  wrong  in  human  con- 
duct, has  to  decide  in  what  way  the  wrong  deviates  from  the 
right,  and  how  the  right  is  to  be  most  nearly  approached. 
"When,  formulating  normal  conduct  in  an  ideal  society,  we 
have  reached  a  science  of  absolute  ethics,  we  have  simul- 
taneously reached  a  science  which,  when  used  to  interpret 
the  phenomena  of  real  societies  in  their  transitional  states, 
full  of  the  miseries  due  to  non-adaptation  (which  we  may  call 
pathological  states)  enables  us  to  form  approximately  true 
conclusions  respecting  the  natures  of  the  abnormalities,  and 
the  courses  which  tend  most  in  the  direction  of  the  normal. 

§  106.  And  now  let  it  be  observed  that  the  conception 
of  ethics  thus  set  forth,  strange  as  many  will  think  it,  is  one 
which  really  lies  latent  in  the  beliefs  of  moralists  at  large. 
Though  not  definitely  acknowledged  it  is  vaguely  implied  in 
many  of  their  propositions. 


278  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

From  early  times  downwards  we  find  in  ethical  specula- 
tions, references  to  the  ideal  man,  his  acts,  his  feelings,  his 
judgments.  When  Sokrates  said  that  well-doing  is  the 
thing  to  be  chiefly  studied,  and  that  he  achieved  it  who 
devoted  to  the  study  searching  and  labour,  he  made  the 
actions  of  the  superior  man  his  standard,  since  he  gave  no 
other.  Plato,  in  Minos,  asserts  that  "  the  authoritative 
rescripts  or  laws  are  those  laid  down  by  the  artists  or  men 
of  knowledge  in  that  department;"  and  the  doctrine 
contained  in  Laches  is  that  only  "  the  One  Wise  Man  "  can 
estimate  the  good  or  evil,  or  the  comparative  value  of  two 
alternative  ends  in  each  individual  case : "  an  ideal  man  is 
postulated.  Aristotle  says : — "  For  it  is  the  man  whose 
condition,  whether  moral  or  bodily,  is  in  each  case  perfect 
who  in  each  case  judges  rightly,  and  at  once  perceives 
the  truth.  .  .  .  And  herein  it  is  that  the  perfect  man 
may  be  said  to  differ  most  widely  from  all  others,  in  that 
in  all  such  cases  he  at  once  perceives  the  truth,  being,  as 
it  were,  the  rule  and  measure  of  its  application."  While 
observing  that  the  Stoics,  like  other  ancient  philosophers, 
failing  to  distinguish  properly  between  intellect  and  feeling, 
identified  wisdom  with  goodness,  we  see  that  they,  too,  made 
the  perfect  man  the  measure  of  rectitude.  And  Epicurus, 
also,  regards  the  wise  man  as  the  only  one  who  can  achieve 
a  happy  life — "  he  alone  knows  how  to  do  the  right  thing  in 
the  right  way." 

If  in  modern  times,  influenced  by  theological  dogmas 
concerning  human  sinfulness,  and  by  a  theory  of  divinelv 
prescribed  conduct,  moralists  have  not  so  frequently  referred 
to  an  ideal,  yet  various  references  are  traceable.  We  may  see 
one  in  the  dictum  of  Kant—"  Act  only  on  that  maxim  where- 
by thou  canst  at  the  same  time  will  that  it  should  become  a 
universal  law."  For  this  implies  the  thought  of  a  society 
in  which  the  maxim  is  acted  upon  by  all  and  universal  bene- 
fit recognized  as  the  effect :  there  is  a  conception  of  ideal 
conduct  under  ideal  conditions.  And  though  Mr.  Sidgwick, 


ABSOLUTE   AND   KELATIVE   ETHICS.  279 

in  the  quotation  above  made  from  him,  implies  that  Ethics 
is  concerned  with  man  as  he  is,  rather  than  with  man  as  he 
should  be ;  yet,  in  elsewhere  speaking  of  Ethics  as  dealing 
with  conduct  as  it  should  be,  rather  than  with  conduct  as 
it  is,  he  postulates  ideal  conduct  and  indirectly  the  ideal 
man.  On  his  first  page,  speaking  of  Ethics  along  with 
Jurisprudence  and  Politics,  he  says  that  they  are  distin- 
guished "  by  the  characteristic  that  they  attempt  to  deter- 
mine not  the  actual  but  the  ideal — what  ought  to  exist,  not 
what  does  exist." 

It  requires  only  that  these  various  conceptions  of  an  ideal 
conduct  and  of  an  ideal  humanity,  should  be  made  consistent 
and  definite,  to  bring  them  into  agreement  with  the  concep- 
tion above  set  forth.  At  present  such  conceptions  are  ha- 
bitually vague.  The  ideal  man  having  been  conceived  in 
terms  of  the  current  morality,  is  thereupon  erected  into  a 
moral  standard  by  which  the  goodness  of  actions  may  be 
judged ;  and  the  reasoning  becomes  circular.  To  make  the 
ideal  man  serve  as  a  standard,  he  has  to  be  defined  in  terms 
of  the  conditions  which  his  nature  fulfils — in  terms  of  those 
objective  requirements  which  must  be  met  before  conduct 
can  be  right ;  and  the  common  defect  of  these  conceptions 
of  the  ideal  man,  is  that  they  suppose  him  out  of  relation  to 
such  conditions. 

All  the  above  references  to  him,  direct  or  indirect, 
imply  that  the  ideal  man  is  supposed  to  live  and  act  under 
existing  social  conditions.  The  tacit  inquiry  is,  not  what 
his  actions  would  be  under  circumstances  altogether  changed, 
but  what  they  would  be  under  present  circumstances.  And 
this  inquiry  is  futile  for  two  reasons.  The  co-existence  of  a 
perfect  man  and  an  imperfect  society  is  impossible;  and 
could  the  two  co-exist,  the  resulting  conduct  would  not 
furnish  the  ethical  standard  sought.  In  the 

first  place,  given  the  laws  of  life  as  they  are,  and  a  man  of 
ideal  nature  cannot  be  produced  in  a  society  consisting  of 
men  having  natures  remote  from  the  ideal.  As  well  might 


280  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

we  expect  a  child  of  English  type  to  be  born  among  Negroes, 
as  expect  that  among  the  organically  immoral,  one  who  is 
organically  moral  will  arise.  Unless  it  be  denied  that 
character  results  from  inherited  structure,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  since,  in  any  society,  each  individual  descends 
from  a  stock  which,  traced  back  a  few  generations,  ramifies 
everywhere  through  the  society,  and  participates  in  its  aver- 
age nature,  there  must,  notwithstanding  marked  individual 
diversities,  be  preserved  such  community  as  prevents  any- 
one from  reaching  an  ideal  form  while  the  rest  remain  far 
below  it.  In  the  second  place,  ideal  conduct 

such  as  ethical  theory  is  concerned  with,  is  not  possible  for 
the  ideal  man  in  the  midst  of  men  otherwise  constituted. 
An  absolutely  just  or  perfectly  sympathetic  person,  could 
not  live  and  act  according  to  his  nature  in  a  tribe  of  canni- 
bals. Among  people  who  are  treacherous  and  utterly  with- 
out scruple,  en  ti  re  Truthfulness  and  openness  must  bring  ruin. 
If  anaround  recognize  only  the  law  of  the  strongest,  one 
whose  nature  will  not  allow  him  to  inflict  pain  on  others, 
must  go  to  the  wall.  There  requires  a  certain  congruity 
between  the  conduct  of  each  member  of  a  society  and  other's 
conduct.  A  mode  of  action  entirely  alien  to  the  prevailing 
modes  of  action,  cannot  be  successfully  persisted  in — must 
eventuate  in  death  itself,  or  posterity,  or  both. 

Hence  it  is  manifest  that  we  must  consider  the  ideal  man 
as  existing  in  the  ideal  social  state.  On  the  evolution-hypoth- 
esis, the  two  presuppose  one  another ;  and  only  when  they 
co-exist,  can  there  exist  that  ideal  conduct  which  Absolute 
Ethics  has  to  formulate,  and  which  Relative  Ethics  has  to 
take  as  the  standard  by  which  to  estimate  divergencies  from 
right,  or  degrees  of  wrong. 


CHAPTEK  XYI. 

THE  SCOPE  OF  ETHICS. 

§  107.  At  the  outset  it  was  shown  that  as  the  conduct 
with  which  Ethics  deals,  is  a  part  of  conduct  at  large,  con- 
duct at  large  must  be  understood  before  this  part  can  be 
understood.  After  taking  a  general  view  of  conduct,  not 
human  only  but  sub-human,  and  not  only  as  existing  but  as 
evolving,  we  saw  that  Ethics  has  for  its  subject-matter  the 
most  highly-evolved  conduct  as  displayed  by  the  most 
highly-evolved  being,  Man — is  a  specification  of  those  traits 
which  his  conduct  assumes  on  reaching  its  limit  of  evolution. 
Conceived  thus  as  comprehending  the  laws  of  right  living  at 
large,  Ethics  has  a  wider  field  than  is  commonly  assigned  to 
it.  Beyond  the  conduct  commonly  approved  or  reprobated 
as  right  or  wrong,  it  includes  all  conduct  which  furthers  or 
hinders,  in  either  direct  or  indirect  ways,  the  welfare  of  self 
or  others. 

As  foregoing  chapters  in  various  places  imply,  the  entire 
field  of  Ethics  includes  the  two  great  divisions,  personal  and 
social.  There  is  a  class  of  actions  directed  to  personal  ends, 
which  are  to  be  judged  in  their  relations  to  personal  well- 
being,  considered  apart  from  the  well-being  of  others : 
though  they  secondarily  affect  fellow-men  these  primarily 
affect  the  agent  himself,  and  must  be  classed  as  intrinsically 
right  or  wrong  according  to  their  beneficial  or  detrimental 
effects  on  him.  There  are  actions  of  another  class  which 

281 


282  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

affect  fellow  men  immediately  and  remotely,  and  which, 
though  their  results  to  self  are  not  to  be  ignored,  must  be 
judged  as  good  or  bad  mainly  by  their  results  to  others. 
Actions  of  this  last  class  fall  into  two  groups.  Those  of  the 
one  group  achieve  ends  in  ways  that  do  or  do  not  unduly 
interfere  with  the  pursuit  of  ends  by  others — actions  which, 
because  of  this  difference,  we  call  respectively  unjust  or  just. 
Those  forming  the  other  group  are  of  a  kind  which  influence 
the  states  of  others  without  directly  interfering  with  the  rela- 
tions between  their  labours  and  the  results,  in  one  way  or  the 
other — actions  which  we  speak  of  as  beneficent  or  maleficent. 
And  the  conduct  which  we  regard  as  beneficent  is  itself  sub- 
divisible according  as  it  shows  us  a  self-repression  to  avoid 
giving  pain,  or  an  expenditure  of  effort  to  give  pleasure — 
negative  beneficence  and  positive  beneficence. 

Each  of  these  divisions  and  sub-divisions  has  to  be  con- 
sidered first  as  a  part  of  Absolute  Ethics  and  then  as  a  part 
of  Relative  Ethics.  Having  seen  what  its  injunctions  must 
be  for  the  ideal  man  under  the  implied  ideal  conditions, 
we  shall  be  prepared  to  see  how  such  injunctions  are  to 
be  most  nearly  fulfilled  by  actual  men  under  existing  con- 
ditions. 

§  108.  For  reasons  already  pointed  out,  a  code  of  perfect 
personal  conduct  can  never  be  made  definite.  Many  forms 
of  life,  diverging  from  one  another  in  considerable  degrees, 
may  be  so  carried  on  in  society  as  entirely  to  fulfil  the  con- 
ditions to  harmonious  co-operation.  And  if  various  types 
of  men  adapted  to  various  types  of  activities,  may  thus  lead 
lives  that  are  severally  complete  after  their  kinds,  no  specific 
statement  of  the  activities  universally  required  for  personal 
well-being  is  possible. 

But  though  the  particular  requirements  to  be  fulfilled  for 
perfect  individual  well-being,  must  vary  along  with  varia- 
tions in  the  material  conditions  of  each  society,  certain  gen- 
eral requirements  have  to  be  fulfilled  by  the  individuals  of 


THE   SCOPE   OF   ETHICS.  283 

all  societies.  An  average  balance  between  waste  and  nutri- 
tion has  universally  to  be  preserved.  Normal  vitality  implies 
a  relation  between  activity  and  rest  falling  within  moderate 
limits  of  variation.  Continuance  of  the  society  depends  on 
satisfaction  of  those  primarily-personal  needs  which  result 
in  marriage  and  parenthood.  Perfection  of  individual  life 
hence  implies  certain  modes  of  action  which  are  approxi- 
mately alike  in  all  cases,  and  which  therefore  become  part  of 
the  subject-matter  of  Ethics. 

That  it  is  possible  to  reduce  even  this  restricted  part 
to  scientific  definiteness,  can  scarcely  be  said.  But  ethical 
requirements  may  here  be  to  such  extent  affiliated  upon 
physical  necessities,  as  to  give  them  a  partially-scientific 
authority.  It  is  clear  that  between  the  expenditure  of  bodily 
substance  in  vital  activities,  and  the  taking  in  of  materials 
from  which  this  substance  may  be  renewed,  there  is  a  direct 
relation.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  there  is  a  direct  relation 
between  the  wasting  of  tissue  by  effort,  and  the  need  for 
those  cessations  of  effort  during  which  repair  may  overtake 
waste.  Nor  is  it  less  clear  that  between  the  rate  of  mortal- 
ity and  the  rate  of  multiplication  in  any  society,  there  is  a 
relation  such  that  the  last  must  reach  a  certain  level  before 
it  can  balance  the  first,  and  prevent  disappearance  of  the 
society.  And  it  may  be  inferred  that  pursuits  of  other  lead- 
ing ends  are,  in  like  manner,  determined  by  certain  natural 
necessities,  and  from  these  derive  their  ethical  sanctions. 
That  it  will  ever  be  practicable  to  lay  down  precise  rules  for 
private  conduct  in  conformity  with  such  requirements,  may 
be  doubted.  But  the  function  of  Absolute  Ethics  in  rela- 
tion to  private  conduct  will  have  been  discharged,  when  it 
has  produced  the  warrant  for  its  requirements  as  generally 
expressed  ;  when  it  has  shown  the  imperativeness  of  obe- 
dience to  them ;  and  when  it  has  thus  taught  the  need  for 
deliberately  considering  whether  the  conduct  fulfils  them  as 
well  as  may  be. 

Under  the  ethics  of  personal  conduct  considered  in  rela- 


284  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

tion  to  existing  conditions,  have  to  come  all  questions  con- 
cerning the  degree  in  which  immediate  personal  welfare 
has  to  be  postponed,  either  to  ultimate  personal  welfare  or 
to  the  welfare  of  others.  As  now  carried  on,  life  hourly 
sets  the  claims  of  present  self  against  the  claims  of  future 
self,  and  hourly  brings  individual  interests  face  to  face  with 
the  interests  of  other  individuals,  taken  singly  or  as  asso- 
ciated. In  many  of  such  cases  the  decisions  can  be  nothing 
more  than  compromises ;  and  ethical  science,  here  neces- 
sarily empirical,  can  do  no  more  than  aid  in  making  com- 
promises that  are  the  least  ojectionable.  To  arrive  at  the 
best  compromise  in  any  case,  implies  correct  conceptions  of 
the  alternative  results  of  this  or  that  course.  And,  con- 
sequently, in  so  far  as  the  absolute  ethics  of  individual 
conduct  can  be  made  definite,  it  must  help  us  to  decide 
between  conflicting  personal  requirements,  and  also  between 
the  needs  for  asserting  self  and  the  needs  for  subordinating 
self. 

§  109.  From  that  division  of  Ethics  which  deals  with  the 
right  regulation  of  private  conduct,  considered  apart  from 
the  effects  directly  produced  on  others,  we  pass  now  to  that 
division  of  Ethics  which,  considering  exclusively  the  effects 
of  conduct  on  others,  treats  of  the  right  regulation  of  it  with 
a  view  to  such  effects. 

The  first  set  of  regulations  coming  under  this  head  are 
those  concerning  what  we  distinguish  as  justice.  Individual 
life  is  possible  only  on  condition  that  each  organ  is  paid  for 
its  action  by  an  equivalent  of  blood,  while  the  organism  as 
a  whole  obtains  from  the  environment  assimilable  matters 
that  compensate  for  its  efforts  ;  and  the  mutual  dependence 
of  parts  in  the  social  organism,  necessitates  that,  alike  for 
its  total  life  and  the  lives  of  its  units,  there  similarly  shall 
be  maintained  a  due  proportion  between  returns  and 
labours :  the  natural  relation  between  work  and  welfare 
shall  be  preserved  intact.  Justice,  which  formulates  the 


THE    SCOPE   OF   ETHICS.  285 

range  of  conduct  and  limitations  to  conduct  hence  arising, 
is  at  once  the  most  important  division  of  Ethics  and  the 
division  which  admits  of  the  greatest  definiteness.  That 
principle  of  equivalence  which  meets  us  when  we  seek  its 
roots  in  the  laws  of  individual  life,  involves  the  idea  of 
'measure /  and  on  passing  to  social  life,  the  same  principle 
introduces  us  to  the  conception  of  equity  or  equalness,  in  the 
relations  of  citizens  to  one  another  :  the  elements  of  the 
questions  arising  are  quantitative,  and  hence  the  solutions 
assume  a  more  scientific  form.  Though,  having  to  recog- 
nize differences  among  individuals  due  to  age,  sex,  or  other 
cause,  we  cannot  regard  the  members  of  a  society  as 
absolutely  equal,  and  therefore  cannot  deal  with  problems 
growing  out  of  their  relations  with  that  precision  which 
absolute  equality  might  make  possible ;  yet,  considering 
them  as  approximately  eqtral-  in  virtue  of  their  common 
human  nature,  and  dealing  with  questions  of  equity  on  this 
supposition,  we  may  reach  conclusions  of  a  sufficiently- 
definite  kind. 

This  division  of  Ethics  considered  under  its  absolute  form, 
has  to  define  the  equitable  relations  among  perfect  individuals 
who  limit  one  another's  spheres  of  action  by  co-existing,  and 
who  achieve  their  ends  by  co-operation.  It  has  to  do  much 
more  than  this.  Beyond  justice  between  man  and  man,  jus- 
tice between  each  man  and  the  aggregate  of  men  has  to  be 
dealt  with  by  it.  The  relations  between  the  individual  and 
the  State,  considered  as  representing  all  individuals,  have  to 
be  deduced — an  important  and  a  relatively-difficult  matter. 
What  is  the  ethical  warrant  for  governmental  authority? 
To  what  ends  may  it  be  legitimately  exercised  ?  How  far 
may  it  rightly  be  carried  ?  Up  to  what  point  is  the  citi- 
zen bound  to  recognize  the  collective  decisions  of  other  citi- 
zens, and  beyond  what  point  may  he  properly  refuse  to  obey 
them. 

These  relations,  private  and  public,  considered  as  main- 
tained under  ideal  conditions,  having  been  formulated,  there 


286  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

come  to  be  dealt  with  the  analogous  relations  under  real  con- 
ditions— absolute  justice  being  the  standard,  relative  justice 
has  to  be  determined  by  considering  how  near  an  approach 
may,  under  present  circumstances,  be  made  to  it.  As  al- 
ready implied  in  various  places,  it  is  impossible  during  stages 
of  transition  which  necessitate  ever-changing  compromises, 
to  fulfil  the  dictates  of  absolute  equity  ;  and  nothing  beyond 
empirical  judgments  can  be  formed  of  the  extent  to  which 
they  may  be,  at  any  given  time,  fulfilled.  While  war  con- 
tinues and  injustice  is  done  between  societies,  there  cannot 
be  anything  like  complete  justice  within  each  society.  Mili- 
tant organization  no  less  than  militant  action,  is  irreconcilable 
with  pure  equity ;  and  the  inequity  implied  by  it  inevitably 
ramifies  throughout  all  social  relations.  But  there  is  at  every 
stage  in  social  evolution,  a  certain  range  of  variation  within 
which  it  is  possible  to  approach  nearer  to,  or  diverge  fur- 
ther from,  the  requirements  of  absolute  equity.  Hence  these 
requirements  have  ever  to  be  kept  in  view  that  relative  equity 
may  be  ascertained. 

§  110.  Of  the  two  sub-divisions  into  which  beneficence 
falls,  the  negative  and  the  positive,  neither  can  be  specialized. 
Under  ideal  conditions  the  first  of  them  has  but  a  nominal 
existence  ;  and  the  second  of  them  passes  largely  into  a  trans- 
figured form  admitting  of  but  general  definition. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  ideal  man  among  ideal  men,  that  self- 
regulation  which  has  for  its  motive  to  avoid  giving  pain,  prac- 
tically disappears.  No  one  having  feelings  which  prompt 
acts  that  disagreeably  affect  others,  there  can  exist  no  code  of 
restraints  referring  to  this  division  of  conduct. 

But  though  negative  beneficence  is  only  a  nominal  part 
of  Absolute  Ethics,  it  is  an  actual  and  considerable  part  of 
Relative  Ethics.  For  while  men's  natures  remain  imper- 
fectly adapted  to  social  life,  there  must  continue  in  them 
impulses  which,  causing  in  some  cases  the  actions  we  name 
unjust,  cause  in  other  cases  the  actions  we  name  unkind — 


THE   SCOPE    OF   ETHICS.  287 

nnkind  now  in  deed  and  now  in  word  ;  and  in  respect  of 
these  modes  of  behaviour  which,  though  not  aggressive, 
give  pain,  there  arise  numerous  and  complicated  problems. 
Fain  is  sometimes  given  to  others  simply  by  maintaining  an 
equitable  claim  ;  pain  is  at  other  times  given  by  refusing  a 
request ;  and  again  at  other  times  by  maintaining  an  opinion. 
In  these  and  numerous  cases  suggested  by  them,  there  have 
to  be  answered  the  questions  whether,  to  avoid  inflicting 
pain,  personal  feelings  should  be  sacrificed,  and  how  far 
sacrified.  Again,  in  cases  of  another  class,  pain  is  given 
not  by  a  passive  course  but  by  an  active  course.  How  far 
shall  a  person  who  has  misbehaved  be  grieved  by  showing 
aversion  to  him  ?  Shall  one  whose  action  is  to  be  repro- 
bated, have  the  reprobation  expressed  to  him  or  shall  noth- 
ing be  said  ?  Is  it  right  to  annoy  by  condemning  a  preju- 
dice which  another  displays?  These  and  kindred  queries 
have  to  be  answered  after  taking  into  account  the  immediate 

o 

pain  given,  the  possible  benefit  caused  by  giving  it,  and  the 
possible  evil  caused  by  not  giving  it.  In  solving  problems 
of  this  class,  the  only  help  Absolute  Ethics  gives,  is  by  en- 
forcing the  consideration  that  inflicting  more  pain  than  is 
necessitated  by  proper  self-regard,  or  by  desire  for  another's 
benefit,  or  by  the  maintenance  of  a  general  principle,  is  un- 
warranted. 

Of  positive  beneficence  under  its  absolute  form  nothing 
more  specific  can  be  said  than  that  it  must  become  co-exten- 
sive with  whatever  sphere  remains  for  it ;  aiding  to  complete 
the  life  of  each  as  a  recipient  of  services  and  to  exalt  the  life 
of  each  as  a  renderer  of  services.  As  with  a  developed  hu- 
manity the  desire  for  it  by  every  one  will  so  increase,  and 
the  sphere  for  exercise  of  it  so  decrease,  as  to  involve  an  al- 
truistic competition,  analogous  to  the  existing  egoistic  com- 
petition, it  may  be  that  Absolute  Ethics  will  eventually  in- 
clude what  we  before  called  a  higher  equity,  prescribing  the 
mutual  limitations  of  altruistic  activities. 

Under  its  relative  form,  positive  beneficence  presents 
20 


288  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

numerous  problems,  alike  important  and  difficult,  admitting 
only  of  empirical  solutions.  How  far  is  self  sacrifice  for  an- 
other's benefit  to  be  carried  in  each  case  ? — a  question  which 
must  be  answered  differently  according  to  the  character  of 
the  other,  the  needs  of  the  other,  and  the  various  claims  of 
self  and  belongings  which  have  to  be  met.  To  what  extent 
under  given  circumstances  shall  private  welfare  be  subordi- 
nated to  public  welfare  ? — a  question  to  be  answered  after  con  • 
sidering  the  importance  of  the  end  and  the  seriousness  of  the 
sacrifice.  What  benefit  and  what  detriment  will  result  from 
gratuitous  aid  yielded  to  another  ? — a  question  in  each  case 
implying  an  estimate  of  probabilities.  Is  there  any  unfair 
treatment  of  sundry  others,  involved  by  more  than  fair  treat- 
ment of  this  one  other  ?  Up  to  what  limit  may  help  be  given 
to  the  existing  generation  of  the  inferior,  without  entailing 
mischief  on  future  generations  of  the  superior  ?  Evidently 
to  these  and  many  kindred  questions  included  in  this  division 
of  Relative  Ethics,  approximately  true  answers  only  can  be 
given. 

But  though  here  Absolute  Ethics,  by  the  standard  it  sup- 
plies, does  not  greatly  aid  Relative  Ethics,  yet,  as  in  other 
cases,  it  aids  somewhat  by  keeping  before  consciousness  an 
ideal  conciliation  of  the  various  claims  involved ;  and  by  sug- 
gesting the  search  for  such  compromise  among  them,  as  shall 
not  disregard  any,  but  shall  satisfy  all  to  the  greatest  extent 
practicable. 


APPENDIX  TO  PART  I. 


THE   CONCILIATION. 

[  While  searching  for  some  memoranda,  I  have  discovered  the 
rough  draft  of  a  chapter  belonging  to  this  work.  Whether  it 
was  that,  when  writing  out  at  length  the  part  of  the  argument 
it  belongs  to,  I  was  led  to  put  aside  this  chapter  as  having  a 
form  unfitting  it  for  incorporation,  or  whether  it  was  that  I  had 
mislaid  it,  I  cannot  now  remember.  The  last  supposition  is,  I 
think,  the  more  probable  ;  since  this  rough  draft  contains  matter 
which,  had  it  been  before  me,  I  should  have  embodied. 

Partly  because  certain  of  the  arguments  it  contains  yield  fur- 
ther support  to  the  general  conclusion  drawn,  and  partly  because 
such  of  its  arguments  as  answer  to  those  included  in  the  text 
are  set  forth  in  another  way,  I  have  decided  here  to  append  this 
omitted  chapter.  "  The  Data  of  Ethics,"  as  finally  elaborated, 
was  based  on  a  manuscript  dictated  to  a  short-hand  amanuensis, 
and  written  out  by  him  in  a  series  of  copy-books,  one  to  each 
chapter :  an  arrangement  which,  I  suspect,  accidentally  led  to  the 
omission  indicated.  As,  on  reading  this  rough  draft,  I  find  that 
it  is  fairly  coherent  and  expressed  with  adequate  clearness,  I  have 
thought  it  well  to  print  it  just  as  it  stands.  In  a  few  places 
where  the  short-hand  writer  failed  to  interpret  his  notes,  I  have 
supplied,  in  square  brackets,  what  I  suppose  were  the  missing 
words  ;  and  in  some  other  cases  I  have  corrected  errors  that  were 
obviously  due  to  misunderstanding  or  to  mistranscription.] 

§  In  the  last  two  chapters  have  been  enunciated  the  claims  of 
egoism  and  altruism  respectively.  Each  has  been  insisted  upon 
so  strongly  that,  taken  alone,  it  would  seem  to  go  far  toward  the 
repudiation  of  the  other.  The  usual  tendency  in  ethical  specula- 
tion is  not  to  recognize  in  full  both  factors,  as  essential  to  human 
happiness,  but  to  insist  almost  exclusively  upon  the  one  or  the 
other.  Or  rather  I  should  say  that,  in  almost  all  cases,  ignoring 
the  egoistic  factor,  the  insistence  has  been  upon  the  altruistic 
one. 

At  first  sight  it  seems  that  there  is  some  inconsistency  in  the 
position  here  taken.  To  enunciate  the  legitimacy  of  egoism  in 
the  way  done,  possibly  caused  the  reader  to  think  that  the  high- 
er morality  was  being  denied  by  the  assertion  of  a  system 
of  selfishness.  Contrariwise,  reading  by  itself  the  subsequent 


290  APPENDIX. 

chapter,  he  might,  if  one  who  had  before  appreciated  the  claims 
of  egoism,  be  led  to  suppose  that  egoism  was  being  ignored,  and 
the  tacit  assertion  made  that  egoistic  gratifications  were  to  be 
achieved  through  fulfilment  of  altruistic  obligations.  And 
finding  that  each  of  the  chapters  to  a  considerable  extent  seems 
to  conflict  with  the  other,  he  will  incline  to  allege  an  incongruity 
of  doctrine.  If  he  does  not  go  farther,  he  will  at  any  rate  be 
inclined  to  say  that  the  doctrine  implies  a  necessary  incomplete- 
ness— implies  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  life  in  which 
all  requirements  are  fully  satisfied.  That  process  of  evolution 
set  forth  in  preceding  chapters,  will  appear  to  be  negatived  by 
such  incompatibility  between  the  conflicting  claims  of  self  and 
others ;  so  that  it  cannot  end  in  an  entire  equilibrium  between 
human  nature  and  its  conditions.  Taking  by  itself  the  chapter  on 
Egoism  versus  Altruism,  it  would  seem  that  for  the  imperative 
welfare  of  the  individual,  and  of  those  belonging  to  him,  and  of 
those  afterwards  descending  from  him,  there  must  be  such  sub- 
ordination of  the  claims  of  others,  as  from  time  to  time  deducts 
from  their  welfare  or  diminishes  the  total  happiness.  On  the 
other  hand,  reading  by  itself  the  chapter  on  Altruism  versus 
Egoism,  it  seems  to  be  an  inevitable  corollary  that  self-abnegation 
— that  is,  the  abandonment  of  a  gratification  or  the  submission  to 
a  pain  due  to  the  craving  unsatisfied,  is  more  or  less  demanded  of 
all,  that  there  may  be  maintained  that  social  state  which,  by  its 
prosperity,  conduces  to  the  egoistic  welfare  of  each,  and  that 
there  may  be  also  achieved  the  character  and  the  capacity  which 
are  the  means  to  their  egoistic  gratifications ;  and  that  thus  the 
pursuit  of  altruistic  ends  must  of  necessity  entail  egoistic 
deprivations.  Or,  to  put  the  matter  briefly,  it  seems  to  be  clear 
that  there  must  be  everywhere  a  certain  large  percentage  of 
sacrifice — sacrifice  of  others  to  self  or  sacrifice  of  self  to  others ; 
and  that,  in  so  far  as  there  is  sacrifice,  there  is  a  submission  to 
pain,  positive  or  negative,  and  therefore  a  necessary  failure  in  the 
working  out  of  [a]  nature  capable  of  complete  life — that  is, 
complete  happiness. 

Here  there  remains  to  be  shown  the  invalidity  of  this  con- 
clusion. On  tracing  upwards  the  process  of  evolution  to  a  higher 
stage,  we  shall  see  that  this  conflict  between  egoism  and  altruism, 
which  now  constitutes  the  crux  in  all  ethical  speculation,  is 
transitional,  and  is  in  process  of  gradual  disappearance. 

§  Already  in  seeking  clues  for  the  interpretation  of  the  future, 
we  have  gone  back  to  the  past ;  and  that  we  may  understand  the 
past  have  carried  our  inquiry  back  to  the  beginning.  In  seeking 
a  right  interpretation  of  egoism  we  set  out  with  life  in  its  earlier 
stages,  and  observed  the  truth  that  a  predominant  egoism,  through 
which  each  achieved  the  benefits  of  its  own  superiority,  was  the 


THE   CONCILIATION.  291 

condition  not  only  to  the  maintenance  of  life  from  the  begin- 
ning, but  a  condition  to  the  maintenance  of  each  species,  and 
therefore  to  the  evolution  of  higher  species.  Similarly,  when  seek- 
ing for  an  ultimate  basis  for  the  claims  of  altruism,  we  observed, 
on  going  back  to  its  root,  that  from  the  beginning  altruism  has 
been  co-essential ;  in  so  far  that  the  continued  egoism  of  gen- 
eration after  generation  has  been  made  possible  only  through 
the  altruism  which  sacrifices,  physically  and  otherwise,  a  portion 
of  the  life  of  each  generation  for  the  next.  Here  we  may  with 
advantage  pursue,  in  seeking  the  ultimate  conciliation  of  egoism 
and  altruism,  the  same  course.  If  we  similarly  go  back  to  the 
beginning,  we  shall  get  a  clue  to  the  method  by  which  the  con- 
ciliation, already  in  certain  directions  achieved,  will  in  the 
future  be  carried  out  to  the  full. 

For  how  is  there  effected  that  conciliation  of  the  egoism  and 
altruism,  co-essential  as  we  have  seen,  by  which  each  race,  and 
life  on  the  globe  as  a  whole,  have  been  maintained  and  evolved  ? 
How  is  there  achieved  that  conciliation  between  the  egoism  of 
the  parent,  which  is  essential  to  production  and  fostering  of 
offspring,  and  the  altruism  by  which  that  fostering  is  effected  ? 
The  answer  is  perfectly  simple.  There  has  from  the  beginning 
been  arising,  and  has  arisen  more  and  more  to  a  higher  and 
higher  stage,  such  constitution  in  each  creature,  as  entailed 
egoistic  gratification  in  performing  the  altruistic  action. 

If  we  glance  afresh  at  the  cases  before  indicated,  in  which 
there  is  a  self-sacrifice  of  parent  for  the  benefit  of  offspring,  we 
observe  that  throughout,  this  self-sacrifice  is  made  in  gratifica- 
tion of  a  powerful  instinct,  and  is  a  source  of  pleasure,  and  the 
negation  of  it  an  extreme  pain.  Not  to  dwell  on  cases,  even  low 
down  among  invertebrate  animals,  where,  as  even  with  molluscs, 
great  labour  is  taken  in  safe  laying  of  ova,  or,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  spider,  the  ova  are  carried  about  and  protected  till  they  are 
hatched — cases  which  show  us  even  there  that  this  expenditure 
of  labour  by  which  other  beings  are  benefited,  is  itself  done  in 
fulfilment  of  an  instinct  which  is  only  to  be  satisfied  by  the  act, 
and  is  therefore  in  that  sense  egoistic ;  we  have  this  relation 
forced  upon  us  distinctly,  when  we  come  to  the  more  highly 
organized  and  intelligent  creatures.  If  we  ask  how  it  is  that 
there  are  gone  through  by  a  pair  of  birds,  all  the  labours  of  nest- 
building,  the  denial  of  activity  implied  by  incubation,  the  activity 
of  the  male  in  feeding  the  female  while  sitting,  and  the  prolonged 
labours  of  both  in  subsequently  bringing  food  to  the  young ;  the 
answer  is  that  all  these  actions  are  carried  on  under  the  prompt- 
ings of  certain  inherited  and  organized  cravings,  which  make  the 
successive  activities  sources  of  gratification.  And  it  needs  but 
to  observe  the  signs  of  distress  consequent  on  danger  to  the  young 
to  get  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  pleasure  taken  in  performing 


292  APPENDIX. 

these  acts  that  are  directly  beneficial  to  others  and  at  the  same 
time  pleasurable  to  self.  Evidently  this  conciliation  between  the 
requirements  of  egoism  and  altruism,  has  from  the  beginning 
been  growing  in  extent  and  completeness — necessarily  has  been 
doing  so — since  the  higher  the  type  of  creature  evolved,  the  more 
the  young  becomes  dependent  upon  the  parent  and  the  more 
involved  the  requirements  to  be  fulfilled  in  fostering  them,  and 
therefore  the  more  continuous  and  more  varied  the  activities 
carried  on  by  adults  in  behalf  of  the  young. 

And  this  conciliation  which  we  see  has  gone  hand-in-hand 
with  evolution,  is  a  conciliation  which  we  see  has  reached  a  high 
degree  in  the  human  race.  It  needs  not  here  to  dwell  on  parental 
sacrifices  as  prompted  by  parental  affections.  It  needs  not  to 
dwell  on  the  amount  of  positive  pleasure  which  the  mother,  de- 
rives from  daily  witnessing  that  welfare  of  her  offspring  which 
her  self-sacrificing  efforts  achieve;  nor  does  it  need  to  dwell 
upon  the  intensity  of  the  unhappiness  which  from  time  to  time 
results  if  illness  threatens  or  death  destroys,  and  if ,  as  a  conse- 
quence, the  mother,  no  longer  called  on  to  make  these  daily 
sacrifices,  is  at  the  same  time  defrauded  of  the  pleasures  those 
sacrifices  brought.  All  that  needs  to  be  more  especially  indicated 
in  further  insisting  on  this  great  fact  is,  that  during  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  human  race  itself  there  has  been  a  marked  further 
progress  in  this  conciliation ;  so  that  whereas  during  savage  life 
the  sacrifices  made  on  the  part  of  both  parents  are  less  varied 
and  persistent,  they  endure  for  a  shorter  period,  and  that  among 
the  civilized  the  labours  of  both  parents,  gone  through  in  rearing 
and  education,  much  more  complex,  are  prolonged  over  a  greater 
number  of  years,  and  the  labours  gone  through  in  accumulating 
the  means  for  setting  them  up  in  life,  and  often  the  injury  to 
health  borne  in  providing  them  with  fortunes,  are  such  as  to 
make  it  manifest  that  a  large  part  of  the  pleasure  of  daily  life 
is  achieved  in  the  process  of  sacrificing  personal  ends  for  the 
benefit  of  offspring. 

In  all  which  illustrations  the  one  truth  to  be  observed  and 
carried  with  us  is,  ihat  there  gradually  evolves  with  the  evolution 
of  a  higher  life,  an  organic  altruism,  which,  in  relation  to  a  cer- 
tain limited  class  of  other  beings,  works  to  the  effect  of  making 
what  we  call  self -sacrifice  not  a  sacrifice  in  the  ordinary  sense  of 
the  word,  but  an  act  which  brings  more  pleasure  than  pain — an 
act  which  has  for  its  accompaniment  an  altruistic  gratification 
which  outweighs  the  egoistic  gratification  lost ;  and  this,  other- 
wise stated,  implies  that  as  the  altruistic  gratification  is  egoisti- 
cally  expressed,  egoism  and  altruism  coalesce. 

§  That  which  has  been  in  course  of  achievement  in  respect  of 
the  limited  group  of  beings  constituting  a  family,  in  the  course 


THE   CONCILIATION.  293 

of  the  evolution  of  life,  and  has  now,  in  the  human  race,  been 
in  very  large  measure  achieved,  has  been  in  course  of  achieve- 
ment, and  is  to  a  comparatively  small  extent  achieved,  with 
those  larger  groups  constituting  societies.  The  conciliation  be- 
tween egoism  and  altruism  under  their  aspects  as  ordinarily 
understood,  is  slowly  coming  about  by  analogous  conciliation  of 
the  egoistic  and  altruistic  gratifications. 

Only  those  whose  creed  prompts  them  to  believe  in  the 
unalterable  badness  of  human  nature,  and  who,  in  face  of  the 
evidence  which  mankind  at  large  furnish,  hold  that  man  not 
only  always  has  been,  but  always  will  be,  "  desperately  wicked," 
can  refuse  to  recognize  the  conspicuous  fact  that  along  with 
the  progress  of  civilization,  there  has  been  growing  up  not  only 
that  kind  of  altruism  which  is  shown  in  decreasing  aggressive- 
ness on  fellow-men,  but  also  that  kind  of  altruism  which  is  shown 
in  actual  regard  for  their  welfare.  Go  back  to  the  times  when 
blood-feuds  were  not  only  chronic  between  adjacent  tribes  but 
in  the  later  times  in  which  there  were  blood-feuds  maintained 
from  generation  to  generation  between  families  of  the  same 
tribe,  and  contrast  it  with  the  present  time  in  which,  among 
civilized  peoples,  such  aggressions  as  exist,  relatively  few,  are  far 
less  violent  in  kind ;  and  it  cannot  be  denied  that  that  negative 
latruism  which  is  shown  in  refraining  from  injuring  others,  has 
increased.  Contrast  the  times  in  which  slavery,  existing  every- 
where, excited  even  in  moralists  no  repugnance,  with  modern 
times  when  slavery,  by  the  more  sympathetically-minded,  is 
characterized  as  "  the  sum  of  all  villanies ;  "  and  it  is  undeniable 
that  the  extent  to  which  selfish  gratification  is  pursued  at  the 
cost  of  misery  to  others,  is  alike  less  extreme  and  less  widespread. 
Observe  the  contrast  between  savages  who  torture  their  captives 
till  they  die,  or  ancient  so-called  heroes  who  dragged  the  dead 
bodies  of  slain  foes  after  their  chariots,  with  our  own  days  in 
which,  among  the  more  advanced  nations,  wounded  enemies  are 
cared  for,  and  by-standing  nations  send  out  doctors  and  nurses ; 
and  it  cannot  be  questioned  that  there  exists  now  [more  kind 
feeling]  than  existed  in  the  less  developed  human  beings.  So 
in  the  contrast  between  gladiatorial  shows  and  days  when  pugil- 
ism is  forbidden,  or  between  the  societies  in  which  seeing  ani- 
mals slay  one  another  is  a  chief  pleasure  and  societies  in  which 
there  exist  associations  and  laws  for  the  prevention  of  such  re- 
maining cruelty  to  animals  as  exists. 

If,  from  the  increase  of  sympathy  shown  by  the  decrease  of 
cruelty,  we  pass  to  that  which  is  shown  by  the  establishment  of 
juster  social  relations,  the  same  thing  is  shown  to  us.  From 
the  times  when  the  system  of  internal  protection  was  so  little 
developed  that  men  had  to  rectify  their  own  grievances  by  force 
as  well  as  they  might,  to  the  times  when  there  exist  guardians 


294  APPENDIX. 

of  life  and  property  patrolling  the  streets  at  all  hours,  we  are 
shown  a  gradual  rise  of  that  public  sentiment  expressing  regard 
for  the  claims  of  others.  Defective  as  is  the  administration  of 
law,  yet  men's  properties  as  well  as  their  lives  are  far  safer  than 
they  were  in  early  times ;  by  which  there  is  implied  an  increase 
of  those  feelings  which  embody  themselves  in  equitable  laws. 
If  we  again  look  at  the  growth  of  governmental  forms,  which 
have  gone  on  from  period  to  period  decreasing  the  unchecked 
powers  of  ruling  classes,  and  extending  to  lower  and  lower 
grades  shares  of  political  power,  we  see  both  that  the  institu- 
tions so  established  are  more  altruistic  in  the  sense  that  they 
recognize  better  the  claims  of  all,  and  in  the  sense  that  they  are 
advocated  and  carried  on  grounds  of  equity  and  by  appeal  to 
men's  sense  of  justice — that  is,  to  the  most  abstract  and  latest 
developed  of  the  altruistic  sentiments. 

Nor  is  it  otherwise  if  we  consider  the  altruism  which  ex- 
presses itself  in  active  benevolence.  Go  back  to  early  societies, 
and  we  find  little  or  nothing  representing  those  multitudinous 
agencies  which  have  grown  up  during  civilization  for  the  care 
of  the  sick  and  aged  and  the  unfortunate.  In  the  rudest  forms 
of  society,  those  who  were  no  longer  from  one  or  other  cause 
capable  of  taking  care  of  themselves,  were  either  killed  or  left 
to  die.  But  the  moral  modification  which  has  resulted  from 
the  discipline  of  social  life,  as  it  has  gradually  passed  more  and 
more  from  the  militant  to  the  industrial  form,  has  been  accom- 
panied by  growth  of  multitudinous  forms  of  philanthropic  ac- 
tivity—countless societies  voluntarily  established  and  carried 
on,  enormous  sums  of  money  subscribed,  innumerable  people 
busying  themselves  with  a  view  to  the  welfare  of  those  who  are 
not  so  well  off  in  the  world  as  themselves.  That  is  to  say,  altru- 
ism arising  from  that  same  growth  of  sympathy  which  checks 
cruelty  and  extends  justice,  has  been  simultaneously  leading  to 
positive  exertions  for  the  benefit  alike  of  individuals  and  of  the 
community  at  large. 

And  if  we  ask  what  is  the  attitude  of  mind  in  those  who  are 
engaged,  now  in  the  checking  of  actions  which  inflict  pain,  now 
in  the  furtherance  of  political  changes  which  conduce  to  more 
equitable  relations,  now  in  the  agitations  for  changing  unjust 
laws,  now  in  the  carrying  on  of  organizations  for  mitigating  the 
pains  of  less  fortunate  fellow-citizens  or  increasing  their  pleas- 
ures ;  we  see  that  if  [not]  in  the  whole,  still  in  large  measure, 
the  prompting  cause  is  an  actual  satisfaction  in  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  benefits  achieved.  Large  numbers  of  persons  are 
there  who,  often  postponing  in  large  measure,  and  sometimes 
unduly,  their  private  affairs  to  public  affairs,  are  as  eagerly  ener- 
getic in  achieving  what  they  conceive  will  redound  to  human 
welfare  at  large,  or  the  welfare  of  particular  classes  of  Deople,  as 


THE   CONCILIATION.  295 

though  they  were  pursuing  their  personal  ends ;  and  so  show  us 
that  the  gratification  of  their  altruistic  feelings  has  become  to 
them  a  stimulus  approaching  in  potency  to  the  gratification  of 
their  directly  egoistic  feelings.  So  that  the  pursuit  of  the  altru- 
istic pleasure  has  become  a  higher  order  of  egoistic  pleasure. 

§  It  is  a  paradox  daily  illustrated,  that  the  belief  in  irrationali- 
ties habitually  goes  with  scepticism  of  rationalities.  Those  who 
are  impressed  by  some  statement  of  a  wonder,  and  accept  it  on 
the  strength  of  some  emphatic  assertion  notwithstanding  its 
utter  incongruity  with  all  that  is  known  of  the  course  of  things, 
will  listen  with  utter  incredulity  to  inferences  drawn  by  the 
most  cogent  reasoning  from  premises  that  they  do  not  deny. 
Incapable  of  conceiving  with  any  vividness  the  necessary 
dependence  of  conclusions  upon  premises,  where  these  are 
at  all  remote  from  the  simplest  matters,  they  are  not  affected 
in  their  convictions  by  demonstration,  however  clear,  as  they 
are  affected  by  the  manifestation  of  strong  belief  in  those  who 
make  statements  to  them.  And  thus  while,  for  example,  they 
see  nothing  whatever  ridiculous  in  the  tradition  which  ascribes 
the  universe  to  a  great  artificer  who  was  tired  after  six 
days'  labour,  it  seems  to  them  quite  ridiculous  to  suppose 
that  there  are  to  come  in  the  future,  changes  in  human  nature, 
and  corresponding  changes  in  human  society,  analogous  to,  and 
equally  great  with,  those  that  have  taken  place  since  societies 
were  first  formed. 

One  who,  looking  at  the  hour-hand  of  a  watch,  fails  to  see 
it  move,  and  is  prompted  by  his  inability  to  see  the  movement 
to  say  that  it  does  not  move,  is  checked  from  doing  so  by  his 
experiences  of  past  occasions  when,  on  looking  after  an  interval, 
he  has  seen  that  movement  has  taken  place ;  but  one  can 
readily  imagine  that  in  one  who  had  never  had  any  experiences 
of  watches,  and  who  was  told  that  this  hour-hand  was  moving 
though  he  could  not  see  it,  and  that  unless  familiar  with  the 
actions  of  machinery,  it  would  be  of  little  avail  to  point  out 
the  arrangements  of  mainspring,  balance-wheel,  pinions,  and 
the  like,  in  such  way  as  to  prove  to  him  that  although  he 
could  not  see  it,  the  hour-hand  must  be  moving.  And  much 
in  the  same  condition  as  would  be  such  an  one  who  had 
never  before  seen  a  watch,  and  who  was  incredulous  as  to  the 
movement  of  the  hour-hand  because  it  was  imperceptible  to  him, 
are  the  great  mass  of  people  who  habitually  look  upon  human 
nature  and  human  society  as,  if  not  stationary,  still,  not  moving 
in  such  way  as  to  be  likely  to  change  their  places  in  such 
great  degree  as  to  make  them  remote  from  what  they  now 
are.  They  have  indeed  the  opportunity,  not  paralleled  in  the 
hypothetical  case  just  put,  of  contrasting  existing  civilized  socie- 
ties with  existing  savage  societies ;  and  they  have  the  opportunity 


APPENDIX. 

of  contrasting  the  present  state  of  any  one  civilized  society  with 
its  preceding  state.  But  strong  as  is  the  evidence  furnished  to 
them  that  both  the  individual  human  being  and  the  masses 
of  human  beings,  undergo  decided  changes,  they  are  so  domi- 
nated by  the  daily  impression  of  constancy,  as  to  have 
either  unconsciousness,  or  no  adequate  consciousness,  of  the 
changes  that  are,  from  kindred  causes,  hereafter  to  take  place. 
Not  denying  that  there  will  be  changes,  their  imagination  of 
them  is  so  vague,  and  their  belief  in  them  is  so  feeble,  that, 
practically,  the  admission  that  they  may  take  place  amounts  to 
nothing  in  their  general  conception  of  things,  and  plays  no  part 
as  a  factor  in  their  general  thinking.  And,  most  remarkably, 
this  proves  to  be  so  not  [only]  with  the  commonplace  uncultured 
[and]  with  those  of  mere  literary  culture ;  but  it  is  to  a  large  extent 
true  of  those  whose  scientific  culture  should  give  them  clear  con- 
ceptions of  causation — clear  conceptions  that  results  will  not  re- 
sult without  causes,  and,  conversely,  that  given  the  causes  the 
results  are  inevitable.  Even  a  large  proportion  of  the  biological 
world  whose  discipline,  especially  in  recent  years,  might  be  pre- 
sumed to  give  them  full  faith  in  the  potent  working  hereafter  of 
causes  that  have  worked  so  potently  heretofore,  show  no  sign  that 
their  conceptions  of  human  life  and  human  society  are  much  in 
advance  of  those  held  by  other  people.  Strange  to  say,  natu- 
ralists who  have  accepted  in  full  the  general  hypothesis  of  or- 
ganic evolution,  and  hold  that  by  direct  or  indirect  adaptation, 
organisms  have  perpetually  been  moulded  to  their  respective 
conditions,  and  that  in  the  future  as  the  past  such  mouldings  to 
conditions  must  ever  go  on,  show  themselves,  like  the  rest,  little 
regardful  of  the  corollaries  which  must  inevitably  follow  re- 
specting the  future  of  humanity.  And  many  of  them  may  be 
numbered  among  those  who,  in  various  ways,  are  busy  in  thwart- 
ing this  process  of  adaptation  as  respects  men  and  society. 

Hence,  not  at  all  among  the  uneducated  class,  very  little  among 
the  class  called  educated,  and  in  no  adequate  degree  even  in 
the  scientific  class,  is  there  a  belief  in  the  unquestionable  truth 
that  altruism  in  the  future  will  increase  as  it  has  increased  in 
the  past ;  and  that  as,  at  the  present  time,  there  has  grown  up  in 
the  superior  types  of  men,  a  capacity  for  receiving  much  personal 
pleasure  from  furthering  the  welfare  of  others,  and  in  contem- 
plating such  welfare  as  is  produced  by  other  means,  so  will  there 
in  the  future  grow  up  a  much  greater  degree,  and  a  much  more 
widespread  amount,  of  such  pleasure — so  will  there  in  the  fu- 
ture come  a  further  identification  of  altruism  with  egoism,  in 
the  sense  that  personal  gratification  will  be  derived  from  achiev- 
ing the  gratification  of  others.  So  far  is  it  from  being  true,  as 
might  be  supposed  from  the  general  incredulity,  that  though 
there  has  arisen  a  considerable  moralization  of  the  human 


THE   CONCILIATION.  297 

being,  as  a  concomitant  of  civilization,  there  will  be  no  compa- 
rable increase  of  such  moralization  in  the  future,  it  is  true  tfuit 
the  moralization  will  hereafter  go  on  at  a  much  greater  rate, 
because  it  will  no  longer  be  checked  by  influences  hitherto,  and 
at  present,  in  operation.  During  all  the  past,  and  even  still,  the 
egoism  of  warlike  activities  has  been  restraining  the  altruism 
which  grows  up  under  peaceful  activities.  The  need  for  main- 
taining adaptation  to  the  militant  life,  which  implies  readiness 
to  sacrifice  others,  has  perpetually  held  in  check  the  progress  of 
adaptation  to  the  industrial  life,  which,  carried  on  by  exchange 
of  services,  does  not  of  necessity  entail  the  sacrifice  of  others  to 
self.  And  because  of  these  conflicting  influences,  the  growth  of 
altruism  has  of  necessity  been  slow.  What  this  moral  modifica- 
tion due  to  the  adaptation  of  human  beings  to  peaceful  social 
life,  might  have  already  achieved  in  civilized  societies,  had  it 
not  been  for  the  moral  effects  that  have  accompanied  the  neces- 
sary process  of  compounding  and  re-compounding  by  which 
great  nations  have  been  produced,  we  may  judge  on  observing 
the  moral  state  existing  in  the  few  simple  tribes  of  men  who 
have  been  so  circumstanced  as  to  carry  on  peaceful  lives.  (Here 
insert  examples.) 

Judge,  then,  what  might  by  this  time  have  happened  under  the 
closer  mutual  dependence  and  more  complex  relations  which 
civilized  societies  have  originated,  but  for  the  retarding  causes 
which  have  kept  sympathies^  seared ;  and  then  judge  what  will 
happen  in  the  future  when,  by  further  progress  such  as  has  been 
going  on  in  the  past,  we  reach  eventually  a  state  in  which  the 
great  civilized  societies  reach  a  condition  of  permanent  peace, 
and  there  continues  no  such  extreme  check  as  has  been  operating 
thus  far.  Not  only  must  we  infer  that  the  future  of  man  and 
of  society  will  have  modifications  as  great  as  the  past  has 
shown  us,  but  that  it  will  have  much  greater.  That  is  to  say, 
the  transformation  of  altruistic  gratifications  into  egoistic  ones, 
will  be  carried  very  much  further ;  and  an  average  larger  share 
in  the  happiness  of  each  individual,  will  depend  on  conscious- 
ness of  the  well-being  of  other  individuals. 

§  Doubtless  the  moral  modification  of  human  nature  which 
has  thus  to  take  place  hereafter,  analogous  to  that  which  has 
taken  place  heretofore,  will  be  retarded  by  other  causes  than  this 
primary  cause.  Not  only  is  the  growth  of  sympathy  held  in 
check  by  the  performance  of  unsympathetic  actions,  such  as  are 
necessitated  by  militant  activities,  but  it  is  held  in  check  by  the 
constant  presence  of  pains  and  unhappinesses,  and  by  the  con- 
sciousness that  these  exist  even  when  they  are  not  visible.  Those 
in  whom  the  sympathies  have  become  keen,  are  of  .necessity  pro- 
portionately pained  on  witnessing  sufferings  borne  by  others,  not 


298  APPENDIX. 

"  [only]  in  those  cases  where  they  are  the  causes  of  sufferings,  but 
where  the  sufferings  are  caused  in  any  other  way.  To  those  whose 
fellow-feelings  were  too  keenly  alive  to  the  miseries  of  the 
great  mass  of  their  kind — alive  not  only  to  such  miseries  as  they 
saw  but  to  such  miseries  as  they  heard  of  or  read  of,  and  to 
such  miseries  as  they  knew  must  be  existing  all  around,  far 
and  near,  life  would  be  made  intolerable :  the  sympathetic  pains 
would  submerge  not  only  the  sympathetic  pleasures  but  the 
egoistic  pleasures.  And  therefore  life  is  made  tolerable,  even 
to  the  higher  among  us  at  the  present  time,  by  a  certain  per- 
petual searing  of  the  sympathies,  which  keeps  them  down  at 
such  level  of  sensitiveness  as  that  there  remains  a  balance  of 
pleasure  in  life.  Whence  it  follows  that  the  sympathies  can 
become  more  and  more  acute,  only  as  fast  as  the  amount  of 
human  misery  to  be  sympathized  with  becomes  less  and  less ;  and 
while  this  diminution  of  human  misery  to  be  sympathized  with, 
itself  must  be  due  in  part  to  the  increase  of  sympathy  which 
prompts  actions  to  mitigate  it,  it  must  be  due  in  the  main  to 
the  decrease  of  the  pressure  of  population  upon  the  means  of 
subsistence.  "While  the  struggle  for  existence  among  men  has  to 
be  carried  on  with  an  intensity  like  that  which  now  exists,  the 
quantity  of  suffering  to  be  borne  by  the  majority  must  remain 
great.  This  struggle  for  existence  must  continue  to  be  thus 
intense  so  long  as  the  rate  of  multiplication  continues  greatly 
in  excess  of  the  rate  of  mortality.  Only  in  proportion  as  the 
production  of  new  individuals  ceases  to  go  on  so  greatly  in 
excess  of  the  disappearance  of  individuals  by  death,  can  there 
be  a  diminution  of  the  pressure  upon  the  means  of  subsistence, 
and  a  diminution  of  the  strain  and  the  accompanying  pains 
that  arise  more  or  less  to  all,  and  in  a  greater  degree  to  the 
inferior.  On  referring  back  to  the  Principles  of  Biology^ 
Part  VI,  the  reader  will  find  grounds  for  the  inference  that 
along  with  social  progress,  there  must  inevitably  go  a  decrease 
in  human  fertility,  ending  in  a  comparative  balance  of  fertility 
and  mortality,  as  there  comes  the  time  when  human  evolution 
approaches  its  limit  of  complete  adaptation  to  the  social  state. 
And  as  is  here  implied,  the  highest  evolution  of  the  sympathies, 
and  consequent  reaching  of  the  ultimate  altruism,  though  the 
progress  will  go  on  with  comparative  rapidity  when  a  peaceful 
state  is  once  arrived  at,  will  yet  only  approach  its  highest  degree 
as  this  ultimate  state  is  approached. 

§  But  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  perplexity  in  this  question, 
arising  from  the  conflict  of  egoistic  and  altruistic  requirements, 
and  which  is  natural  to  the  present  condition,  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  altruism  is  habitually  associated  with  self-sacrifice.  So  long 
as  egoism  is  in  excess,  and  so  long  as,  in  consequence  of  its  ex- 


THE   CONCILIATION.  299 

cess,  the  counteraction  of  altruism  is  shown  mainly  in  checking 
undue  personal  gratification,  or  in  assuaging  the  pains  that 
have  been  produced  by  selfishness  somewhere  or  other,  it  hap- 
pens, as  a  matter  of  course,  that  the  conception  of  altruism  is 
identified  with  the  conception  of  abandonment  of  individual 
gratification,  and  self-infliction  of  more  or  less  pain.  This, 
however,  as  I  have  implied,  is  an  erroneous  and  purely  transi- 
tional view  of  the  effect  of  altruism  in  its  ultimate  workings  out. 

Sympathy  is  the  root  of  every  other  kind  of  altruism  than  that 
which,  from  the  beginning,  originates  the  parental  activities.  It 
is  the  root  of  that  higher  altruism  which,  apart  from  the  philo- 
progenitive instinct,  produces  desire  for  the  happiness  of  others 
and  reluctance  to  inflict  pain  upon  them.  These  two  traits  are 
inevitably  associated.  The  same  mental  faculty  which  reproduces 
in  the  individual  consciousness,  the  feelings  that  are  being  dis- 
played by  other  beings,  acts  equally  to  reproduce  those  states 
when  they  are  pleasurable  or  when  they  are  painful.  Sympathy, 
therefore,  is  a  state  of  the  individual,  of  pleasure  or  pain,  accord- 
ing to  the  states  of  the  surrounding  beings.  Consequently  it 
happens,  as  indicated  above,  that  when  there  exists  around  a 
large  proportion  of  pain,  sympathy  may  entail  on  its  possessor 
more  pain  than  pleasure,  and  so  is  continually  kept  in  check. 
Contrariwise  as,  in  course  of  the  general  evolution  of  humanity 
and  society,  the  general  increase  of  sympathy  everywhere,  and 
improvement  in  the  social  relations  consequent  upon  greater 
sympathy,  it  more  and  more  happens  that  the  states  of  con- 
sciousness existing  in  those  around  are  pleasurable ;  and  in  pro- 
portion as  this  happens,  the  effect  of  sympathy  is  to  increase 
the  pleasure  of  the  possessor. 

Evidently  the  general  corollary  from  this  is  that  with  the 
increase  of  sympathy,  there  arises  the  double  result,  that  by  its 
increase  it  tends  to  decrease  the  causes  of  human  misery,  and  in 
proportion  as  it  decreases  the  causes  of  human  misery  and 
increases  the  causes  of  happiness,  it  becomes  itself  the  cause  of 
further  reflected  happiness  received  by  each  from  others.  And 
the  limit  towards  which  this  evolution  approaches,  is  one  under 
which,  as  the  amount  of  pain  suffered  by  those  around  from  indi- 
vidual imperfections  and  from  imperfections  of  social  arrange- 
ment and  conduct,  become  relatively  small,  and  simultaneously 
the  growth  of  sympathy  goes  on  with  little  check,  the  sympathy 
becomes  at  the  same  time  almost  exclusively  a  source  of  pleasure 
received  from  the  happiness  of  others,  and  not  of  pains  received 
from  their  pains.  And  as  this  condition  is  approached,  the 
function  of  sympathy  is  not  that  of  stimulating  to  self-sacrifice 
and  of  entailing  upon  its  possessor  positive  or  negative  pain,  but 
its  function  becomes  that  of  making  him  a  recipient  of  positive 
olcasure.  The  altruism  which  1ms  to  arise,  therefore,  in  future, 


300  APPENDIX. 

is  not  an  altruism  which  is  in  conflict  with  egoism,  but  is  an 
altruism  which  comes  eventually  to  coincide  with  egoism  in 
respect  of  a  large  range  of  life ;  and  it  becomes  instrumental 
in  exalting  satisfactions  that  are  egoistic  in  so  far  as  they  are 
pleasures  enjoyed  by  the  individual,  though  they  are  altruistic 
in  respect  of  the  origin  of  these  pleasures. 

So  far  then  from  its  being,  as  is  commonly  assumed,  true  that 
there  must  go  on  throughout  all  the  future,  a  condition  in  which 
self-regard  is  to  be  continually  subjected  by  the  regard  for  others, 
it  will,  contrariwise,  be  the  case,  that  a  regard  for  others  will 
eventually  become  so  large  a  source  of  pleasure,  as  to  compete 
with  in  its  amount,  and  indeed  overgrow,  the  pleasure  which  is 
derivable  from  direct  egoistic  gratification  ;  and  the  pursuit  of 
this  indirect  egoistic  gratification  may  so  become  itself  the  pre- 
dominant part  of  egoism. 

Eventually,  then,  along  with  the  approximately-complete 
adaptation  of  man  to  the  social  state,  along  with  the  evolution 
of  a  society  complete  in  its  adjustments,  and  along  with  the  ulti- 
mate diminution  of  pressure  of  population,  which  must  come 
with  the  highest  type  of  human  life,  there  will  come  also  a  state 
in  which  egoism  and  altruism  are  so  conciliated  that  the  one 
merges  in  the  other. 

§  To  those  who  look  at  the  creation  at  large,  and  the  organic 
creation  in  particular,  from  the  old  point  of  view  of  special 
creation,  and  who  think  of  the  structures  and  functions  of  all 
species  as  supernaturally  given,  and  therefore  fixed  by  God,  there 
will  not  only  be  a  repudiation  of  a  conception  like  this  as  chi- 
merical, but  there  will  also  be  an  utter  impervipusness  to  all 
arguments  derived  from  those  adaptations  of  constitution  to  con- 
ditions which  the  organic  creation  at  large  presents,  and  espe- 
cially those  which  present  adaptations  of  the  kind  here  prophe- 
sied. But  all  who  take  the  evolution  view,  cannot  in  consistency 
deny  that  if  we  have  in  lower  orders  of  creatures  cases  in  which 
the  nature  is  constitutionally  so  modified  that  altruistic  activi- 
ties have  become  one  with  egoistic  activities,  there  is  an  irre- 
sistible implication  that  a  parallel  identification  will,  under 
parallel  conditions,  take  place  among  human  beings. 

Social  insects  furnish  us  with  instances  completely  to  the  point ; 
and  instances  showing  us,  indeed,  to  what  a  marvellous  degree  the 
life  of  the  individual  may  be  absorbed  in  subserving  the  lives  of 
other  individuals.  Strangely  enough,  it  happens  that  the  typical 
illustrations  taken  from  the  animal  creation  to  enforce  on  human 
beings  the  virtue  of  activity,  are  taken  from  those  creatures  whose 
activities  are  devoted,  not  to  their  own  special  welfare,  but  to  the 
welfare  of  the  communities  they  form  part  of.  The  ant,  which 
in  the  Bible  is  referred  to  as  showing  an  industry  which  should 


THE   CONCILIATION.  301 

Bhame  the  sluggard  among  men,  and  the  busy  bee  which,  in 
the  child's  hymn,  is  named  as  an  example  to  be  followed  in 
making  the  best  of  time,  are  creatures  whose  activities  are  not 
like  those  commended  to  the  child  and  the  sluggard — activities 
mainly  to  be  expended  in  subserving  personal  well-being ;  but 
they  are  activities  which  postpone  individual  well-being  so  com- 
pletely to  the  well-being  of  the  community,  that  individual 
life  appears  to  be  attended  to  only  just  as  far  as  necessary  to 
make  possible  due  attention  to  the  social  life.  These  instances 
which  are  given  as  spurs  to  egoistic  activity,  are  actually  sup- 
plied by  creatures  whose  activity  is  almost  wholly  altruistic. 
Throughout  the  animal  kingdom  there  are  found  no  better 
examples  of  energetic  industry,  than  these  in  which  the  ends 
which  the  activities  subserve  are  altruistic  rather  than  egoistic. 
And  hence  we  are  shown,  undeniably,  that  it  is  a  perfectly  pos- 
sible thing  for  organisms  to  become  so  adjusted  to  the  require- 
ments of  their  lives,  that  energy  expended  for  the  general  wel- 
fare may  not  only  be  adequate  to  check  energy  expended  for 
the  individual  welfare,  but  may  come  to  subordinate  it  so  far 
as  to  leave  individual  welfare  no  greater  than  is  requisite  for 
maintenance  of  individual  life. 

And  now  observe,  further,  that  we  are  thus  shown  not  only  the 
existence  of  an  almost  complete  identification  of  egoism  and 
altruism ;  but  we  are  also  shown  that  this  identification  takes 
place  in  consequence  of  the  gratification  accompanying  the 
altruistic  activities  having  become  a  gratification  that  is  sub- 
stantially egoistic.  Neither  the  ant  nor  the  bee  can  be  supposed 
to  have  a  sense  of  duty,  in  the  acceptation  we  give  to  that  word ; 
nor  can  it  be  supposed  that  it  is  continually  undergoing  self- 
sacrifice  in  the  ordinary  acceptation  of  that  word.  At  the  very 
outset  of  its  mature  life,  the  working  bee  begins  that  life 
which,  with  untiring  energy,  it  pursues  to  the  end — collecting 
food  to  feed  the  growing  members  of  the  community,  gathering 
pollen  with  which  to  build  new  cells,  and  taking  only  just  such 
food  and  such  rest  as  are  needful  to  maintain  its  vigour ;  and  in 
the  absence  of  those  moral  instigations  existing  only  in  the  high- 
er vertebrates,  the  instigations  are  in  this  case  simply  those  re- 
sulting from  an  organization  which  has  become  adjusted  in  the 
course  of  evolution  to  the  carrying  on  a  social  life.  They  show  us 
that  it  is  within  the  possibilities  of  organization  to  produce  a  na- 
ture which  shall  be  just  as  energetic,  and  even  more  energetic,  in 
the  pursuit  of  altruistic  ends,  as  is,  in  other  cases,  shown  in  the 
pursuit  of  egoistic  ends ;  and  they  show  that  in  such  cases  these 
altruistic  ends  are  pursued  in  pursuing  ends  which  on  their  other 
face  are  egoistic.  For  the  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  the  organ- 
ization, these  actions  conducive  to  the  welfare  of  others  must  be 
carried  on.  The  seeking  for  the  satisfaction  which  the  organiza- 


302  APPENDIX. 

tion  requires,  itself  entails  the  performance  of  those  activities 
which  the  welfare  of  the  community  requires. 

§  And  here  we  are  brought  to  a  special  application  of  that 
general  law,  the  relativity  of  pleasure,  set  forth  and  illustrated  in 
a  preceding  chapter.  We  have  but  duly  to  see  the  far-reaching 
sequences  of  this  law,  to  understand,  even  without  such  an  illus- 
tration as  that  just  furnished,  that  such  a  relation  between 
the  individual  and  the  community  is  not  only  possible,  but  is 
certain  to  establish  itself  if  the  conditions  to  its  establishment 
are  maintained. 

One  who  once  fully  grasps  the  truth  that  pleasure  of  every 
kind  is  the  concomitant  of  the  activity  of  some  nervous  structure, 
inherited  from  the  race  or  developed  by  modification  in  the  in- 
dividual, will  see  it  to  be  an  inevitable  corollary  that  there  can 
be  a  gratification  in  altruistic  activities  just  as  great  as  in  egoistic 
activities,  if  there  exists  the  structure  which  answers  to  those 
activities ;  and  that  the  evolution  of  such  a  structure  will  inevitably 
take  place,  partly  by  direct  and  partly  by  indirect  equilibration, 
where  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  the  species  that  it  should  exist. 
In  proportion  as,  with  the  advance  of  society  to  a  peaceful  state, 
there  increases  the  form  of  social  life  which  consists  in  mutual 
exchange  of  services — in  proportion  as  it  becomes  to  the  advantage 
of  the  individual,  and  to  the  prosperity  of  the  society,  to  regard 
others'  claims  and  fulfil  contracts — in  proportion  as  the  individual 
comes  to  be  aided  in  leading  a  more  complete  life,  by  possessing  a 
nature  which  begets  friendship  and  kindly  offices  from  all  around ; 
in  such  proportion  does  there  continuously  tend  to  take  place  both 
a  strengthening  of  the  altruistic  emotions  directly  in  the  individ- 
ual, and  the  increase  of  those  individuals  who  inherit  most  largely 
the  altruistic  nature.  And  in  proportion  as  there  goes  on  this 
individual  modification,  conducing  ever  to  the  prosperity  of  the 
society  after  the  peaceful  [stage]  has  been  reached,  in  that  same 
proportion  does  it  also  happen  that  among  societies  those  among 
whom  that  modification  has  gone  on  most  effectually  will  be  those 
to  [survive  and  grow,  so  as  gradually  to  replace  those  societies] 
in  which  the  individual  nature  is  not  so  adapted  to  social  require- 
ments. Inevitably,  therefore,  by  this  process,  the  tendency  of 
peaceful  conditions  is  to  the  continual  increase  of  those  faculties, 
that  is,  those  nervous  structures,  which  have  for  their  spheres  of 
activity,  pleasure  taken  in  the  welfare  of  others ;  and  in  pro- 
portion as  this  takes  place,  there  is  evolved  more  and  more  a 
nature  in  which  the  egoistic  pursuit  of  these  pleasures,  arising 
from  the  activity  of  the  altruistic  feelings,  becomes  a  source  of 
such  altruistic  activities  as  are  needful  for  the  general  welfare. 
As  certainly  as  those  organized  and  inherited  structures  Avhich 
prompt  the  activities  of  the  chase,  in  animals  and  in  men  who 


THE   CONCILIATION.  303 

live  by  the  chase,  and  which,  surviving  in  civilized  men,  give  them 
what  seems  so  natural,  the  pleasure  in  achieving  the  success  of 
the  chase,  are  structures  which  prompt  to  actions  in  pursuit  of 
gratification  apart  from  future  egoistic  ends  (for  the  sportsman 
may  be  indifferent  to  the  game  he  kills)  ;  so  are  there  growing 
up,  and  will  still  further  grow  up  with  the  progress  towards 
a  peaceful  state,  structures  which  will  prompt  to  altruistic 
activities,  and  which  will  find  their  gratification  in  those 
altruistic  activities  quite  apart  from  any  egoistic  motives. 

Anyone  who  looks  around  and  observes  the  higher  types  of 
men  and  women  already  existing,  will  see  that  even  now  the 
evolution  of  such  structures  has  made  considerable  progress; 
and  that  there  is  no  limit  to  the  progress,  save  reaching  the 
height  at  which  it  completely  fulfils  requirements. 


21 


PAKT  II. 
THE  INDUCTIONS  OF  ETHICS, 


COPYRIGHT,  1892, 
BY  D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  CONFUSION  OF  ETHICAL  THOUGHT. 

§  111.  If,  in  common  with  other  things,  human  feelings 
and  ideas  conform  to  the  general  law  of  evolution,  the 
implication  is  that  the  set  of  conceptions  constituting 
ethics,  together  with  the  associated  sentiments,  arise  out  of 
a  relatively  incoherent  and  indefinite  consciousness;  and 
slowly  acquire  coherence  and  definiteness  at  the  same  time 
that  the  aggregate  of  them  differentiates  from  the  larger 
aggregate  with  which  it  is  originally  mingled.  Long 
remaining  undistinguished,  and  then  but  vaguely  discern- 
ible as  something  independent,  ethics  must  be  expected  to  ac- 
quire  a  distinct  embodiment  only  when  mental  evolution  has 
reached  a  high  stage. 

Hence  the  present  confusion  of  ethical  thought.  Total 
at  the  outset,  it  has  necessarily  continued  great  during 
social  progress  at  large,  and,  though  diminished,  must  be 
supposed  to  be  still  great  in  our  present  semi-civilized  state. 
Notions  of  right  and  wrong,  variously  derived  and 
changing  with  every  change  in  social  arrangements  and 
activities,  form  an  assemblage  which  we  may  conclude  is 
even  now  in  large  measure  chaotic. 

Let  us  contemplate  some  of  the  chief  factors  of  the  ethical 
consciousness,  and  observe  the  sets  of  conflicting  beliefs  and 
opinions  severally  resulting  from  them. 

§  112.  Originally,  ethics  has  no  existence  apart  from 
religion,  which  holds  it  in  solution.  Religion  itself,  in  its 


308  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

earliest  form,  is  undistinguished  from  ancestor-worship. 
And  the  propitiations  of  ancestral  ghosts,  made  for  the 
purpose  of  avoiding  the  evils  they  may  inflict  and  gaining 
the  benefits  they  may  confer,  are  prompted  by  prudential 
considerations  like  those  which  guide  the  ordinary  actions 
of  life. 

"  Come  and  partake  of  this !  Give  us  maintenance  as 
you  did  when  living!"  calls  out  the  innocent  Wood- 
Yeddah  to  the  spirit  of  his  relative,  when  leaving  an 
offering  for  him ;  and  then,  at  another  time,  he  expects  this 
spirit  to  give  him  success  in  the  chase.  A  Zulu  dreams 
that  his  brother's  ghost,  scolding  him  and  beating  him  for 
not  sacrificing,  says — "  I  wish  for  meat ; "  and  then  to  the 
reply — "  No,  my  brother,  I  have  no  bullock ;  do  you  see  any 
in  the  cattle-pen  ? "  the  rejoinder  is — "  Though  there  be  but 
one,  I  demand  it."  The  Australian  medicine-man,  eulo- 
gizing the  dead  hunter  and  listening  to  replies  from  the 
corpse,  announces  that  should  he  be  sufficiently  avenged  he 
has  promised  that  "his  spirit  would  not  haunt  the  tribe, 
nor  cause  them  fear,  nor  mislead  them  into  wrong  tracks, 
nor  bring  sickness  amongst  them,  nor  make  loud  noises  in 
the  night."  Thus  is  it  generally.  Savages  ascribe  their 
good  or  ill  fortunes  to  the  doubles  of  the  dead  whom  they 
have  pleased  or  angered ;  and,  while  offering  to  them  food 
and  drink  and  clothing,  promise  conformity  to  their  wishes 
and  beg  for  their  help.* 

When  from  the  first  stage,  in  which  only  the  ghosts  of 
fathers  and  other  relatives  are  propitiated  by  the  members 
of  each  family,  we  pass  to  the  second  stage,  in  which,  along 
with  the  rise  of  an  established  chieftainship,  there  arises 
a  special  fear  of  the  chief's  ghost,  there  results  propitiation 
of  this  also — offerings,  eulogies,  prayers,  promises.  If,  as 
warrior  or  ruler,  a  powerful  man  has  excited  admiration 
and  dread,  the  anxiety  to  be  on  good  terms  with  his  still 

*  For  further  illustrations  see  Principles  of  Sociology,  §  143-3,  and 
Ecclesiastical  Institutions,  §  584. 


THE   CONFUSION   OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT.  309 

more  powerful  double  is  great,  and  prompts  observance 
of  his  commands  and  interdicts.  Of  course,  after  many 
conquests  have  made  him  a  king,  the  expressions  of 
subordination  to  his  deified  spirit,  regarded  as  omnipotent 
and  terrible,  are  more  pronounced,  and  submission  to  his  will 
becomes  imperative :  the  concomitant  idea  being  that  right 
and  wrong  consist  simply  in  obedience  and  disobedience  to 
him. 

All  religions  exemplify  these  relations  of   phenomena. 
Concerning  the  Tongans,  Mariner  says  that — 
"  Several  acts  acknowledged  by  all  civilized  nations  as  crimes,  are  under 
many  circumstances  considered  by  them  as  matters  of  indifference,"  unless 
they  involve  disrespect  to  "  the  gods,  nobles,  and  aged  persons." 
In  his  description  of  certain  peoples  of  the  Gold   Coast, 
Major  Ellis  shows  that  with  them  the  idea  of  sin  is  limited 
to  insults  offered  to  the  gods,  and  to  the  neglect  of  the 
gods. 

"  The  most  atrocious  crimes,  committed  as  between  man  and  man,  the 
gods  can  view  with  equanimity.  These  are  man's  concerns,  and  must  be 
rectified  or  punished  by  man.  But,  like  the  gods  of  people  much  farther 
advanced  in  civilisation,  there  is  nothing  that  offends  them  so  deeply  as  to 
ignore  them,  or  question  their  power,  or  laugh  at  them." 

When  from  these  cases,  in  which  the  required  subordi- 
nation is  shown  exclusively  in  observances  expressive  of 
reverence,  we  pass  to  cases  in  which  there  are  commands 
of  the  kind  called  ethical,  we  find  that  the  propriety  of 
not  offending  God  is  the  primary  reason  for  fulfilling  them. 
Describing  the  admonitions  given  by  parents  to  children 
among  the  ancient  Mexicans,  Zurita  instances  these : — 

"  Do  not  poison  any  one,  since  you  would  sin  against  God  in  his  creature ; 
your  crime  would  be  discovered  and  punished,  and  .  .  you  would  suffer  the 
same  death ''  (p.  138).  "  Do  not  injure  any  one,  shun  adultery  and  luxury ; 
that  is  a  mean  vice  which  causes  the  ruin  of  him  who  yields  to  it,  and 
which  offends  God"  (p.  139).  "Be  modest;  humility  procures  us  the 
favour  of  God  and  of  the  powerful "  (p.  141). 

Much  more  pronounced,  however,  among  the  Hebrews  was 
the  belief  that  right  and  wrong  are  made  such  simply  by 
the  will  of  God.  As  Schenkel  remarks — "Inasmuch  as 


310  THE  INDUCTIONS  OF  ETHICS. 

man  owes  obedience  to  God's  laws,  sin  is  regarded  as 
rebellion  (Isa.  i.  2,  lix.  13 ;  Hos.  vii.  13 ;  Amos  iv.  4)." 
Conformity  to  divine  injunctions  is  insisted  upon  solely 
because  they  are  divine  injunctions,  as  is  shown  in  Leviticus 

xviii.  4,  5  : — 

"  Ye  shall  do  my  judgments,  and  keep  mine  ordinances,  to  walk  there- 
in :  I  am  the  Lord  your  God.  Ye  shall  therefore  keep  my  statutes  and  my 
judgments." 

Such  was  the  view  which  the  Hebrews  themselves  avowedly 
entertained.  This  is  proved  by  their  later  writings.  Bruch 
remarks  that  according  to  the  author  of  the  Book  of  Wisdom, 
"  virtue  is  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  and  where  this  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  Law  fulfilment  of  it  is  required  (vi.  5,  19)." 
And  in  like  manner,  Fritzsche  says — In  Ecclesiasticus  "  the 
command  of  God  appears  as  the  proper  motive  of  morality." 

How  little  good  and  bad  conduct  were  associated  in 
thought  with  the  intrinsic  natures  of  right  and  wrong,  and 
how  completely  they  were  associated  in  thought  with 
obedience  and  disobedience  to  Jahveh,  we  see  in  the  facts 
that  prosperity  and  increase  of  population  were  promised  as 
rewards  of  allegiance ;  while  there  was  punishment  for  such 
non-ethical  disobediences  as  omitting  circumcision  or  number- 
ing the  people. 

That  conformity  to  injunctions,  as  well  as  making  sacri- 
fices and  singing  praises,  had  in  view  benefits  to  be  received 
in  return  for  subordination,  other  ancient  peoples  show  us. 
Here  are  illustrative  passages  from  the  Rig-  Veda. 

"  The  unsacrificing  Sanakas  perished.  Contending  with  the  sacrificers 
the  non-sacrificers  fled,  0  Indra,  with  averted  faces."  i.  33,  4-5. 

"  Men  fight  the  fiend,  trying  to  overcome  by  their  deeds  him  who  performs 
no  sacrifices."  vi.  14,  3. 

"  May  all  other  people  around  us  vanish  into  nothing,  but  our  own  off- 
spring remain  blessed  in  this  world."  x.  81,  7. 

"  We  who  are  wishing  for  horses,  for  booty,  for  women.  .  .  Indra,  the 
strong  one  who  gives  us  women."  iv.  17, 16. 

A  like  expected  exchange  of  obligations  was  shown 
among  the  Egyptians  when  Barneses,  invoking  Ammon 
for  aid,  reminded  him  of  the  hecatombs  of  bulls  he  had 


THE   CONFUSION   OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT.  311 

sacrificed  to  him.  And,  similarly,  it  was  shown  among 
the  early  Greeks  when  Chrises,  praying  for  vengeance, 
emphasized  the  claim  he  had  established  on  Apollo  by  deco- 
rating his  temple.  Evidently  the  good  and  evil  which  come 
from  enjoined  and  forbidden  actions,  are  considered  as  di- 
rectly caused  by  God,  and  not  as  indirectly  due  to  the  consti- 
tution of  things. 

That  like  conceptions  prevailed  throughout  mediaeval 
Europe  everyone  knows.  With  the  appeals  to  saints  for 
aid  in  battle,  with  the  vows  to  build  chapels  to  the  Virgin 
by  way  of  compounding  for  crimes,  and  with  the  crusading 
expeditions  and  pilgrimages  undertaken  as  means  to  salva- 
tion, there  went  the  idea  that  divine  injunctions  are  to  be 
obeyed  simply  because  they  are  divine  injunctions ;  and  the 
accompanying  idea  was  that  good  and  evil  are  consequences 
of  God's  will  and  not  consequences  naturally  caused.  The 
current  idea  was  well  shown  in  the  forms  of  manumission — 
"  For  fear  of  Almighty  God,  and  for  the  cure  of  my  soul,  I 
liberate  thee"  &c.  or  "For  lessening  my  sins"  &c.  Even 
now  a  kindred  conception  survives  in  most  men.  Not  only 
is  it  still  the  popular  belief  that  right  and  wrong  become 
such  by  divine  fiat,  but  it  is  the  belief  of  many  theologians 
and  moralists.  The  speeches  of  bishops  concerning  the 
Deceased  "Wife's  Sisters  Bill,  sufficiently  indicate  the  attitude 
of  the  one ;  and  various  books,  among  others  that  of  the 
Quaker-moralist  Jonathan  Dymond,  show  the  other.  Though 
there  has  long  been  growing  a  vague  recognition  of  natural 
sanctions  which  some  actions  have  and  others  have  not,  yet 
there  continues  a  general  belief  that  moral  obligation  is  su- 
pernaturally  derived. 

§  113.  Yarious  mythologies  of  ancient  peoples,  in 
common  with  those  of  some  existing  savages,  describe 
the  battles  of  the  gods :  now  with  one  another  and  now 
with  alien  foes.  If  the  deities  of  the  Scandinavians, 
the  Mongolians,  the  Indians,  the  Assyrians,  the  Greeks, 


312  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

are  not  all  of  them  successful  warriors,  yet  the  supremacy 
of  the  gods  over  other  beings,  or  of  one  over  the  rest,  is 
habitually  represented  as  established  by  conquest.  Even 
the  Hebrew  deity,  characterized  as  a  "man  of  war,"  is 
constantly  spoken  of  as  a  subduer  of  enemies,  if  not  per- 
sonally yet  by  proxy. 

The  apotheosized  chiefs  who  become  the  personages  of 
mythologies  (frequently  invaders,  like  the  Egyptian  gods 
who  came  into  Egypt  from  the  land  of  Punt)  usually  leave 
behind  them  wars  in  progress  or  unsettled  feuds;  and 
fulfilment  of  their  commands,  or  known  wishes,  by  over- 
coming enemies,  then  becomes  a  duty.  Even  where  there 
are  no  bequeathed  antagonisms  with  peoples  around, 
example  and  precept  given  by  the  warrior-king  unite  in 
giving  divine  sanction  to  the  ethics  of  enmity. 

Hence  such  a  fact  as  that  told  of  the  Fijian  chief, 
who  was  in  a  state  of  mental  agony  because  he  had  dis- 
pleased his  god  by  not  killing  enough  of  the  enemy. 
Hence  such  representations  as  are  made  by  Assyrian  kings : 
Shalmaneser  II.  asserting  that  Assur  "had  strongly 
urged  me  to  conquer  and  subjugate;"  Tiglath  Pileser 
naming  Ashur  and  the  great  gods  as  having  "ordered 
an  enlarged  frontier  to"  his  dominions;  Sennacherib 
describing  himself  as  the  instrument  of  Assur,  and  aided 
by  him  in  battle;  Assurbanipal,  as  fighting  in  the  service 
of  the  gods  who,  he  says,  are  his  leaders  in  war.  Of 
like  meaning  is  the  account  which  the  Egyptian  king, 
Rameses  II,  gives  of  his  transcendant  achievements  in  the 
field  while  inspired  by  the  ghost  of  his  deified  father. 
Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  the  carrying  on  of  wars  among 
the  Hebrews  in  pursuance  of  divine  behests ;  as  when  it  is 
said — "  Whomsoever  the  Lord  our  God  shall  drive  out  from 
before  us,  them  will  we  possess."  (Judg.  xi.  24.)  And 
among  other  peoples,  in  later  times,  we  see  the  same  con- 
nexion of  ideas  in  the  name  assumed  by  Attila — "  the  scourge 
of  God." 


THE   CONFUSION   OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT.  313 

Sanctions  for  deeds  entailed  by  the  conflicts  between  so- 
cieties, when  not  thus  arising,  inevitably  arise  from  social 
necessities.  Congruity  must  be  established  between  the  con- 
duct found  needful  for  self-preservation  and  the  conduct 
held  to  be  right.  When,  throughout  a  whole  community, 
daily  acts  are  at  variance  with  feelings,  these  feelings,  con- 
tinually repressed,  diminish,  and  antagonist  feelings,  con- 
tinually encouraged,  grow ;  until  the  average  sentiments 
are  adjusted  to  the  average  requirements.  Whatever  in- 
jures foes  is  then  thought  not  only  justifiable  but  praise- 
worthy, and  a  part  of  duty.  Success  in  killing  brings 
admiration  above  every  other  achievement;  burning  of 
habitations  and  laying  waste  of  territory  become  things  to 
be  boasted  of ;  while  in  trophies,  going  even  to  the  extent 
of  a  pyramid  of  heads  of  the  slain,  the  conqueror  and  his 
followers  show  that  pride  which  implies  the  consciousness 
of  great  deeds. 

These  conceptions  and  feelings,  conspicuous  in  ancient 
epics  and  histories,  have  continued  conspicuous  during  the 
course  of  social  evolution,  and  are  conspicuous  still.  If,  in- 
stead of  asking  for  men's  nominal  code  of  right  and  wrong, 
we  seek  for  their  real  code,  we  find  that  in  most  minds  the 
virtues  of  the  warrior  take  the  first  place.  Concerning  an 
officer  killed  in  a  nefarious  war,  you  may  hear  the  remark — 
"  He  died  the  death  of  a  gentleman."  And  among  civilians, 
as  among  soldiers,  there  is  tacit  approval  of  the  political 
brigandage  going  on  in  various  quarters  of  the  globe ;  while 
there  are  no  protests  against  the  massacres  euphemistically 
called  "  punishments." 

§  114.  But  though  for  the  defence  against,  and  conquest 
of,  societies,  one  by  another,  injurious  actions  of  all  kinds 
have  been  needful,  and  have  acquired  in  men's  minds  that 
sanction  implied  by  calling  them  right,  such  injurious  ac- 
tions have  not  been  needful  within  each  society ;  but,  con- 
trariwise, actions  of  an  opposite  kind  have  been  needful. 


314:  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

Violent  as  may  frequently  be  the  conduct  of  tribesmen  to 
one  another,  combined  action  of  them  against  other  tribes 
must  be  impossible  in  the  absence  of  some  mutual  trust* 
consequent  on  experience  of  friendliness  and  fairness.  And 
since  a  behaviour  which  favours  harmonious  co-operation 
within  the  tribe  conduces  to  its  prosperity  and  growth, 
and  therefore  to  the  conquest  of  other  tribes,  survival  of 
the  fittest  among  tribes  causes  the  establishment  of  such 
behaviour  as  a  general  trait. 

The  authority  of  ruling  men  gives  the  ethics  of  amity 
collateral  support.  Dissension  being  recognized  by  chiefs 
as  a  source  of  tribal  weakness,  acts  leading  to  it  are  repro- 
bated by  them ;  and  where  the  injunctions  of  deified  chiefs 
are  remembered  after  their  deaths,  there  results  a  super- 
natural sanction  for  actions  conducive  to  harmony,  and  a 
supernatural  condemnation  for  actions  at  variance  with  it. 
Hence  the  origin  of  what  we  distinguish  as  moral  codes. 
Hence  the  fact  that  in  numerous  societies,  formed  by  various 
races  of  men,  such  moral  codes  agree  in  forbidding  actions 
which  are  anti-social  in  conspicuous  degrees. 

We  find  evidence  that  moral  codes  thus  arising  are 
transmitted  from  generation  to  generation,  now  informally 
and  now  formally.  Thus  "  the  Karens  ascribe  all  their  laws, 
and  instructions,  to  the  elders  of  preceding  generations." 
According  to  Schoolcraft,  the  Dakotas  "repeat  traditions 
to  the  family,  with  maxims,  and  tell  their  children  they 
must  live  up  to  them."  And  then  Morgan  tells  us  that 
among  the  Iroquois,  when  mourning  for  their  sachems,  u  a 
prominent  part  of  the  ceremonial  consisted  in  the  repetition 
of  their  ancient  laws  and  usages."  Whence  it  is  manifest 
that,  sachems  being  the  ruling  men,  this  repetition  of  their 
injunctions  during  their  obsequies,  amounted  to  a  tacit 
expression  of  obedience,  and  the  injunctions  became  an 
ethical  creed  having  a  quasi-supernatural  sanction. 

The  gravest  transgressions,  first  recognized  as  such,  and 
their  flagitiousness  taken  for  granted,  are,  in  the  absence  of 


THE    CONFUSION   OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT.  315 

a  systematized  code  of  conduct,  not  conspicuously  denounced 
by  early  teachers ;  any  more  than  by  our  own  priests,  the 
wrongfulness  of  murder  and  robbery  is  much  insisted  on. 
Interdicts  referring  to  the  less  marked  deviations  from  ordi- 
nary conduct,  and  injunctions  to  behave  worthily,  are  most 
common.  The  works  of  the  ancient  Indians  furnish  illus- 
trations; at  the  same  time  showing  how  reaction  against 
extreme  egoism  leads  to  enunciation  of  extreme  altruism. 
Thus,  in  the  later  part  of  that  heterogeneous  compound,  the 
Mahabharata,  we  read : — 

"  Enjoy  thou  the  prosperity  of  others, 
Although  thyself  unprosperous ;  noble  men 
Take  pleasure  in  their  neighbour's  happiness." 

And  again  in  Bharavi's  Kiratarjunlya  it  is  said : — 

"  The  noble-minded  dedicate  themselves 
To  the  promotion  of  the  happiness 
Of  others — e'en  of  those  who  injure  them." 

So  too  a  passage  in  the  Cural  runs : — 

"  To  exercise  benevolence  is  the  whole  design  of  acquiring  property. 
"  He  truly  lives  who  knows  and  discharges  the  duties  of  benevolence. 
He  who  knows  them  not  may  be  reckoned  among  the  dead." 

In  the  Chinese  books  we  have,  besides  the  injunctions  of 
the  Taouists,  the  moral  maxims  of  Confucius,  exemplifying 
high  development  of  the  ethics  of  amity.  Enumerating  the 
five  cardinal  virtues  Confucius  says : — 

"  First  among  these  stands  humanity,  that  is  to  say,  that  universal  sym- 
pathy which  should  exist  between  man  and  man  without  distinction  of 
class  or  race.  Justice,  which  gives  to  each  member  of  the  community  his 
due,  without  favour  or  affection." 

And  then  in  another  place  he  expresses,  in  a  different  form, 
the  Christian  maxim : — 

"  Do  not  let  a  man  practise  to  those  beneath  him,  that  which  he  dislikes 
in  those  above  him ;  to  those  before  him,  what  he  dislikes  in  those  behind 
him ;  to  those  on  the  right  hand,  that  which  he  dislikes  on  the  left." 

Social  life  in  Ancient  Egypt  had  produced  clear  recog- 
nition of  the  essential  principles  of  harmonious  co-opera- 


316  THE   INDUCTIONS    OF   ETHICS. 

tion.    M.  Chabas,  as  quoted  by  Renouf  and  verified  by  him, 

says : — 

"  None  of  the  Christian  virtues  is  forgotten  in  it ;  piety,  charity,  gentle- 
ness, self-command  in  word  and  action,  chastity,  the  protection  of  the 
weak,  benevolence  towards  the  humble,  deference  to  superiors,  respect  for 
property  in  its  minutest  details,  ...  all  is  expressed  there,  and  in  ex- 
tremely good  language." 

And  then,  according  to  Kuenen,  who  gives  evidence  of  the 
correspondence,  we  have  the  same  principles  adopted  by  the 
Hebrews,  and  formulated  by  Moses  into  the  familiar  deca- 
logue ;  the  essentials  of  which,  summed  up  in  the  Christian 
maxim,  serve  along  with  that  maxim  as  standards  of  conduct 
down  to  our  own  day. 

The  broad  fact  which  here  chiefly  concerns  us  is  that,  in 
one  or  other  way,  communities  have  habitually  established 
for  themselves,  now  tacitly  and  now  avowedly,  here  in  rudi- 
mentary forms  and  there  in  elaborated  forms,  sets  of  com- 
mands and  restraints  conducive  to  internal  amity.  And  the 
genesis  of  such  codes,  and  partial  conformity  to  them,  have 
been  necessary ;  since,  if  not  in  any  degree  recognized  and 
observed,  there  must  result  social  dissolution. 

§  115.  As  the  ethics  of  enmity  and  the  ethics  of  amity, 
thus  arising  in  each  society  in  response  to  external  and  in- 
ternal conditions  respectively,  have  to  be  simultaneously  en- 
tertained, there  is  formed  an  assemblage  of  utterly  incon- 
sistent sentiments  and  ideas.  Its  components  can  by  no 
possibility  be  harmonized,  and  yet  they  have  to  be  all  ac- 
cepted and  acted  upon.  Every  day  exemplifies  the  resulting 
contradictions,  and  also  exemplifies  men's  contentment  under 
them. 

When,  after  prayers  asking  for  divine  guidance,  nearly  all 
the  bishops  approve  an  unwarranted  invasion,  like  that  of 
Afghanistan,  the  incident  passes  without  any  expression  of 
surprise;  while,  conversely,  when  the  Bishop  of  Durham 
takes  the  chair  at  a  Peace-meeting,  his  act  is  commented 
upon  as  remarkable.  When,  at  a  Diocesan  Conference,  a 


THE    CONFUSION   OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT.  317 

peer  (Lord  Cranbrook),  opposing  international  arbitration, 
says  he  is  "  not  quite  sure  that  a  state  of  peace  might  not 
be  a  more  dangerous  thing  for  a  nation  than  war,"  the  as- 
sembled priests  of  the  religion  of  love  make  no  protest; 
nor  does  any  general  reprobation,  clerical  or  lay,  arise  when 
a  ruler  in  the  Church,  Dr.  Moorhouse,  advocating  a  physi- 
cal and  moral  discipline  fitting  the  English  for  war,  ex- 
presses the  wish  "  to  make  them  so  that  they  would,  in  fact, 
like  the  fox  when  fastened  by  the  dogs,  die  biting,"  and 
says  that  "  these  were  moral  qualities  to  be  encouraged  and 
increased  among  our  people,  and  he  believed  that  nothing 
could  suffice  for  this  but  the  grace  of  God  operating  in 
their  hearts."  How  completely  in  harmony  with  the  popu- 
lar feeling,  in  a  land  covered  with  Christian  churches  and 
chapels,  is  this  exhortation  of  the  Bishop  of  Manchester, 
we  see  in  such  facts  as  that  people  eagerly  read  accounts 
of  football-matches  in  which  there  is  an  average  of  a  death 
per  week ;  that  they  rush  in  crowds  to  buy  newspapers 
which  give  detailed  reports  of  a  brutal  prize-fight,  but 
which  pass  over  in  a  few  lines  the  proceedings  of  a  Peace- 
Congress;  and  that  they  are  lavish  patrons  of  illustrated 
papers,  half  the  wood-cuts  in  which  have  for  their  sub- 
jects the  destruction  of  life  or  the  agencies  for  its  destruc- 
tion. 

Still  more  conspicuous  do  we  find  the  incongruity  between 
the  nominally-accepted  ethics  of  amity  and  the  actually- 
accepted  ethics  of  enmity,  when  we  pass  to  the  Continent. 
In  France,  as  elsewhere,  the  multitudinous  appointed  agents 
for  diffusing  the  injunction  to  do  good  to  enemies,  are 
practically  dumb  in  respect  of  this  injunction  ;  and,  instead 
of  seeking  to  make  their  people  put  up  the  sword,  are 
themselves,  under  the  direction  of  these  people  they  have 
been  teaching,  obliged,  during  their  student  days,  to  serve 
in  the  army.  Not  to  achieve  any  humane  end  or  to  enhance 
the  happiness  of  mankind,  either  at  home  or  abroad,  do  the 
French  submit  to  the  crushing  weight  of  their  military 


818  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

budget;  but  to  wrest  back  territories  taken  from  them  in 
punishment  for  their  aggressiveness.  And,  as  we  have 
lately  seen,  a  wave  of  enthusiasm  very  nearly  raised  to 
supreme  power  a  soldier  who  was  expected  to  lead  them  to 
a  war  of  revenge. 

So  is  it,  too,  in  Protestant  Germany — the  land  of  Luther 
and  the  favourite  home  of  Christian  theology.  Significant 
of  the  national  feeling  was  that  general  order  to  his  soldiers 
issued  by  the  Emperor  on  ascending  the  throne,  in  which, 
saying  that  "  God's  decree  places  me  at  the  head  of  the 
army,"  and  otherwise  expressing  his  submission  to  "  God's 
will,"  he  ends  by  swearing  "ever  to  remember  that  the 
eyes  of  my  ancestors  look  down  upon  me  from  the  other 
world,  and  that  I  shall  one  day  have  to  render  account  to 
them  of  the  glory  and  honour  of  the  Army."  To  which 
add  that,  in  harmony  with  this  oath,  pagan  alike  in 
sentiment  and  idea,  we  have  his  more  recent  laudation  of 
duelling-clubs:  a  laudation  soon  afterwards  followed  by 
personal  performance  of  divine  service  on  board  his  yacht. 

How  absolute  throughout  Europe  is  the  contradiction 
between  the  codes  of  conduct  adjusted  respectively  to  the 
needs  of  internal  amity  and  external  enmity,  we  see  in  the 
broad  fact  that  along  with  several  hundred  thousand  priests 
who  are  supposed  to  preach  forgiveness  of  injuries,  there 
exist  immensely  larger  armies  than  any  on  record  ! 

§  116.  But  side  by  side  with  the  ethical  conceptions  above 
described,  originating  in  one  or  other  way  and  having  one 
or  other  sanction,  there  has  been  slowly  evolving  a  different 
conception — a  conception  derived  wholly  from  recognition 
of  naturally-produced  consequences.  This  gradual  rise  of 
a  utilitarian  ethics  has,  indeed,  been  inevitable;  since  the 
reasons  which  led  to  commands  and  interdicts  by  a  ruler, 
living  or  apotheosized,  have  habitually  been  reasons  of  ex- 
pediency, more  or  less  visible  to  all.  Though,  when  once 
established,  such  commands  and  interdicts  have  been  con» 


THE   CONFUSION   OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT.  319 

formed  to  mainly  because  obedience  to  the  authority  impos- 
ing them  was  a  duty,  yet  there  has  been  very  generally  some 
accompanying  perception  of  their  fitness. 

Even  among  the  uncivilized,  or  but  slightly  civilized,  we 
find  a  nascent  utilitarianism.  The  Malagasy,  for  example, 
have — 

4  laws  against  Adultery,  Theft  and  Murder ;  .  .  .  there  is  also  a  Fine 
inflicted  on  a  Man,  who  shall  curse  another  Man's  Parents.  They  never 
swear  profanely,  but  these  things  they  do, '  because,  said  they,  it  is  conven- 
ient and  proper ;  and  we  could  not  live  by  one  another,  if  there  were  not 
such  laws. " 

In  the  later  Hebrew  writings  the  beginnings  of  a  utilitarian 
ethics  are  visible;  for  though,  as  Bruch  remarks  of  the 
author  of  Ecclesiasticus,  "  all  his  ethical  rules  and  precepts 
in  a  truly  Hebrew  way  run  together  in  the  notion  of  the 
fear  of  God,"  yet  many  of  his  maxims  do  not  originate 
from  divine  injunctions.  When  he  advises  not  to  become 
too  dependent,  to  value  a  good  name,  to  be  cautious  in 
talk,  and  to  be  judicious  in  eating  and  drinking,  he  mani- 
festly derives  guidance  from  the  results  of  experience.  A 
fully-differentiated  system  of  expediency-morals  had  been 
reached  by  some  of  the  Egyptians.  Mr.  Poole  writes : — 

"  Ptah-hotep  is  wearied  with  religious  services  already  outworn,  and 
instead  of  the  endless  prescriptions  of  the  current  religion,  he  attempts 
a  simple  doctrine  of  morals,  founded  on  the  observation  of  a  long  life." 
.  .  .  His  proverbs  "  enforce  the  advantage  of  virtuous  life  in  the  present. 
The  future  has  no  place  in  the  scheme."  ..."  This  moral  philosophy  of 
the  sages  is  far  above  that  of  the  Book  of  the  Dead,  inasmuch  as  it  throws 
aside  all  that  is  trivial  and  teaches  alone  the  necessary  duties.  But  it  rests 
on  a  basis  of  .  .  expediency.  The  love  of  God,  and  the  love  of  man,  are 
unnoticed  as  the  causes  of  virtue." 

Similarly  was  it  with  the  later  Greeks.  In  the  Platonic 
Dialogues,  and  in  the  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  we  see  morality  in 
large  measure  separated  from  theology  and  placed  upon  a 
utilitarian  basis. 

Coming  down  to  modern  days,  the  divergence  of  expedi- 
ency-ethics  from   theological   ethics,  is  well  illustrated   in 
22 


320  THE  INDUCTIONS   OF  ETHICS. 

Paley,  who,  in  his  official  character,  derived  right  and  wrong 
from  divine  commands,  and  in  his  unofficial  character  de- 
rived them  from  observation  of  consequences.  Since  his 
day  the  last  of  these  views  has  spread  at  the  expense  of 
the  first,  and  by  Bentham  and  Mill  we  have  utility  estab- 
lished as  the  sole  standard  of  conduct.  How  completely  in 
this  last,  conduciveness  to  human  welfare  had  become  the 
supreme  sanction,  replacing  alleged  divine  commands,  we 
see  in  his  refusal  to  call  "  good  "  a  supreme  being  whose  acts 
are  not  sanctioned  by  "  the  highest  human  morality ; "  and 
by  his  statement  that  "  if  such  a  being  can  sentence  me  to 
hell  for  not  so  calling  him,  to  hell  I  will  go." 

§  117.  Yet  a  further  origin  of  moral  dictates  is  to  be 
recognized  as  having  arisen  simultaneously.  Habits  of 
conformity  to  rules  of  conduct  have  generated  sentiments 
adjusted  to  such  rules.  The  discipline  of  social  life  has 
produced  in  men  conceptions  and  emotions  which,  irre- 
spective of  supposed  divine  commands,  and  irrespective  of 
observed  consequences,  issue  in  certain  degrees  of  liking 
for  conduct  favouring  social  welfare  and  aversion  to  conduct 
at  variance  with  it.  Manifestly  such  a  moulding  of  human 
nature  has  been  furthered  by  survival  of  the  fittest ;  since 
groups  of  men  having  feelings  least  adapted  to  social  require- 
ments must,  other  things  equal,  have  tended  to  disappear 
before  groups  of  men  having  feelings  most  adapted  to 
them. 

The  effects  of  moral  sentiments  thus  arising  are  shown 
among  races  partially  civilized.  Cook  says  : — 

The  Otaheitans  "  have  a  knowledge  of  right  and  wrong  from  the  mere 
dictates  of  natural  conscience ;  and  involuntarily  condemn  themselves  when 
they  do  that  to  others,  which  they  would  condemn  others  for  doing  to  them." 

So,  too,  that  moral  sentiments  were  influential  during 
early  stages  of  some  civilized  races,  proof  is  yielded  by 
ancient  Indian  books.  In  the  Mahdbharata,  Draupadi 
complains  of  the  hard  lot  of  her  righteous  husband,  and 


THE   CONFUSION   OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT.  321 

charges  the  Deity  with  injustice ;  but  is  answered  by  Yud- 
dishthira : — 

"  Thou  utterest  infidel  sentiments.  1  do  not  act  from  a  desire  to  gain  the 
recompense  of  my  works.  I  give  what  I  ought  to  give  .  .  .  Whether  re- 
ward accrues  to  me  or  not,  I  do  to  the  best  of  my  power  what  a  man  should 
do  ....  It  is  on  duty  alone  that  my  thoughts  are  fixed,  and  this,  too,  nat- 
urally. The  man  who  seeks  to  make  of  righteousness  a  gainful  merchandise, 
is  low.  The  man  who  seeks  to  milk  righteousness  does  not  obtain  its  re- 
ward ....  Do  not  doubt  about  righteousness :  he  who  does  so  is  on  the 
way  to  be  born  a  brute." 

And  similarly,  in  another  of  these  ancient  books,  the  Rdmd- 
yana,  we  read  : — 

"  Virtue  is  a  service  man  owes  himself,  and  though  there  were  no  Heaven, 
nor  any  God  to  rule  the  world,  it  were  not  less  the  binding  law  of  life.  It 
is  man's  privilege  to  know  the  Right  and  follow  it." 
In  like  manner,  according  to  Edkins,  conscience  is  re- 
garded among  the  Chinese  as  the  supreme  authority.  He 
says: — 

"  When  the  evidence  of  a  new  religion  is  presented  to  them  they  at  once 
refer  it  to  a  moral  standard,  and  give  their  approval  with  the  utmost  readi- 
ness, if  it  passes  the  test.  They  do  not  ask  whether  it  is  Divine,  but  whether 
it  is  good." 

And  elsewhere  he  remarks  that  sin,  according  to  the  Con- 
fucian moral  standard,  "  becomes  an  act  which  robs  a  man 
of  his  self-respect,  and  offends  his  sense  of  right,"  and  is 
not  "  regarded  as  a  transgression  of  God's  law." 

Of  modern  writers  who,  asserting  the  existence  of  a 
moral  sense,  consider  the  intuitions  it  yields  as  guides  to 
conduct,  we  may  distinguish  two  classes.  There  are  those 
who,  taking  a  view  like  that  of  Confucius  just  indicated, 
hold  that  the  dicta  of  conscience  are  authoritative,  irre- 
spective of  alleged  divine  commands;  and,  indeed,  furnish 
a  test  by  which  commands  may  be  known  as  not  divine  if 
they  do  not  withstand  it.  On  the  other  hand  there  are 
those  who  regard  the  authority  of  conscience  as  second  to 
that  of  commands  which  they  accept  as  divine,  and  as 
having  for  its  function  to  prompt  obedience  to  such  com- 


THE   INDUCTIONS    OF    ETHICS. 

mands.  But  the  two  are  at  one  in  so  far  as  they  place  the 
dicta,  of  conscience  above  considerations  of  expediency ;  and 
also  in  so  far  as  they  tacitly  regard  conscience  as  having  a 
supernatural  origin.  To  which  add  that  while  alike  in 
recognizing  the  moral  sentiment  as  innate,  and  in  accepting 
the  ordinary  dogma  that  human  nature  is  everywhere  the 
same,  they  are,  by  implication,  alike  in  supposing  that  the 
moral  sentiment  is  identical  in  all  men. 

But,  as  the  beginning  of  this  section  shows,  it  is  possible 
to  agree  with  moralists  of  the  intuitive  school  respecting 
the  existence  of  a  moral  sense,  while  differing  from  them 
respecting  its  origin.  I  have  contended  in  the  forego- 
ing division  of  this  work,  and  elsewhere,  that  though  there 
exist  feelings  of  the  kind  alleged,  they  are  not  of  supernat- 
ural origin  but  of  natural  origin ;  that,  being  generated  by 
the  discipline  of  the  social  activities,  internal  and  external, 
they  are  not  alike  in  all  men,  but  differ  more  or  less  every- 
where in  proportion  as  the  social  activities  differ ;  and  that, 
in  virtue  of  their  mode  of  genesis,  they  have  a  co-ordinate 
authority  with  the  inductions  of  utih'ty. 

§  118.  Before  going  further  it  will  be  well  to  sum  up 
these  various  detailed  statements,  changing  somewhat  the 
order  and  point  of  view. 

Survival  of  the  fittest  insures  that  the  faculties  of  every 
species  of  creature  tend  to  adapt  themselves  to  its  mode  of 
life.  It  must  be  so  with  man.  From  the  earliest  times 
groups  of  men  whose  feelings  and  conceptions  were  con- 
gruous with  the  conditions  they  lived  under,  must,  other 
things  equal,  have  spread  and  replaced  those  whose  feelings 
and  conceptions  were  incongruous  with  their  conditions. 

Recognizing  a  few  exceptions,  which  special  circum- 
stances have  made  possible,  it  holds,  both  of  rude  tribes 
and  of  civilized  societies,  that  they  have  had  continually  to 
carry  on  external  self-defence  and  internal  co-operation — 
external  antagonism  and  internal  friendship.  Hence  their 


THE   CONFUSION   OF   ETHICAL   THOUGHT.  323 

members  have  required  two  different  sets  of  sentiments  and 
ideas,  adjusted  to  these  two  kinds  of  activity. 

In  societies  having  indigenous  religions,  the  resulting 
conflict  of  codes  is  not  overt.  As  the  commands  to  destroy 
external  enemies  and  to  desist  from  acts  which  produce 
internal  dissensions,  come  either  from  the  living  ruler  or 
from  the  apotheosized  ruler;  and  as,  in  both  cases,  the 
obligation  arises  not  from  the  natures  of  the  prescribed 
acts,  but  from  the  necessity  of  obedience ;  the  two,  having 
the  same  sanction,  are  not  perceived  to  stand  in  opposition. 
But  where,  as  throughout  Christendom,  the  indigenous 
religion  in  which  the  ethics  of  enmity  and  the  ethics  of 
amity  coexisted  with  like  authorities,  has  been  suppressed 
by  an  invading  religion,  which,  insisting  on  the  ethics  of 
amity  only,  reprobates  the  ethics  of  enmity,  incongruity 
has  resulted.  International  antagonisms  having  continued, 
there  has  of  necessity  survived  the  appropriate  ethics  of 
enmity,  which,  not  being  included  in  the  nominally-accepted 
creed,  has  not  had  the  religious  sanction.  Hence  the  fact 
that  we  have  a  thin  layer  of  Christianity  overlying  a  thick 
layer  of  Paganism.  The  Christianity  insists  on  duties  which 
the  paganism  does  not  recognize  as  such ;  and  the  Paganism 
insists  on  duties  which  the  Christianity  forbids.  The  new 
and  superposed  religion,  with  its  system  of  ethics,  has  the 
nominal  honour  and  the  professed  obedience  ;  while  the  old 
and  suppressed  religion  has  its  system  of  ethics  nominally 
discredited  but  practically  obeyed.  Both  are  believed  in, 
the  last  more  strongly  than  the  first ;  and  men,  now  acting 
on  the  principles  of  the  one  and  now  on  those  of  the  other, 
according  to  circumstances,  sit  down  under  their  contradic- 
tory beliefs  as  well  as  they  may ;  or,  rather,  refrain  from  re- 
cognizing the  contradictions. 

Hence  the  first  of  these  various  confusions  of  ethical 
thought.  Since,  in  the  general  mind,  moral  injunctions  are 
identified  with  divine  commands,  those  injunctions  only  are 
regarded  as  moral  which  harmonize  with  the  nominally- 


324  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

accepted  religion,  Christianity;  while  those  injunctions 
which  belong  to  the  primitive  and  suppressed  religion,  au- 
thoritative as  they  may  be  considered,  and  eagerly  as  they 
are  obeyed,  are  not  regarded  as  moral.  There  have  come 
to  be  two  classes  of  duties  and  virtues,  condemned  and  ap- 
proved in  similar  ways,  but  one  of  which  is  associated  with 
ethical  conceptions  and  the  other  not :  the  result  being  that 
men  cannot  bring  their  real  and  nominal  beliefs  into  har- 
mony. 

And  then  we  have  the  further  confusions  which  arise, 
not  from  the  conflict  of  codes,  but  from  the  conflict  of 
sanctions.  Divine  commands  are  not  the  authorities  whence 
rules  of  conduct  are  derived,  say  the  utilitarians,  but  their 
authorities  are  given  by  conduciveness  to  human  welfare  as 
ascertained  by  induction.  And  then,  either  with  or  without 
recognition  of  divine  commands,  we  have  writers  of  the 
moral-sense  school  making  conscience  the  arbiter ;  and  hold- 
ing its  dicta  to  be  authoritative  irrespective  of  calculated 
consequences.  Obviously  the  essential  difference  between 
these  two  classes  of  moralists  is  that  the  one  regards  as  of  no 
value  for  guidance  the  feelings  with  which  acts  are  regarded, 
while  the  other  regards  these  feelings  as  of  supreme  value. 

Such  being  the  conflict  of  codes  and  conflict  of  sanctions, 
what  must  be  our  first  step  ?  We  must  look  at  the  actual 
ideas  and  feelings  concerning  conduct  which  men  entertain, 
apart  from  established  nomenclatures  and  current  professions. 
How  needful  is  such  an  analysis  we  shall  be  further  shown 
while  making  it ;  for  it  will  become  manifest  that  the  confu- 
sion of  ethical  thought  is  even  greater  than  we  have  already 
seen  it  to  be. 


CHAPTER  II. 

WHAT  IDEAS  AND   SENTIMENTS  ARE  ETHICAL? 

§  119.  A  silent  protest  has  been  made  by  many  readers, 
and  probably  by  most,  while  reading  that  section  of  the 
foregoing  chapter  which  describes  the  ethics  of  enmity. 
Governed  by  feelings  and  ideas  which  date  from  their 
earliest  lessons,  and  have  been  constantly  impressed  on 
them  at  home  and  in  church,  they  have  formed  an  almost 
indissoluble  association  between  a  doctrine  of  right  and 
wrong  in  general,  and  those  particular  commands  and  in- 
terdicts included  in  the  decalogue,  which,  contemplating  the 
actions  of  men  to  one  another  in  the  same  society,  takes 
no  note  of  their  combined  actions  against  men  of  alien  so- 
cieties. The  conception  of  ethics  has,  in  this  way,  come  to 
be  limited  to  that  which  I  have  distinguished  as  the  ethics 
of  amity ;  and  to  speak  of  the  ethics  of  enmity  seems  ab- 
surd. 

Yet,  beyond  question,  men  associate  ideas  of  right  and 
wrong  with  the  carrying  on  of  inter-tribal  and  inter-national 
conflicts;  and  this  or  that  conduct  in  battle  is  applauded 
or  condemned  no  less  strongly  than  this  or  that  conduct  in 
ordinary  social  life.  Are  we  then  to  say  that  there  is  one 
kind  of  right  and  wrong  recognized  by  ethics  and  another 
kind  of  right  and  wrong  not  recognized  by  ethics?  If  so, 
under  what  title  is  this  second  kind  of  right  and  wrong  to 
be  dealt  with  ?  Evidently  men's  ideas  about  conduct  are  in 


THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 


BO  unorganized  a  state,  that  while  one  large  class  of  actions 
has  an  overtly-recognized  sanction,  another  large  class  of  ac- 
tions has  a  sanction,  equally  strong  or  stronger,  which  is  not 
overtly  recognized. 

The  existence  of  these  distinct  sanctions,  of  which  one  is 
classed  as  moral  and  the  other  not,  is  still  more  clearly  seen 
when  we  contrast  the  maxims  of  Christianity  with  the  dog- 
mas of  duellists.  During  centuries  throughout  Europe,  and 
even  still  throughout  the  greater  part  of  it,  there  has  existed, 
and  exists,  an  imperative  "  obligation,"  under  certain  con- 
ditions, to  challenge  another  to  fight,  and  an  imperative  ob- 
ligation to  accept  the  challenge — an  obligation  much  more 
imperative  than  the  obligation  to  discharge  a  debt.  To 
either  combatant  the  word  "must"  is  used  with  as  much 
emphasis  as  it  would  be  used  were  he  enjoined  to  tell  the 
truth.  The  "  duty "  of  the  insulted  man  is  to  defend  his 
honour ;  and  so  wrong  is  his  conduct  considered  if  he  does 
not  do  this,  that  he  is  shunned  by  his  friends  as  a  disgraced 
man,  just  as  he  would  be  had  he  committed  a  theft.  Beyond 
question,  then,  we  see  here  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  quite 
as  pronounced,  with  corresponding  sentiments  of  approba- 
tion and  reprobation  quite  as  strong,  as  those  which  refer  to 
fulfilments  and  breaches  of  what  are  classed  as  moral  injunc- 
tions. How,  then,  can  we  include  the  last  under  ethical  sci- 
ence and  exclude  the  first  from  it  ? 

The  need  for  greatly  widening  the  current  conception  of 
ethics  is,  however,  still  greater  than  is  thus  shown.  There 
are  other  large  classes  of  actions  which  excite  ideas  and  feel- 
ings undistinguishable  in  their  essential  natures  from  those 
to  which  the  term  ethical  is  conventionally  limited. 

§  120.  Among  uncivilized  and  semi-civilized  peoples,  the 
obligations  imposed  by  custom  are  peremptory.  The  uni- 
versal belief  that  such  things  ought  to  be  done,  is  not  usually 
made  manifest  by  the  visiting  of  punishment  or  reprobation 
on  those  who  do  not  conform,  because  nonconformity  is 


WHAT   IDEAS   AND   SENTIMENTS   ABE   ETHICAL  t  327 

scarcely  heard  of.  How  intolerable  to  the  general  mind  is 
breach  of  usages,  is  shown  occasionally  when  a  ruler  is  de- 
posed and  even  killed  for  disregard  of  them:  a  sufficient 
proof  that  his  act  is  held  wrong.  And  we  sometimes  find 
distinct  expressions  of  moral  sentiment  on  behalf  of  customs 
having  nothing  which  we  should  call  moral  authority,  and 
even  on  behalf  of  customs  which  we  should  call  profoundly 
immoral. 

I  may  begin  with  an  instance  I  have  named  elsewhere 
in  another  connexion  —  the  instance  furnished  by  some 
Mahomedan  tribes  who  consider  that  one  of  the  worst 
offences  is  smoking :  "  drinking  the  shameful,"  as  they  term 
it.  Palgrave  narrates  that  while  "  giving  divine  honours 
to  a  creature,"  is  regarded  by  the  Wahhabees  as  "  the  first 
of  the  great  sins,"  the  second  great  sin  is  smoking — a 
sin  in  comparison  with  which  murder,  adultery,  and  false 
witness,  are  trivial  sins.  Similarly,  by  certain  Russian  sects 
close  to  Siberia,  smoking  is  an  offence  distinguished  from 
all  others  as  being  never  forgiven :  "  every  crime  can  be 
expiated  by  repentance  except  this  one."  In  these  cases 
the  repugnance  felt  for  an  act  held  by  us  to  be  quite  harm- 
less, is  of  the  same  nature  as  the  repugnance  felt  for  the 
blackest  crimes:  the  only  difference  being  that  it  is  more 
intense. 

Lichtenstein  tells  us  that  when  Mulihawang,  king  of  the 
Matelhapees  (a  division  of  the  Bechuanas),  was  told  that 
Europeans  are  not  permitted  to  have  more  than  one  wife, 
"he  said  it  was  perfectly  incomprehensible  to  him  how  a 
whole  nation  could  submit  voluntarily  to  such  extraordinary 
laws."  Similar  was  the  opinion  of  the  Arab  sheikh  who, 
along  with  his  people,  received  the  account  of  monogamy 
in  England  with  indignation,  and  said  "  the  fact  is  simply 
impossible !  Jtpjsj2(^a  manb^^mj^jj^^^  nr>R  wiff> ? " 
Nor  is  it  only  men  who  tKmS  mus.  Livingstone  says  of  the 
Makololo  women  on  the  shores  of  the  Zambesi,  that  they 
were  quite  shocked  to  hear  that  in  England  a  man  had  only 


328  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

one  wife :  to  have  only  one  was  not  "  respectable."  So,  too, 
in  Equatorial  Africa,  according  to  Reade, 

"  If  a  man  marries,  and  his  wife  thinks  that  he  can  afford  another  spouse, 
she  pesters  him  to  many  again ;  and  calls  him  a  '  stingy  fellow '  if  he  de- 
clines to  do  so." 
Similar  is  the  feeling  shown  by  the  Araucanian  women. 

"  Far  from  being  dissatisfied,  or  entertaining  any  jealousy  toward  the 
new-comer,  she  [one  of  two  wives]  said  that  she  wished  her  husband  would 
marry  again ;  for  she  considered  it  a  great  relief  to  have  some  one  to  assist 
her  in  her  household  duties,  and  in  the  maintenance  of  her  husband." 
No  notion  of  immorality,  much  less  criminality,  such  as  we 
associate  with  bigamy  and  polygamy,  is  here  entertained ; 
but,  contrariwise,  when  a  woman  calls  her  husband  a  "  stingy 
fellow "  if  he  does  not  take  a  second  wife,  we  have  proof 
that  monogamy  is  reprobated. 

Ideas  relevant  to  the  relations  of  the  sexes,  still  more  pro- 
foundly at  variance  with  our  own,  are  displayed  in  many 
places.  Books  of  travel  have  made  readers  familiar  with 
the  fact  that  among  various  races,  a  traveller  entertained  by 
a  chief  is  offered  a  wife  or  a  daughter  as  a  temporary  bed- 
fellow ;  and  the  duty  of  hospitality  is  held  to  require  this 
offer.  In  other  cases  the  loan  takes  a  somewhat  different 
shape.  Of  the  Chinooks  we  read : — 

"  Among  all  the  tribes,  a  man  will  lend  his  wife  or  daughter  for  a  fish-hook 
or  a  strand  of  beads.  To  decline  an  offer  of  this  sort  is,  indeed,  to  disparage 
the  charms  of  the  lady,  and  therefore  give  such  offence,  that  although  we 
had  occasionally  to  treat  the  Indians  with  rigour,  nothing  seemed  to  irritate 
both  sexes  more  than  our  refusal  to  accept  the  favours  of  the  females." 

Still  more  pronounced  is  the  feeling  shown  by  the  members 
of  an  Asiatic  tribe  which  Erman  visited. 

"  The  Chuckchi  offer  to  travellers  who  chance  to  visit  them,  their  wives, 
and  also  what  we  should  call  their  daughters'  honour,  and  resent  as  a  deadly 
affront  any  refusal  of  such  offers." 

Here  we  see  that  deeds  which  among  ourselves  would  be 
classed  among  the  profoundest  disgraces,  are  not  only  re- 
garded without  shame,  but  declining  to  participate  in  them 
causes  indignation :  implying  a  sense  of  wrong. 

As  it  concerns  in  another  way  the  relations  of  the  sexes, 


WHAT   IDEAS   AND    SENTIMENTS   AEE   ETHICAL?  329 

I  may  instance  next  a  further  contrast  between  the  senti- 
ments entertained  by  many  partially-civilized  peoples,  and 
those  which  have  arisen  along  with  the  advance  of  civiliza- 
tion. Interdicts  on  marriages  between  persons  of  different 
ranks,  breaches  of  which  have  in  some  cases  brought  the 
severest  punishment,  date  back  to  very  early  times.  Thus, 
in  the  Mahdbharata  we  read  that  Draupadi  refused  the 
"  ambitious  Kama,"  saying : — "  I  wed  not  with  the  base- 
born."  And  then,  coming  down  to  comparatively  modern 
times,  we  have  the  penalties  entailed  on  those  who  broke  the 
laws  against  mesalliances  /  as  in  France  during  the  feudal 
period,  on  nobles  who  married  beneath  them  :  they  were  ex- 
cluded from  tournaments,  and  their  descendants  also.  But 
the  condemnation  thus  manifested  five  centuries  ago  is  not 
paralleled  now.  Though  a  certain  amount  of  reprobation  is 
in  some  cases  shown,  in  other  cases  there  is  approbation ;  as 
witness  Tennyson's  "  Miller's  Daughter "  and  Mrs.  Brown- 
ing's "  Lady  Geraldine's  Courtship."  Here  the  different  feel- 
ings excited,  though  like  in  nature  to  those  we  call  moral,  are 
not  concerned  with  either  supposed  divine  commands  or  with 
acts  usually  classed  as  moral  or  immoral. 

Returning  to  the  uncivilized  races,  I  may  instance  the  con- 
ceptions associated  with  the  division  of  labour  between 
the  sexes.  Concerning  various  tribes  of  American  Indians, 
North  and  South,  we  read  that  custom,  limiting  the  actions 
of  the  men  mainly  to  war  and  the  chase,  devolves  on  the 
women  all  the  menial  and  laborious  occupations ;  and  these 
customs  have  an  imperative  sanction.  Says  Falkner  con- 
cerning the  Patagonians : — 

"  So  rigidly  are  "  the  women  "  obliged  to  perform  their  duty,  that  their 
husbands  cannot  help  them  on  any  occasion,  or  in  the  greatest  distress, 
without  incurring  the  highest  ignominy." 

And  these  usages  are  fully  approved  of  by  the  women  them- 
selves;  as  witness   the  following   extract   concerning  the 
Dakotas : — 
"  It  is  the  worst  insult  one  virago  can  cast  upon  another  in  a  moment  of 


330  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

altercation.  '  Infamous  woman  1 '  will  she  cry,  '  I  have  seen  your  husband 
carrying  wood  into  his  lodge  to  make  the  fire.  Where  was  his  squaw,  that 
he  should  be  obliged  to  make  a  woman  of  himself  f ' " 
Clearly  this  indignation  is  the  correlative  of  a  strong  moral 
feeling  enlisted  on  behalf  of  the  prescribed  conduct.  But  if. 
among  ourselves,  any  women  were  left,  as  among  the  Esqui- 
maux, "  to  carry  stones  [for  building  houses],  almost  heavy 
enough  to  break  their  backs,"  while  "  the  men  look  on  with 
the  greatest  insensibility,  not  stirring  a  finger  to  assist  them," 
moral  reprobation  would  be  felt.  As  there  are  no  specific 
injunctions,  divine  or  human,  referring  to  transactions  of 
these  kinds,  the  strongly-contrasted  emotions  which  they  ex- 
cite in  ourselves  and  in  these  uncivilized  peoples,  must  be 
ascribed  to  unlikenesses  of  customs — unlikenesses,  however, 
which  are  themselves  significant  of  innate  emotional  unlike- 
nesses. 

As  further  illustrating  in  a  variety  of  ways  these  differ- 
ences of  feelings  akin  in  nature  to  those  we  call  moral, 
though  not  ordinarily  classed  as  such,  I  may,  without  com- 
menting upon  each,  here  append  a  series  of  them. 

"  The  Caffers  despise  the  Hottentots,  Bushmen,  Malays,  and  other  people 
of  colour,  on  account  of  their  not  being  circumcised.  On  this  account, 
they  regard  them  as  boys,  and  will  not  allow  them  to  sit  in  their  company, 
or  to  eat  with  them." 

"  A  Mayoruna,  who  had  been  baptized,  when  at  the  point  of  death  was 
very  unhappy  .  .  .  because,  dying  as  a  Christian,  instead  of  furnish- 
ing a  meal  to  his  relations,  he  would  be  eaten  up  by  worms." 

"  The  Bambara  washerwomen  .  .  .  were  stark  naked,  yet  they  manifested 
no  shame  at  being  seen  in  this  state  by  the  men  composing  our  caravan." 
And  a  kindred  statement  is  made  concerning  the  Wakavi- 
rondo  by  Thomson,  who  describes  their  women  as  neverthe- 
less altogether  modest,  and,  remarking  that  "morality  has 
nothing  to  do  with  clothes,"  says  of  these  people  that  "  they 
are  the  most  moral  of  all  the  tribes  of  this  region,  and  they 
are  simply  angels  of  purity  beside  the  decently-dressed 
Masai." 

"  I  found  that  the  married  men,"  among  the  Hassanyeh  Arabs,  says 
Petherick,  "  felt  themselves  highly  flattered  by  any  attentions  paid  to  their 
better  halves  during  their  free-and-easy  days.  [Their  marriages  are  for 


WHAT   IDEAS   AND   SENTIMENTS   AEE   ETHICAL  f  331 

three  or  four  days  in  the  week  only.]  They  seem  to  take  such  attentions 
as  evidence  that  their  wives  are  attractive." 

Among  the  Khonds,  "  so  far  is  constancy  to  a  husband  from  being  required 
in  a  wife,  that  her  pretensions  do  not,  in  the  least,  suffer  diminution  in  the 
eyes  of  either  sex  when  fines  are  levied  on  her  convicted  lovers ;  while  on  the 
other  hand,  infidelity  on  the  part  of  a  married  man  is  held  to  be  highly  dis- 
honourable, and  is  often  punished  by  deprivation  of  many  social  privileges." 

I  have  reserved  for  the  last,  two  remarkable  cases  in  which 
feelings  like  those  which  we  class  as  moral,  are  definitely  ex- 
pressed in  ways  to  us  very  surprising.  The  first  concerns 
the  Tahitians,  who  were  described  by  Cook  as  without  shame 
in  respect  of  actions  which  among  ourselves  especially  ex- 
cite it,  and  as  feeling  shame  in  respect  of  actions  which  among 
ourselves  excite  none.  These  people  were  extremely  averse 
to  our  custom  of  eating  in  society.  "  They  eat  alone,  they 
said,  because  it  was  right."  The  other  instance,  equally 
anomalous,  is  even  more  startling.  In  Vate  "  it  is  consid- 
ered a  disgrace  to  the  family  of  an  aged  chief  if  he  is  not 
buried  alive."  A  like  usage  and  accompanying  feeling  ex- 
isted in  Fiji. 

A  son  said,  when  about  to  bury  his  mother  alive,  "  that  it  was  from  love 
to  his  mother  that  he  had  done  so ;  that,  in  consequence  of  the  same  love, 
they  were  now  going  to  bury  her,  and  that  none  but  themselves  could  or 
ought  to  do  so  sacred  an  office !  .  .  .  she  was  their  mother,  and  they 
were  her  children,  and  they  ought  to  put  her  to  death." 

The  belief  being  that  people  commence  life  in  the  next  world 
at  the  stage  they  have  reached  when  they  leave  this  world ; 
and  that  hence  postponement  of  death  till  old  age  entails  a 
subsequent  miserable  existence. 

Thus  we  have  abundant  proof  that  with  acts  which  do  vio- 
lence to  our  moral  sentiments,  there  are  associated,  in  the 
minds  of  other  races,  feelings  and  ideas  not  only  warranting 
them  but  enforcing  them.  They  are  fulfilled  with  a  sense 
of  obligation ;  and  non-fulfilment  of  them,  regarded  as 
breach  of  duty,  brings  condemnation  and  resulting  self- 
reproach. 

§  121.  Everywhere  during  social  progress  custom  passes 


332  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

into  law.  Practically  speaking,  custom  is  law  in  undevel- 
oped societies.  "  The  old  Innuits  did  so,  and  therefore  we 
must,"  say  the  existing  Innuits  (Esquimaux) ;  and  other  un- 
civilized peoples  similarly  express  the  constraint  they  are 
under.  In  subsequent  stages,  customs  become  the  acknowl- 
edged bases  of  laws.  It  is  true  that  afterwards  the  body 
of  laws  is  made  up  in  part  of  alleged  divine  commands — 
the  themistes  of  the  Greeks,  for  example;  but  in  reality 
these,  supposed  to  come  from  one  who  was  originally  an 
apotheosized  ruler,  usually  enforce  existing  customs.  Leviti- 
cus shows  us  a  whole  body  of  practices,  many  of  them  of 
kinds  which  would  be  now  regarded  as  neither  religious  nor 
moral,  thus  acquiring  authority.  Whether  inherited  from 
the  undistinguished  forefathers  of  the  tribes,  or  ascribed  to 
the  will  of  a  deceased  king,  customs  embody  the  rule  of  the 
dead  over  the  living ;  as  do  also  the  laws  into  which  they 
harden. 

Of  course,  therefore,  if  ideas  of  duty  and  feelings  of  obli- 
gation cluster  round  customs,  they  cluster  round  the  derived 
laws.  The  sentiment  of  "ought"  comes  to  be  associated 
with  a  legal  injunction,  as  with  an  injunction  traced  to  the 
general  authority  of  ancestors  or  the  special  authority  of  a 
deified  ancestor.  And  not  only  does  there  hence  arise  a 
consciousness  that  obedience  to  each  particular  law  is  right 
and  disobedience  to  it  wrong,  but  eventually  there  arises  a 
consciousness  that  obedience  to  law  in  general  is  right  and 
disobedience  to  it  wrong.  Especially  is  this  the  case  where 
the  living  ruler  has  a  divine  or  semi-divine  character;  as 
witness  the  following  statement  concerning  the  ancient  Pe- 
ruvians : — 

"  The  most  common  punishment  was  death,  for  they  said  that  a  culprit 
was  not  punished  for  the  delinquencies  he  had  committed,  but  for  having 
broken  the  commandment  of  the  Ynca,  who  was  respected  as  God." 

And  this  conception,  reminding  us  of  religious  conceptions 
anciently  current  and  still  current,  is  practically  paralleled 
by  the  conceptions  still  expressed  by  jurists  and  accepted 


WHAT   IDEAS   AND    SENTIMENTS   ABE   ETHICAL?  333 

by  most  citizens.  For  though  a  distinction  is  commonly 
made  between  legal  obligation  and  moral  obligation,  in  those 
cases  where  the  law  is  of  a  kind  in  respect  of  which  ethics 
gives  no  direct  verdict ;  yet  the  obligation  to  obey  has  come 
to  be,  if  not  nominally  yet  practically,  a  moral  obligation. 
The  words  habitually  used  imply  rthis.  It  is  held  "  right " 
to  obey  the  law  and  "  wrong "  to  disobey  it.  Conformity 
and  nonconformity  bring  approbation  and  reprobation,  just 
as  though  the  legal  injunction  were  a  moral  injunction.  A 
man  who  has  broken  the  law,  even  though  it  be  in  a  matter 
of  no  ethical  significance, — say  a  householder  who  has  re- 
fused to  fill  up  the  census-paper  or  a  pedlar  who  has  not 
taken  out  a  license — feels,  when  he  is  brought  before  the 
magistrates,  that  he  is  regarded  not  only  by  them  but  by 
spectators  as  morally  blameworthy.  The  feeling  shown  is 
quite  as  strong  as  it  would  be  were  he  convicted  of  aggress- 
ing on  his  neighbours  by  nuisances — perpetual  noises  or  pes- 
tilent odours — which  are  moral  offences  properly  so  called. 
That  is  to  say,  law  is  upheld  by  a  sentiment  indistinguish- 
able from  moral  sentiment.  Moreover,  in  some  cases  where 
the  two  conflict,  the  sentiment  which  upholds  the  legal 
dictum  overrides  the  sentiment  which  upholds  the  moral 
dictum;  as  in  the  case  of  the  pedlar  above  named.  His 
act  in  selling  without  a  licence  is  morally  justifiable,  and 
forbidding  him  to  sell  without  a  licence  is  morally  unjusti- 
fiable— is  an  interference  with  his  due  liberty,  which  is 
ethically  unwarranted.  Yet  the  factitious  moral  sentiment 
enlisted  on  behalf  of  legal  authority,  triumphs  over  the 
natural  moral  sentiment  enlisted  on  behalf  of  rightful  free- 
dom. 

How  strong  is  the  artificial  sanction  acquired  by  a 
constituted  authority,  is  seen  very  strikingly  in  the  doings 
of  Joint  Stock  associations.  If  the  directors  of  a  company 
formed  to  carry  out  a  specified  undertaking,  decide  to  extend 
their  activities  so  as  to  include  undertakings  not  originally 
specified,  and  even  undertakings  wholly  unallied  to  those 


334  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

originally  specified ;  and  if  they  bring  before  the  proprietary 
their  proposals  for  doing  this ;  it  is  held  that  if  a  majority 
(at  one  time  a  simple  majority,  but  now  two-thirds)  approve 
the  proposal,  the  proprietary  at  large  is  bound  by  the 
decision.  Should  a  few  protest  against  being  committed  to 
such  new  undertakings,  they  are  frowned  upon  and  pooh- 
poohed  as  unreasonable  obstructions :  moral  reprobation  is 
vented  against  such  resistance  to  the  ruling  agent  and 
its  supporters.  Nevertheless  the  moral  reprobation  should 
be  inverted.  As  a  question  of  pure  equity,  the  incorporated 
body  cannot  enter  on  any  businesses  not  specified  or  implied 
in  the  deed  of  incorporation.  Those  who  break  the  original 
contract  by  entering  on  unspecified  businesses,  are  un- 
justified; while  those  who  stand  by  the  original  contract, 
however  few  in  number,  are  justified.  Yet  so  strong  is  the 
quasi-moral  sanction  associated  with  the  acts  of  a  constituted 
authority,  that  its  ethically-wrong  course  is  thought  right, 
and  insistence  on  regard  for  the  ethically-right  course  is 
thought  wrong ! 

§  122.  How  then  are  ethical  ideas  and  sentiments  to  be 
defined — How,  indeed,  are  they  to  be  conceived  in  any  con- 
sistent way  ?  Let  us  recapitulate. 

Throughout  the  past,  and  down  to  present  days  in  most 
minds,  conceptions  of  right  and  wrong  have  been  directly 
associated  with  supposed  divine  injunctions.  Acts  have 
been  classed  as  good  or  bad,  not  because  of  their  intrinsic 
natures  but  because  of  their  extrinsic  derivations;  and 
virtue  has  consisted  in  obedience.  Under  certain  circum- 
stances, we  find  conduct  regarded  as  praiseworthy  or 
blameworthy  according  as  it  does  or  does  not  inflict 
suffering  or  death  upon  fellow-beings ;  while,  under  other 
circumstances,  we  find  the  praise  or  blame  given  according 
as  it  does  or  does  not  conduce  to  the  welfare  of  fellow- 
beings.  Then  there  is  the  opposition  between  hedonism 
and  asceticism :  by  some  approbation  is  felt  for  deeds  which 


WHAT   IDEAS   AND   SENTIMENTS   ABE   ETHICAL?  335 

apparently  conduce  to  the  happiness  of  self  or  others  or 
both;  while,  contrariwise,  others  look  with  reprobation 
upon  a  way  of  living  which  makes  happiness  an  end. 
By  this  class  the  perceptions  of  good  and  evil  conduct, 
along  with  love  of  the  one  and  hatred  of  the  other,  are 
traced  to  a  moral  sense ;  and  ethics  becomes  the  interroga- 
tion of,  and  obedience  to,  conscience.  Contrariwise,  by  that 
class  such  guidance  is  ridiculed  ;  and  calculations  of  conse- 
quences, irrespective  of  sentiment  of  right  or  theory  of  right, 
occupy  the  ethical  sphere.  Universally  in  early  stages,  and 
to  a  considerable  degree  in  late  stages,  the  idea  of  ought  is 
associated  with  conformity  to  established  customs,  irrespec- 
tive of  their  natures ;  and  when  established  customs  grow  into 
laws,  the  idea  of  ought  comes  to  be  associated  with  obedience 
to  laws :  no  matter  whether  considered  intrinsically  good  <or 
intrinsically  bad. 

Clearly,  therefore,  the  conceptions  of  right,  obligation, 
duty,  and  the  sentiments  associated  with  those  conceptions, 
have  a  far  wider  range  than  the  conduct  ordinarily  con- 
ceived as  the  subject-matter  of  moral  science.  In  different 
places  and  under  different  circumstances,  substantially  the 
same  ideas  and  feelings  are  joined  with  classes  of  actions  of 
totally  opposite  kinds,  and  also  with  classes  of  actions  of  which 
moral  science,  as  ordinarily  conceived,  takes  no  cognizance. 
Hence,  if  we  are  to  treat  the  subject  scientifically,  we  must 
disregard  the  limits  of  conventional  ethics,  and  consider 
what  are  the  intrinsic  natures  of  ethical  ideas  and  senti- 
ments. 

§  123.  A  trait  common  to  all  forms  of  sentiments  and  ideas 
to  be  classed  as  ethical,  is  the  consciousness  of  authority. 
The  nature  of  the  authority  is  inconstant.  It  may  be  that 
of  an  apotheosized  ruler  or  other  deity  supposed  to  give 
commands.  It  may  be  that  of  ancestors  who  have  be- 
queathed usages,  with  or  without  injunctions  to  follow 
them.  It  may  be  that  of  a  living  ruler  who  makes  laws,  or 
23 


336  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

a  military  commander  who  issues  orders.  It  may  be  that  of 
an  aggregate  public  opinion,  either  expressed  through  a  gov- 
ernment or  otherwise  expressed.  It  may  be  that  of  an  im- 
agined utility  which  every  one  is  bound  to  further.  Or  it; 
may  be  that  of  an  internal  monitor  distinguished  as  con- 
science. 

Along  with  the  element  of  authority,  at  once  intellectu- 
ally recognized  and  emotionally  responded  to,  there  goes  the 
element,  more  or  less  definite,  of  coercion.  The  conscious- 
ness of  ought  which  the  recognition  of  authority  implies,  is 
joined  with  the  consciousness  of  must,  which  the  recognition 
of  force  implies.  Be  it  the  power  of  a  god,  of  a  king,  of  a 
chief  soldier,  of  a  popular  government,  of  an  inherited  cus- 
tom, of  an  unorganized  social  feeling,  there  is  always  present 
the  conception  of  a  power.  Even  when  the  injunction  is 
that  of  an  internal  monitor,  the  conception  of  a  power  is  not 
absent ;  since  the  expectation  of  the  penalty  of  self-reproach, 
which  disobedience  may  entail,  is  vaguely  recognized  as  co- 
ercive. 

A  further  component  of  the  ethical  consciousness, 
and  often  the  largest  component,  is  the  represented 
opinion  of  other  individuals,  who  also,  in  one  sense, 
constitute  an  authority  and  exercise  a  coercion.  This, 
either  as  actually  implied  in  others'  behaviour,  or  as 
imagined  if  they  are  not  present,  commonly  serves  more 
than  anything  else  to  restrain  or  impel.  How  large  a 
component  this  is,  we  see  in  a  child  who  blushes  when 
wrongly  suspected  of  a  transgression,  as  much  as  when 
rightly  suspected ;  and  probably  most  have  had  proof  that, 
when  guiltless,  the  feeling  produced  by  the  conceived  repro- 
bation of  others  is  scarcely  distinguishable  from  the  feeling 
which  would  be  produced  by  such  reprobation  if  guilty. 
That  an  imagined  public  opinion  is  the  chief  element  of 
consciousness  in  cases  where  the  acts  ascribed  or  committed 
are  intrinsically  wrong,  is  shown  when  this  imagined  or 
expressed  opinion  refers  to  acts  which  are  not  intrinsically 


WHAT  IDEAS   AND   SENTIMENTS   ABE   ETHICAL  f  337 

wrong.  The  emotion  of  shame  ordinarily  accompanying 
some  gross  breach  of  social  convention  which  is  morally 
indifferent,  or  even  morally  praiseworthy  (say  wheeling 
home  the  barrow  of  a  costermonger  who  has  lamed  himself), 
may  be  quite  as  strong  as  the  emotion  of  shame  which  fol- 
lows the  proved  utterance  of  an  unwarranted  libel — an  act 
intrinsically  wrong.  In  the  majority  of  people  the  feeling 
of  ought  not  will  be  more  peremptory  in  the  first  case  than  in 
the  last. 

If,  now,  we  look  at  the  matter  apart  from  conventional 
classifications,  we  see  that  where  the  consciousnesses  of  au- 
thority, of  coercion,  and  of  public  opinion,  combined  in  dif- 
ferent proportions,  result  in  an  idea  and  a  feeling  of  obliga- 
tion, we  must  class  these  as  ethical  irrespective  of  the  kind 
of  action  to  which  they  refer.  If  the  associated  conceptions 
of  right  are  similar,  and  the  prompting  emotions  similar,  we 
must  consider  the  mental  states  as  of  the  same  nature,  though 
they  are  enlisted  on  behalf  of  acts  radically  opposed.  Or 
rather,  let  us  say  that,  with  the  exception  of  an  idea  and  a 
sentiment  incidentally  referred  to,  we  must  class  them  as 
forming  a  body  of  thought  and  feeling  which  may  be  called 
pro-ethical ;  and  which,  with  the  mass  of  mankind,  stands  in 
place  of  the  ethical  properly  so  called. 

§  124.  For  now  let  us  observe  that  the  ethical  sentiment 
and  idea  properly  so  called,  are  independent  of  the  ideas 
and  sentiments  above  described  as  derived  from  external 
authorities,  and  coercions,  and  approbations — religious,  po- 
litical, or  social.  The  true  moral  consciousness  which  we 
name  conscience,  does  not  refer  to  those  extrinsic  results 
of  conduct  which  take  the  shape  of  praise  or  blame,  reward 
or  punishment,  externally  awarded;  but  it  refers  to  the 
intrinsic  results  of  conduct  which,  in  part  and  by  some  in- 
tellectually perceived,  are  mainly  and  by  most,  intuitively 
felt.  The  moral  consciousness  proper  does  not  contemplate 
obligations  as  artificially  imposed  by  an  external  power; 


338  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF    ETHICS. 

nor  is  it  chiefly  occupied  with  estimates  of  the  amounts  of 
pleasure  and  pain  which  given  actions  may  produce,  though 
these  may  be  clearly  or  dimly  perceived ;  but  it  is  chiefly 
occupied  with  recognition  of,  and  regard  for,  those  condi- 
tions by  fulfilment  of  which  happiness  is  achieved  or  misery 
avoided.  The  sentiment  enlisted  on  behalf  of  these  con- 
ditions is  often  in  harmony  with  the  pro-ethical  sentiment 
compounded  as  above  described,  though  from  time  to  time 
in  conflict  with  it ;  but  whether  in  harmony  or  in  conflict, 
it  is  vaguely  or  distinctly  recognized  as  the  rightful  ruler : 
responding,  as  it  does,  to  consequences  which  are  not  arti- 
ficial and  variable,  but  to  consequences  which  are  natural  and 
permanent. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  along  with  established  su- 
premacy of  this  ethical  sentiment  proper,  the  feeling  of  ob- 
ligation, though  continuing  to  exist  in  the  background  of 
consciousness,  ceases  to  occupy  its  foreground;  since  the 
right  actions  are  habitually  performed  spontaneously  or  from 
liking.  Though,  while  the  moral  nature  is  imperfectly  de- 
veloped, there  may  often  arise  conformity  to  the  ethical  sen- 
timent under  a  sense  of  compulsion  by  it;  and  though,  in 
other  cases,  non-conformity  to  it  may  cause  subsequent  self- 
reproach  (as  instance  a  remembered  lack  of  gratitude,  which 
may  be  a  source  of  pain  without  there  being  any  thought 
of  extrinsic  penalty);  yet  with  a  moral  nature  completely 
balanced,  neither  of  these  feelings  will  arise,  because  that 
which  is  done  is  done  in  satisfaction  of  the  appropriate 
desire. 

And  now  having,  mainly  for  the  purpose  of  making  the 
statement  complete,  contemplated  the  ethical  sentiment  proper, 
as  distinguished  from  the  pro-ethical  sentiment,  we  may  for 
the  present  practically  dismiss  it  from  our  thoughts,  and  con- 
sider only  the  phenomena  presented  by  the  pro-ethical  sen- 
timent under  its  various  forms.  For  throughout  the  remain- 
ing chapters  of  this  division,  treating  inductively  of  ideas 
and  feelings  about  conduct  displayed  by  mankind  at  large, 


WHAT   IDEAS   AND    SENTIMENTS   ARE   ETHICAL?  339 

we  shall  be  concerned  almost  exclusively  with  the  pro-ethical 
sentiment :  the  ethical  sentiment  proper  being,  in  the  great 
mass  of  cases,  scarcely  discernible. 

Before  entering  on  the  task  indicated,  let  me  add  that  a 
good  deal  which  approaches  to  repetition  will  be  found  in 
the  immediately-succeeding  pages — not  repetition  in  so  far 
as  the  evidence  given  is  concerned,  but  in  so  far  as  the  car- 
dinal ideas  are  concerned.  In  the  preliminary  discussion  to 
which  this  chapter  and  the  preceding  one  have  been  devoted, 
it  has  been  necessary  to  state  in  brief  some  of  the  leading 
conceptions  which  a  general  inspection  of  the  phenomena 
suggests.  These  conceptions  have  now  to  be  set  forth  in 
full,  along  with  the  masses  of  facts  which  give  birth  to  them. 
But  while  it  seems  well  to  apologize  beforehand  for  the  re- 
currence, in  elaborated  forms,  of  ideas  already  expressed  in 
small  space,  I  do  not  altogether  regret  having  to  elaborate 
the  ideas ;  since  there  will  be  afforded  occasion  for  further 
emphasizing  conclusions  which  can  scarcely  be  too  much 
dwelt  upon. 


CHAPTER  III. 

AGGEESSION. 

§  125.  Under  this  title,  accepted  in  its  full  meaning,  may 
be  ranged  many  kinds  of  acts — acts  so  many  and  various 
that  they  cannot  be  dealt  with  in  one  chapter.  Here  I 
propose  to  restrict  the  application  of  the  title  to  acts  in- 
flicting bodily  injury  on  others  to  the  extent  of  killing  or 
wounding  them — acts  of  kinds  which  we  class  as  destruct- 
ive. 

Even  of  these  acts,  which  we  may  consider  as  completely 
or  partially  homicidal,  there  are  sundry  kinds  not  compre- 
hended under  aggression  as  ordinarily  understood.  I  refer 
to  those  which  do  not  imply  antagonism  or  conflict. 

The  first  of  them  to  be  named  is  infanticide.  Far  from 
j  being  regarded  as  a  crime,  child-murder  has  been,  through- 
out the  world  in  early  times,  and  in  various  parts  of  the 
world  still  is,  regarded  as  not  even  an  offence :  occasionally, 
indeed,  as  a  duty.  We  have  that  infanticide  which  is  dic- 
tated by  desire  to  preserve  the  lives  of  adults ;  for  in  a  tribe 
which  is  ever  on  the  border  of  starvation,  addition  of  some 
to  its  number  may  prove  fatal  to  others.  Female  infanti- 
cide, too,  is  often  dictated  by  thought  of  tribal  welfare :  the 
established  policy  is  to  kill  girls,  who,  while  not  useful  for 
purposes  of  war  and  the  chase,  will,  if  in  excess,  injuriously 
tax  the  food-supplies.  Then,  again,  we  have  the  child- 
murder  committed  in  a  fit  of  passion.  Among  savages,  and 


AGGKESSION.  341 

even  among  the  semi-civilized,  this  is  considered  an  indiffer- 
ent matter :  the  power  of  life  and  death  over  children  being, 
in  early  stages,  taken  for  granted.  Once  more  we  have  the 
sacrifice  of  children  to  propitiate  cannibal  chiefs,  living  or 
dead.  Regarded  as  an  obligation,  this  may  be  classed  as 
prompted  by  a  pro-ethical  sentiment. 

Turning  to  the  socially-sanctioned  homicides  of  which  the 
victims  are  adults,  we  may  set  down  first  those  which  in 
many  places  occur  at  funerals ;  as  instance  Indian  suttees 
until  recent  times.  On  much  larger  scales  are  the  immola- 
tions during  the  obsequies  of  chiefs  and  kings.  The  killing 
of  wives  to  accompany  their  dead  husbands  to  the  other 
world,  and  the  killing  of  male  attendants  to  serve  them  in 
the  other  world  (sometimes  also  of  friends)  are  forms  of 
wholesale  slaughter  which  have  occurred  in  many  countries, 
and  still  occur  in  parts  of  Africa.  And  with  these  may 
be  joined  such  slaughters  as  those  which  are  common  in  Da- 
homey, where  a  man  is  killed  that  his  double  may  carry  a 
message  from  the  king  to  a  deceased  ancestor.  Homicides 
of  this  class  have  also  a  kind  of  pro-ethical  warrant ;  since 
they  are  instigated  by  reverence  for  custom  and  by  the  obli- 
gation of  loyalty. 

Lastly  we  have  the  homicides  prompted  by  beliefs  classed 
as  religious.  With  or  without  the  ascription  of  divine 
cannibalism,  the  sacrifices  of  victims  to  deities  have  prevailed 
widely  among  various  races  in  early  times — Phoenicians, 
Scythians,  Greeks,  Romans,  Assyrians,  Hebrews  &c. — 
carried,  in  some  places,  to  great  extremes ;  as  in  Ancient 
Mexico,  where  thousands  of  human  victims  annually  were 
slain  on  altars,  and  where  wars  were  made  on  the  plea  that 
the  gods  were  hungry.  And  to  these  religious  homicides 
which,  in  early  stages,  ministered  to  the  supposed  appetites 
of  the  gods,  must  be  added  the  religious  homicides  which, 
in  comparatively  modern  times,  have  been  committed,  alike 
by  Catholics  and  Protestants,  to  appease  the  supposed  wrath 
of  their  God  against  misbelievers. 


342  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF  ETHICS. 

Under  that  theory  which  regards  the  Tightness  of  acts  as 
constituted  by  fulfilment  of  divine  injunctions,  these  re- 
ligious homicides,  in  common  with  sundry  of  those  above  de- 
scribed, were  prompted  by  one  of  the  motives  we  class  as 
pro-ethical. 

§  126.  From  these  aggressions,  taking  the  form  of  homi- 
cides, which  are  not  consequent  on  personal  or  tribal  antag- 
onisms, let  us  pass  to  those  of  which  bloodthirstiness  is  the 
cause,  with  or  without  enmity,  personal  or  tribal. 

I  will  begin  with  an  instance  which  I  have  named  elsewhere 
— that  of  the  Fijians,  among  whom  murder  was  thought  hon- 
ourable. Credence  to  this  statement,  which  otherwise  one 
would  be  inclined  to  withhold,  is  justified  by  knowledge  of 
kindred  statements  respecting  other  peoples.  Livingstone 
tells  us  that — 

A  Bushman  "  sat  by  the  fire  relating  his  early  adventures :  among  these 
was  killing  five  other  Bushmen.  '  Two,'  said  he,  counting  on  his  fingers, 
'  were  females,  one  a  male,  and  the  other  two  calves.' — '  What  a  villain 
you  are  to  boast  of  killing  women  and  children  of  your  own  nation  !  What 
will  God  say  when  you  appear  before  him  f ' — '  He  will  say,'  replied  he, 
'  that  I  was  a  very  clever  fellow.'  ...  I  discovered  that,  though  he  was 
employing  the  word  which  is  used  among  the  Bakwains  when  speaking  of 
the  Deity,  he  had  only  the  idea  of  a  chief,  and  was  all  the  time  referring  to 
Sekomi." 

Still  more  astounding  is  the  state  of  things,  and  the  kind  of 
sentiment,  described  by  Wilson  and  Felkin  in  their  account 
of  Uganda.  Here  is  an  illustrative  incident. 

"  A  young  page  of  Mtesa's  [king  of  Uganda],  son  of  a  subordinate  chief, 
was  frequently  employed  to  bring  me  messages  from  the  palace,  and  one 
morning  came  down  to  my  house,  and  informed  me  with  great  glee  that  he 
had  just  killed  his  father.  1  inquired  why  he  had  done  this,  and  he  said 
that  he  was  tired  of  being  merely  a  servant,  and  wished  to  become  a  chief, 
and  said  so  to  Mtesa,  who  replied, '  Oh,  kill  your  father,  and  you  will  be- 
come a  chief ; '  and  the  boy  did  so." 

That,  among  peoples  who  lead  lives  of  aggression,  it  is  a 
virtue  to  be  a  destroyer  and  a  vice  to  be  peaceful,  sundry 
cases  prove. 


AGGEES8ION.  343 

"  The  name  of  '  harami ' — brigand — is  still  honourable  among  the  Hejazi 
Bedouins.  .  .  .  He,  on  the  other  hand,  who  is  lucky  enough,  as  we  should 
express  it,  to  die  in  his  bed,  is  called  '  f atis  '  (carrion,  the  corps  crtve  of  the 
Klephts);  his  weeping  mother  will  exclaim, '  O  that  my  son  had  perished  of 
a  cut-throat  I '  and  her  attendant  crones  will  suggest,  with  deference,  that 
such  evil  came  of  the  will  of  Allah." 

How  profound  may  become  the  belief  in  the  virtue  of  man- 
slaughter,  is  made  clear  by  the  Kukis,  whose  paradise  is 
"  the  heritage  of  the  man  who  has  killed  the  largest  number 
of  his  enemies  in  life,  the  people  killed  by  him  attending  on 
him  as  his  slaves." 

With  this  supposed  divine  approval  of  man-slaying,  we 
may  join  the  social  approval  manifested  in  other  cases. 
Among  the  Pathans,  one  of  the  tribes  on  the  north-west 
frontier  of  the  Punjaub,  "  there  is  hardly  a  man  whose  hands 
are  unstained,"  and  "  each  person  counts  up  his  murders." 
That,  under  wild  social  conditions,  a  sentiment  of  this  kind 
readily  arises,  was  shown  in  California  during  the  gold  period. 
Murderers  "  continued  to  notch  the  number  of  their  victims 
on  neatly  kept  hilts  of  pistols  or  knives." 

§  127.  If  from  the  implied  or  expressed  belief  in  the  hon- 
ourableness  of  private  homicide,  illustrated  by  some  still-ex- 
tant savages,  we  turn  to  the  belief  in  the  honourableness  of 
that  public  and  wholesale  homicide  for  which  the  occasions 
are  given  by  real  or  pretended  inter-tribal  or  international  in- 
juries, ancient  records  of  barbarous  and  semi-civilized  peoples 
furnish  illustrations  in  abundance. 

Among  the  gods  of  the  primitive  Indians,  Indra  is  lauded 
in  the  Rig -Veda  as  the  devastating  warrior,  and  Agni,  too, 
"  was  born,  the  slayer  of  the  enemy,"  and  the  "  destroyer  of 
cities."  Emulating  their  gods,  the  warriors  of  the  Rig-  Veda 
and  the  Mahdbharata  glory  in  conquests.  Propitiating  Indra 
with  deep  libations,  the  hero  prays : — "  Let  us  share  the 
wealth  of  him  whom  thou  hast  slain ;  bring  us  to  the  house- 
hold of  him  who  is  hard  to  vanquish."  And  then  with  such 


£44  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

prayers,  common  to  militant  peoples,  may  be  joined  passages 
from  the  Mahabharata  recommending  atrocities. 

"  Let  a  man  inspire  his  enemy  with  confidence  for  some  real  reason,  and 
then  smite  him  at  the  proper  time,  when  his  foot  has  slipped  a  little." 

"Without  cutting  into  an  enemy's  marrow,  without  doing  something 
dreadful,  without  smiting  like  a  killer  of  fish,  a  man  does  not  attain  great 
prosperity." 

"  A  son,  a  brother,  a  father,  or  a  friend,  who  present  any  obstacle  to  one's 
interests  are  to  be  slain." 

After  these  early  Aryans,  look  now  at  some  of  the  early 
Semites.  Still  more  extreme  in  the  implied  praiseworthi- 
ness  of  sanguinary  deeds,  are  they  shown  to  have  been  by 
their  records.  Assyrian  kings  glorify  themselves  in  inscrip- 
tions describing  wholesale  slaughters  and  the  most  savage 
cruelties.  Sennacherib,  driving  his  chariot  through  "  deep 
pools  of  blood,"  boasts — "  with  blood  and  flesh  its  wheels 
were  clogged  ; "  Assurbanipal  says  of  the  conquered — "  their 
tongues  I  pulled  out,"  "the  limbs  cut  off  I  caused  to  be 
eaten  by  dogs,  bears,  eagles,  vultures,  birds  of  heaven ; " 
Tiglath-Pileser's  account  of  the  slain  Muskayans  is  that 
"  their  carcases  covered  the  valleys  and  the  tops  of  the  mount- 
ains ; "  in  an  inscription  of  Assur-natsir-pal  come  the  words 
— "  I  am  a  weapon  that  spares  not,"  the  revolted  nobles  "  I 
flayed,  with  their  skins  I  covered  the  pyramid,"  "  their  young 
men  and  maidens  I  burned  as  a  holocaust ; "  and  of  his  ene- 
mies Shalmaneser  II  says — "  with  their  blood  I  dyed  the 
mountains  like  wool."  Evidently  the  expectation  was  that 
men  of  after  times  would  admire  these  merciless  destructions, 
and  this  implies  belief  in  their  righteousness ;  for  we  cannot 
assume  that  these  Assyrian  kings  intentionally  made  them- 
selves eternally  infamous. 

Omitting  evidence  furnished  in  plenty  by  the  histories 
of  the  Egyptians,  Persians,  Greeks,  Macedonians,  Romans, 
we  find  kindred  thoughts  and  feelings  betrayed  by  the 
peoples  of  northern  Europe.  The  Gauls  of  early  days, 
galloping  home  with  the  heads  of  their  enemies  slung  to 


AGGRESSION.  345 

their  saddles,  displayed  them  on  stakes  or  preserved  them  in 
chests.    According  to  Caesar  : — 

The  Suevi  and  Germans  generally  "  esteem  it  their  greatest  praise  . .  that 
the  lands  about  their  territories  lie  unoccupied  to  a  very  great  extent." 
And  the  fact  that  the  Norse  paradise  was  conceived  as  a 
place  for  daily  combats,  sufficiently  shows  how  dominant 
was  the  belief  in  the  virtue  of  successful  aggression.  That 
throughout  the  Middle  Ages  successful  aggression  was 
thought  the  one  thing  worth  living  for,  needs  no  proof. 
History,  which  is  little  more  than  the  Newgate  Calendar  of 
nations,  describing  political  burglaries  and  their  results,  yields 
illustrations  on  every  page  :  "  arms  and  the  man "  supply 
the  universal  theme.  No  better  way  of  showing  the  dominant 
sentiment  down  to  comparatively  recent  times,  can  be  found 
than  that  of  quoting  the  mottoes  of  nobles,  of  which  here  are 
some  English  ones.  Earl  of  Rosslyn — "Fight;"  Baron 
Hawke — "  Strike  ; "  Earl  of  Sef  ton — "  To  conquer  is  to  live ;" 
the  Marquis  of  Downshire — "  By  God  and  my  sword  I  will 
obtain;"  the  Earl  of  Carysfort — "This  hand  is  hostile;" 
Count  Magawley — "  The  red  hand  to  victory ; "  the  Duke  of 
Athole — "  Forth,  fortune,  and  fill  the  fetters."  And  the  gen- 
eral spirit  is  well  shown  by  lines  illustrating  the  motto  of  the 
Middleton  family : — 

"  My  sword,  my  spear,  my  shaggy  shield, 
These  make  me  lord  of  all  below, 
And  he  who  fears  the  lance  to  wield 
Beneath  my  shaggy  shield  must  bow, 
His  lands,  his  vineyards  must  resign, 
For  all  that  cowards  have  is  mine." 

Mottoes  being  the  expressions  of  feelings  held  above  all  others 
worthy,  and  tacitly  assuming  the  existence  of  like  feelings  in 
others,  those  quoted  imply  the  social  sanction  given  to  ag- 
gressiveness ;  and  we  need  but  recall  the  religious  ceremonies 
on  the  initiation  of  a  knight,  to  see  that  his  militant  course 
of  life  was  supposed  to  have  a  divine  sanction  also.  War,  even 
unprovoked  war,  was  supported  by  a  pro-ethical  sentiment. 
Nor  is  it  essentially  otherwise  even  now.  Thinly  veiled 


34:6  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

by  conventional  respect  for  the  professed  religious  creed, 
the  old  spirit  continually  discloses  itself.  Much  more  feeling 
than  is  excited  by  a  hymn,  is  excited  by  the  song — "  The 
Hardy  Norseman;"  and  pride  in  the  doing  of  the  "sea- 
wolves  "  who  "  conquered  Normandy,"  shown  by  the  line — 
"Oh,  ne'er  should  we  forget  our  sires,"  is  habitually 
sympathized  in.  No  reading  is  more  popular  than  narra- 
tives of  battles ;  and  the  epithet  "  great,"  as  applied  to 
Alexander,  Karl,  Peter,  Frederick,  Napoleon,  is  applied 
notwithstanding  all  the  atrocities  they  committed.  Occa- 
sionally, indeed,  we  meet  with  overt  expression  of  this 
sentiment.  Lord  Wolseley  says  of  the  soldier: — "He  must 
believe  that  his  duties  are  the  noblest  that  fall  to  man's 
lot.  He  must  be  taught  to  despise  all  those  of  civil  life  : " 
a  sentiment  which  is  not  limited  to  the  "  duties "  of  the 
soldier  as  a  defender  of  his  country,  which  in  our  day  he 
never  performs,  but  is  extended  to  his  "duties"  as  an 
invader  of  other  countries,  and  especially  those  of  weak 
peoples:  the  appetite  for  aggression  transforms  baseness 
into  nobility.  When,  in  the  Hindoo  epic,  the  god  Indra  is 
described  as  conquering  a  woman,  we  are  astonished  to  find 
a  victory  which  we  should  consider  so  cowardly  lauded  by 
the  poet ;  and  when,  on  the  walls  of  Karnak,  we  see  Rameses 
represented  as  a  giant  holding  by  the  hair  half-a-dozen 
dwarfs,  and  cutting  off  all  their  heads  with  one  sweep  of  his 
sword,  we  think  it  strange  that  he  should  have  thought  to 
glorify  himself  by  depicting  an  easy  triumph  of  strong 
over  weak.  But  when  with  arms  of  precision,  with  shells, 
with  rockets,  with  far-reaching  cannon,  peoples  possessed 
only  of  feeble  weapons  are  conquered  with  as  great  facility 
as  a  man  conquers  a  child,  there  comes  applause  in  our 
journals,  with  titles  and  rewards  to  the  leaders!  The 
"  duties "  of  the  soldier  so  performed  are  called  "  noble ; " 
while,  held  up  in  contrast  with  them,  those  of  the  peaceful 
citizen  are  called  despicable ! 

Beyond  question,  then,  the  sentiment  which  rejoices  in 


AGGRESSION.  347 

personal  superiority,  and,  not  asking  for  equitable  cause,  is 
ready,  under  an  authority  it  willingly  accepts,  to  slaughter 
so-called  enemies,  is  still  dominant.  The  social  sanction,  and 
the  reflected  inner  sanction  due  to  it,  constitute  a  pro-ethi- 
cal sentiment  which,  in  international  relations,  remains  su- 
preme. 

§  128.  The  ethics  of  enmity  thus  illustrated,  very  little 
qualified  in  some  tribes  of  savages,  especially  cannibals, 
qualified  in  but  a  moderate  degree  in  ancient  semi-civilized 
societies,  and  continuing  predominant  during  the  develop- 
ment of  civilized  societies,  has  been  qualified  more  and  more 
by  the  ethics  of  amity  as  the  internal  social  life  has  disci- 
plined men  in  co-operation :  the  relative  prosperities  of  na- 
tions, while  in  part  determined  by  their  powers  of  conquest, 
having  been  all  along  in  part  determined  by  the  extents  to 
which,  in  daily  intercourse,  the  aggressiveness  of  their  mem- 
bers has  been  restrained. 

Such  peoples  as  have  produced  literatures  show  us,  in 
relatively  early  days,  the  rise  of  an  ethics  of  amity,  set  in 
opposition  to  the  ethics  of  enmity.  Proceeding,  as  the 
expressions  of  it  do,  from  the  mouths  of  poets  and  sages, 
we  may  not  measure  by  them  the  beliefs  which  then  pre- 
vailed ;  any  more  than  we  may  now  measure  the  prevailing 
beliefs  by  the  injunctions  to  forgive  enemies,  perpetually 
uttered  by  our  priests.  But  even  the  occasional  enuncia- 
tion of  altruistic  sentiments,  occurring  in  ancient  societies 
after  there  had  been  long-established  states  of  relatively- 
peaceful  life,  is  significant.  And  it  is  interesting  to  observe, 
too,  how,  after  the  absolute  selfishness  of  the  antagonistic 
activities,  a  violent  reaction  led  to  the  preaching  of  absolute 
unselfishness.  Thus  while  of  that  vast  compilation  which 
constitutes  the  Mahabharata,  the  older  parts  are  sanguinary 
in  sentiment,  the  latter  parts  contain  condemnations  of  need- 
less warfare.  It  is  said  that  fighting  is  the  worst  means  of 
gaining  victory,  and  that  a  king  should  extend  his  conquests 


348  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

without  fighting.    And  there  are  much  more  pronounced  re- 
probations  of  aggressive  action,  as  this : — 
"  Treat  others  as  thou  would'st  thyself  be  treated. 

Do  nothing  to  thy  neighbour,  which  hereafter 

Thou  would'st  not  have  thy  neighbour  do  to  thee. 

A  man  obtains  a  rule  of  action  by  looking  on  his  neighbour  as  himself." 

And  then  in  the  writings  of  an  Indian  moralist,  said  by  Sir 
"William  Jones  to  date  three  centuries  B.  c.,  we  read  the  ex- 
treme statement : — 

"  A  good  man  who  thinks  only  of  benefiting  his  enemy  has  no  feelings  of 
hostility  towards  him  even  at  the  moment  of  being  destroyed  by  him." 

Similarly  among  the  Persians,  we  find  Sadi  writing — "  Show 
kindness  even  to  thy  foes ; "  and  again — "  The  men  of  God's 
true  faith,  I've  heard,  grieve  not  the  hearts  e'en  of  their  foes." 
In  like  manner  among  the  Chinese,  the  teaching  of  Lao-Tsze 
was  that — 

"  Peace  is  his  highest  aim ...  he  who  rejoices  at  the  destruction  of 
human  life  is  not  fit  to  be  entrusted  with  power  in  the  world.  He  who  has 
been  instrumental  in  killing  many  people  should  move  on  over  them  with 
bitter  tears." 

Confucius  said: — "In  carrying  on  your  government,  why 
should  you  use  killing  at  all  ?  Let  your  evinced  desires  be 
for  what  is  good,  and  the  people  will  be  good."  Mencius 
held  that "  he  who  has  no  pleasure  in  killing  men  can  "  unite 
the  empire ;  and  of  the  warlike  he  said  that — 

"When  contentions  about  territory  are  the  ground  on  which  they  fight, 
they  slaughter  men,  till  the  fields  are  filled  with  them.  When  some  strug- 
gle for  a  city  is  the  ground  on  which  they  fight,  they  slaughter  men  till 
the  cfty  is  filled  with  them.  .  .  .  Death  is  not  enough  for  such  a  crime." 

Early  as  was  his  time,  Mencius  evidently  entertained  higher 
sentiments  than  do  "  the  western  barbarians  "  at  the  present 
time.  The  characterization  which  has  been  given  to  slavery 
— "the  sum  of  all  villanies" — would  probably  have  been 
given  by  him  to  aggressive  war. 

In  section  573  of  Tlie  Principles  of  Sociology,  as  also  in 
section  437,  instances  are  given  of  various  tribes  which,  non- 
aggressive  externally  are  also  non-aggressive  internally — 


AGGBESSION.  349 

tribes  in  which  crimes  of  violence  are  so  rare  that  scarcely 
any  control  is  needed.  There  may  be  added  a  few  other 
examples.  There  are  the  aborigines  of  Sumatra,  a  simple 
people  who,  thrust  into  the  interior  by  the  Malays,  are  de- 
scribed by  Marsden  as  "  mild,  peaceable,  and  forbearing  " — 
that  is,  non-aggressive.  There  are  the  Tharus,  inhabiting  a 
retired  strip  of  forest  at  the  foot  of  the  Himalayas,  which  af- 
fords them  a  refuge  from  invaders,  and  who  are  described  as 
"a  peaceful  and  good-natured  race."  Further,  we  have  a 
specially  relevant  testimony  given  by  different  authorities  re- 
specting the  Iroquois.  In  his  work,  The  League  of  the  Iro- 
quois, Morgan  says : — 

"  It  was  the  boast  of  the  Iroquois  that  the  great  object  of  their  confeder- 
acy was  peace— to  break  up  the  spirit  of  perpetual  warfare,  which  had 
wasted  the  red  race  from  age  to  age." 

And  then  clear  indication  of  the  results  is  contained  in  the 
following  statement  made  by  the  same  writer— 

"  Crimes  and  offences  were  so  unfrequent  under  their  social  system,  that 
the  Iroquois  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  had  a  criminal  code." 

Here,  however,  the  truth  which  it  specially  concerns  us 
to  note  is  that  during  states  of  hostility  which  make  ag- 
gression habitual,  it  acquires  a  social  sanction,  and  in  some 
cases  a  divine  sanction :  there  is  a  pro-ethical  sentiment 
enlisted  on  its  behalf.  Contrariwise,  in  the  cases  just 
referred  to,  aggressiveness  meets  with  reprobation.  An 
ethical  sentiment,  rightly  so-called,  produces  repugnance 
to  it 

Nor  was  it  otherwise  with  the  Hebrews.  After  the 
chronic  antagonisms  of  nomadic  life  had  been  brought  to  an 
end  by  their  captivity,  and  after  their  subsequent  wars  of  con- 
quest had  ended  in  a  comparatively  peaceful  state,  the  ex- 
pression of  altruistic  sentiments  became  marked ;  until,  in 
Leviticus,  we  see  emerging  the  principle,  often  regarded  as 
exclusively  Christian — "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  as 
thyself  " — a  principle,  however,  which  appears  to  have  been 
limited  to  "  the  congregation  of  the  children  of  Israel."  And 


350  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

then  in  later  days  by  the  Essenes,  as  well  as  by  Christ  and 
his  apostles,  the  ethics  of  amity,  extended  so  as  to  include 
enemies,  was  carried  even  to  the  extreme  of  turning  the 
cheek  to  the  smiter. 

§  129.  Into  what  general  induction  may  these  facts  be 
grouped?  Taken  in  the  mass,  the  evidence  shows,  as  we 
might  expect,  that  in  proportion  as  inter-tribal  and  inter- 
national antagonisms  are  great  and  constant,  the  ideas  and 
feelings  belonging  to  the  ethics  of  enmity  predominate ;  and, 
conflicting  as  they  do  with  the  ideas  and  feelings  belonging 
to  the  ethics  of  amity,  proper  to  the  internal  life  of  a  society, 
they  in  greater  or  less  degrees  suppress  these,  and  fill  with 
aggressions  the  conduct  of  man  to  man. 

Miscellaneous  kinds  of  homicide,  such  as  were  noted  at 
the  outset — infanticide,  killing  for  cannibalism,  immolations 
at  funerals,  sacrifices  to  the  gods — are  characteristic  of 
societies  in  which  warfare  is  habitual.  Those  most  atrocious 
of  man-eaters,  the  Fijians,  among  whom  every  one  carried 
his  life  in  his  hand,  implied  their  ingrained  militancy  by 
their  conception  of  the  other  world,  where  their  gods  "  make 
war,  and  kill  and  eat  each  another,"  and  bear  such  names  as 
"  the  murderer,"  "  fresh  from  the  cutting  up  or  slaughter," 
&c. ;  where  a  chief  arriving  after  death,  boasts  that  he  has 
"  destroyed  many  towns,  and  slain  many  in  war  ; "  and  where 
"  men  who  have  not  slain  an  enemy "  suffer  "  the  most  de- 
grading of  all  punishments."  The  Bushmen,  exhibiting  pride 
in  private  murder,  pass  their  lives  in  ceaseless  antagonism 
with  men  and  beasts  around — aggressing  and  aggressed  upon. 
So,  too,  the  Bedouin  tribes  instanced  as  thinking  any  death 
save  one  suffered  in  combat  disgraceful,  commit  never-ending 
aggressions.  And  the  Waganda,  the  king  of  whom  sug- 
gested to  his  page  the  parricide  gladly  carried  out  by  him, 
are  soldiers  noted  for  "  their  warlike  character,  which  tinges 
the  whole  of  their  life  and  government." 

If,   from  the   relations  as   illustrated   in   these   extreme 


AGGRESSION.  351 

cases,  we  pass  to  the  relations  as  illustrated  in  developing 
societies,  we  see  that  with  decrease  of  external  aggressive- 
ness there  goes  decrease  of  internal  aggressiveness.  During 
the  Merovingian  period,  along  with  chronic  militant  ac- 
tivities on  large  and  small  scales,  occurring  even  to  the 
extent  of  wars  between  towns,  perpetual  violence  charac- 
terized the  relations  of  individuals :  kings  murdered  their 
queens,  royal  fathers  were  murdered  by  their  sons,  princely 
brothers  murdered  brothers,  while  bloodshed  and  cruelty 
prevailed  everywhere.  In  the  next  period  the  conquests  of 
Charlemagne  were  accompanied  by  atrocities  large  and 
small.  He  beheaded  4,000  Saxons  in  one  day,  and  in- 
flicted death  on  those  who  refused  baptism  or  ate  flesh 
during  Lent.  Similarly  throughout  the  Feudal  ages,  recur- 
ring international  fights  were  accompanied  by  perpetual 
fights  among  nobles;  the  chroniclers  describe  little  else 
than  crimes ;  and  the  slaughtering  of  serfs  by  knights  was 
passed  over  as  a  thing  not  calling  for  reproach.  But  as  the 
course  of  ages  and  the  consolidation  of  kingdoms  brought 
diminution  of  a  diffused  warfare,  and  as,  by  consequence, 
industrial  activities,  with  resulting  internal  co-operation, 
filled  larger  spaces  in  men's  lives,  the  more  unscrupulous 
forms  of  aggressiveness  came  to  be  reprobated,  while  appro- 
bation was  given  to  conduct  characterized  by  regard  for 
others.  And  though  modern  times  have  seen  great  wars, 
yet,  since  the  militant  activities  have  not  been  all-pervading 
as  in  earlier  times,  the  sentiments  appropriate  to  peaceful 
activities  have  not  been  so  universally  repressed.  Moreover, 
as  we  elsewhere  saw,  (Principles  of  Sociology,  §  573),  the 
brutality  of  citizens  to  one  another  has  from  time  to  time 
increased  along  with  renewed  militancy  and  decreased  along 
with  cessation  of  it ;  while  there  have  been  concomitant  mod- 
ifications in  the  ethical  standard. 


24 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ROBBERY. 

§  130.  Between  physically  injuring  another,  partially  or 
to  the  death,  and  injuring  him  either  by  taking  possession 
of  his  body  and  labour,  or  of  his  property,  the  kinship  in 
nature  is  obvious.  Both  direct  and  indirect  injuries  are 
comprehended  under  the  title  Aggression ;  and  the  second, 
like  the  first,  might,  without  undue  straining  of  words,  have 
been  brought  within  the  limits  of  the  last  chapter.  But,  as 
before  implied,  it  has  seemed  more  convenient  to  separate 
the  aggression  which  nearly  always  has  bloodshed  for  its 
concomitant,  from  the  aggression  which  is  commonly  blood- 
less. Here  we  have  to  deal  with  this  last. 

The  extreme  form  of  this  last  aggression  is  that  which 
ends  in  capturing  a  man  and  enslaving  him.  Though  to 
class  this  under  the  head  of  robbery  is  to  do  some  violence 
to  the  name,  yet  we  may  reasonably  say  that  to  take  a  man 
from  himself,  and  use  his  powers  for  other  purposes  than 
his  own,  is  robbery  in  the  highest  degree.  Instead  of  de- 
priving him  of  some  product  of  past  labour  voluntarily  under- 
taken, it  deprives  him  of  the  products  of  future  labours 
which  he  is  compelled  to  undertake.  At  any  rate,  whether 
rightly  to  be  called  robbery  or  not,  it  is  to  be  classed  as  an 
aggression,  if  not  so  grave  as  that  of  inflicting  death,  yet 
next  to  it  in  gravity. 

It  is  needless  here  to  furnish  proofs  that  this  kind  of 
aggression  has  been,  from  very  early  stages  of  human  pro- 


EOBBEEY.  353 

gress,  a  concomitant  of  militancy.  Eating  the  vanquished 
or  turning  them  into  bondsmen,  commonly  became  alterna- 
tives where  inter-tribal  conflicts  were  perpetual.  From  the 
incidental  making  of  captives  there  has  frequently  grown 
up  the  intentional  making  of  captive.8.  An  established 
policy  has  dictated  invasions  to  procure  workers  or  victims. 
But  whether  with  or  without  intention,  this  robbery  in  the 
highest  degree  has  been,  throughout,  a  concomitant  of  habitual 
war ;  could  not,  indeed,  have  arisen  to  any  extent  without  war. 

A  closely-allied  form  of  robbery — somewhat  earlier,  since 
we  find  it  in  rude  tribes  which  do  not  make  slaves — is  the 
stealing  of  women.  Of  course,  along  with  victory  over  com- 
batants there  has  gone  appropriation  of  the  non-combatants 
belonging  to  them ;  and  women  have  consequently  been  in 
all  early  stages  among  the  prizes  of  conquerors.  In  books 
treating  of  primitive  marriage,  like  that  of  Mr.  McLennan, 
there  will  be  found  evidence  that  the  stealing  of  women  not 
unfrequently  becomes  the  normal  process  by  which  the 
numbers  of  a  tribe  are  maintained.  It  is  found  best  to 
avoid  the  cost  of  rearing  them,  and  to  obtain  by  fighting 
or  theft  the  requisite  number  from  other  tribes.  Becoming 
a  traditional  policy,  this  custom  often  acquires  a  strong 
sanction ;  and  is  supposed  by  some  to  have  originated  the 
interdict  against  marriage  with  those  of  the  same  clan. 
But,  however  this  may  be,  we  habitually  find  women  re- 
garded as  the  most  valued  spoils  of  victory;  and  often, 
where  the  men  are  killed,  the  women  are  preserved  to 
become  mothers.  It  was  so  with  the  Caribs  in  their  can- 
nibal days ;  and  it  was  so  with  the  Hebrews,  as  shown  in 
Numbers  xxxi,  17 — 18,  where  we  read  that,  after  a  suc- 
cessful war,  all  the  wives  and  the  males  among  the  children 
were  ordered  by  Moses  to  be  killed,  while  the  virgins  were  re- 
served for  the  use  of  the  captors.  (See  also  Deuteronomy  xxi.) 

Now  the  truth  here  to  be  observed  is  that  in  societies 
which  have  not  risen  to  high  stages,  the  ethical  sentiment, 
or  rather  the  pro-ethical  sentiment,  makes  no  protest 


354:  THE   INDUCTIONS    OF   ETHICS. 

against  robberies  of  these  kind ;  but,  contrariwise,  gives 
countenance  to  them.  The  cruel  treatment  of  prisoners 
delineated  in  Egyptian  and  Assyrian  wall-paintings  and 
wall-sculptures,  implies,  what  the  records  tell,  that  there 
was  a  social  sanction  for  their  subsequent  bondage.  Simi- 
larly, we  do  not  see  in  the  literature  of  the  Greeks,  any 
more  than  in  the  literature  of  the  Hebrews,  that  the  holding 
of  men  in  slavery  called  forth  moral  reprobation.  It  was 
the  same  with  the  capture  of  women  and  the  making  wives 
of  them,  or  more  frequently  concubines :  this  was  creditable 
rather  than  discreditable.  "With  the  social  sanction  for  the 
stealing  of  women  by  the  early  Aryans,  as  narrated  in  the 
Ma/iabharata,  there  was  also  a  divine  sanction ;  and  it  is 
manifest  that  among  the  Hebrews  there  was  social  if  not 
divine  sanction  for  the  taking  of  the  virgins  of  Jabesh 
Gilead  for  wives,  and  also  for  the  stealing  of  the  "  daughters 
of  Shiloh."  (Judges  xxi.) 

Under  this  head  it  needs  only  to  add  that  modern  pro- 
gress with  its  prolonged  discipline  of  internal  amity,  as  op- 
posed to  that  of  external  enmity,  has  been  accompanied  by 
disappearance  of  these  grossest  forms  of  robbery.  The  ethi- 
cal sentiment,  rightly  so-called,  has  been  developed  to  the 
extent  needful  for  suppressing  them. 

§  131.  Success  in  war  being  honourable,  all  accompani- 
ments and  signs  of  such  success  become  honourable.  Hence, 
along  with  the  enslaving  of  captives  if  they  are  not  eaten, 
and  along  with  the  appropriation  of  their  women  as  concu- 
bines or  wives,  there  goes  the  seizing  of  their  property.  A 
natural  sequence  is  that  not  only  during  war  but  at  other 
times,  robbery  of  enemies,  and  by  implication  of  strangers, 
who  are  ordinarily  classed  as  enemies,  is  distinguished  from 
robbery  of  fellow-tribesmen :  the  first  being  called  good  even 
when  the  last  is  called  bad. 

Among  the  Comanches  "a  young  man  is  not  thought 
worthy  to  be  counted  in  the  list  of  warriors,  till  he  has 


BOBBERY.  355 

returned  from  some  successful  plundering  expedition, 
the  greatest  thieves  are  .  .  the  most  respectable  members  of 
society."  A  Patagonian  is  considered  "  as  indifferently  capa- 
ble of  supporting  a  wife  unless  he  is  an  adept  in  the  art  of 
stealing  from  a  stranger."  Livingstone  says  of  the  East 
Africans : 

"  In  tribes  which  have  been  accustomed  to  cattle-stealing,  the  act  is  not 
considered  immoral,  in  the  way  that  theft  is.  Before  I  knew  the  language 
well,  I  said  to  a  chief, '  You  stole  the  cattle  of  so  and  so.'  '  No,  I  did  not 
steal  them,'  was  the  reply,  '  I  only  lifted  them,'  The  word '  gapa '  is  iden- 
tical with  the  Highland  term  for  the  same  deed." 
Concerning  the  Kalmucks  the  account  of  Pallas  is  that 
they  are  addicted  to  theft  and  robbery  on  a  large  scale,  but 
not  of  people  of  their  own  tribe.  And  Atkinson  asserts 
the  like  of  the  Kirghis. 

"  Thieving  of  this  kind  [stealing  horses  or  camels  from  one  of  the  same 
tribe]  is  instantly  punished  among  the  Kirghis ;  but  a  baranta,  like  the 
sacking  of  a  town,  is  honourable  plunder." 

Hence  doubtless  arises  that  contrast,  seeming  to  us  so 
strange,  between  the  treatment  which  robber-tribes,  such 
as  Bedouins,  show  to  strangers  under  their  roofs  and  the 
opposite  treatment  they  show  to  them  after  they  have 
departed.  Says  Atkinson  : — 

"  My  host  [a  Kirghis  chief]  said  Koubaldos  [another  Kirghis  chief  to 
whom  I  was  going]  would  not  molest  us  at  his  aoul,  but  that  some  of  his 
bands  would  be  set  on  our  track  and  try  to  plunder  us  on  our  march." 

Perhaps  it  is  among  the  Turkomans  that  we  find  the  most 
marked  illustrations  of  the  way  in  which  predatory  tribes 
come  to  regard  theft  as  honourable.  By  the  people  of  Merv, 
raids  "  even  among  members  of  the  same  tribe  are  not,  or 
were  not  until  lately,  looked  upon  in  the  light  of  robberies  "  ; 
but  the  raids  must  be  on  a  respectable  scale. 

"  It  is  curious  that,  while  red-handed  murder  and  robbery  were  a  recognized 
means  of  existence  among  the  Tekkes,  thievery,  in  the  sense  of  stealing  from 
the  person,  or  filching  an  article  from  a  stall  of  the  bazaar,  was  despised." 

And  Mr.  O'Donovan  subsequently  relates  that  when  urging 
on  the  Merv  Council  the  cessation  of  marauding  expedi- 
tions, a  member  "with  angry  astonishment"  asked  "how 


356  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

in  the  name  of  Allah  they  were  going  to  live  if  raids  were 
not  to  be  made  "  !  To  all  which  evidence  we  may  add  the 
facts  that  "  the  Pathan  mother  often  prays  that  her  son  may 
be  a  successful  robber,"  that  according  to  Rowney  the  like 
is  done  by  the  Afridi  mother,  and  the  further  fact  that 
among  the  Turkomans  a  celebrated  robber  becomes  a  saint, 
and  pilgrimages  are  made  to  his  tomb  to  sacrifice  and  pray. 

While,  in  most  of  these  cases,  a  marked  distinction  is 
recognized  between  robbery  outside  the  tribe  and  robbery 
within  the  tribe,  in  other  cases  the  last  as  well  as  the  first  is 
deemed  not  only  legitimate  but  praiseworthy.  Dalton  says 
of  the  Kukis  : — 

"The  accomplishment  most  esteemed  amongst  them  was  dexterity 
in  thieving." 

Similarly,  according  to  Gilmour — 

"  In  Mongolia  known  thieves  are  treated  as  respectable  members  of  soci- 
ety. As  long  as  they  manage  well  and  are  successful,  little  or  no  odium 
seems  to  attach  to  them." 

Of  another  Asiatic  tribe  we  read : 

"  They  [Angamis]  are  expert  thieves  and  glory  in  the  art,  for  among 
them,  as  with  the  Spartans  of  old,  theft  is  only  dishonourable  and  obnoxious 
to  punishment  when  discovered  in  the  act  of  being  committed." 

From  America  may  be  instanced  the  case  of  the  Chinooks, 
by  whom  "cunning  theft  is  regarded  as  honourable;  but 
they  despise  and  often  punish  the  inexpert  thief."  A  case 
in  Africa  is  furnished  by  the  "Waganda,  warlike  and  blood- 
thirsty, among  whom — 

"  The  distinctions  between  meum  and  tuum  are  very  ill-defined ;  and  indeed 
all  sin  is  only  relative,  the  crime  consisting  in  being  detected." 

And  then,  passing  to  Polynesia,  we  find  that  among  the 
Fijians — 

"  Success,  without  discovery,  is  deemed  quite  enough  to  make  thieving 
virtuous,  and  a  participation  in  the  ill-gotten  gain  honourable." 

So  that  in  these  instances  skill  or  courage  sanctifies  any 
invasion  of  property-rights. 

§  132.  Evidence  yielded  by  the  historic  races  proves 
that  along  with  a  less  active  life  of  external  enmity  and  a 


BOBBERY  t  357 

more  active  life  of  internal  amity,  there  goes  a  change  of 
ethical  ideas  and  sentiments,  allied  to  that  noted  in  the 
last  chapter. 

The  Rig -Veda  describes  the  thievish  acts  of  the  gods. 
Vishnu  "  stole  the  cooked  mess  "  at  the  libations  of  Indra. 
When  Tvash$ri  began  to  perform  a  soma-sacrifice  in  honour 
of  his  son  who  A  been  slain  by  Indra,  and  refused,  on  the 
ground  of  his  homicide,  to  allow  the  latter  to  assist  at  the 
ceremony,  then  "  Indra  interrupted  the  celebration,  and  drank 
off  the  soma  by  force." 

The  moral  principle  thus  exemplified  by  the  gods  is 
paralleled  by  the  moral  principle  recommended  for  men. 

"  Even  if  he  were  to  covet  the  property  of  other  people,  he  is  bound  as  a 
Kshatriya  to  take  it  by  force  of  arms,  and  never  to  beg  for  it." 

But  the  Indian  literature  of  later  ages,  displaying  the  results 
of  settled  life,  inculcates  opposite  principles. 

Passing  over  illustrative  facts  furnished  by  other  ancient 
historic  peoples,  it  will  suffice  if  we  glance  at  the  facts  which 
mediaeval  and  modern  histories  furnish.  Dasent  tells  us  of  the 
Norsemen,  that — "  Robbery  and  piracy  in  a  good  straight- 
forward wholesale  way  were  honoured  and  respected.  Simi- 
larly with  the  primitive  Germans.  Describing  them,  Caesar 
says : — 

"  Robberies  which  are  committed  beyond  the  boundaries  of  each  state 
bear  no  infamy.  .  .  And  when  any  of  their  chiefs  has  said  in  an  assembly 
'  that  he  will  be  their  leader,  let  those  who  are  willing  to  follow,  give  in 
their  names;'  they  who  approve  of  both  the  enterprise  and  the  man  arise 
and  promise  their  assistance,  and  are  applauded  by  the  people ;  such  of 
them  as  have  not  followed  him  are  considered  deserters  and  traitors,  and 
confidence  in  all  matters  is  afterwards  refused  them." 

Not  to  attempt  the  impossible  task  of  tracing  through  some 
ten  centuries  the  relation  between  the  perpetual  wars,  large 
and  small,  public  and  private,  and  the  plundering  of  men  by 
one  another,  wholesale  and  retail,  it  will  suffice  to  single  out 
special  periods.  Of  France  in  the  early  feudal  period,  Ste. 
Palaye  says : — 

«/  •/ 

"  Our  old  writers  denounce  the  avarice,  greed,  deceit,  perjury,  pillage,  theft, 


358  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

and  brigandage,  and  other  excesses  of  an  unbridled  soldiery,  equally  devoid 
of  principles,  morals,  and  sentiments." 

During  the  Hundred  Years  War  a  regime  of  robbery  became 
universal.  Among  the  nobles  the  desire  for  plunder  was  the 
motive  for  fighting.  Everywhere  there  was  brigandage  on  a 
large  scale,  as  well  as  on  a  small  scale.  In  addition  to  multi- 
tudinous scattered  highwaymen  there  were  organized  com- 
panies of  robbers  who  had  their  fortresses,  lived  luxuriously 
on  the  spoils  of  the  surrounding  country,  kidnapped  children 
for  pages  and  women  for  concubines,  and  sold  at  high  prices 
safe-conducts  to  travellers.  And  then,  along  with  all  these 
plunderings  on  land,  there  was  habitual  piracy  at  sea.  Not 
only  states,  but  towns  and  individuals  equipped  vessels  for 
buccaneering ;  and  there  were  established  refuges  for  marine 
freebooters.  Take,  again,  the  evidence  furnished  by  the 
Thirty  Years  War  in  Germany.  Universal  marauding  be- 
came the  established  system.  Soldiers  were  brigands.  Not 
only  did  they  plunder  the  people  everywhere,  but  they  used 
"  thousand-fold  torments  "  to  make  them  disclose  the  places 
where  they  had  hidden  their  goods ;  and  the  peasants  had 
to  "  till  their  fields  armed  to  the  teeth "  against  their  fel- 
low-countrymen. Meanwhile  the  soldiers  were  themselves 
cheated  by  their  officers,  small  and  great,  who  some  of  them 
made  large  fortunes  by  their  accumulated  embezzlements,  at 
the  same  time  that  the  princes  robbed  the  nation  by  debasing 
the  coinage. 

Involved  and  obscure  as  the  evidence  is,  no  one  can  fail 
to  recognize  the  broad  fact  that  with  progress  towards  a 
state  in  which  war  is  less  frequent,  and  does  not,  as  of  old? 
implicate  almost  everyone,  there  has  been  a  decrease  of 
dishonesty,  and  a  higher  appreciation  of  honesty;  to  the 
extent  that  now  robbery  of  a  stranger  has  come  to  be  as 
much  a  crime  as  robbery  of  a  fellow-citizen.  It  is  true 
that  there  are  still  thefts.  It  is  true  that  there  are  still 
multitudinous  frauds.  But  the  thefts  are  not  so  numerous, 
and  the  frauds  are  not  of  such  gross  kinds  as  they  were. 


ROBBERY.  359 

From  the  days  when  kings  frequently  tricked  their  cred- 
itors and  shopkeepers  boasted  of  their  ability  to  pass  bad 
money,  as  Defoe  tells  us,  we  have  somewhat  advanced  in 
the  respect  for  meum  and  tuum.  Nay,  as  shown  by  Pike's 
History  of  Crime,  the  contrast  is  marked  even  between 
the  amount  of  transgression  against  property  during  the  war 
period  ending  in  1815  and  the  recent  amount  of  such  trans- 
gression. 

§  133.  But  of  the  relationship  alleged,  the  clearest  proofs 
are  furnished  by  contrasts  between  the  warlike  uncivilized 
tribes  instanced  above,  and  the  peaceful  uncivilized  tribes. 
Here  are  traits  presented  by  some  of  these  last. 

Not  only,  according  to  Hartshorne,  is  the  harmless  "Wood- 
Yeddah  perfectly  honest,  but  he  cannot  conceive  it  possible 
that  a  man  should  "  take  that  which  does  not  belong  to  him." 
Of  the  Esquimaux,  among  whom  war  is  unknown,  we  read 
that  "they  are  uniformly  described  as  most  scrupulously 
honest ; "  and  any  such  qualification  of  this  statement  as  is 
made  by  Bancroft,  refers  to  Esquimaux  demoralized  by  con- 
tact with  white  traders.  Of  the  Fuegians  we  learn  from 
Darwin  that — 

"  If  any  present  was  designed  for  one  canoe,  and  it  fell  near  another,  it 
was  invariably  given  to  the  right  owner." 

And  Snow  says  they  were  very  honourable  in  their  com- 
mercial dealings  with  him.  Concerning  certain  of  the 
Papuans  on  the  Southern  coast  of  New  Guinea,  who  are 
described  as  too  independent  for  combined  action  in  war, 
we  read  that  "  in  their  bargaining  the  natives  have  generally 
been  very  honest,  far  more  so  than  our  own  people."  And 
concerning  others  of  this  race,  Kops  tells  us  that  the  natives 
of  Dory  give  evidence  "  of  an  inclination  to  right  and  jus- 
tice, and  strong  moral  principles.  Theft  is  considered  by 
them  as  a  very  grave  offence,  and  is  of  very  rare  occur- 
rence." A  like  character  is  ascribed  by  Kolff  to  the  abo- 
rigines of  Lette.  In  The  Principles  of  Sociology,  §§  437  and 


360  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

574,  I  have  given  testimonies  respecting  the  honesty  of  the 
peaceful  Todas,  Santals,  Lepchas,  Bodo  and  Dhiinals,  Hos, 
Chakmas,  Jakuns.  Here  I  add  some  further  testimonies. 
Consul  Baker  tells  us  of  the  aborigines  of  Vera  Cruz,  now  a 
subject  race  averse  to  military  service,  that  "  the  Indian  is 
honest,  and  seldom  yields  to  even  the  greatest  temptation  to 
steal."  In  his  description  of  a  race  inhabiting  a  "  long  strip 
of  swamp  and  forest "  at  "  the  foot  of  the  Himalayas,"  Mr. 
Nesfield  says  that  "  their  honesty  is  vouched  for  by  a  hun- 
dred stories ; "  "  such  at  least  is  the  character  of  the  Tharu, 
so  long  as  he  remains  in  the  safe  seclusion  of  his  solitary 
wilds,"  where  he  is  free  from  hostilities.  And  then,  with 
the  fact  stated  by  Morgan  concerning  the  Iroquois,  that 
"  theft,  the  most  despicable  of  human  crimes,  was  scarcely 
known  among  them,"  we  have  to  join  the  fact  that  their 
league  had  been  formed  for  the  preservation  of  peace  among 
its  component  peoples  and  had  succeeded  in  its  purpose  for 
many  generations. 


CHAPTER  Y. 

BEVENGE. 

§  134.  Among  intelligent  creatures  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence entails  aggressions.  Where  these  are  not  the  de- 
structive aggressions  of  carnivorous  creatures  on  their  prey, 
they  are  the  aggressions,  not  necessarily  destructive  but 
commonly  violent,  of  creatures  competing  with  one  another 
for  food.  Animals  severally  impelled  by  hunger  are  inevi- 
tably led  into  antagonisms  by  endeavours  severally  to  seize 
whatever  food  they  can ;  and  injuries,  more  or  less  decided, 
are  usual  concomitants. 

Aggression  leads  to  counter-aggression.  "Where  both 
creatures  have  powers  of  offence,  they  are  likely  both  to 
use  them;  especially  where  their  powers  of  offence  are 
approximately  equal,  that  is,  where  they  are  creatures  of 
the  same  species :  such  creatures  being  also  those  commonly 
brought  into  competition.  That  results  of  this  kind  are 
inevitable,  will  be  manifest  on  remembering  that  among 
members  of  the  same  species,  those  individuals  which  have 
not,  in  any  considerable  degree,  resented  aggressions,  must 
have  ever  tended  to  disappear,  and  to  have  left  behind 
those  which  have  with  some  effect  made  counter-aggres- 
sions. Fights,  therefore,  not  only  of  predatory  animals  with 
prey  but  of  animals  of  the  same  kind  with  one  another, 
have  been  unavoidable  from  the  first  and  have  continued 
to  the  last. 

Every  fight  is  a   succession  of  retaliations — bite  being 


362  THE   INDUCTIONS    OF   ETHICS. 

given  for  bite,  and  blow  for  blow.  Usually  these  follow  one 
another  in  quick  succession,  but  not  always.  There  is  a 
postponed  retaliation ;  and  a  postponed  retaliation  is  what 
we  call  revenge.  It  may  be  postponed  for  so  short  a  time 
as  to  be  merely  a  recommencement  of  the  fight,  or  it  may 
be  postponed  for  days,  or  it  may  be  postponed  for  years. 
And  hence  the  retaliation  which  constitutes  what  we  call  re- 
venge, diverges  insensibly  from  the  retaliations  which  char- 
acterize a  conflict. 

But  the  practice,  alike  of  immediate  revenge  and  of  post- 
poned revenge,  establishes  itself  as  in  some  measure  a  check 
upon  aggression  ;  since  the  motive  to  aggress  is  checked  by 
the  consciousness  that  a  counter-aggression  will  come :  if  not 
at  once  then  after  a  time. 

§  135.  Among  human  beings  in  early  stages,  there  hence 
arises  not  only  the  practice  of  revenge  but  a  belief  that  re- 
venge is  imperative — that  revenge  is  a  duty.  Here,  from  Sir 
George  Grey's  account  of  the  Australians,  we  have  a  graphic 
picture  of  the  sentiment  and  its  results : — 

"  The  holiest  duty  a  native  is  called  on  to  perform  is  that  of  avenging  the 
death  of  his  nearest  relation,  for  it  is  his  peculiar  duty  to  do  so :  until  he  has 
fulfilled  this  task,  he  is  constantly  taunted  by  the  old  women ;  his  wives,  if 
he  be  married,  would  soon  quit  him ;  if  he  is  unmarried,  not  a  single  young 
woman  would  speak  to  him ;  his  mother  would  constantly  cry,  and  lament 
she  should  ever  have  given  birth  to  so  degenerate  a  son ;  his  father  would  treat 
him  with  contempt,  and  reproaches  would  constantly  be  sounded  in  his  ear." 

Of  illustrations  from  North  America  that  furnished  by  the 
Sioux  may  be  named.  Burton  says : — 

"  The  obstinate  revengefulness  of  their  vendetta  is  proverbial ;  they  hate 
with  the  '  hate  of  Hell ; '  and,  like  the  Highlanders  of  old,  if  the  author  of 
an  injury  escape  them,  they  vent  their  rage  upon  the  innocent,  because  he 
is  of  the  same  clan  or  colour." 

From  South  America  a  case  given  by  Schomburgk  may  be 
quoted. 

"  My  revenge  is  not  yet  satisfied,  there  still  lives  a  member  of  the  hated 
family,"  said  a  Guiana  native,  whose  relative  he  suspected  to  have  been 
poisoned. 


REVENGE.  363 

Here,  again,  is  an  instance  from  Williams'  account  of  the 

Fijians. 

"  At  that  hour  of  death,  he  never  forgets  an  enemy,  and  at  that  time  he 

never  forgives  one.    The  dying  man  mentions  his  foe,  that  his  children 

may  perpetuate  his  hatred, — it  may  be  against  his  own  son, — and  kill  him 

at  the  first  opportunity." 

And  then  Thomson  tells  us  of  the  New  Zealanders  that 
"  not  to  avenge  the  dead,  according  to  native  law,  indicates 
the  most  craven  spirit."  Passing  to  Asia  I  may  quote 
Macrae's  account  of  the  Kukis. 

"  Like  all  savage  people,"  the  Kukis  "  are  of  a  most  vindictive  disposi- 
tion ;  blood  must  always  be  shed  for  blood.  ...  If  a  man  should  happen 
to  be  killed  by  an  accidental  fall  from  a  tree,  all  his  relations  assemble  .  .  . 
and  reduce  it  to  chips." 

In  Petherick,  we  read  that — 

The  shedding  of  blood  is  "  an  offence  with  Arabs  that  neither  time  nor 
contrition  can  obliterate,  thirst  for  revenge  descending  from  father  to  son, 
and  even  through  successive  generations." 

So  too  of  the  East  Africans  Burton  writes — 

"  Revenge  is  a  ruling  passion,  as  the  many  rancorous  fratricidal  wars  that 
have  prevailed  between  kindred  clans,  even  for  a  generation,  prove.  Re- 
taliation and  vengeance  are,  in  fact,  their  great  agents  of  moral  control." 

In  all  these  cases  we  see  that  either  avowedly  or  tacitly  re- 
venge is  considered  a  moral  obligation. 

The  early  stages  of  various  existing  peoples  yield  equally 
clear  evidence.  In  his  Jo/pan  in  Days  of  Tore,  Mr.  Dening 
translates  the  life  of  Musashi,  published  by  the  Momtusho 
(Education  Department),  narrating  a  prolonged  vendetta 
full  of  combats  and  murders  ;  and,  in  partial  sympathy  with 
the  Japanese  educationists,  remarks  that  his  hero's  acts  of 
undying  revenge,  displayed  "  so  many  of  the  nobler  aspects 
of  human  nature  "  and  are  "  calculated  to  inspire  confidence 
in  humanity."  A  kindred  spirit  is  shown  in  the  early  In- 
dian literature.  The  gods  are  revengeful.  As  described  in 
the  Rig-  Veda — 

"  Agni  swallows  his  enemies,  tears  their  skin,  minces  their  members,  and 
throws  them  before  the  wolves  to  be  eaten  by  them,  or  by  the  shrieking 
vultures." 


364:  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

And  the  ascribed  character  of  the  gods  is  participated  in  by 
their  devotees,  as  instance  the  invocation  : — 

"  Indra  and  Soma,  burn  the  Rakshas,  destroy  them,  throw  them  down,  ye 
two  Bulls,  the  people  that  grow  in  darkness.  Hew  down  the  madmen, 
suffocate  them,  kill  them,  hurl  them  away,  and  slay  the  voracious.  Indra 
and  Soma,  up  together  against  the  cursing  demon !  May  he  burn  and  hiss 
like  an  oblation  in  the  fire  1  Put  your  everlasting  hatred  on  the  villain." 

The  narrative  of  the  "  ferocious  and  deadly  struggle "  car- 
ried on  "  with  all  the  frenzied  wrath  of  demons,"  as  Wheeler 
says,  is  full  of  vows  of  revenge — a  revenge  extending  to 
horrible  treatment  of  enemies'  remains.  Nor  do  we  find  a 
different  sentiment  displayed  among  the  Hebrews,  whether 
in  the  ascribed  actions  of  Jahveh  or  the  actions  of  his  wor- 
shippers. The  command  to  "  blot  out  the  remembrance  of 
Amalek  from  under  heaven"  (Deut.  xxv.  19),  and  the  ful- 
filment of  this  command  by  Saul  and  Samuel,  to  the  extent 
of  destroying  not  only  the  Amalekites  but  all  their  cattle, 
is  a  typical  example  of  the  implied  divine  revenge — a  sam- 
ple variously  paralleled  in  other  cases.  And  with  this  sanc- 
tification  of  revenge  we  see  that  the  acts  and  feelings  of 
the  Hebrews  themselves  harmonized.  The  wreaking  of 
vengeance  was  bequeathed  as  a  duty ;  as  when  David,  after 
enjoining  Solomon  to  walk  in  the  ways  of  the  Lord,  told 
him  not  to  spare  the  son  of  a  man  who  had  cursed  him, 
(and  who  had  been  forgiven  on  oath),  saying — "but  his 
hoar  head  bring  thou  down  to  the  grave  with  blood."  (1 
Kings  ii.  9.) 

It  is  superfluous  to  illustrate  in  detail  the  kindred  senti- 
ments and  ideas  of  European  peoples  throughout  mediaeval 
times.  Most  of  the  political  and  private  incidents  narrated 
exhibit  them.  To  inflict  vengeance  was  among  them,  as 
now  among  savages,  considered  an  obligation;  and  when, 
occasionally,  the  spirit  flagged  in  men  it  was  kept  alive 
by  women,  as  in  the  Merovingian  period  by  Fredegonde 
and  Brunehaut.  Then  in  later  centuries  there  were  chronic 
family-feuds  between  nobles  everywhere,  transmitted  from 


REVENGE.  365 

generation  to  generation.  And  the  spirit  was  still  active 
down  to  the  time  of  the  Abbe"  Brantome,  who,  in  his  will,  en- 
joins a  nephew  to  execute  vengeance  on  his  behalf  should 
he  be  injured  when  too  old  to  avenge  himself.  Nay,  the 
vendetta,  once  so  general,  is  even  now  not  extinct  in  the 
East  of  Europe. 

Though,  throughout  the  modern  civilized  world,  not  per- 
turbed everywhere  and  always  by  conflicts,  life  does  not 
furnish  such  multitudinous  examples  of  like  meaning,  yet 
survival  of  the  ethics  of  enmity,  in  so  far  as  it  enjoins  re- 
venge, is  sufficiently  manifest.  Duels  almost  daily  occurring 
somewhere  or  other  on  the  Continent,  exhibit  the  conceived 
obligation  under  its  private  form;  and  under  its  public 
form  we  have  before  us  a  striking  example  in  the  persistent 
desire  which  the  French  cherish  to  punish  the  Germans  for 
defeating  them — a  desire  of  which  the  strength  has  lately 
(August,  1891)  been  shown  by  the  remarkable  fact  that 
while  professedly  enthusiastic  advocates  of  liberty  and  up- 
holders of  free  institutions,  they  have  been  lauding  "the 
noble  Russian  people"  and  the  despotic  Czar  who  holds 
them  in  bondage ;  and  all  because  they  hope  thus  to  be  aided 
in  their  wished-for  fight  with  Germany.  Clearly  the  ap- 
propriate expression  of  their  feeling  is — Not  that  we  love 
freedom  less  but  that  we  love  revenge  more. 

§  136.  But,  while  societies  have  been  in  course  of  growth 
and  consolidation,  there  have  been  occasional  expressions  of 
ideas  and  sentiments  opposite  to  these — occasional  expres- 
sions which,  as  they  are  associated  with  the  arrival  at  more 
settled  social  states,  may  be  fairly  regarded  as  consequent 
upon  a  diminution  of  warlike  activities. 

Various  illustrations  are  furnished  by  the  literature  of 
Hindostan.  In  the  code  of  Manu  we  read : — 

"  Wound  not  another,  though  by  him  provoked, 
Do  no  one  injury  by  thought  or  deed, 
Utter  no  word  to  pain  thy  fellow-creatures." 


366  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

Aud  again,  in  another  place,  there  is  the  exhortation — 

"  Treat  no  one  with  disdain,  with  patience  bear 
Reviling  language ;  with  an  angry  man 
Be  never  angry ;  blessings  give  for  curses." 

Of  like  spirit  is  the  following  from  the  Cural : — 

"  To  do  no  evil  even  to  enemies  will  be  called  the  chief  of  virtues." 

So,  too,  among  some  of  the  Persians.     In  their  literature  of 

the  Tth  century  we  find  the  passage — 

"  Think  not  that  the  valour  of  a  man  consists  only  in  courage  and  force ; 
if  you  can  rise  above  wrath  and  forgive,  you  are  of  a  value  inestimable." 
At  a  later  date,  namely  in  a  story  of  Sadi,  there  occurs  the 
injunction : — 

"  Hast  thou  been  injured!  suffer  it  and  clear 
Thyself  from  guilt  in  pardoning  others'  sin." 

And  still  more  extreme  is  the  doctrine  we  find  in  Hafiz,  as 
translated  by  Sir  "William  Jones : — 

"  Learn  from  yon  orient  shell  to  love  thy  foe, 
And  store  with  pearls  the  hand,  that  brings  thee  woe, 
Free,  like  yon  rock,  from  base  vindictive  pride, 
Imblaze  with  gems  the  wrist,  that  rends  thy  side." 

Nor  are  the  writings  of  the  Chinese  sages  without  kindred 
utterances  of  sentiment.  Lao-Tsze  says,  "  Recompense  injury 
with  kindness."  So  also  according  to  Mencius — 

"  A  benevolent  man  does  not  lay  up  anger,  nor  cherish  resentment  against 
his  brother,  but  only  regards  him  with  affection  and  love." 
While  Confucius,  in  conformity  with  his  doctrine  of  the 
mean,  expresses  a  less  extreme  view. 

" '  What  do  you  say  concerning  the  principle  that  injury  should  be 
recompensed  with  kindness  ? '  The  Master  said, '  With  what  then  will 
you  recompense  kindness  ?  Recompense  injury  with  justice,  and  recom- 
pense kindness  with  kindness.' '' 

In  the  later  stages  of  Hebrew  civilization,  we  similarly 
find  the  social  and  divine  sanctions  for  revenge  occasionally 
qualified — a  mingling  of  opposed  ideas  and  sentiments. 
While,  in  Ecclesiasticus  xxx.  6,  a  father  is  regarded  as 


KEVENGE.  367 

happy  who  leaves  "  an  avenger  against  his  enemies,"  yet  in 
ch.  x.  6  there  is  an  injunction  to  "bear  not  hatred" 
for  wrong  received — an  injunction  containing  in  germ 
the  ethical  principle  which,  centuries  later,  took  shape  in 
Christianity. 

§  137.  Proofs  that  decline  of  vindictiveness  and  growth 
of  forgiveness  are  associated  with  decrease  of  militancy  and 
increase  of  peaceful  co-operation,  cannot  be  clearly  disen- 
tangled from  the  facts;  since  the  two  kinds  of  life  have 
nearly  everywhere,  and  at  all  times,  been  associated  in  one 
or  other  proportion.  But  to  such  general  evidence  as  the 
foregoing  quotations  furnish,  may  be  added  some  evidence 
furnished  by  existing  societies. 

There  is  the  fact  that  throughout  the  chief  nations  of 
Europe,  the  family-vendetta  has  disappeared  during  a  period 
in  which  the  conflicts  of  nations  have  become  less  constant, 
and  the  peaceful  exchange  of  services  within  each  nation 
more  active :  a  contrast  between  ancient  and  modern  which 
asserted  itself  soonest  where  the  industrial  type  was  earliest 
developed,  namely,  among  ourselves. 

Again,  there  is  the  fact  that  in  our  own  society,  with  its 
comparatively  small  number  of  soldiers  and  a  militancy 
less  predominant  than  that  of  continental  societies  with 
their  vast  armies  and  warlike  attitudes,  there  has  been  a 
suppression  of  the  revenge  for  private  insults,  while  this 
with  them  continues;  and  so  far  has  the  vindictive  spirit 
declined  that  an  injured  man  who  shows  persistent  animosi- 
ty towards  one  who  has  injured  him,  is  reprobated  rather 
than  applauded :  forgiveness  is,  at  any  rate  by  many,  tacitly 
approved. 

But  if  we  seek  a  case  in  which  the  virtue  supposed  to  be 
especially  Christian  is  practised,  we  must  seek  it  among 
the  non-Christians.  Certain  peaceful  tribes  of  the  Indian 
hills  are  characterized  by  it,  as  witness  this  account  of  the 

Lepchas :— > 

25 


368  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF  ETHICS. 

"  They  are  wonderfully  honest,  theft  being  scarcely  known  among  them ; 
they  rarely  quarrel  among  themselves.  .  .  .  They  are  singularly  forgiving 
of  injuries,  when  time  is  given  them,  after  hasty  loss  of  temper.  Although 
they  were  ready  enough  to  lodge  complaints  before  the  magistrate  against 
one  another  in  cases  of  assault  and  other  offences,  they  rarely  prosecuted 
to  a  decision,  generally  preferring  to  submit  to  arbitration,  or  making 
mutual  amends  and  concessions.  They  are  averse  to  soldiering,  and  cannot 
be  induced  to  enlist  in  our  army  even  for  local  service  in  the  Hills." 

Thus  we  get  both  positive  and  negative  evidence  that  the 
revengefulness  within  each  society  is  proportionate  to  the 
habitual  conflict  with  other  societies ;  and  that  while,  at  the 
one  extreme,  there  is  a  moral  sanction  for  revenge,  at  the 
other  extreme  there  is  a  moral  sanction  for  forgiveness. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

JUSTICE. 

§  138.  Perhaps  the  soul  of  goodness  in  things  evil  is 
by  nothing  better  exemplified  than  by  the  good  thing, 
justice,  which,  in  a  rudimentary  form,  exists  within  the  evil 
thing  revenge.  Meeting  aggression  by  counter-aggression 
is,  in  the  first  place,  an  endeavour  to  avoid  being  suppressed 
by  the  aggressor,  and  to  maintain  that  ability  to  carry  on 
life  which  justice  implies ;  and  it  is,  in  the  second  place,  an 
endeavour  to  enforce  justice  by  establishing  an  equality 
with  the  aggressor :  inflicting  injuries  as  great  as  have  been 
received. 

This  rude  process  of  balancing  claims  usually  fails  to  es- 
tablish equilibrium.  Revenge,  habitually  carried  not  as  far 
only  as  suffices  to  compensate  for  injuries  received  but,  if 
possible,  farther,  evokes  re-revenge,  which  also,  if  possible, 
is  carried  to  excess;  and  so  there  result  chronic  wars  be- 
tween tribes  and  chronic  antagonisms  between  families  and 
between  individuals.  These  commonly  continue  from  gen- 
eration to  generation. 

;But  occasionally  there  is  shown  a  tendency  towards  estab- 
lishment of  an  equilibrium,  by  bringing  aggression  and 
counter-aggression  to  a  definite  balance,  achieved  by  meas- 
ure. Let  us  look  at  the  evidence. 

§  139.  Men  of  various  rude  types,  as  the  Australians,  con- 
stantly show  the  idea,  tacitly  asserted  and  acted  upon,  that 
the  loss  of  a  life  in  one  tribe  must  be  compensated  by  the 


370  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

infliction  of  a  death  in  another  tribe;  some  member  of 
which  is  known,  or  supposed,  to  have  caused  the  said  loss  of 
life.  And  since  deaths  from  disease  and  old  age  are,  among 
others,  ascribed  to  the  machinations  of  foes — since  equiv- 
alent deaths  must  be  inflicted  for  these  also,  there  have  to  be 
frequent  balancings  of  losses.  [It  seems  clear,  however, 
that  these  revenges  and  re-revenges  cannot  be  always  carried 
out  as  alleged.  For  if  not  only  deaths  by  violence  but 
deaths  by  disease  entail  them  the  two  tribes  must  soon  dis- 
appear by  mutual  extirpation.]  Races  much  more  advanced 
in  some  cases  carry  out,  not  this  secret  balancing  of  mor- 
tality-accounts between  tribes,  but  an  overt  balancing.  This 
is  the  case  with  the  Sumatrans,  among  whom  the  differences 
are  squared  by  money  payments. 

This  maintenance  of  inter-tribal  justice,  prompted  in  part 
by  consciousness  of  that  corporate  injury  which  loss  of  a 
member. of  the  tribe  entails,  and  requiring  the  infliction  of 
an  equivalent  corporate  injury  on  the  offending  tribe,  has 
the  trait  that  it  is  indifferent  what  member  of  the  offending 
tribe  is  killed  in  compensation  :  whether  it  be  the  guilty  man 
or  some  innocent  man  matters  not.  This  conception  of  inter- 
tribal justice  is  repeated  in  the  conception  of  inter-family 
justice.  Those  early  types  of  social  organization  in  which 
the  family  is  the  unit  of  composition,  show  us  that  in  each 
family  there  arises  an  idea  allied  to  the  idea  of  nationality ; 
and  there  results  an  allied  system  of  reprisals  for  the  bal- 
ancing of  injuries.  The  Philippine  Islands  supply  evidence. 
"  In  the  province  of  La  Isabela,  the  Negrito  and  Igorrote 
tribes  keep  a  regular  Dr.  and  Or.  account  of  heads."  A 
further  interesting  illustration  is  yielded  by  the  Quianganes 
of  Luzon.  From  an  account  of  them  given  by  Prof.  F. 
Blumentritt,  here  is  a  translated  passage : — 

"  Blood  vengeance  is  a  sacred  law  with  the  Quianganes.  If  one  plebeian 
is  killed  by  another,  the  matter  is  settled  in  a  simple  manner  by  killing 
the  murderer  or  some  one  of  his  family  who  is  likewise  a  plebeian.  But  if 
a  prominent  man  or  noble  is  killed  by  a  plebeian,  vengeance  on  the  mur- 


JUSTICE.  3T1 

derer,  a  mere  plebeian,  is  not  enough ;  the  victim  of  the  sin-offering  must 
be  an  equivalent  in  rank.  Another  nobleman  must  fall  for  the  murdered 
noble,  for  their  doctrine  is, — What  kind  of  an  equivalent  is  it  to  kill  some 
one  who  is  no  better  than  a  dog?  Hence  the  family  of  the  slain  noble 
looks  around  to  see  if  it  cannot  find  a  relative  of  the  murderer  to  wreak 
vengeance  upon,  who  is  also  a  noble;  while  the  murderer  himself  is 
ignored.  If  no  noble  can  be  found  among  his  relatives,  the  family  of  the 
murdered  man  wait  patiently  till  some  one  of  them  is  received  into  the 
noble's  caste ;  then  the  vendetta  is  prosecuted,  although  many  years  may 
have  elapsed.  When  the  blood-feud  is  satisfied  a  reconciliation  of  the 
contending  factions  takes  place.  In  all  the  feuds  the  heads  of  the  mur- 
dered champions  are  cut  off  and  taken  home,  and  the  head-hunters  cele- 
brate the  affair  festally.  The  skulls  are  fixed  to  the  front  of  the  house." 
Here  the  need  for  inflicting  an  injury  of  like  amount,  and 
so  equalizing  the  losses,  is  evidently  the  dominant  need. 
The  Semitic  peoples  in  general  furnish  kindred  facts. 
"  It  is  a  received  law  among  all  the  Arabs,  that  whoever  sheds  the  blood 
of  a  man,  owes  blood  on  that  account  to  the  family  of  the  slain  person.  .  . 
The  lineal  descendants  of  all  those  who  were  entitled  to  revenge  at  the 
moment  of  the  man-slaughter,  inherit  this  right  from  their  parents." 
Burckhardt  writes : — 

And  respecting  this   system  of  administering  rude  justice 
by  the  balancing   of  deaths  between  families,  Burckhardt 

remarks : — 

"  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  this  salutary  institution  has  contributed, 
in  a  greater  degree  than  any  other  circumstance,  to  prevent  the  warlike 
tribes  of  Arabia  from  exterminating  one  another.  .  .  the  terrible  '  blood- 
revenge  '  renders  the  most  inveterate  war  nearly  bloodless." 
The  evident  implication  being  that  dread  of  this  persistent 
revenge,  makes  members  of  different  families  and  tribes 
fearful  of  killing  one  another.  That  with  the  feelings  and 
practices  of  existing  Semites,  those  of  ancient  Semites 
agreed,  there  is  good  reason  to  believe.  The  authorization 
of  blood-revenge  between  families,  is  implied  in  1  Kings, 
ii,  31,  33,  as  well  as  elsewhere.  How,  among  European 
peoples  in  early  times,  kindred  conceptions  led  to  kindred 
usages,  need  not  be  shown  in  detail.  The  fact  that  when 
the  system  of  taking  life  for  life  was  replaced  by  the  system 
of  compensations,  these  were  adjusted  to  ranks,  so  that  the 
murder  of  a  person  more  valuable  to  the  group  he  belonged 


372  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

to  was  compounded  for  by  a  larger  fine  payable  to  it,  shows 
how  dominant  was  the  idea  of  group-injury,  and  how  domi- 
nant was  the  idea  of  equivalence. 

§  140.  But  these  ideas  of  family-injury  and  family-guilt 
have  all  along  been  accompanied  by  ideas  of  individual- 
injury  and  individual-guilt :  here  very  distinct  and  there  less 
distinct. 

They  are  very  distinct  among  some  peoples  in  early  social 
stages,  as  is  shown  by  the  account  which  Im  Thurn  gives  of 
the  Guiana  tribes. 

"  In  the  absence  of  anything  corresponding  to  police  regulations,  their 
mutual  relations  in  everyday  life  are  very  well-ordered  by  the  traditional 
respect  which  each  individual  feels  for  the  rights  of  the  others,  and  by 
their  dread  of  adverse  public  opinion  should  they  act  contrary  to  such 
traditions.  .  .  .  The  smallest  injury  done  by  one  Indian  to  another,  even 
if  unintentional,  must  be  atoned  by  suffering  a  similar  injury." 

And  that  among  the  Hebrews  there  was  a  balancing  of 
individual-injuries  is  a  fact  more  frequently  referred  to 
than  is  the  fact  that  there  was  a  balancing  of  family- 
injuries;  as  witness  the  familiar  "eye  for  eye,  tooth 
for  tooth,  hand  for  hand,  foot  for  foot"  prescribed  in 
Deuteronomy  xix. 

The  decline  of  family-responsibility  and  growth  of 
individual-responsibility,  seem  to  be  concomitants  of  the 
change  in  social  organization  from  the  type  in  which  the 
family  is  the  unit  of  composition  to  the  type  in  which  the 
individual  is  the  unit  of  composition.  For,  evidently,  as 
fast  as  the  family-organization  dissolves,  there  cease  to  be 
any  groups  which  can  be  held  responsible  to  one  another 
for  injuries  inflicted  by  their  members ;  and  as  fast  as  this 
happens  the  responsibility  must  fall  on  the  members 
themselves.  Thus  it  naturally  happens  that  along  with 
social  evolution,  there  emerges  from  that  unjust  form  of 
retaliation,  in  which  the  groups  more  than  their  component 
men  are  answerable,  that  just  form  in  which  the  men  them- 
selves are  answerable:  the  guilty  person  takes  the  conse- 


JUSTICE.  373 

quences  of  his  acts,  and  does  not  leave  them  to  be  borne  by 
other  persons. 

An  instructive  contrast  in  the  literature  of  the  Hebrews 
supports  this  conclusion.  In  the  earlier  writings,  God  is 
represented  as  punishing  not  only  those  who  have  sinned 
against  him,  but  their  posterity  for  generations.  In  the 
later  writings,  however,  there  occurs  the  prophecy  of  a  time 
when  this  shall  no  longer  be.  Here  is  a  passage  from 
Jeremiah,  xxxi.  29,  30. 

"  In  those  days  they  shall  say  no  more,  The  fathers  have  eaten  a  sour 
grape,  and  the  children's  teeth  are  set  on  edge.  But  every  one  shall  die 
for  his  own  iniquity :  every  man  that  eateth  the  sour  grape,  his  teeth  shall 
be  set  on  edge." 

That  in  European  peoples  growth  of  this  factor  in  the 
conception  of  justice  has  gone  along  with  the  lapsing  of 
group-organization  and  the  rise  of  individual  citizenship,  is 
clear.  And  it  is  interesting  to  observe  how  strange  now 
seem  to  us  the  old  idea  and  sentiment,  when  we  come  in 
contact  with  them,  as  in  China,  where  the  group-organiza- 
tion lingers,  and  it  is  thought  sufficient  if,  in  compensation 
for  one  of  our  people  who  has  been  murdered,  a  victim  is 
delivered  up :  no  matter  whether  the  victim  be  the  guilty 
man  or  not. 

§  141.  But  while,  in  the  more  advanced  social  stages, 
maintenance  of  the  relation  between  conduct  and  conse- 
quence comes  to  be  recognized  as  required  by  justice ;  in 
early  social  stages  the  idea  of  equality  is  that  which  chiefly 
obtains  recognition,  under  the  form  of  an  infliction  of  equiv- 
alent injuries.  It  could  scarcely  be  otherwise.  During 
times  of  unceasing  strife,  with  entailed  wounds  and  deaths, 
this  is  the  only  equality  admitting  of  distinct  maintenance. 
Evidently,  however,  from  this  practice  of  balancing  deaths 
and  mutilations,  there  tends  to  arise  one  component  in  the 
conception  of  equity. 

We  may  see,  too,  that  the  activities  of  militant  life  them- 
selves afford  scope  for  some  further  development  of  the 


374  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

idea ;  and  occasionally  there  grow  up  usages  requiring  some 
maintenance  of  equality,  even  in  the  midst  of  conflict. 
Speaking  of  certain  early  wars  recorded  in  the  Indian  books, 
Wheeler  remarks  that — 

"  The  sentiment  of  honour  which  undoubtedly  prevailed  amongst  the  an- 
cient Kshatriyas  made  them  regard  an  attack  upon  a  sleeping  enemy  as  a 
heinous  crime."  "Aswatthama  even  whilst  bent  upon  being  revenged  on 
the  murderer  of  his  father,  awoke  his  sleeping  enemy  before  slaying  him." 

And  various  histories  yield  occasional  signs  of  the  belief 
that  under  certain  circumstances — especially  in  personal 
combats — foes  should  be  placed  under  something  like  equal 
conditions  before  they  are  attacked ;  though,  very  generally, 
the  aim  has  been  the  reverse — to  attack  them  under  every 
disadvantage. 

That  all  along  the  idea  of  likeness  of  treatment  has 
entered  into  human  relations  at  large,  but  chiefly  among 
members  of  the  same  society,  is  manifest.  But  any  con- 
siderable development  of  it  has  been  inconsistent  with 
militant  life  and  militant  organization.  While  war,  even 
when  retaliatory,  has  necessarily  been  a  discipline  in  in- 
justice, by  inflicting  wounds  and  death  upon  individuals 
who  have  mostly  been  guiltless  of  aggression,  it  has,  at  the 
same  time,  necessitated  within  each  society  a  type  of  or- 
ganization which  has  disregarded  the  requirements  of  jus- 
tice ;  alike  by  the  coercive  arrangements  within  its  fighting 
part,  by  the  tyranny  over  slaves  and  serfs  forming  its 
industrial  part,  and  by  the  subjection  of  women.  Hence 
the  broad  fact  that  throughout  civilization  the  relations  of 
citizens  have  become  relatively  equitable  only  as  fast  as 
militancy  has  become  less  predominant ;  and  that  only  along 
with  this  change  has  the  sentiment  of  justice  become  more 
pronounced. 

As  yielding  converse  evidence  I  must  again  refer  to  the 
habits  and  sentiments  which  accompany  entire  peaceful- 
ness.  Already  in  the  last  chapter  but  one  I  have  named 
some  peoples  whose  unaggressiveness  towards  other  peoples 


JUSTICE.  375 

is  accompanied  by  unaggressiveness  among  themselves ;  and 
of  course  this  trait  is  in  part  ascribable  to  that  regard  for 
others'  claims  which  justice  implies.  Already,  too,  in 
the  last  chapter,  I  have  quoted  various  travellers  in  proof 
of  the  great  honesty  characterizing  tribes  of  this  same 
class ;  and  of  course  their  honesty  may  be  taken  as,  in  a 
considerable  degree,  proof  of  the  prevailing  sentiment  of 
justice.  Here,  to  this  indirect  evidence,  I  may  add  evidence 
of  a  more  direct  kind,  furnished  by  the  treatment  of  women 
and  children  among  them.  In  The  Principles  of  Sociology, 
§§  324,  327,  I  have  drawn  a  contrast  between  the  low 
status  of  women  among  militant  savages,  as  well  as  the 
militant  semi-civilized,  and  the  high  status  of  women 
among  these  uncultured  but  unmilitant  peoples ;  showing 
that  by  the  Todas,  low  as  they  are  in  sundry  respects,  the 
women  are  relieved  from  all  hard  work,  and  "  do  not  even 
step  out  of  doors  to  fetch  water  or  wood  ;  "  that  the  wives 
of  the  Bodo  and  Dhimdls  "  are  free  from  all  out-door  work 
whatever ; "  that  among  the  Hos  a  wife  "  receives  the 
fullest  consideration  due  to  her  sex ; "  and  that  among  the 
"  industrious,  honest,  and  peace-loving  Pueblos,"  no  girl 
is  forced  to  marry  against  her  will,  and  "  the  usual  order 
of  courtship  is  reversed " — facts  all  of  them  showing  a 
recognition  of  that  equality  of  claims  which  is  an  essential 
element  in  the  idea  of  justice.  And  here  I  may  add  an 
instance  not  before  mentioned,  furnished  by  the  Manansas, 
who  occupy  a  hill-country  in  which  they  have  taken  ref- 
uge from  the  invading  Bamangwatos  and  Makololo.  Said 
one  of  them  to  Holub — "We  want  not  the  blood  of  the 
beasts,  much  less  do  we  thirst  for  the  blood  of  men  ; "  and 
hence  they  are  regarded  with  great  contempt  by  the 
more  powerful  tribes.  Holub,  however,  testifying  to  their 
honesty  and  fidelity,  says  that  "nothing  worse  seems  to 
be  alleged  against  them  than  their  habitual  courtesy  and 
good-nature ;  "  and  he  adds — "  They  treat  their  women  in  a 
way  that  offers  a  very  favourable  contrast  to  either  the 


376  THE  INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

Bechuanas  or  the  Matabele : "  that  is,  they  are  relatively 
just  to  them.  Similarly,  in  The  Principles  of  Sociology r, 
§§  330 — 2,  I  have  shown  how  much  the  way  in  which 
children  are  treated  by  warlike  peoples  who  exercise  over 
them  the  powers  of  life  and  death,  and  behave  to  boys 
far  better  than  to  girls,  differs  from  the  way  in  which  they 
are  treated  by  these  unwarlike  peoples,  whose  conduct  to 
them  is  both  kind  and  equal ;  girls  are  dealt  with  as  fairly 
as  boys. 

To  these  indications  that  the  sentiment  of  justice  is 
marked  where  the  habits  are  peaceful,  something  should  be 
added  respecting  the  overt  expression  of  it.  Little  that  is 
definite  can  be  expected  from  the  uncultured,  since  both 
the  sentiment  and  the  idea  are  complex.  "We  may,  how- 
ever, infer  that  in  a  Wood-Yeddah  who  cannot  conceive 
that  a  man  should  take  that  which  is  not  his  own,  there 
exists  a  sufficiently  clear,  if  not  a  formulated,  idea  of 
justice ;  and  we  may  fairly  say  that  this  idea  is  implied  in 
the  peaceful  Tharus  who,  when  they  fly  to  the  hills  for 
refuge,  "  always  leave  any  arrears  of  rent  that  may  be  due 
tied  up  in  a  rag  to  the  lintel  of  their  deserted  house." 
Nor  can  we  doubt  that  both  the  sentiment  and  idea,  from 
which  result  regard  for  other  men's  claims,  must  be 
dominant  in  the  Hos,  of  whom  we  read  that  one  suspected 
of  theft  is  not  unlikely  to  commit  suicide,  as  also  in  the 
Let-htas,  an  aboriginal  hill-tribe  in  Burma,  described  as 
ideally  good,  among  whom  one  accused  by  several  of  an 
evil  act  "  retires  to  some  secluded  spot,  there  digs  his  grave 
and  strangles  himself."  But  it  is  only  when  we  pass  to 
peoples  who  have  risen  to  a  state  of  culture  high  enough  to 
evolve  literatures,  that  we  get  definite  evidence  concerning 
the  conception  of  justice  which  has  arisen,  and  among  these 
we  meet  with  a  very  significant  fact. 

For  throughout  ancient  societies  at  large,  militant  in 
their  activities,  in  their  types  of  structure,  and  in  the 
universally-established  system  of  status  or  compulsory 


JUSTICE.  377 

cooperation,  justice  is  not  differentiated  in  thought  from 
altruism  in  general.  In  the  literatures  of  the  Chinese,  the 
Persians,  the  Ancient  Indians,  the  Egyptians,  the  Hebrews, 
justice  is  in  the  main  confounded  with  generosity  and 
humanity.  The  maxim  commonly  supposed  to  be  especially 
Christian,  but  which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  in  kindred  forms 
enunciated  among  various  peoples  in  pre-Christian  days,  shows 
us  this.  "  Do  unto  others  as  ye  would  that  they  should  do 
unto  you,"  is  an  injunction  which  merges  generosity  and 
justice  in  one.  In  the  first  place,  it  makes  no  distinction  be- 
tween that  which  you  are  called  upon  to  do  to  another  on 
grounds -of  equity,  and  that  which  you  are  called  upon  to  do  to 
him  on  grounds  of  kindness  ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  it  in- 
cludes no  recognition,  overt  or  tacit,  of  those  claims  of  the 
doer  which  we  call  "  rights."  In  the  consciousness  of  justice 
properly  so-called,  there  is  included  an  egoistic  as  well  as  an 
altruistic  element — a  consciousness  of  the  claim  of  self  and  a 
sympathetic  consciousness  of  the  claims  of  others.  Percep- 
tion and  assertion  of  this  claim  of  self,  cannot  develop  in  a 
society  organized  for  warfare,  and  carried  on  by  compulsory 
cooperation.  Universal  paralysis  would  ensue  if  each  man 
were  free,  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  equity,  to  do  as  he 
liked.  Under  a  despotic  rule  there  is  scope  for  any  amount 
of  generosity  but  for  only  a  limited  amount  of  justice.  The 
sentiment  and  the  idea  can  grow  only  as  fast  as  the  external 
antagonisms  of  societies  decrease  and  the  internal  harmonious 
co-operations  of  their  members  increase. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

GENEROSITY. 

§  142.  To  bring  into  intelligible  order  the  kinds  of  con- 
duct ordinarily  grouped  under  the  name  Generosity,  is  diffi- 
cult ;  partly  because  much  which  passes  under  the  name  is 
not  really  prompted  by  generous  feeling,  and  partly  because 
generosity  rightly  so-called  is  complex  in  nature  and  its 
composition  variable. 

Generosity  is  a  double-rooted  sentiment :  one  of  its 
roots  being  very  ancient  and  the  other  very  modern.  Its 
ancient  root  is  the  philoprogenitive  instinct,  which,  as 
manifested  throughout  a  large  part  of  the  animal  kingdom, 
leads  to  the  sacrifice  of  self  for  the  benefit  of  offspring. 
This  form  of  generosity  co-exists  in  many  creatures  with 
absolute  disregard  of  the  welfare  of  all  save  offspring: 
conspicuously  so  in  the  Carnwora  and  less  conspicuously  so 
in  the  Herbivora.  The  relatively  modern  root  of  generosity 
is  sympathy,  which  is  shown  by  some  of  the  higher  gregari- 
ous creatures,  as  the  dog,  in  considerable  degrees.  This 
trait  is  more  variously  and  largely  displayed  by  human 
beings,  and  especially  by  certain  higher  types  of  them. 
The  earlier  factor  in  the  sentiment  is  personal  and  narrow, 
while  the  later  is  impersonal  and  broad. 

In  mankind,  generosity  ordinarily  combines  the  two. 
The  love  of  the  helpless,  which  constitutes  the  essential 
part  of  the  philoprogenitive  instinct,  is,  nearly  always, 
associated  with  fellow-feeling :  the  parent  sympathizes  with 
the  pleasures  and  pains  of  the  child.  Conversely,  the 


GENEROSITY.  379 

feeling  which  prompts  a  generous  act  of  one  adult  to 
another,  commonly  includes  an  element  derived  from  the 
early  instinct.  The  individual  aided  is  conceived  in  a 
distinct  or  vague  way  as  an  object  of  pity;  and  pity  is  a 
sentiment  closely  allied  to  the  parental,  since  it  is  drawn  out 
towards  some  being  relatively  helpless  or  unfortunate  or 
suffering. 

To  this  mixed  nature  of  the  sentiment  as  commonly 
displayed,  is  due  the  confusion  in  its  manifestations  among 
races  in  different  stages ;  and  to  it  must  consequently  be 
ascribed  the  perplexities  which  stand  in  the  way  of  satisfac- 
tory inductions. 

§  143.  As  a  preliminary  it  should  be  further  remarked 
that  the  sentiment  of  generosity,  even  in  its  developed 
form,  is  simpler  than  the  sentiment  of  justice;  and  hence 
is  earlier  manifested.  The  one  results  from  mental  repre- 
sentations of  the  pleasures  or  pains  of  another  or  others — is 
shown  in  acts  instigated  by  the  feelings  which  these  men- 
tal representations  arouse.  But  the  other  implies  repre- 
sentations, not  simply  of  pains  or  pleasures,  but  also,  and 
chiefly,  representations  of  the  conditions  which  are  required 
for,  or  are  conducive  to,  the  avoidance  of  pains  or  pro- 
curing of  pleasures.  Hence  it  includes  a  set  of  mental 
actions  superposed  on  the  mental  actions  constituting 
generosity. 

Recognition  of  this  truth  makes  comprehensible  the  order 
of  their  succession  in  the  course  of  civilization.  And  this 
order  will  be  rendered  still  more  comprehensible  if  we  re- 
member that  generosity,  among  people  of  low  intelligence, 
often  results  from  inability  to  represent  to  themselves  dis- 
tinctly the  consequences  of  the  sacrifices  they  make — they 
are  improvident. 

§  144.  First  to  be  dealt  with  is  that  pseudo-generosity 
mainly  composed  of  other  feelings  than  benevolent  ones. 


380  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

The  wish  for  the  welfare  of  another  is,  indeed,  rarely  with- 
out alloy :  there  are  mostly  present  other  motives — chiefly 
the  desire  for  applause.  But  to  the  lowest  of  the  actions 
apparently  caused  by  generosity,  these  other  motives  form 
the  predominant  or  sole  prompters  instead  of  the  subordi- 
nate prompters. 

The  displays  of  hospitality  among  uncivilized  and  barbar- 
ous peoples  furnishes  striking  examples.  Of  the  Bedouin 
"  at  once  rapacious  and  profuse,"  and  who  is  scrupulously 
hospitable,  Palgrave  says : — 

"  He  has  in  general  but  little  to  offer,  and  for  that  very  little  he  not 
unfrequently  promises  himself  an  ample  retribution,  by  plundering  his  last 
night's  guest  when  a  few  hours  distant  on  his  morning  journey." 

Similarly  of  the  Kirghiz,  we  are  told  by  Atkinson  that  a 
chief  who  does  not  molest  travellers  while  with  him,  sends 
his  followers  to  rob  them  on  their  march.  In  East  Africa, 
too,  a  chief  of  Urori  "will  entertain  his  guests  hospitably 
as  long  as  they  remain  in  his  village,  but  he  will  plunder 
them  the  moment  they  leave  it."  Still  more  startling  are 
the  apparent  incongruities  of  conduct  among  the  Fijians. 

"  The  same  native  who  within  a  few  yards  of  his  house  would  murder 
a  coming  or  departing  guest  for  sake  of  a  knife  or  a  hatchet,  will  defend 
him  at  the  risk  of  his  own  life  as  soon  as  he  has  passed  his  threshold." 

And  then  how  little  relation  there  is  between  generosity 
rightly  so-called  and  hospitality  in  such  cases,  is  further 
shown  by  the  statement  of  Jackson  that  the  Europeans  who 
have  lived  long  among  Fijians  have  become  hospitable :  "  a 
practice  which  they  have  adopted  through  the  example  of 
these  savages." 

Among  the  uncivilized  at  large,  of  whatever  type,  hospi- 
tality of  a  less  treacherous  kind,  prompted  apparently  by 
usage  the  origin  of  which  is  difficult  to  understand,  is  con- 
stantly displayed. 

" '  Custom '  enjoins  the  exercise  of  hospitality  on  every  Aino.  They 
receive  all  strangers  as  they  received  me,  giving  them  of  their  best,  placing 
them  in  the  most  honourable  place,  bestowing  gifts  upon  them,  and,  when 
they  depart,  furnishing  them  with  cakes  of  boiled  millet." 


GENEEO8ITT.  381 

We  read  that  among  the  Australians,  the  laws  of  hospitality 
require  that  strangers  should  be  perfectly  unmolested  dur- 
ing their  sojourn.  Jackson  says  that  according  to  the  rules 
of  Samoan  hospitality,  strangers  are  well  treated,  receiv- 
ing the  best  of  everything.  According  to  Lichtenstein 
"  the  Caffres  are  hospitable ; "  and  that  "  the  hospitality 
of  the  Africans  has  been  noticed  by  almost  every  traveller 
who  has  been  much  among  them  "  is  remarked  by  Winter- 
bottom.  Of  the  tribes  inhabiting  North  America  Morgan 
says : — 

"  One  of  the  most  attractive  features  of  Indian  society  was  the  spirit  of 
hospitality  by  which  it  was  pervaded.  Perhaps  no  people  ever  carried  this 
principle  to  the  same  degree  of  universality,  as  did  the  Iroquois." 

So,  too,  Angas  tells  us  of  the  New  Zealanders  that  they  are 
very  hospitable  to  strangers. 

By  this  last  people  we  are  shown  in  how  large  a  measure 
the  love  of  applause  is  a  factor  in  apparent  generosity. 
The  New  Zealanders,  writes  Thomson,  have  a  great  admira- 
tion of  profuseness,  and  desire  to  be  considered  liberal  at 
their  feasts ;  and  elsewhere  he  says  that  by  them  "  heaping 
up  riches,  unless  to  squander,  was  disgraceful."  To  an 
allied  feeling  may  be  ascribed  the  trait  presented  by  the 
people  of  St.  Augustine  Island,  among  whom  the  dead  were 
judged  and  sent  to  happiness  or  misery  according  to  their 
"  goodness  "  or  "  badness ; "  and  "  goodness  meant  one  whose 
friends  had  given  a  grand  funeral  feast,  and  badness  a  per- 
son whose  stingy  friends  provided  nothing  at  all."  To  this 
peremptory  desire  for  approval  is  in  some  cases  due  an  ex- 
penditure, on  the  occasion  of  a  death  or  a  marriage,  so  great 
that  the  family  is  impoverished  by  it  for  years ;  and  in  one 
case,  if  not  in  more  cases,  female  infanticide  is  committed 
with  the  view  of  avoiding  the  ruinous  expense  which  a 
daughter's  marriage  entails. 

To  the  prompters  of  pseudo-generosity  thus  disclosed,  may 
be  added  another  disclosed  by  the  habits  of  civilized  settlers 
in  remote  regions.  Leading  solitary  lives  as  such  men  do, 


382  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

the  arrival  of  a  stranger  brings  an  immense  relief  from  mo> 
notony,  and  gratifies  the  craving  for  social  intercourse. 
Hence  it  happens  that  travellers  and  sportsmen  are  not  only 
welcomed  but  even  pressed  to  stay. 

Manifestly,  then,  the  sentiment  which  in  many  cases  insti- 
gates hospitality  to  visitors  and  feasts  to  friends,  is  a  pro- 
ethical  sentiment.  There  goes  with  it  little,  or  none,  of  the 
ethical  sentiment  proper. 

§  145.  We  find,  however,  among  some  of  the  most  un- 
civilized peoples,  displays  of  a  generosity  which  is  manifestly 
genuine — sometimes,  indeed,  find  displays  of  it  greater  than 
among  the  civilized. 

Burchell  tells  us  even  of  the  Bushmen  that  towards 
one  another  they  "exercise  the  virtues  of  hospitality  and 
generosity  ;  often  in  an  extraordinary  degree."  So,  too,  he 
says  that  the  Hottentots  are  very  hospitable  among  them- 
selves, and  often  to  people  of  other  tribes;  and  Kolben 
expresses  the  belief  that  "  In  Munificence  and  Hospitality 
the  Hottentots,  perhaps,  go  beyond  all  the  other  Nations 
upon  Earth."  Of  the  East  Africans,  again,  Livingstone 
says : — • 

"  The  real  politeness  with  which  food  is  given  by  nearly  all  the  interior 
tribes,  who  have  not  had  much  intercourse  with  Europeans,  makes  it  a 
pleasure  to  accept." 

Though,  in  the  following  extract  concerning  the  people  of 
Loango,  there  is  proof  that  love  of  approbation  is  a  strong 
prompter  to  generous  actions,  yet  there  seems  evidence  that 
there  is  mingled  with  it  a  true  sentiment  of  generosity. 

"  They  are  always  ready  to  share  the  little  they  have  with  those  whom 
they  know  to  be  in  need.  If  they  have  been  fortunate  in  hunting  and  fishing, 
or  have  procured  something  rare,  they  immediately  run  and  tell  their  friends 
and  neighbours,  taking  to  each  his  share.  They  would  choose  to  stint 
themselves  rather  than  not  give  them  this  proof  of  their  friendship.  .  .  . 
They  call  the  Europeans  close  fists,  because  they  give  nothing  for  nothing." 

Other  races,  some  lower  and  some  higher,  yield  like  facts. 
We  read  that  the  Australian  natives  who  have  been  success- 
ful in  hunting  always,  and  without  any  remark,  supply 


GENEROSITY.  383 

those  of  their  number  who  have  been  unsuccessful  with  a 
share  of  their  meal.  The  account  given  by  Yancouver 
of  the  Sandwich  Islanders,  shows  that,  in  their  generosity 
towards  strangers,  they  were  like  most  uncivilized  peoples 
before  bad  treatment  by  Europeans  had  demoralized  them. 
He  says : — 

"  Our  reception  and  entertainment  here  [at  Hawaii]  by  these  unlettered 
people,  who  in  general  have  been  distinguished  by  the  appellation  of  sav- 
ages, was  such  as,  I  believe,  is  seldom  equalled  by  the  most  civilized  nations 
of  Europe." 

Brett  describes  the  Guiana  tribes  as  "passionately  fond 
of  their  children ;  hospitable  to  every  one ;  and,  among 
themselves,  generous  to  a  fault."  These  instances  I  may 
reinforce  by  one  from  a  remote  region.  Bogle  stayed 
while  in  Thibet  with  the  Lama's  family — that  is,  with  his 
relations,  at  whose  hands  he  received  much  kindness.  When 
he  offered  them  presents  they  refused  to  accept  them  ;  say- 
ing— "  You  .  .  .  are  come  from  a  far  country ;  it  is  our 
business  to  render  your  stay  agreeable ;  why  should  you 
make  us  presents  ? " 

§  146.  Various  of  the  uncivilized  display  generosity  in 
other  ways  than  by  hospitality,  and  in  ways  which  exhibit 
the  sentiment  more  clearly  detached  from  other  sentiments. 
Illustrations  are  furnished  by  that  very  inferior  race,  the 
Australians.  They  were  always  willing  to  show  Mr.  Eyre 
where  water  was  to  be  had,  and,  even  unsolicited,  would  help 
his  men  to  dig  for  it.  Their  kindness  in  this  respect  seems 
the  more  remarkable  on  remembering  how  difficult  it  was  for 
them  to  find  a  proper  supply  for  themselves.  Sturt  tells  us 
that  a  friendly  native  has  been  known  to  interpose,  at  great 
personal  risk,  on  behalf  of  travellers  whom  a  hostile  tribe 
was  about  to  attack.  "With  an  adjacent  race  it  was  the  same. 
During  troubled  times  in  Tasmania,  the  lives  of  white  people 
were  in  several  instances  "  saved  by  the  native  women,  who 
would  often  steal  away  from  the  tribe,  and  give  notice  of  an 
26 


384  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

intended  attack."  Under  another  form,  much  generosity  of 
feeling  is  shown  by  the  Tongans.  Mariner  writes  of  them 
that— 

"  They  never  exult  in  any  feats  of  bravery  they  may  have  performed,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  take  every  opportunity  of  praising  their  adversaries ;  and 
this  a  man  will  do,  although  his  adversary  may  be  plainly  a  coward,  and 
will  make  an  excuse  for  him,  such  as  the  unf avorableness  of  the  opportunity, 
or  great  fatigue,  or  ill  state  of  health,  or  badness  of  his  ground,  &c." 

These,  and  many  kindred  facts,  make  it  clear  that  the 
name  "  savages,"  as  applied  to  the  uncivilized,  misleads  us ; 
and  they  suggest  that  the  name  might  with  greater  propriety 
be  applied  to  many  among  ourselves  and  our  European 
neighbours. 

§  147.  If,  as  we  see,  under  the  form  of  hospitality 
enforced  by  custom,  in  which  it  is  largely  simulated,  or 
under  forms  in  which  it  is  more  manifestly  genuine,  gener- 
osity is  widely  prevalent  among  peoples  who  have  not 
emerged  from  low  stages  of  culture ;  we  need  not  be  sur- 
prised to  find  expressions  of  generous  sentiments,  and  in- 
junctions to  perform  generous  actions,  in  the  early  literatures 
of  races  which  have  risen  to  higher  stages.  The  ancient 
Indian  books  furnish  examples.  Here,  from  the  Rig-  Veda, 
is  an  extract  exhibiting  the  interested  or  non-sympathetic 
prompting  of  generosity : — 

"  The  givers  of  largesses  abide  high  in  the  sky ;  the  givers  of  horses  live 
with  the  sun ;  the  givers  of  gold  enjoy  immortality ;  the  givers  of  raiment 
prolong  their  lives." 

Similarly  Rig-  Veda  X.  107,  eulogizes  liberality  to  priests. 

"  I  regard  as  the  king  of  men  him  who  first  presented  a  gift  ....  The 
wise  man  makes  largesse,  giving  his  breastplate.  Bountiful  men  neither 
die  nor  fall  into  calamity ;  they  suffer  neither  wrong  nor  pain.  Their  liber- 
ality confers  on  them  this  whole  world  as  well  as  heaven." 

In  the  Code  of  Manu,  too,  we  read  that  strangers  are  to  be 
allowed  to  sojourn  and  be  well  entertained.  He  must  eat 
before  the  householder  (iii.  105).  "The  honouring  of  a 
guest  confers  wealth,  reputation,  life,  and  heaven"  (iii. 


GENEBOSITY.  385 

106;  iv.  29)  and  delivers  from  guilt  (iii.  98).  And  kin- 
dred reasons  for  hospitality  are  given  by  Apastamba: — 
The  reception  of  guests  is  rewarded  by  "  immunity  from  misfortunes,  and 
heavenly  bliss,"  (ii.  3,  6,  6.)  "  He  who  entertains  guests  for  one  night 
obtains  earthly  happiness,  a  second  night  gains  the  middle  air,  a  third 
heavenly  bliss,  a  fourth  the  world  of  unsurpassable  bliss ;  many  nights 
procure  endless  worlds  "  (ii.  3,  7,  16.) 

The  literature  of  the  Persians  contains  kindred  thoughts. 
In  the  Shdyast,  the  clothing  of  the  soul  in  the  next  world 
is  said  to  be  formed  "out  of  almsgivings."  Passages  in 
the  Gulistan  enjoin  liberality  while  reprobating  asceticism. 

"  The  liberal  man  who  eats  and  bestows,  is  better  than  the  religious  man 
who  fasts  and  hoards.  Whosoever  hath  forsaken  luxury  to  gain  the  appro- 
bation of  mankind,  hath  fallen  from  lawful  into  unlawful  voluptuousness." 

And  in  the  same  work  we  have  a  more  positive  injunction 
to  be  generous,  but  still  associated  with  self-interest  as  a 
motive. 

"  Do  good,  and  do  not  speak  of  it,  and  assuredly  thy  kindness  will  be 
recompensed  to  thee." 

Passing  to  China  we  find  in  Confucius  various  kindred 
injunctions;  dissociated^  too,  from  promptings  of  lower 
motives.  Here  are  examples — 

"  Now  the  man  of  perfect  virtue,  wishing  to  be  established,  himself,  seeks 
also  to  establish  others ;  wishing  to  be  enlarged  himself,  he  seeks  also  to 
enlarge  others.' " 

"  The  Master  said,  '  Though  a  man  have  abilities  as  admirable  as  those  of 
the  duke  of  Chow,  yet  if  he  be  proud  and  niggardly,  those  other  things  are 
really  not  worth  being  looked  at.' " 

"  When  any  of  his  [Confucius's]  friends  died,  if  he  had  no  relations  who 
could  be  depended  on  for  the  necessary  offices,  he  would  say,  '  I  will  bury 
him.'" 

That  in  the  sacred  books  of  the  Hebrews  are  to  be  found 
kindred  admonitions,  here  joined  with  promises  of  super- 
natural rewards  and  there  without  such  promises,  needs  no 
saying.  It  should  be  added,  however,  that  we  are  not 
enabled  by  these  quoted  passages  to  compare  the  characters 
displayed  by  Indians,  Persians,  Chinese,  or  Hebrews,  with 
the  characters  described  in  the  foregoing  accounts  travellers 


386  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

give  us  of  the  uncivilized ;  for  these  passages  come  from  the 
writings  of  exceptional  men — poets  and  sages.  But  though 
violent  reaction  against  an  all-pervading  selfishness  may 
mostly  be  the  cause  of  exaggerated  expressions  of  generosity, 
we  must  admit  that  the  possibility  of  such  exaggerated 
expressions  goes  for  something. 

§  148.  Concerning  generosity  among  European  peoples,  as 
exhibited  in  history  at  successive  stages  of  their  progress,  no 
very  definite  statements  can  be  made.  We  have  evidence 
that  in  early  days  there  existed  much  the  same  feelings  and 
practices  as  those  now  existing  among  savages — practices 
simulating  generosity.  Tacitus  says  of  the  primitive  Ger- 
mans : — 

"  No  nation  indulges  more  profusely  in  entertainments  and  hospitality. 
To  exclude  any  human  being  from  their  roof  is  thought  impious." 

And  these  usages  and  ideas  went,  as  we  know,  along  with 
utter  lack  of  sympathy :  they  implied  the  generosity  of  dis- 
play sanctified  by  tradition. 

Throughout  the  Middle  Ages  and  down  to  comparatively 
recent  times,  we  see,  along  with  a  decreasing  generosity 
of  display,  little  more  than  the  generosity  prompted  by  hope 
of  buying  divine  favour.  The  motive  has  been  all  along 
expressed  in  the  saying, — "  He  that  hath  pity  upon  the  poor 
lendeth  to  the  Lord  "  (Prov.  xix.  IT) ;  and  the  Lord  is  expected 
to  pay  good  interest.  Christianity,  even  in  its  initial  form, 
represents  the  giving  of  alms  as  a  means  of  salvation ;  and 
throughout  many  centuries  of  Christian  history  the  giving  of 
alms  had  little  other  motive.  Just  as  they  built  chapels  to 
compound  for  crimes  and  manumitted  slaves  to  make  peace 
with  God  ;  so,  beyond  a  desire  for  the  applause  which 
followed  largesse,  the  only  motive  of  the  rich  for  performing 
kind  actions  was  an  other-worldly  motive — a  dread  of  hell 
and  wish  for  heaven.  As  Mr.  Lecky  remarks — "  Men  gave 
money  to  the  poor,  simply  and  exclusively  for  their  own 
spiritual  benefit,  and  the  welfare  of  the  sufferer  was  altogether 


GENEROSITY.  387 

foreign  to  their  thoughts."  How  utterly  alien  to  generosity, 
rightly  so-called,  was  the  feeling  at  work,  is  shown  by  the 
unblushing,  and  indeed  self-satisfied,  avowal  made  by  Sir 
Thomas  Browne  in  the  passage  which  Mr.  Lecky  quotes 
from  him, — "  I  give  no  alms  to  satisfy  the  hunger  of  my 
brother,  but  to  fulfil  and  accomplish  the  will  and  command 
of  my  God." 

In  modern  days,  however,  we  may  recognize  a  growing 
proportion  of  true  generosity — the  ethical  sentiment  as 
distinguished  from  the  pro-ethical  sentiment.  Though 
there  is  still  in  predominant  amount  that  transcendental 
self-seeking  which  does  good  here  merely  to  get  happiness 
hereafter — though  there  are  even  multitudes  who,  in  the 
spirit  of  Sir  Thomas  Browne,  feel  no  shame  in  the  avowal 
that  their  kindnesses  to  others  are  prompted  by  the  wish 
to  please  God  more  than  by  the  wish  to  further  human  wel- 
fare; yet  there  are  many  who,  in  conferring  benefits,  are 
prompted  mainly,  and  others  who  are  prompted  wholly,  by 
fellow-feeling  with  those  whom  they  aid.  And  beyond  the 
manifestations  of  this  sentiment  of  true  generosity  in  private 
actions,  there  are  occasionally  manifestations  of  it  in  public 
actions;  as  when  the  nation  made  a  sacrifice  of  twenty 
millions  of  money  that  the  West  Indian  slaves  might  be 
emancipated. 

That  this  development  of  true  generosity  has  been  conse- 
quent on  increase  of  sympathy,  and  that  sympathy  has  gained 
scope  for  exercise  and  growth  with  the  advance  to  an  orderly 
and  amicable  social  life,  scarcely  needs  saying. 

§  149.  For  reasons  given  at  the  outset,  it  is  difficult  to 
bring  the  various  manifestations  of  pseudo-generosity  and 
generosity  proper,  into  generalizations  of  a  definite  kind. 
And  the  impediment  due  to  the  complexity  and  variable 
composition  of  the  emotion  prompting  generous  acts,  is 
made  greater  by  the  inconsistency  of  the  traits  which 
men,  and  especially  the  lower  types  of  men,  present.  Un- 


388  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

balanced  as  their  natures  are,  they  act  in  quite  opposite  ways 
according  to  the  impulse  which  is  for  the  moment  in  pos- 
session of  consciousness.  Angas  tells  us  that  "infanticide 
is  frequent  among  the  New  Zealanders."  Yet  "  both  parents 
are  almost  idolatrously  fond  of  their  children ; "  and  while 
Cook  described  them  as  "  implacable  towards  their  enemies," 
Thomson  observed  that  they  were  kind  to  their  slaves. 
Other  instances  are  furnished  by  the  Negro  races.  Reade 
says  that  in  parts  of  Equatorial  Africa  where  there  is  the 
greatest  treachery,  there  are  also  strong  marks  of  affec- 
tionate friendship.  Concerning  the  East  Africans  Burton 
writes : — 

"  When  childhood  is  passed,  the  father  and  son  become  natural  enemies, 
after  the  manner  of  wild  beasts.  Yet  they  are  a  sociable  race,  and  the 
sudden  loss  of  relatives  sometimes  leads  from  grief  to  hypochondria  and 
insanity." 

Lacking  those  higher  emotions  which  serve  to  coordinate 
the  lower,  these  last  severally  determine  the  actions  now  this 
way  and  now  that,  according  to  the  incidents  of  the  moment. 
Hence  only  by  comparison  of  extremes  are  we  likely  to  dis- 
cover any  significant  relations  of  facts. 

In  the  accounts  of  those  most  ferocious  savages,  the 
cannibal  Fijians,  who  worship  cannibal  gods, — savages 
whose  titles  of  honour  are  "  the  waster  of "  such  a  coast, 
"  the  depopulator  of "  such  an  island,  and  who  committed 
atrocities  which  "Williams  said  "  I  dare  not  record  here," 
no  mention  is  made  of  any  generosity  save  that  which 
results  from  display.  Among  the  predatory  red  men  of 
North  America,  the  Dakotas  may  be  singled  out  as  those 
who,  in  the  greatest  degree,  show  the  aggressiveness  and 
revengefulness  fostered  by  a  life  of  chronic  war — men  by 
whom  prisoners,  especially  aged  ones,  are  handed  over  to 
the  squaws  to  torture  for  their  amusement.  Here  gen- 
erosity is  referred  to  only  to  note  its  absence :  the  Dakota 
is  ungenerous,  says  Burton — never  gives  except  to  get 
more  in  return.  Similarly  of  the  Nagas,  ever  fighting, 


GENEROSITY.  389 

village  with  village  as  well  as  with  neighbouring  races, 
carrying  blood-feuds  to  extremes,  dreaded  as  robbers  and 
murderers,  and  always  mutilating  their  dead  enemies,  we 
read  that  "  they  are  totally  devoid  of  a  spark  of  generosity, 
and  will  not  give  the  most  trifling  articles  without  receiving 
remuneration." 

Of  the  converse  connexion  of  traits  the  evidence  is  usually 
not  clear,  for  the  reason  that  the  generosity  ascribed  to 
tribes  which  do  not  carry  on  perpetual  hostilities  is  mostly 
of  the  kind  shown  in  hospitality,  which  is  always  open  to  the 
interpretation  of  being  due  in  part,  if  not  wholly,  to  usage 
or  love  of  display.  Thus  Colquhoun,  who  talks  of  the  "  hos- 
pitable aborigines  "  and  says  "  it  is  quite  refreshing  to  turn 
from  the  Christian  Anamites  to  the  less  repulsive,  if  heathen, 
hill-tribes  "  (the  Steins  who  inhabit  "  fever-stricken  haunts," 
where  they  can  lead  peaceful  lives)  says  that  "  amongst  them 
a  stranger  is  certain  of  a  welcome ;  the  fatted  pig  or  fowl  is 
at  once  killed,  the  loving  cup  produced."  Similarly  in  his 
earlier  work,  Across  Chryse,  Mr.  Colquhoun,  speaking  of 
indigenous  peoples  here  and  there  islanded  among  the  con- 
quering Tartars,  speaks  of  them  as  "  very  pleasant  in  their 
ways,  kind  and  hospitable ; "  and  afterwards  he  quotes  the 
impressions  of  a  resident  French  missionary,  who  spoke  of 
the  peaceful  native  inhabitants  as  "  simple,  hospitable,  hon- 
est," having  "  le  bon  coeur,"  while  of  the  governing  Chinese, 
and  especially  the  military  mandarins,  his  verdict  was — 
"  etre  mandarin,  c'est  etre  voleur,  brigand  !  "  Of  like  mean- 
ing is  the  contrast  drawn  by  the  Abbe  Favre  in  his  Account 
of  the  Wild  Tribes  of  the  Malm/an  Peninsula.  On  the  one 
hand  he  describes  the  conquering  race,  the  Malays,  as  being 
full  of  predatory  vices,  lying,  cheating,  plundering — "no 
man  can  entrust  them  with  anything;"  and,  so  far  from 
being  hospitable,  using  every  means  to  fleece  the  traveller. 
On  the  other  hand  of  the  aboriginal  peoples,  who  "  fled  to 
the  fastnesses  of  the  interior,  where  they  have  since  con- 
tinued in  a  savage  state,"  he  tells  us  that  their  disputes  are 


390  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

settled  "  without  fighting  or  malice,"  that  they  are  "  entirely 
inoffensive,"  and  "  generally  kind,  affable,  inclined  to  grati- 
tude and  to  beneficence,"  "liberal  and  generous."  Briefly 
contrasting  the  two  he  says — "  The  actions  of  Malays  gen- 
erally show  low  sentiments  and  a  sordid  feeling;  but  the 
Jakuns  are  naturally  proud  and  generous;"  and  then  he 
asks — "  Whence  then  comes  so  remarkable  a  difference  ? " 
As  a  cause  he  comments  on  the  "  plundering  and  bloody 
actions"  of  the  piratical  Malays;  while  the  Jakuns  have 
been  led  into  quiet  lives  in  their  fastnesses.  Let  me  add, 
lastly,  the  case  of  the  peaceful  and  "  simple  Arafuras,"  of 
whom  the  French  resident,  M.  Bik,  says : — "  They  have  a 
very  excusable  ambition  to  gain  the  name  of  rich  men,  by 
paying  the  debts  of  their  poorer  fellow-villagers  .  .  .  Thus 
the  only  use  they  make  of  their  riches  is  to  employ  it  in 
settling  differences." 


CHAPTEK  VIII. 

HUMANITY. 

§  150.  The  division  between  the  subject-matter  of  this 
chapter  and  that  of  the  last  chapter,  is  in  large  measure 
artificial,  and  defensible  only  for  convenience  sake.  Kind- 
ness, pity,  mercy,  which  we  here  group  under  the  general 
head  of  humanity,  are  closely  allied  to  generosity ;  though 
less  liable  than  it  to  be  simulated  by  lower  feelings.  They 
are  all  altruistic  sentiments,  and  have  for  their  common  root, 
sympathy.  Hence  we  may  expect  to  find,  as  we  shall  find, 
that  in  respect  of  their  relations  to  other  traits  of  nature, 
and  to  type  of  social  life,  much  the  same  may  be  said  of 
them  as  may  be  said  of  generosity. 

It  may  also  be  said  of  them,  as  of  generosity,  that  while  in 
their  developed  forms  they  are  mainly  prompted  by  mental 
representations  of  the  pains  or  pleasures  of  other  beings, 
they  usually  contain  to  the  last,  as  they  contain  in  chief 
measure  at  first,  the  parental  feeling — the  feeling  which  is 
excited  by  the  consciousness  of  relative  incapacity  or  help- 
lessness— the  pleasure  felt  in  taking  care  of  something  which 
tacitly  appeals  for  aid.  And  the  mixed  nature  of  these 
sentiments  hence  resulting,  adds,  as  in  the  case  of  gener- 
osity, to  the  difficulty  of  generalizing. 

A  further  difficulty,  which  is  indeed  a  sequence  of  the 
last,  results  from  the  incongruous  emotions  which  many 
types  of  men,  and  especially  inferior  types,  display.  Thus, 


392  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

while  Moffat  says  "the  Bushmen  will  kill  their  children 
without  remorse,"  and  while  Lichtenstein  tells  us  that  no 
other  savages  betray  "  so  high  a  degree  of  brutal  ferocity ; " 
Moffat,  speaking  of  their  attentions  to  him  when  he  was 
ill,  says: — "I  was  deeply  affected  by  the  sympathy  of 
these  poor  Bushmen,  to  whom  we  were  utter  strangers." 
Agreeing  with  Burchell,  Kolben  describes  the  Hottentots 
as  friendly,  liberal,  benevolent;  and  yet,  from  Kolben,  as 
from  Sparrman,  we  learn  that  they  frequently  bury  infants 
alive,  and  leave  their  aged  to  die  in  solitary  places.  It  is 
so,  too,  with  the  Australians.  While  they  abandon  their 
aged  to  perish,  and  often  destroy  their  infants,  they  are 
represented  as  fond  and  indulgent  parents,  and  as  often 
showing  kind  feelings  to  travellers.  More  strange  still  is 
the  contrast  exhibited  in  Borneo,  where,  according  to  Boyle, 
a  Dyak  has  often  been  seen  rushing  "through  a  captured 
village,  clasping  in  his  arms  a  young  child  as  tenderly  as 
possible,  without  relaxing  his  grasp  of  its  father's  gory 
head." 

In  face  of  such  facts  it  seems  unlikely  that  our  inductions 
concerning  the  relations  of  humane  feeling  to  type  of  man, 
and  to  social  type,  can  be  more  than  rudely  approximate. 

§  151.  "We  may  fitly  begin  with  illustrations  of  entire  lack 
of  sympathy,  now  taking  the  negative  shape  of  simple  in- 
difference to  others'  suffering,  and  now  taking  the  positive 
shape  of  delight  in  their  suffering.  Of  the  Karens  Mason 
says : — 

"  I  have  stood  over  an  old  woman  dying  alone  in  a  miserable  shed,  and 
tried  in  vain  to  induce  her  children  and  grandchildren,  close  by,  to  come 
to  help  her." 

The  lack  of  feeling  shown  by  the  Honduras  people  in 
Herrera's  day,  he  illustrates  by  the  refusal  of  a  wife  to 
kill  a  hen  for  her  sick  husband,  because,  as  she  said,  "  her 
husband  would  die,  and  then  she  should  lose  him  and  the 
hen  too."  Various  Negro  races  furnish  kindred  examples. 
"While,  concerning  the  natives  of  Loando,  Monteiro  says 


HUMANITY.  393 

that  "the  negro  is  not  cruelly  inclined"  [not  actively 
cruel]  yet  "he  has  not  the  slightest  idea  of  mercy,  pity, 
or  compassion  "  : — 

"  A  fellow-creature,  or  animal,  writhing  in  pain  or  torture,  is  to  him  a 
sight  highly  provocative  of  merriment  and  enjoyment." 
Duncan  and  Burton  agree  in  saying  that  the  Dahomans, 
who  "are  void  either  of  sympathy  or  gratitude,  even  in 
their  own  families,"  are  "in  point  of  parental  affection, 
inferior  to  brutes."  And  then  the  Ashantees  show  us  this 
indifference  formulated  as  a  principle  of  conduct.  Two  of 
their  proverbs,  as  rendered  by  Burton,  run  thus : — "  If  an- 
other suffers  pain,  (to  you)  a  piece  of  wood  suffers."  "  The 
distress  of  others  is  no  concern  of  yours;  do  not  trouble 
yourself  about  it." 

Passing  from  negative  to  positive  cruelty,  we  find  in  the 
Damaras  illustrations  of  both.  Baines  says  of  them : — 
"  Everybody  knows  that  in  other  tribes  the  aged  and  helpless  are  left  to 
perish,  but  that  a  mother  should  refuse  to  pull  a  few  bundles  of  grass  to 
close  up  a  sleeping  hut  for  her  sick  daughter.  ...  is  almost  beyond  belief." 
And,  according  to  Galton,  a  sick  man  "  is  pushed  out  of  his 
hut  by  his  relations  away  from  the  fire  into  the  cold ;  they 
do  all  they  can  to  expedite  his  death."  So  with  the  negative 
inhumanity  of  the  Dahomans  above  named  may  be  joined 
their  positive  inhumanity ;  shown,  for  instance,  in  the 
"  annual  customs "  at  which  numbers  of  victims  are  slaugh- 
tered to  supply  a  dead  king  "  with  fresh  attendants  in  the 
shadowy  world,"  and  again  shown  by  decorating  their 
buildings  with  great  numbers  of  human  skulls,  which  they 
make  war  to  obtain.  Of  kindred  testimonies  .Holub  yields 
one  concerning  the  Marutse,  asserting  that  "  a  brutal  cruelty 
is  one  of  the  predominant  failings  of  these  people ; "  and 
another  is  yielded  by  Lord  "Wolseley,  who  says  that  "  the 
love  of  bloodshed  and  of  watching  human  bodily  suffering 
in  any  shape  is  a  real  natural  pleasure  to  the  negroes  of 
West  Africa." 

To   these   cases   of  positive  inhumanity,  may  be  added 
those  displayed  by  the  predatory  tribes  of  North  America 


394  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

who,  while  they  discipline  their  young  men  by  subjecting 
them  to  tortures,  also  torture  their  enemies.  "Wolves 
of  women  borne,"  as  the  Prairie  Indians  are  called,  hand 
over  "  an  old  man  or  woman  "  for  torture,  "  to  the  squaws 
and  papooses,  pour  les  amuser."  Burton  who  tells  us  this, 
says  of  the  Yutahs  that  they  are  "  as  cruel  as  their 
limited  intellects  allow  them  to  be."  From  another 
authority  we  learn  that  the  squaws  among  the  Comanches 
are  crueller  than  the  men,  and  delight  in  torturing  the  male 
prisoners. 

§  152.  How  often  misused  words  generate  misleading 
thoughts !  Savage,  originally  meaning  rude,  wild,  uncul- 
tured, was  consequently  applied  to  aboriginal  peoples. 
Behaving  treacherously  and  cruelly  to  voyagers,  as  some 
of  them  did  in  retaliation,  this  trait  was  regarded  as  a 
universal  trait ;  and  "  savage "  came  to  mean  ferocious. 
Hence  the  baseless  belief  that  savageness  in  this  sense, 
characterizes  the  uncivilized  in  contrast  with  the  civilized. 
But  the  inhumanity  which  has  been  shown  by  the  races 
classed  as  civilized,  is  certainly  not  less,  and  has  often 
been  greater,  than  that  shown  by  the  races  classed  as 
uncivilized. 

Passing  over  the  multitudinous  cruelties  which  stain  the 
annals  of  ancient  Eastern  nations,  of  whom  the  Assyrians 
may  be  named  as  a  sample ;  merely  naming  the  doings  of 
the  admired  Homeric  Greeks — liars,  thieves  and  murderers, 
as  Grote  shows — whose  heroes  revelled  in  atrocities ;  and 
not  dwelling  on  the  brutalities  of  the  Spartans  or  the 
callousness,  if  nothing  more,  of  other  later  Greeks ;  we 
may  turn  to  the  Romans,  whose  ruthless  civilization, 
lauded  by  admirers  of  conquests,  entailed  on  Europe 
centuries  of  misery.  Twenty  generations  of  predatory  wars, 
developed  a  nature  of  which  the  savagery  has  rarely  been 
equalled  by  that  of  the  worst  barbarian  races  known  to  us. 
Though  the  torture  of  captives  has  been  practised  by  the 


HUMANITY.  395 

North  American  Indians,  they  have  not  been  in  the  habit 
of  torturing  their  slaves.  Though  there  were  subject  tribes 
among  the  Fijians  who  were  liable  to  be  used  for  cannibal 
feasts,  yet  the  Fijians  did  not  go  to  the  length  of  killing 
hundreds  of  his  fellow-slaves  along  with  one  who  had  mur- 
dered his  master.  And  if  very  often  the  uncivilized  reduce 
to  bondage  such  of  the  conquered  as  are  not  slain,  they  do 
not  form  them  into  herds,  make  them  work  like  beasts,  and 
deny  them  all  human  privileges ;  nor  do  they  use  any  of 
them  to  gratify  their  appetites  for  bloodshed  by  combats  in 
arenas — appetites  so  rampant  in  Rome  that  the  need  for 
satisfying  them  was  bracketed  with  the  need  for  satisfying 
bodily  hunger.  Using  the  word  "savage"  in  its  modern 
acceptation,  we  may  fairly  say  that,  leaving  the  Fijians  out 
of  the  comparison,  the  white  savages  of  Rome  outdid  all 
which  the  dark  savages  elsewhere  have  done. 

"Were  it  not  that  men  are  blinded  by  the  theological  bias 
and  the  bias  of  patriotism,  it  would  be  clear  to  them  that 
throughout  Christian  Europe  also,  during  the  greater  part 
of  its  history,  the  inhumanity  fostered  by  the  wars  between 
societies,  as  well  as  by  the  feuds  within  each  society,  has 
been  carried  to  extremes  beyond  those  reached  by  inferior 
peoples  whom  we  think  of  as  ferocious.  Though  the 
atrocities  committed  by  such  semi-civilized  races  as  the 
Mexicans  and  Central  Americans,  such  as  skinning  victims 
alive  and  tearing  out  their  palpitating  hearts,  may  not  have 
been  paralleled  in  Europe  ;  yet  Europeans,  loudly  professing 
a  religion  of  love,  have  far  exceeded  them  in  the  ingenuity 
of  their  multitudinous  appliances  for  the  infliction  of  pro- 
longed agonies  on  heretics,  on  witches,  and  on  political 
offenders.  And  even  now,  though  at  home  the  discipline,  of 
a  peaceful  social  life  has  nearly  extinguished  such  inhumani- 
ties, yet  by  our  people  abroad  there  are  still  perpetrated  in- 
human deeds,  if  not  of  these  kinds,  yet  of  other  kinds.  The 
doings  of  Australian  settlers  to  the  natives,  of  "beach- 
combers "  and  kidnappers  in  the  Pacific,  do  but  exemplify 


396  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

in  vivid  ways  the  barbarous  conduct  of  European  invaders  to 
native  races — races  which,  when  they  retaliate,  are  con- 
demned as  "  savage." 

§  153.  While  men  of  some  varieties  appear  to  be  devoid 
of  sympathy,  and  the  moral  traits  which  it  originates,  there 
are  men  of  other  varieties  who,  inferior  to  ourselves  as  they 
may  be  in  respect  of  culture,  are  our  equals,  and  some  of 
them  our  superiors,  in  respect  of  humanity.  Here,  in  the 
briefest  way,  I  string  together  the  testimonies  of  travellers, 
whose  names  will  be  found  in  the  references. 

The  Veddahs  are  "  in  general  gentle  and  affectionate : " 
"  widows  are  always  supported  by  the  community."  Tannese 
— "The  sick  are  kindly  attended  to  the  last."  In  New 
Guinea  some  tribes  of  Papuans  have  shown  great  humanity 
to  Europeans  placed  at  their  mercy.  Dyaks — "  Humane  to 
a  degree  which  well  might  shame  ourselves."  Malagasy — 
"  Treat  one  another  with  more  humanity  than  we  do." 
Esquimaux — "As  between  themselves,  there  can  be  no 
people  exceeding  them  in  this  virtue — kindness  of  heart." 
Iroquois — "Kindness  to  the  orphan,  hospitality  to  all,  and  a 
common  brotherhood  "  were  enjoined.  Chippewas — before 
the  white  man  came,  there  was  more  "charity  practised 
towards  one  another ;  and  the  widow  and  orphan  were  never 
allowed  to  live  in  poverty  and  want."  Araucanians — No 
indigent  person  is  to  be  found  .  .  .  the  "most  incapable 
of  subsisting  themselves  are  -  decently  clothed  : "  "  generous 
and  humane  towards  the  vanquished."  Mandingos — "  It  is 
impossible  for  me  to  forget  the  disinterested  charity,  and 
tender  solicitude,  with  which  many  of  these  poor  heathens 
.  .  .  sympathized  with  me  in  my  sufferings."  And  Kolff, 
speaking  of  the  "  continued  kindness "  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Luan,  says — "  I  never  met  with  more  harmony,  content- 
ment and  toleration,  more  readiness  to  afford  mutual  assist- 
ance, more  domestic  peace  and  happiness,  nor  more  humanity 
and  hospitality." 


HUMANITY.  397 

Though,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Bushmen,  characterized  by 
Moffat  in  the  first  section  of  this  chapter,  humane  actions  on 
some  occasions  are  associated  with  brutal  actions  on  other  oc- 
casions, yet  in  some  of  the  peoples  here  instanced — the  Ved- 
dahs,  the  Esquimaux,  and  the  inhabitants  of  Luan — there  is 
no  such  alloy. 

§  154.  In  the  literatures  of  ancient  Eastern  peoples,  there 
are  numerous  expressions  of  humane  sentiments  and  exhor- 
tations to  humane  actions — utterances  of  poets  and  sages, 
which,  though  they  probably  indicate  in  but  small  measure 
the  prevailing  sentiments,  may  be  taken  as  in  some  measure 
significant  of  advance  consequent  on  settled  social  life. 
Among  the  early  Indian  books,  the  Mahabha/rata  contains 
the  following : — 

"  To  injure  none  by  thought  or  word  or  deed, 
To  give  to  others,  and  be  kind  to  all — 
This  is  the  constant  duty  of  the  good." 

And  in  the  same  book,  the  princess  Savitri,  urging  Yama, 
the  god  of  death,  to  give  back  the  soul  of  her  husband 
which  he  was  carrying  away,  tells  the  god  how  noble  is  the 
quality  of  mercy.  She  argues  that  to  give  is  more  divine 
than  to  take ;  to  preserve  is  mightier  than  to  destroy.  The 
sacred  book  of  the  Persians,  the  Zend-Avesta,  appears  to 
have  its  humane  precepts  in  some  measure  prompted  by  the 
doctrine  of  metempsychosis — kind  treatment  of  animals 
being  insisted  upon  partly  for  that  reason ;  but  Sadi,  in  the 
Gulistan,  has  definite  injunctions  of  a  relevant  kind : — 
"  Show  mercy  to  the  weak  peasant  ...  it  is  criminal  to  crush  the  poor 
and  defenceless  subjects  with  the  arm  of  power  .  .  .  Thou  who  art  indif- 
ferent to  the  sufferings  of  others  deservest  not  to  be  called  a  man." 
Charitable  conduct  was  insisted  upon  among  the  Egyptians 
too.  According  to  Birch  and  Duucker,  it  was  enjoined  "  to 
give  bread  to  the  hungry,  water  to  the  thirsty,  >  clothes  to 
the  naked,  and  shelter  to  the  wanderer  ; "  and  the  memoirs 
in  the  tombs  "  portray  just  and  charitable  lives,  protection 
of  the  widow  and  the  needy,  care  for  the  people  in  times  of 


398  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

famine."  Similarly,  the  books  of  the  Chinese  sages  agree 
in  emphasizing  the  virtues  which  flow  from  fellow-feeling. 
According  to  Legge,  Lao-tsze  "  seems  to  condemn  the  inflic- 
tion of  capital  punishment ;  and  he  deplores  the  practice  of 
war."  In  a  like  spirit  Confucius  says  that  "  benevolence  is 
the  characteristic  element  of  humanity."  And  Mencius  too, 
while  alleging  that  the  "  feeling  of  commiseration  is  essential 
to  man,"  remarks  that  "so  is  the  superior  man  affected 
towards  animals,  that,  having  seen  them  alive,  he  cannot 
bear  to  see  them  die."  To  all  which  has  of  course  to  be 
added  the  evidence  furnished  by  the  sacred  books  of  the 
Hebrews,  in  the  later  of  which  there  are  injunctions  to  show 
kindness  and  mercy,  not  to  men  only  but  to  animals — injunc- 
tions which  the  European  peoples  who  avowedly  accepted 
them,  along  with  the  still  more  humane  doctrine  of  Jesus, 
did  so  little  throughout  many  centuries  to  practise,  even  in 
small  measure. 

§  155.  Amid  perturbing  causes  and  conflicting  testi- 
monies, no  general  conclusions  seem  trustworthy  save  those 
reached  by  putting  side  by  side  the  extreme  cases.  Compari- 
sons so  made  justify  anticipation. 

Of  the  Karens,  instanced  above  as  absolutely  heartless, 
it  is  said  that  "  every  tribe  is  antagonistic  to  each  other," 
and  there  is  almost  continual  war.  So  too  is  it  with  another 
Indian  race,  the  Afridis.  The  intensity  of  the  fighting 
propensity  among  them  is  such  that  "  an  Af  rldi  generally 
has  a  blood-feud  with  nine  out  of  ten  of  his  own  relations ;  " 
and  their  lack  of  all  humane  sentiment  is  implied  by  the 
statement  that  "ruthless,  cowardly  robbery,  cold-blooded, 
treacherous  murder,  are  to  an  Af ridi  the  salt  of  life."  Then 
we  have  the  case  of  the  Dahomans,  above  shown  to  be 
utterly  void  of  sympathy,  even  with  their  own  offspring, 
and  whose  absolutely  militant  social  state  is  so  exceptionally 
indicated  by  their  army  of  Amazons.  The  wildest  tribes  of 
the  North  American  Indians,  too,  the  Dakotas  and  the 


HUMANITY.  399 

Comanches,  whose  inhumanity  is  shown  by  torturing  their 
prisoners,  are  tribes  of  warriors  carrying  on  chronic  feuds 
and  perpetual  wars. 

Of  the  converse  relation,  the  most  marked  cases  above 
instanced  are  those  exhibited  by  certain  absolutely  peaceful 
peoples — the  Esquimaux,  the  inhabitants  of  Luan,  the  Ved- 
dahs.  Among  such,  free  as  they  are  from  those  passions 
which  inter-tribal  enmities  exercise  and  increase,  we  find  an 
unusual  display  of  that  fellow-feeling  which  results  in  kindly 
behaviour  and  benevolent  actions. 

And  here,  along  with  this  contrast,  may  be  joined  a  con- 
trast of  kindred  nature,  between  the  absence  and  presence 
of  a  trait  allied  to  humane  feeling — I  mean  gratitude ;  for 
of  gratitude,  as  of  humanity,  the  ultimate  root  is  sympathy. 
Of  the  fighting  and  destructive  Fijians  "Williams  says — "  In- 
gratitude deeply  and  disgracefully  stains  the  character  of  the 
Fijian  heathen." 

"  If  one  of  them,  when  sick,  obtained  medicine  from  me,  he  thought  me 
bound  to  give  him  food ;  the  reception  of  food  he  considered  as  giving 
him  a  claim  on  me  for  covering ;  and,  that  being  secured,  he  deemed  him- 
self at  liberty  to  beg  anything  he  wanted,  and  abuse  me  if  I  refused  his 
unreasonable  request." 

On  the  other  hand,  what  do  we  read  about  the  Yeddahs, 
living  always  in  peace?  Mr.  Atherton  describes  them  as 
"  very  grateful  for  attention  or  assistance ; "  and,  as  quoted 
by  Pridham,  Mr.  Bennett  says  that  after  having  given  some 
Yeddahs  presents  and  done  them  a  service — 
"  a  couple  of  elephant's  tusks,  nearly  six  feet  in  length,  found  their  way 
into  his  front  verandah  at  night,  but  the  Veddahs  who  had  brought  them 
never  gave  him  an  opportunity  to  reward  them.  '  What  a  lesson  in  grati- 
tude and  delicacy,'  he  observes, '  even  a  Veddah  may  teach ! ' " 
Truly,  indeed,  they  may  teach  this,  by  making  in  so  un- 
obtrusive a  way,  and  with  great  labour,  a  return  greater  in 
value  than  the  obligation ;  and  they  may  teach  more — may 
teach  that  where  there  have  not  been  preached  the  Christian 
virtues,  these  may  be  shown  in  a  higher  degree  than 
where  they  are  ostentatiously  professed  and  perpetually 

enioined. 
J 


CHAPTER  IX. 

VEEACITY. 

§  156.  Complete  truthfulness  is  one  of  the  rarest  of  vir- 
tues. Even  those  who  regard  themselves  as  absolutely  truth- 
ful are  daily  guilty  of  over-statements  and  under-statements. 
Exaggeration  is  almost  universal.  The  perpetual  use  of  the 
word  "  very,"  where  the  occasion  does  not  call  for  it,  shows 
how  widely  diffused  and  confirmed  is  the  habit  of  misrepre- 
sentation. And  this  habit  sometimes  goes  along  with  the 
loudest  denunciations  of  falsehood.  After  much  vehement 
talk  about  "  the  veracities,"  will  come  utterly  unveracious 
accounts  of  things  and  people — accounts  made  unveracious 
by  the  use  of  emphatic  words  where  ordinary  words  alone 
are  warranted:  pictures  of  which  the  outlines  are  correct 
but  the  lights  and  shades  and  colours  are  doubly  and  trebly 
as  strong  as  they  should  be. 

Here,  among  the  countless  deviations  of  statement  from 
fact,  we  are  concerned  only  with  those  in  which  form  is 
wrong  as*  well  as  colour — those  in  which  the  statement  is 
not  merely  a  perversion  of  the  fact  but,  practically,  an 
inversion  of  it.  Chiefly,  too,  we  have  to  deal  with  cases  in 
which  personal  interests  of  one  or  other  kind  are  the 
prompters  to  falsehood : — now  the  desire  to  inflict  injury,  as 
by  false  witness ;  now  the  desire  to  gain  a  material  advan- 
tage ;  now  the  desire  to  escape  a  punishment  or  other  threat- 
ened evil;  now  the  desire  to  get  favour  by  saying  that 


VERACITY.  401 

which  pleases.  For  in  mankind  at  large,  the  love  of 
truth  for  truth's  sake,  irrespective  of  ends,  is  but  little 
exemplified. 

Here  let  us  contemplate  some  of  the  illustrations  of  ve- 
racity and  un  veracity — chiefly  unveracity — furnished  by  vari- 
ous human  races. 

§  157.  The  members  of  wild  tribes  in  different  parts  of 
the  world,  who,  as  hunters  or  as  nomads,  are  more  or  less 
hostile  to  their  neighbours,  are  nearly  always  reprobated  by 
travellers  for  their  untruthf ulness ;  as  are  also  the  members 
of  larger  societies  consolidated  by  conquest  under  despotic 
rulers. 

Says  Burton  of  the  Dakotas — "The  Indian,  like  other 
savages,  never  tells  the  truth."  Of  the  Mishmis,  Griffith 
writes — "They  have  so  little  regard  for  truth,  that  one 
cannot  rely  much  on  what  they  say."  And  a  general 
remark,  d  propos  of  the  Kirghiz,  is  to  the  same  effect. 
"  Truth,  throughout  Central  Asia,  is  subservient  to  the  pow- 
erful, and  the  ruler  who  governs  leniently  commands  but 
little  respect." 

Of  the  settled  societies,  the  first  to  be  named  is  the  Fijian. 
Williams  tells  us  that — 

"  Among  the  Fijians  the  propensity  to  lie  is  so  strong,  that  they  seem  to 
have  no  wish  to  deny  its  existence.  .  .  .  Adroitness  in  lying  is  attained  by 
the  constant  use  made  of  it  to  conceal  the  schemes  and  plots  of  the  Chiefs, 
to  whom  a  ready  and  clever  liar  is  a  valuable  acquisition.  .  .  .  '  A  Fijian 
truth '  has  been  regarded  as  a  synonym  for  a  lie." 

Of  kindred  nature,  under  kindred  conditions,  is  the  trait  dis- 
played by  the  people  of  Uganda. 

"  In  common  with  all  savage  tribes,  truth  is  held  in  very  low  estimation, 
and  it  is  never  considered  wrong  to  tell  lies ;  indeed,  a  successful  liar  is 
considered  a  smart,  clever  fellow,  and  rather  admired." 

So,  too,  was  it  among  the  ancient  semi-civilized  peoples  of 
Central  America.  De  Laet  says  of  certain  of  them,  living 
under  a  despotic  and  bloody  regime — "  they  are  liars,  like 
most  of  the  Indians."  And  concerning  the  modern  Indians, 


402  THE   INDUCTIONS    OF    ETHICS. 

who  may  be  supposed  to  have  preserved  more  or  less  the 
character  of  their  progenitors,  Dunlop  writes : — 

"  I  never  have  found  any  native  of  Central  America,  who  would  admit 
that  there  could  be  any  vice  in  lying ;  and  when  one  has  succeeded  in 
cheating  another,  however  gross  and  infamous  the  fraud  may  be,  the  na- 
tives will  only  remark,  '  Que  hombre  vivo '  (What  a  clever  fellow)." 

A  like  fact  is  given  by  Mr.  Foreman  in  his  work  on  the 
Philippine  Islands.  He  says  the  natives  do  not  "  appear  to 
regard  lying  as  a  sin,  but  rather  as  a  legitimate,  though  cun- 
ning, convenience." 

§  158.  The  literatures  of  ancient  semi-civilized  peoples 
yield  evidence  of  stages  during  which  truth  was  little  es- 
teemed, or  rather,  during  which  lying  was  tacitly  or  openly 
applauded.  As  we  saw  in  a  recent  chapter  (§  127)  decep- 
tion, joined  with  atrocity,  was  occasionally  inculcated  in  the 
early  Indian  literature  as  a  means  to  personal  advancement. 
We  have  proof  in  the  Bible  that,  apart  from  the  lying  which 
constituted  false  witness,  and  was  to  the  injury  of  a  neigh- 
bour, there  was  among  the  Hebrews  but  little  reprobation 
of  lying.  Indeed  it  would  be  remarkable  were  it  otherwise, 
considering  that  Jahveh  set  the  example ;  as  when,  to  ruin 
Ahab,  he  commissioned  "  a  lying  spirit "  (1  Kings,  xxii,  22) 
to  deceive  his  prophets ;  or  as  when,  according  to  Ezekiel*  xiv, 
9,  he  threatened  to  use  deception  as  a  means  of  vengeance. 

"  If  the  prophet  be  deceived  when  he  hath  spoken  a  thing,  I  the  Lord 
have  deceived  that  prophet,  and  I  will  stretch  out  my  hand  upon  him,  and 
will  destroy  him  from  the  midst  of  my  people  Israel." 

Evidently  from  a  race-character  which  evolved  such  a  con- 
ception of  a  deity's  principles,  there  naturally  came  no  great 
regard  for  veracity.  This  we  see  in  sundry  cases  ;  as  when 
Isaac  said  Rebecca  was  not  his  wife  but  his  sister,  and  never- 
theless received  the  same  year  a  bountiful  harvest :  "  the 
Lord  blessed  him"  (Gen.  xxvi,  12);  or  as  when  Rebecca  in- 
duced Jacob  to  tell  a  lie  to  his  father  and  defraud  Esau — a 
lie  not  condemned  but  shortly  followed  by  a  divine  promise 
of  prosperity ;  or  as  when  Jeremiah  tells  a  falsehood  at  the 


VERACITY.  403 

king's  suggestion.  Still  we  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that 
in  the  writings  of  the  Hebrew  prophets,  as  also  in  parts  of 
the  New  Testament,  lying  is  strongly  reprobated.  Averag- 
ing the  evidence,  we  may  infer  that  along  with  the  settled 
life  of  the  Hebrews  there  had  grown  up  among  them  an 
increased  truthfulness. 

Much  regard  for  veracity  was  hardly  to  be  expected 
among  the  Greeks.  In  the  Iliad  the  gods  are  represented 
not  only  as  deceiving  men  but  as  deceiving  one  another. 
The  chiefs  "  do  not  hesitate  at  all  manner  of  lying."  Pallas 
Athene  is  described  as  loving  Ulysses  because  he  is  so  de- 
ceitful ;  and,  in  the  words  of  Mahaffy,  the  Homeric  society 
is  full  of  "  guile  and  falsehood."  *  Nor  was  it  widely  other- 
wise in  later  days.  The  trait  alleged  of  the  Cretans — 
"  always  liars  " — though  it  may  have  been  more  marked  in 
them  than  in  Greeks  at  large,  did  not  constitute  an  essential 
difference.  Mahaffy  describes  Greek  conduct  in  the  Attic 
age  as  characterized  by  "  treachery  "  and  "  selfish  knavery," 
and  says  that  Darius  thought  a  Greek  who  kept  his  word  a 
notable  exception. 

Evidence  of  the  relation  between  chronic  hostilities  and 
utter  disregard  of  truth,  is  furnished  throughout  the  history 
of  Europe.  In  the  Merovingian  period  — "  the  era  of 

*  Marvelous  are  the  effects  of  educational  bias.  Familiarity  with  the 
doings  of  these  people,  guilty  of  so  many  "  atrocities,"  characterized  by  such 
"  revolting  cruelty  of  manners,"  as  Grote  says,  who  were  liars  through  all 
grades  from  their  gods  down  to  their  slaves,  and  whose  religion  was  made  up 
of  gross  and  brutal  superstitions,  distinguishes  one  of  our  leading  statesmen ; 
and,  joined  to  familiarity  with  the  doings  of  other  Greeks,  it  is  thought  by 
him  to  furnish  the  best  possible  preparation  for  life  of  the  highest  kind.  In 
a  speech  at  Eton,  reported  in  The  Times,  of  16  March,  1891,  Mr.  Gladstone 
said — "  If  the  purpose  of  education  is  to  fit  the  human  mind  for  the  efficient 
performance  of  the  greatest  functions,  the  ancient  culture,  and,  above  all, 
Greek  culture,  is  by  far  the  best,  the  most  lasting,  and  the  most  elastic 
instrument  that  can  possibly  be  applied  to  it."  Other  questions  aside,  one 
might  ask  with  puzzled  curiosity  which  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  creeds,  as  a 
statesman,  it  is  which  we  must  ascribe  to  the  influence  of  Greek  culture — 
whether  the  creed  with  which  he  set  out  as  a  Tory  when  fresh  from  Ox- 
ford, or  the  extreme  radical  creed  which  he  has  adopted  of  late  years? 


404:  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

"  blood  " — oaths  taken  by  rulers,  even  with  their  hands  on 
the  altar,  were  forthwith  broken ;  and  Salvian  writes — "  If 
a  Frank  forswear  himself,  where's  the  wonder,  when  he 
thinks  perjury  but  a  form  of  speech,  not  of  crime  ? " 
After  perpetual  wars  during  the  two  hundred  years  of  the 
Carolingian  period,  with  Arabs,  Saracens,  Aquitanians,  Sax- 
ons, Lombards,  Slavs,  Avars,  Normans,  came  the  early  feudal 
period,  of  which  H.  Martin  says  : — 

"  The  tenth  [century]  may  pass  for  the  era  of  fraud  and  deceit.  At  no 
other  epoch  of  our  history  does  the  moral  sense  appear  to  have  been  so  com- 
pletely effaced  from  the  human  soul  as  in  that  first  period  of  feudalism." 

And  then,  as  an  accompaniment  and  consequence  of  the 
internal  conflicts  which  ended  in  the  establishment  of  the 
French  monarchy,  there  was  a  still-continued  treachery : 
the  aristocracy  in  their  relations  with  one  another  "were 
without  truth,  loyalty,  or  disinterestedness  .  .  .  Neither  life 
nor  character  was  safe  in  their  hands."  Though  Mr.  Lecky 
ascribes  the  mediaeval  "  indifference  to  truth "  to  other 
causes  than  chronic  militancy,  yet  he  furnishes  a  sentence 
which  indirectly  yields  support  to  the  induction  here  made, 
and  is  the  more  to  be  valued  because  it  is  not  intended  to 
yield  such  support.  He  remarks  that  "  where  the  indus- 
trial spirit  has  not  penetrated,  truthfulness  rarely  occupies 
in  the  popular  mind  the  same  prominent  position  in  the 
catalogue  of  virtues "  as  it  does  among  those  "  educated  in 
the  habits  of  industrial  life." 

Nor  do  we  fail  to  see  at  the  present  time,  in  the  contrasts 
between  the  Eastern  and  Western  nations  of  Europe,  a  like 
relation  of  phenomena. 

§  159.  Reflection  shows,  however,  that  this  relation  is 
not  a  direct  one.  There  is  no  immediate  connexion  between 
bloodthirstiness  and  the  telling  of  lies.  Nor  because  a  man 
is  kind-hearted  does  it  follow  that  he  is  truthful.  If,  as 
above  implied,  a  life  of  amity  is  conducive  to  veracity,  while 
a  life  of  enmity  fosters  unveracity,  the  dependencies  must  be 


VERACITY.  405 

indirect.  After  glancing  at  some  further  facts,  we  shall 
understand  better  in  what  ways  these  traits  of  life  and 
character  are  usually  associated. 

In  respect  of  veracity,  as  in  respect  of  other  virtues,  I 
have  again  to  instance  various  aboriginal  peoples  who  have 
been  thrust  by  invading  races  into  undesirable  habitats ;  and 
have  there  been  left  either  in  absolute  tranquillity  or  free 
from  chronic  hostilities  with  their  neighbours.  Saying  of 
the  Kois  that  they  all  seem  to  suffer  from  chronic  fever 
(which  sufficiently  shows  why  they  are  left  unmolested  in 
their  malarious  wilds)  Morris  tells  us  that — 
"  They  are  noted  for  truthfulness,  and  are  quite  an  example  in  this  re- 
spect to  the  civilized  and  more  cultivated  inhabitants  of  the  plains." 
According  to  Shortt,  in  his  Hill  Ranges  of  Southern  India — 

"A  pleasing  feature  in  their  [Sowrahs]  character  is  their  complete 
truthfulness.  They  do  not  know  how  to  tell  a  lie.  They  are  not  suffi- 
ciently civilized  to  be  able  to  invent." 

I  may  remark  in  passing  that  I  have  heard  other  Anglo- 
Indians  assign  lack  of  intelligence  as  the  cause  of  this  good 
trait — a  not  very  respectable  endeavour  to  save  the  credit  of 
the  higher  races.  Considering  that  small  children  tell  lies, 
and  that  lies  are  told,  if  not  in  speech  yet  in  acts,  by  dogs, 
considerable  hardihood  is  shown  in  ascribing  the  truthful- 
ness of  these  and  kindred  peoples  to  stupidity.  In  his 
Highlands  of  Central  India,  Forsyth  writes  : — 

"  The  aborigine  is  the  most  truthful  of  beings,  and  rarely  denies  either  a 
money  obligation  or  a  crime  really  chargeable  against  him." 
Describing  the  Ramosis,  Sinclair  alleges  that — 
"  They  are  as  great  liars  as  the  most  civilized  races,  differing  in  this  from 
the  Hill  tribes  proper,  and  from  the  Parwaris,  of  whom  I  once  knew  a 
Brahman  to  say :  '  The  Kunabis,  if  they  have  made  a  promise,  will  keep  it, 
but  a  Mahar  [Parwari]  is  such  a  fool  that  he  will  tell  the  truth  without 
any  reason  at  all.' " 

And  this  opinion  expressed  by  the  Brahman,  well  illustrates 
the  way  in  which  their  more  civilized  neighbours  corrupt 
these  veracious  aborigines ;  for  while  Sherwill,  writing  of 
another  tribe,  says  — "  The  truth  is  by  a  Sonthal  held 
sacred,  offering  in  this  respect  a  bright  example  to  their 


406  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

lying  neighbours  the  Bengalis,"  it  is  remarked  of  them  by 
Man  that — 

"Evil  communications  are  exercising  their  baneful  influences  over  them, 
and  soon,  I  fear,  the  proverbial  veracity  of  the  Sonthal  will  cease  to  become 
a  by-word." 

In  The  Principles  of  Sociology,  vol.  ii,  §§  43T  and  5Y4,  I 
gave  the  names  of  others  of  these  Indian  hill-tribes  noted 
for  veracity — the  Bodo  and  Dhimals,  the  Carnatic  abori- 
gines, the  Todas,  the  Hos ;  and  here  I  may  add  one  more, 
the  Puluyans,  whose  refuge  is  "  hemmed  in  on  all  sides  by 
mountains,  woods,  backwaters,  swamps,  and  the  sea,"  and 
who  "  are  sometimes  distinguished  by  a  rare  character  for 
truth  and  honour,  which  their  superiors  in  the  caste  scale 
might  well  emulate."  So  too  is  it  in  a  neighbouring  land, 
Ceylon.  Wood-Yeddahs  are  described  as  "  proverbially  truth- 
ful and  honest."  From  other  regions  there  comes  kindred 
evidence.  Of  some  Northern  Asiatic  peoples,  who  are  ap- 
parently without  any  organization  for  offence  or  defence,  we 
read : — "  To  the  credit  of  the  Ostiaks  and  Samoiedes  it 
must  be  said,  that  they  are  eminently  distinguished  for  in- 
tegrity and  truthfulness." 

But  now  we  have  to  note  facts  which  make  us  pause. 
There  are  instances  of  truthfulness  among  peoples  who 
are  but  partially  peaceful,  and  among  others  who  are  any- 
thing but  peaceful.  Though  characterized  as  "  mild,  quiet, 
and  timid,"  the  Hottentots  have  not  infrequent  wars  about 
territories;  and  yet,  in  agreement  with  Barrow,  Kolben 
says — 

The  Word  of  a  Hottentot  "  is  sacred :  and  there  is  hardly  any  Thing 
upon  Earth  they  look  upon  as  a  fouler  Crime  than  breach  of  Engagement." 
Morgan,  writing  of  the  Iroquois,  states  that  "  the  love  of 
truth  was  another  marked  trait  of  the  Indian  character." 
And  yet,  though  the  Iroquois  league  was  formed  avowedly 
for  the  preservation  of  peace,  and  achieved  this  end  in 
respect  of  its  component  nations,  these  nations  carried  on 
hostilities  with  their  neighbours.  The  Patagonian  tribes 


VERACITY.  407 

have  frequent  fights  with  one  another,  as  well  as  with  the 
aggressive  Spaniards ;  and  yet  Snow  says — "  A  lie  with 
them  is  held  in  detestation."  The  Khonds,  too,  who  believe 
that  truthfulness  is  one  of  the  most  sacred  duties  imposed 
by  the  gods,  have  "  sanguinary  conflicts "  between  tribes 
respecting  their  lands.  And  of  the  Kolis,  inhabiting  the 
highlands  of  the  Dekhan,  we  read  that  though  "  manly, 
simple,  and  truthful,"  they  are  "great  plunderers"  and 
guilty  of  "  unrelenting  cruelty." 

What  is  there  in  common  between  these  truthful  and  pa- 
cific tribes  and  these  truthful  tribes  which  are  more  or  less 
warlike  ?  The  common  trait  is  that  they  are  not  subject  to 
coercive  rule.  That  this  is  so  with  tribes  which  are  peace- 
ful, I  have  shown  elsewhere  (Principles  of  Sociology,  ii, 
§§  573 — 4:) ;  and  here  we  come  upon  the  significant  fact  that 
it  is  so,  too,  with  truthful  tribes  which  are  not  peaceful. 
The  Hottentots  are  governed  by  an  assembly  deciding  by  a 
majority,  and  the  head  men  have  but  little  authority.  The 
Iroquois  were  under  the  control  of  a  council  of  fifty  elected 
sachems,  who  could  be  deposed  by  their  tribes ;  and  military 
expeditions,  led  by  chiefs  chosen  for  merit,  were  left  to 
private  enterprise  and  voluntary  service.  Among  the 
Patagonians  there  was  but  feeble  government:  followers 
deserting  their  chiefs  if  dissatisfied.  Writing  of  the  Khonds' 
"  system  of  society  "  Macpherson  says — "  The  spirit  of  equal- 
ity pervades  its  whole  constitution,  society  is  governed  by  the 
moral  influence  of  its  natural  heads  alone,  to  the  entire  ex- 
clusion of  the  principle  of  coercive  authority." 

§  160.  In  the  remarks  of  sundry  travellers,  we  find  evi- 
dence that  it  is  the  presence  or  absence  of  despotic  rule  which 
leads  to  prevalent  falsehood  or  prevalent  truth. 

Reference  to  the  Reports  on  the  Discovery  of  Peru  of 
Xeres  and  Pizarro  (pp.  68—9,  85 — 6,  114 — 120),  makes  it 
manifest  that  the  general  untruthfulness  described  was  due  to 
the  intimidation  the  Indians  were  subject  to.  So,  too,  respect- 


408  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

ing  the  Mexicans,  the  Franciscan  testimony  was — "  They  are 
liars,  but  to  those  who  treat  them  well  they  speak  the 
truth  readily."  A  clear  conception  of  the  relation  between 
mendacity  and  fear  was  given  to  Livingstone  by  his  experi- 
ences. Speaking  of  the  falsehood  of  the  East  Africans  he 
says — 

"  But  great  as  this  failing  is  among  the  free,  it  is  much  more  annoying 
among  the  slaves.  One  can  scarcely  induce  a  slave  to  translate  anything 
truly :  he  is  so  intent  on  thinking  of  what  will  please." 

And  he  further  remarks  that  "  untruthf ulness  is  a  sort  of 
refuge  for  the  weak  and  oppressed." 

A  glance  over  civilized  communities  at  once  furnishes 
verification.  Of  European  peoples,  those  subject  to  the 
most  absolute  rule,  running  down  from  their  autocrat 
through  all  grades,  are  the  Kussians;  and  their  extreme 
untruthfulness  is  notorious.  Among  the  Egyptians,  long 
subject  to  a  despotism  administered  by  despotic  officials,  a 
man  prides  himself  on  successful  lying,  and  will  even  ascribe 
a  defect  in  his  work  to  failure  in  deceiving  some  one. 
Then  we  have  the  case  of  the  Hindus,  who,  in  their  early 
days  irresponsibly  governed,  afterwards  subject  for  a  long 
period  to  the  brutal  rule  of  the  Mahometans,  and  since  that 
time  to  the  scarcely-less  brutal  rule  of  the  Christians,  are  so 
utterly  untruthful  that  oaths  in  Courts  of  Justice  are  of  no 
avail,  and  lying  is  confessed  to  without  shame.  Histories  tell 
like  tales  of  a  mendacity  which,  beginning  with  the  ruled, 
infects  the  rulers.  Writing  of  the  later  feudal  period  in 
France,  Michelet  says  : — "  It  is  curious  to  trace  from  year  to 
year  the  lies  and  tergiversations  of  the  royal  false  coiner  "  ; 
but  nowadays  political  deceptions  in  France,  though  still 
practised,  are  nothing  like  so  gross.  Nor  has  it  been  other- 
wise among  ourselves.  If  with  the  "universal  and  loath- 
some treachery  of  which  every  statesman  of  every  party  was 
continually  guilty,"  during  Elizabeth's  reign,  while  monarch- 
ical power  was  still  but  little  qualified,  we  contrast  the  ve- 
racity of  statesmen  in  recent  days,  we  see  a  kindred  instance 


VEBACITY.  409 

of  the  relations  between  the  untruthfulness  which  accom- 
panies tyranny  and  the  truthfulness  which  arises  along  with 
increase  of  liberty. 

Hence  such  connexions  as  we  trace  between  mendacity 
and  a  life  of  external  enmity,  and  between  veracity  and  a 
life  of  internal  amity,  are  not  due  to  any  direct  relations 
between  violence  and  lying  and  between  peacefulness 
and  truth-telling ;  but  are  due  to  the  coercive  social 
structure  which  chronic  external  enmity  develops,  and  to 
the  non-coercive  social  structure  developed  by  a  life  of 
internal  amity.  To  which  it  should  be  added  that  under 
the  one  set  of  conditions  there  is  little  or  no  ethical,  or 
rather  pro-ethical,  reprobation  of  lying ;  while  under  the 
other  set  of  conditions  the  pro-ethical  reprobation  of  lying, 
and  in  considerable  measure  the  ethical  reprobation,  become 
strong. 


CHAPTER  X. 

OBEDIENCE. 

§  161.  Under  the  one  name  "  obedience "  are  grouped 
two  kinds  of  conduct,  which  have  widely  different  sanctions : 
the  one  sanction  being  permanent  and  the  other  temporary. 
Filial  obedience  and  political  obedience  being  thus  bracketed, 
the  idea  of  virtuousness  is  associated  with  both ;  and  almost 
everyone  thinks  that  a  submission  which  is  praiseworthy  in 
the  one  case,  is  praiseworthy  in  the  other  also. 

Here  we  have  to  recognize  the  truth  that  while  due  subor- 
dination of  child  to  parent  originates  in  a  permanent  order 
of  Nature,  and  is  unconditionally  good,  the  subordination  of 
citizen  to  government  is  appropriate  to  a  process  which  is 
transitional,  and  is  but  conditionally  good. 

It  is  true  that  in  societies  which  have  had  a  genesis 
of  the  kind  erroneously  supposed  by  Sir  Henry  Maine  to 
be  universal,  the  two  kinds  of  obedience  have  a  common 
root:  the  patriarchal  group  grows  out  of  the  family,  and, 
by  insensible  steps,  the  subjection  of  children  to  parents 
passes  into  the  subjection  of  adult  sons  to  their  father,  and 
the  subjection  of  family-groups  to  the  father  of  the  father 
or  patriarch.  It  is  true,  also,  that  by  union  of  many 
patriarchal  groups  there  is  produced  an  organization  in 
which  a  supreme  patriarch  is  the  political  head.  But  in 
developed  societies,  such  as  those  of  modern  days,  these 
primitive  relationships  have  wholly  disappeared,  and  the  two 
kinds  of  obedience  have  become  quite  distinct.  Neverthe- 


OBEDIENCE.  411 

less,  being  in  large  measure  prompted  by  the  same  senti- 
ment, the  two  commonly  vary  together. 

In  contemplating  the  facts,  we  will  first  take  those 
which  concern  the  subordination  of  child  to  father,  and 
then  those  which  concern  the  subordination  of  citizen  to 
government. 

§  162.  The  earliest  social  stages  are  characterized  not  only 
by  absence  of  chiefs,  and  therefore  absence  of  the  sentiment 
which  causes  political  submission,  but  they  are  often  char- 
acterized by  such  small  submission  of  sons  as  renders  the 
human  family-group  near  akin  to  the  brutal  family-group — a 
group  in  which  parental  responsibility  on  the  one  side,  and 
filial  subjection  on  the  other,  soon  cease. 

The  American  races  yield  instances.  The  Araucanians 
"  never  punish  their  male  children,  considering  chastisement 
degrading,  and  calculated  to  render  the  future  man  pusil- 
lanimous and  unfit  for  the  duties  of  a  warrior."  Among  the 
Arawaks  affection  seems  to  prompt  this  lenient  treatment : 
a  father  "will  bear  any  insult  or  inconvenience  from  his 
child  tamely,  rather  than  administer  personal  correction." 
And  then  of  a  Dakota  boy  we  read  that — 

"  At  ten  or  twelve,  he  openly  rebels  against  all  domestic  rule,  and  does  not 
hesitate  to  strike  his  father :  the  parent  then  goes  off  rubbing  his  hurt,  and 
boasting  to  his  neighbours  of  the  brave  boy  whom  he  has  begotten." 

Some  old-world  races  supply  kindred  illustrations.  Of  the 
East  Africans,  Burton  says : — "  When  childhood  is  past,  the 
father  and  son  become  natural  enemies,  after  the  manner  of 
wild  beasts."  So,  too,  when,  writing  about  the  Bedouin 
character,  and  commenting  on  "  the  daily  quarrels  between 
parents  and  children,"  Burckhardt  tells  us  that  "  instead  of 
teaching  the  boy  civil  manners,  the  father  desires  him  to  beat 
and  pelt  the  strangers  who  come  to  the  tent,"  to  cultivate  his 
high  spirit :  adding  elsewhere  that — 

"  The  young  man,  as  soon  as  it  is  in  his  power,  emancipates  himself  from 
the  father's  authority  .  .  .  whenever  he  can  become  master  of  a  tent  himself 


412  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

...  he  listens  to  no  advice,  nor  obeys  any  earthly  command  but  that  of 
his  own  wilL" 

Associated  with  insubordination  to  parents,  we  sometimes 
have  cruelty  shown  to  them  in  age.  A  Chippewayan  old 
man  "  is  neglected,  and  treated  with  great  disrespect,  even  by 
his  own  children ; "  and  the  Kamtschadales  "  did  not  even 
consider  it  a  violation  of  filial  duty  to  kill  them  [their  parents] 
when  they  became  burdensome." 

Towards  mothers,  more  especially,  is  disregard  shown  : 
their  relatively  low  position  as  slaves  to  men,  prompting 
contempt  for  them.  By  the  Dakotas  "  the  son  is  taught  to 
make  his  mother  toil  for  him."  In  Fiji  "  one  of  the  first 
lessons  taught  the  infant  is  to  strike  its  mother,  a  neglect  of 
which  would  beget  a  fear  lest  the  child  should  grow  up  to  be 
a  coward."  When  a  young  Hottentot  has  been  admitted 
into  the  society  of  men — 

He  "  may  insult "  his  mother  "  when  he  will  with  Impunity.  He  may  cudgel 
her,  if  he  pleases,  only  for  his  Humour,  without  any  danger  of  being  called 
to  an  Account  for  it."  Such  actions  are  "  esteemed  as  Tokens  of  a  Manly 
Temper  and  Bravery." 

Concerning  the  Zulu  boys  Thompson  writes  : — 
"  It  is  a  melancholy  fact,  that  when  they  have  arrived  at  a  very  early  age, 
should  their  mothers  attempt  to  chastise  them,  such  is  the  law,  that  these 
lads  are  at  the  moment  allowed  to  kill  their  mothers." 

And  Mason  says  of  the  Karens  that — 

"Occasionally,  when  the  mother  gives  annoyance  to  her  children  by 
reproving  them ;  one  will  say :  '  My  mother  talks  excessively.  I  shall  not  be 
happy  till  she  dies.  I  will  sell  her,  though  I  do  not  get  more  than  a  gong 
or  five  rupees  for  her.'  And  he  sells  her." 

So  far  as  these  instances  go,  they  associate  lack  of 
obedience  of  children  to  parents  with  a  low  type  of  social 
organization.  This,  however,  is  not  a  uniform  relation,  as 
we  see  in  the  case  of  the  Esquimaux,  among  whom  "  the 
affection  of  the  parents  for  their  children  is  very  great,  and 
disobedience  on  the  part  of  the  latter  is  rare.  The  parents 
never  inflict  physical  chastisement  upon  the  children."  The 
fact  would  appear  to  be  that  in  the  lowest  social  groups,  we 
may  have  either  filial  obedience  or  filial  disobedience ;  but 


OBEDIENCE.  413 

that  if  the  groups  are  of  kinds  which  lead  lives  of  antagonism, 
then,  in  the  absence  of  filial  obedience,  there  does  not  arise 
that  cohesion  required  for  social  organization. 

§  163.  This  is  implied  by  the  converse  connexion  which 
we  see  displayed  among  various  types  of  men. 

If,  with  the  wandering  Semites  above  named,  we  contrast 
the  Semites  who,  though  at  first  wandering,  became  settled 
and  politically-organized,  we  see  little  filial  subordination  in 
the  one  and  much  in  the  other.  Among  the  Hebrews  the 
head  of  the  family  exercised  capital  jurisdiction  (Genesis 
xxxviii.  24).  In  the  decalogue  (Exodus  xx.  12)  honouring 
parents  comes  next  to  obeying  God.  In  Leviticus  xx.  9, 
punishment  is  threatened  for  cursing  father  or  mother, 
just  as  it  is  for  blasphemy ;  and  in  Deuteronomy  xxi.  18 — 21, 
it  is  ordered  that  a  rebellious  son  shall  be  publicly  stoned 
to  death.  Of  another  branch  of  the  race,  which  assumed 
the  coercive  type  of  social  organization — the  Assyrians — we 
read  that — 

"  A  father  was  supreme  in  his  household  ...  If  the  son  or  daughter  dis- 
owned his  father  he  was  sold  as  a  slave,  and  if  he  disowned  his  mother  he 
was  outlawed." 

By  the  Hindus,  filial  piety,  vividly  shown  by  sacrifices  of 
food  to  deceased  father,  grandfather,  great-grandfather,  &c., 
was  in  early  times  vividly  shown,  too,  during  life. 

"  The  father  of  Nakiketas  had  offered  what  is  called  an  All-sacrifice,  which 
requires  a  man  to  give  away  all  that  he  possesses.  His  son,  hearing  of  his 
father's  vow,  asks  him,  whether  he  does  or  does  not  mean  to  fulfil  his  vow 
without  reserve.  At  first  the  father  hesitates;  at  last,  becoming  angry,  he 
says :  '  Yes,  I  shall  give  thee  also  unto  death.'  The  father,  having  once 
said  so,  was  bound  to  fulfil  his  vow,  and  to  sacrifice  his  son  to  death.  The 
son  is  quite  willing  to  go,  in  order  to  redeem  his  father's  rash  promise." 

~No  less  conspicuously  has  this  connexion  been  exhibited  in 
China,  where  it  has  continued  from  the  earliest  recorded 
days  down  to  our  own.  With  the  established  worship  of 
ancestors,  by  whom  are  supposed  to  be  consumed  the 
periodical  offerings  of  food,  &c.,  made  to  them,  there  has 
all  along  gone  the  absolute  subordination  of  children 


414  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

to  living  parents.  Says  Confucius — "  Filial  piety  and 
fraternal  submission ! — are  they  not  the  root  of  all  benevolent 
actions  ? "  An  old  Chinese  saying  runs — "  Among  the 
hundred  virtues,  filial  piety  is  the  chief ; "  and  a  sacred  edict 
of  16TO  says  filial  piety  is  "  the  first  and  greatest  of  the 
commandments  in  China."  It  was  the  same  in  another 
large  society  of  which  the  continuity  goes  back  beyond  our 
chronology  :  I  mean  that  of  the  Egyptians.  According  to 
Ptah-hotep,  "  the  secret  of  moral  duty  is  obedience ;  filial 
obedience  is  its  root."  Nor  was  it  otherwise  with  the 
society  which,  beginning  as  a  small  cluster  of  clans,  spread 
and  spread  till  it  over-ran  all  Europe,  with  parts  of  Asia  and 
Africa.  The  subjection  of  sons  to  fathers  in  early  Roman 
days,  and  long  afterwards,  was  absolute — less  qualified 
indeed,  than  in  China ;  for  though  down  to  the  present  time 
Chinese  parents  have  the  right  of  infanticide,  and  may  sell 
their  children  as  servants  or  slaves ;  and  though,  by  implica- 
tion, adult  sons  can  do  nothing  without  parental  approval, 
or  own  property  not  subject  to  parental  confiscation ;  yet  we 
do  not  read  that  the  Chinese  have  exercised  the  power  of 
life  and  death  over  adult  children,  as  did  the  Romans.  Of 
course  with  the  establishment  of  this  absolute  parental 
power  went  the  assumption  that  filial  submission  should  be 
absolute.  And  if,  throughout  subsequent  European  history, 
a  father's  authority  and  a  child's  subjection  have  been  less 
extreme ;  yet,  up  to  comparatively  modern  times,  they  have 
been  very  decided. 

By  various  types  of  men  we  are  thus  shown  that  filial 
obedience  has  constantly  accompanied  social  growth  and  con- 
solidation :  if  not  throughout,  yet  during  its  earlier  stages. 

§  164.  The  height  to  which  political  obedience  rises  is 
determined,  in  chief  measure,  by  the  existence  of  favourable 
conditions.  If  the  physical  characters  of  the  habitat  are 
such  as  to  negative  large  aggregations  of  men — as  they  do  in 
wide  tracts  which  are  barren,  leading  to  nomadic  life,  or  as 


OBEDIENCE.  415 

they  do  where  mountain  chains  cut  off  group  from  group 
— the  tendency  seems  rather  to  be  for  the  filial  sentiment 
to  develop  no  further  than  the  patriarchal ;  and  along  with 
this  restricted  growth  there  may  go  resistance  to  a  wider 
rule.  The  Khonds  exemplify  this : — 

"  For  the  head  of  a  family  all  the  tribes  have  the  greatest  respect,  it  being 
a  proverb  with  them  that  '  A  man's  father  is  his  God  on  earth.'  The  so- 
cial organization  among  them  is  indeed  strictly  patriarchal,  the  father  of 
a  family  being  its  absolute  ruler  in  every  case.  Disobedience  to  him  under 
any  circumstances  is  regarded  as  a  crime." 

This  trait  is  possessed  by  another  mountain  people,  the  Bhils, 
who,  along  with  a  certain  amount  of  submission  to  general 
chiefs,  show  an  extreme  allegiance  to  their  family-chiefs  or 
patriarchs,  called  Turwees. 

"  So  wonderful  is  the  influence  of  the  chief  over  this  infatuated  people, 
that  in  no  situation,  however  desperate,  can  they  be  induced  to  betray 
him."  "  To  kill  another  when  their  Turwee  desires,  or  to  suffer  death, 
themselves,  appear  to  them  equally  a  matter  of  indifference." 

From  filial  obedience,  thus  widening  in  range,  may  in 
time  develop  a  settled  political  obedience,  where  physical 
circumstances  favour  it;  and  especially  where  there  arises 
combined  action  in  war.  Pallas  tells  us  that  the  Kalmucks 
manifest  much  "  attachment  towards  their  legitimate  rulers  " ; 
and  that  they  honour  and  obey  their  parents.  Among  the 
Sgaus,  a  division  of  the  Karens  (apparently  unlike  the  other 
divisions) — 

"  The  elders  say :  '  0  children  and  grandchildren !  respect  and  reverence 
your  mother  and  father.'  ..."  0,  children  and  grandchildren !  obey  the 
orders  of  kings,  for  kings  in  former  times  obeyed  the  commands  of  God." 

But  it  is  in  the  larger  societies  of  primitive  types  that 
the  two  kinds  of  obedience  are  most  closely  associated.  In 
China  where,  as  before  shown,  filial  obedience  is  extreme, 
we  see  them  jointly  insisted  upon ;  as  implied  by  Tsze-hea 
when  he  lauded  a  man  "  if,  in  serving  his  parents,  he  can 
exert  his  utmost  strength,  if,  in  serving  his  prince,  he  can 
devote  his  life ; "  and  as  implied  in  the  conduct  of  Confu- 
cius, already  quoted  as  enjoining  filial  obedience,  who  when 
28 


416  THE  INDUCTIONS  OF  ETHICS. 

"  passing  the  vacant  place  of  the  prince,  his  countenance  ap- 
peared to  change,  and  his  legs  to  bend  under  him,  and  his 
words  came  as  if  he  hardly  had  breath  to  utter  them."  After 
recognizing  in  China  occasional  dissent,  as  of  Mencius,  who 
in  one  place  suggests  rebellion,  we  may  pass  to  Persia. 
Here,  too,  there  were  solitary  expressions  of  independence, 
as  by  the  Darwesh  who  said  that  "  kings  are  for  the  pro- 
tection of  their  subjects,  not  subjects  for  the  service  of 
kings ; "  but,  in  general,  political  obedience  was  urged,  for 
reasons  of  prudence  if  for  no  other.  One  of  their  vazirs 
said: — 

"Opinions  differing  from  the  king,  to  have 
'Tis  your  own  hands  in  your  own  blood  to  lave. 
Should  he  affirm  the  day  to  be  the  night, 
Say  you  behold  the  moon  and  Pleiads'  light." 

And  Sadi  enjoins  the  attitude  of  submission  as  a  part  of 
duty :  instance  the  sentence : — 

"  Whosoever  possesseth  the  qualities  of  righteousness  placeth  his  head 
on  the  threshold  of  obedience." 

Among  the  Ancient  Indians,  instanced  above  as  carrying 
to  an  extreme  the  submission  of  son  to  father,  political  sub- 
mission was  strongly  insisted  on ;  as  in  the  Code  of  Manu, 
where  it  is  held  wrong  to  treat  even  a  child-king  "  as  if  he 
were  a  mortal ;  he  is  a  great  divinity  in  human  shape." 
Then  in  Egypt,  along  with  that  exhortation  to  obey  parents 
quoted  from  Ptah-hotep,  may  be  named  his  approval  of 
wider  obedience : — "  If  thou  abasest  thyself  in  obeying  a 
superior,  thy  conduct  is  entirely  good  before  God."  Com- 
menting on  the  grovelling  prostrations  represented  in  their 
sculptures  and  paintings,  Duncker  remarks  that  the  Egyp- 
tians "  worshipped  their  kings  as  the  deities  of  the  land." 
Indeed,  in  the  inscriptions  on  the  tombs  of  officials,  the 
deeds  implying  such  worship  are  specified  as  proofs  of  their 
virtue.  Nor  was  it  otherwise  with  the  Hebrews.  While, 
in  their  decalogue,  religious  obedience  and  filial  obedience  are 
closely  coupled,  there  was  elsewhere  joined  with  these  politi- 
cal obedience  ;  as  in  Proverbs  xvi.  10,  where  it  is  said : — "A 


OBEDIENCE.  417 

divine  sentence  is  in  the  lips  of  the  king ;  his  mouth  trans- 
gresseth  not." 

Throughout  European  history  a  like  relationship  is  trace- 
able. Along  with  the  theory  and  practice  of  absolute 
subjection  of  child  to  parent,  there  went  the  theory  and 
practice  of  absolute  subjection  to  the  chief  man  of  the 
group — now  to  the  local  head,  while  the  groups  were  small 
and  incoherent,  and  now  to  the  central  head,  when  they 
became  large  and  consolidated.  Less  definite  forms  of  rule 
having  been  replaced  by  feudalism,  there  first  came  fealty 
to  the  feudal  lord,  and  then,  with  advancing  political  inte- 
gration, there  came  loyalty  to  the  king.  In  the  old  French 
epic  the  one  inexpiable  crime  is  the  treason  of  a  vassal ; 
the  noblest  virtue  is  a  vassal's  fidelity.  In  our  own  coun- 
try the  extreme  loyalty  of  the  highlanders  to  the  chiefs  of 
their  clans,  and  subsequently  to  the  Stuarts  as  their  kings, 
exemplifies  the  dominance  of  the  sentiment;  while  the 
English  nobility  have,  among  other  ways  of  showing  this 
feeling,  shown  it  in  sundry  of  their  mottoes ;  as  instance — 
Paulet  and  others,  "Aimez  loyaulte;"  Earl  Grey  and 
others,  "De  bon  vouloir  servir  le  roy;"  Earl  of  Lindsay, 
"  Loyalty  binds  me ; "  Baron  Mowbray,  "  I  will  be  loyal 
during  my  life ; "  Earl  of  Kosse,  "  For  God  and  the  King ; " 
Adair,  "  Loyal  to  the  death." 

And  here  let  us  note  how  the  frequency  with  which  loyalty 
is  thus  expressed  as  the  highest  of  sentiments,  reminds  us  of 
the  frequency  with  which  aggressiveness  has  been,  by  other 
nobles,  chosen  as  the  sentiment  most  worthy  to  be  professed. 

§  165.  The  significance  of  this  association  lies  in  the  fact 
that  they  are  both  accompaniments  of  chronic  militancy. 
"When  we  remember  that  first  of  all  the  chief,  and  in  later 
days  the  king,  and  later  still  the  emperor,  is  primarily  the 
supreme  commander  ;  and  that  his  headship  in  peace  is  but 
a  sequence  of  his  headship  in  war;  it  is  clear  that  at  the 
outset  political  obedience  is  identical  with  military  obedience. 


418  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

Further,  it  needs  but  to  consider  that  for  success  in  war  ab- 
solute subordination  to  the  commander-in-chief  is  essential, 
and  that  absolute  subordination  to  him  as  king  is  a  concomi- 
tant, to  see  that  while  the  militancy  remains  active,  the  two 
remain  one. 

Additional  evidence  of  this  relationship  is  yielded  by  a 
few  cases  in  which  political  obedience  is  carried  to  an 
extreme  exceeding  obedience  of  all  other  kinds.  The 
first  to  be  named  is  afforded  by  a  people  who  have  passed 
away — the  warlike  and  cannibal  Mexicans,  who  invaded 
their  neighbours  to  get  victims  to  satisfy  their  hungry  gods. 
Montezuma  II.,  says  Herrera,  "caused  himself  to  be  so 
highly  respected,  that  it  almost  came  to  be  adoration.  Ko 
commoner  was  to  look  him  in  the  face,  and  if  one  did,  he 
died  for  it."  According  to  Peter  of  Ghent,  "the  worst 
feature  in  the  character  of  the  Indians  is  their  submissive- 
ness  ; "  and  then  Herrera,  illustrating  their  loyalty,  names  a 
man  who  would  not  betray  his  lord,  but  rather  than  do  so 
allowed  himself  to  be  "  torn  piece-meal "  by  dogs.  Among 
existing  peoples,  a  striking  example  is  furnished  by  the 
cannibal  Fijians.  These  ferocious  savages,  revelling  in  war 
and  destruction,  are -described  by  Erskine  as  intensely  loyal. 
So  obedient  are  they  to  their  chiefs,  says  Jackson,  that 
they  have  been  known  to  eat  pumice-stone  when  commanded 
to  do  so ;  and  "Williams  says  that  a  condemned  man  stands 
unbound  to  be  killed,  himself  declaring — "Whatever  the 
king  says,  must  be  done."  Of  the  bloody  Dahomans,  too, 
with  their  Amazon  army,  we  are  told  by  one  traveller  that 
"  before  the  king  all  are  slaves  alike,"  and  by  another  that 
"  they  reverence  him  with  a  mixture  of  love  and  fear,  little 
short  of  adoration  : "  "  parents  are  held  to  have  no  right  or 
claim  to  their  children,  who,  like  everything  else,  belong  to 
the  king."  So  that  political  subordination  submerges  all 
other  kinds  of  subordination. 

Nor  is  it  only  by  these  extreme  cases,  and  by  the  extreme 
converse  cases,  that  this  connexion  is  shown.  It  is  shown 


OBEDIENCE.  419 

also  by  the  intermediate  cases :  instance  the  various  peoples 
of  Europe.  In  Russia  militancy  and  its  appliances  subor- 
dinate the  entire  national  life ;  and  among  Europeans  the 
Russians  display  the  most  abject  obedience :  gaining,  there- 
by, the  applause  of  Mr.  Carlyle.  Loyal  to  the  point  of  wor- 
ship, they  submit  unresistingly  to  the  dictation  of  all  State- 
officials  down  to  the  lowest.  On  the  other  hand,  we  are  our- 
selves the  people  among  whom  militancy  and  its  appliances 
occupy  the  smallest  space  in  the  national  life,  and  among 
whom  there  is  least  political  subjection.  The  Government 
has  come  to  be  a  servant  instead  of  a  master.  Citizens  se- 
verely criticize  their  princes ;  discuss  the  propriety  of  abol- 
ishing one  division  of  the  legislature ;  and  expel  from  power 
ministers  who  do  not  please  them. 

Nor  is  it  otherwise  when  we  compare  earlier  and  later 
stages  of  the  same  nation.  By  these,  too,  we  are  shown 
that  as  fast  as  the  life  of  internal  amity  outgrows  the  life 
of  external  enmity,  the  sentiment  of  obedience  declines. 
Though  submissive  loyality  to  the  living  German  Kaiser  is 
great,  yet  it  is  not  so  great  as  was  the  submissive  loyalty  to 
his  conquering  ancestor,  Frederick  II.,  when  Forster  wrote 
— ""What  chiefly  disgusted  me  was  the  deification  of  the 
king."  If,  notwithstanding  the  nominally  free  form  of  their 
government,  the  mass  of  the  French  people  let  their  liberties 
be  trampled  upon  to  an  extent  which  the  English  delegates 
to  a  Trades-Union  Congress  in  Paris  said  is  "a  disgrace 
to,  and  an  anomaly  in,  a  Republican  nation  ; "  yet  their 
willing  subordination  is  not  so  great  as  it  was  at  the  time 
when  war  had  raised  the  French  monarchy  to  its  zenith. 
In  our  own  case,  too,  while  there  is  a  marked  contrast 
between  the  amount  of  war,  internal  and  external,  in  early 
days,  and  the  complete  internal  peace,  joined  with  long 
external  peace,  which  recent  times  have  known ;  there  is  a 
contrast  no  less  marked  between  the  great  loyalty  shown 
in  early  days  and  the  moderate  loyalty,  largely  nominal, 
shown  at  present. 


420  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

It  remains  only  to  add  that,  along  with  the  decline  of 
political  subordination  there  has  gone  a  decline  of  filial 
subordination.  The  harsh  rule  of  parents  and  humble 
submission  of  children  in  past  centuries,  have,  in  our  times, 
been  exchanged  for  a  very  moderate  exercise  of  parental 
authority  and  a  filial  subjection  which,  far  less  conspicuous 
during  youth  than  it  used  to  be,  almost  ceases  when  the 
age  for  marriage  arrives. 

§  166.  Thus,  akin  though  they  are  in  the  sentiment 
prompting  them,  and  in  the  main  varying  together,  the 
two  kinds  of  obedience,  filial  and  political,  have  different 
sanctions.  The  one  is  bound  up  with  the  laws  of  life, 
while  the  other  is  dependent  on  the  needs  of  the  social  state, 
and  changes  as  they  change. 

For  the  obedience  of  child  to  parent  there  is  the  warrant 
arising  from  relatively-imperfect  development,  and  there  is 
the  warrant  arising  from  the  obligation  to  make  some 
return  for  benefits  received.  These  are  obviously  perma- 
nent ;  and  though,  with  the  advance  from  lower  to  higher 
types  of  man  and  society,  filial  subjection  decreases,  yet  some 
degree  of  it  must  ever  remain,  and  must  continue  to  be 
prompted  by  an  ethical  sentiment  properly  so-called. 

On  the  other  hand,  political  obedience,  non-existent  in 
groups  of  primitive  men,  comes  into  existence  during  the 
political  integrations  effected  by  war — during  the  growth  and 
organization  of  large  societies  formed  by  successive  con- 
quests. The  development  of  political  obedience  in  such  soci- 
eties is  a  necessity ;  since,  without  it,  there  cannot  be  carried 
on  the  combined  actions  by  which  subjugations  and  consoli- 
dations are  brought  about. 

The  implication  is  that  the  sentiment  of  political  obedience, 
having  but  a  transitional  function,  must  decrease  in  amount 
as  the  function  decreases  in  needfulness.  Along  with  decline 
of  that  system  of  status  characterizing  the  militant  type  of 
organization,  and  rise  of  that  system  of  contract  charac- 


OBEDIENCE.  421 

terizing  the  industrial  type,  the  need  for  subjection  becomes 
gradually  less.  The  change  of  sentiment  accompanying 
this  change  from  compulsory  co-operation  to  voluntary 
co-operation,  while  it  modifies  the  relations  of  citizens  to 
one  another,  modifies  also  their  relations  to  their  govern- 
ment :  to  this  the  same  degree  of  obedience  is  neither 
required  nor  felt.  Humble  submission  ceases  to  be  a 
virtue;  and  in  place  of  it  there  comes  the  virtue  of  inde- 
pendence. 

Decline  of  political  obedience  and  waning  belief  in  the 
duty  of  it,  go  along  with  increasing  subordination  to  ethical 
principles,  a  clearer  recognition  of  the  supremacy  of  these, 
and  a  determination  to  abide  by  them  rather  than  by  legisla- 
tive dictates.  More  and  more  the  pro-ethical  sentiments 
prompting  obedience  to  government,  come  into  conflict  with 
the  ethical  sentiment  prompting  obedience  to  conscience. 
More  and  more  this  last  causes  unconformity  to  laws  which 
are  at  variance  with  equity.  And  more  and  more  it  comes 
to  be  felt  that  legal  coercion  is  warranted  only  in  so  far  as 
law  is  an  enforcer  of  justice. 

That  political  obedience  is  thus  a  purely  transitional 
virtue,  cannot  be  perceived  while  the  need  for  political  sub- 
ordination remains  great ;  and  while  it  remains  great  the  un- 
limited authority  of  the  ruling  power  (if  not  a  man  then  a 
majority)  will  continue  to  be  asserted.  But  if  from  past 
changes  we  are  to  infer  future  changes,  we  may  conclude 
that  in  an  advanced  state,  the  sphere  of  political  obedience 
will  have  comparatively  narrow  limits ;  and  that  beyond 
those  limits  the  submission  of  citizen  to  government  will  no 
more  be  regarded  as  meritorious  than  is  now  the  cringing  of 
a  slave  to  a  master. 


CHAPTER  XL 

INDUSTRY. 

§  167.  If  we  are  to  understand  the  origins  and  variations 
of  the  sentiments,  ethical  and  pro-ethical,  which  have  been 
entertained  in  different  times  and  places  concerning  indus- 
try and  the  absence  of  industry,  we  must  first  note  certain 
fundamental  distinctions  between  classes  of  human  activities, 
and  between  their  relations  to  the  social  state. 

Industry,  as  we  now  understand  it,  scarcely  exists  among 
primitive  men — scarcely,  indeed,  can  exist  before  the  pastoral 
and  agricultural  states  have  been  established.  Living  on 
wild  products,  savages  of  early  types  have  to  expend  their 
energies  primarily  in  gathering  and  catching  these :  the 
obtainment  of  some,  like  fruits  and  roots,  being  easy  and 
safe,  and  the  obtainment  of  others,  such  as  beasts  of  which 
some  are  swift  and  some  are  large,  being  difficult  and 
dangerous.  After  these  the  remaining  activities,  more  diffi- 
cult and  dangerous  than  those  the  chase  implies,  are  implied 
by  warfare  with  fellow-men.  Hence  the  occupations  of  the 
utterly  uncivilized  may  be  roughly  divided  into  those  which 
demand  strength,  courage,  and  skill,  in  large  measure,  and 
those  which  demand  them  in  but  small  measure  or  not  at 
all.  And  since  in  most  cases  the  preservation  of  the  tribe 
is  mainly  determined  by  its  success  in  war  and  the  chase,  it 
results  that  the  strength,  courage,  or  skill  shown  in  these, 
come  to  be  honoured  both  for  themselves  and  for  their  value 


INDUSTRY.  423 

to  the  tribe.  Conversely,  since  the  digging  up  of  roots,  the 
gathering  of  wild  fruits,  and  the  collecting  of  shell-fish,  do 
not  call  for  strength,  courage,  and  skill,  and  do  not  conspicu- 
ously further  tribal  preservation,  these  occupations  come  to 
be  little  honoured  or  relatively  despised.  An  implication 
strengthens  the  contrast.  While  the  stronger  sex  is  called  on 
to  devote  itself  to  the  one,  the  other  is  left  to  the  weaker  sex : 
sometimes  aided  by  conquered  men,  or  slaves.  Hence  arises 
a  further  reason  why,  in  primitive  societies,  honour  is  given 
to  the  predatory  activities  while  the  peaceful  activities  are 
held  in  dishonour.  Industry,  therefore,  or  that  which  at 
first  represents  it,  is  not  unnaturally  condemned  by  the  pro- 
ethical  sentiment. 

The  only  kinds  of  activity  to  be  classed  as  industrial 
which  the  warriors  of  the  tribe  may  enter  upon,  are  those 
necessitated  by  the  making  of  weapons  and  the  erection  of 
wigwams  or  huts :  the  one,  closely  associated  with  war  and 
the  chase,  demanding  also  the  exercise  of  skill;  and  the 
other  demanding  both  skill  and  strength — not  the  moderate 
strength  shown  in  monotonous  labour,  but  the  great  strength 
which  has  to  be  suddenly  exerted.  And  these  apparent  ex- 
ceptions furnish  a  verification ;  for  they  further  show  that 
the  occupations  held  in  contempt  are  those  which,  demanding 
relatively  little  power,  physical  or  intellectual,  can  be  carried 
on  by  the  inferior. 

The  contrast  thus  initiated  between  the  sentiments  with 
which  these  classes  of  occupations  are  regarded,  has  persisted 
with  but  small,  though  increasing,  qualification,  throughout 
the  course  of  human  progress ;  and  it  has  thus  persisted 
because  the  causes  have  in  the  main  persisted.  While  the 
self-preservation  of  societies  has  most  conspicuously  de- 
pended on  the  activities  implied  by  successful  war,  such 
activities  have  been  held  in  honour;  and,  by  implication, 
industrial  activities  have  been  held  contemptible.  Only  dur- 
ing recent  times — only  now  that  national  welfare  is  becom- 
ing more  and  more  dependent  on  superior  powers  of  produc- 


424:  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

tion,  and  such  superior  powers  of  production  are  becoming 
more  and  more  dependent  on  the  higher  mental  faculties, 
are  other  occupations  than  militant  ones  rising  into  respecta- 
bility ;  while  simultaneously  respectability  is  being  acknowl- 
edged in  the  accompanying  capacity  for  persistent  and 
monotonous  application. 

Carrying  this  clue  with  us,  we  shall  be  able  now  to  under- 
stand better  the  ethics  of  labour,  as  changing  from  people  to 
people  and  from  age  to  age. 

§  168.  The  North  American  Indians  furnish  the  simplest 
and  clearest  illustrations  of  predatory  habits  and  associated 
sentiments.  Schoolcraf t  says  of  the  Chippewas : — 

"  They  have  regarded  the  use  of  the  bow  and  arrow,  the  war-club  and 
spear,  as  the  noblest  employments  of  man.  ...  To  hunt  well  and  to  fight 
well,  are  the  first  and  the  last  themes  of  their  hopes  and  praises  of  the  liv- 
ing and  the  dead.  .  .  .  They  have  ever  looked  upon  agricultural  and  me- 
chanical labors  as  degrading." 

Of  the  Snake  Indian,  Lewis  and  Clarke  writes : — "  He  would 
consider  himself  degraded  by  being  compelled  to  walk  any 
distance."  Of  kindred  nature  is  Burton's  account  of  the 
Dakotas : — 

"  The  warrior,  considering  the  chase  as  an  ample  share  of  the  labour-curse, 
is  so  lazy  that  he  will  not  rise  to  saddle  or  unsaddle  his  pony.  .  .  .  Like  a 
wild  beast  he  cannot  be  broken  to  work :  he  would  rather  die  than  employ 
himself  in  honest  industry." 

By  the  more  civilized  Iroquois,  too,  the  primitive  feeling  was 
displayed — "  The  warrior  despised  the  toil  of  husbandry,  and 
held  all  labour  beneath  him."  Even  the  unwarlike  Esqui- 
maux is  said  to  exhibit  a  like  aversion. 

"  He  hunts  and  fishes,  but  having  brought  his  booty  to  land  troubles 
himself  no  further  about  it ;  for  it  would  be  a  stigma  on  his  character,  if 
he  so  much  as  drew  a  seal  out  of  the  water." 

There  being,  perhaps,  for  this  usage  a  plea  like  that 
possessed  by  the  usage  of  the  Chippewayans,  among  whom, 
"  when  the  men  kill  any  large  beast,  the  women  are  always 
sent  to  bring  it  to  the  tent" — the  plea,  namely,  that  the 
chase,  whether  on  sea  or  on  land,  is  extremely  exhausting. 


INDUSTRY.  4:25 

Passing  to  South  America  we  meet  with  facts  of  kindred 
meaning.  Men  of  the  Guiana  tribes  take  no  share  in 
industry,  save  in  making  clearance  for  the  growing  of  food : 
each  lies  "indolently  in  his  hammock  until  necessitated 
to  fish,  or  use  the  more  violent  exercise  of  the  chase,  to 
provide  for  the  wants  of  his  family."  And  then  of  the 
Araucanians,  warlike  but  agricultural  (apparently  because 
there  is  but  little  scope  for  the  chase),  we  are  told  that 
"  the  '  lord  and  master '  does  little  but  eat,  sleep,  and  ride 
about." 

In  the  wording  of  this  last  statement,  as  by  implication 
in  the  other  statements,  we  may  see  that  in  early  stages 
the  egoism  of  men,  unqualified  by  the  altruism  which 
amicable  social  intercourse  generates,  leads  them  to  devolve 
on  women  all  exertions  which,  unaccompanied  by  the 
pleasures  of  achievement,  are  monotonous  and  wearisome. 
"  The  lord  and  master  "  does  what  he  likes ;  and  he  likes 
to  make  the  woman  (or  his  woman  as  the  case  may  be)  do 
all  the  dull  and  hard  work.  Proofs  of  this  are  multitudi- 
nous. America  furnishes  instances  in  the  accounts  of  the 
Chippewayans,  Creeks,  Tupis,  Patagonians  ;  as  witness  these 
extracts : — 

"  This  labourious  task  [dragging  the  sledges]  falls  mostly  heavily  on  the 
women  ;  nothing  can  more  shock  the  feelings  of  a  person,  accustomed  to 
civilized  life,  than  to  witness  the  state  of  their  degradation." 

"  The  women  perform  all  the  labour,  both  in  the  house  and  field,  and 
are,  in  fact,  but  slaves  to  the  men." 

"When  they  removed,  the  women  were  the  beasts  of  burthen,  and 
carried  the  hammocks,  pots,  wooden  pestles  and  mortars,  and  all  their 
other  household  stock." 

The  lives  of  the  Patagonian  women  are    "  one  continued  scene  of 
labour.  .  .  .  They  do  everything,  except  hunting  and  fighting." 
Here,  again,  are  testimonies  given  by  travellers  in  Africa 
concerning   the   Hottentots,   Bechuanas,   Kaffirs,   Ashantis, 
people  of  Fernando  Po  and  the  Lower  Niger. 

The  wife  "  is  doomed  to  all  the  toil  of  getting  and  dressing  provisions 
for "  her  husband,  "  herself  and  children  ....  and  to  all  the  care  and 
drudgery  within  doors,  with  a  share  of  the  fatigue  in  tending  the  cattle." 

"  The  women  build  the  houses ;  plant  and  reap  the  corn ;  fetch  water 


426  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

and  fuel ;  and  cook  the  food.  It  is  very  rarely  that  the  men  are  seen 
helping  the  women,  even  in  the  most  laborious  work." 

"  Besides  her  domestic  duties,  the  women  has  to  perform  all  the  hard 
work ;  she  is  her  husband's  ox,  as  a  Kafir  once  said  to  me, — she  has  been 
bought,  he  argued,  and  must  therefore  labour." 

"  It  may  be  remarked,  that  the  weightiest  duties  generally  devolve  upon 
the  wife,  who  is  to  be  found  '  grinding  at  the  mill,'  transacting  business 
in  the  market,  or  cultivating  the  plantation." 

"  The  females  in  Fernando  Po  have  a  fair  portion  of  work  assigned  to 
them,  such  as  planting  and  collecting  the  yam  .  .  .  but  they  are  certainly 
treated  with  greater  consideration  and  kindness  than  in  any  part  of  Africa 
we  visited." 

On  the  lower  Niger,  "  women  are  commonly  employed  in  the  petty  retail 
trade  about  the  country ;  they  also  do  a  great  deal  of  hard  work,  especially 
in  the  cultivation  of  the  land." 

Of  which  extracts  it  may  be  remarked  that  the  latter  ones, 
which  concern  races  of  more  advanced  kinds,  carrying  on 
more  settled  industries,  show  that  with  them  the  slavery  of 
women  is  less  pronounced. 

Beyond  that  dishonourableness  which,  in  early  stages, 
attaches  to  labour  because  it  can  be  performed  by  women, 
who  in  most  cases  are  incapable,  or  considered  to  be  inca- 
pable, of  war  and  the  chase ;  there  is  the  further  dishonour- 
ableness which  attaches  to  it  because,  as  above  pointed  out,  it 
is  carried  on  also  by  conquered  men  or  slaves — by  men,  that 
is,  proved  in  one  or  other  way  to  be  inferior.  In  very  early 
stages  we  sometimes  find  slaves  thus  used  for  the  non-pre- 
datory occupations  which  their  masters  find  irksome.  Even 
of  the  Chinooks  we  read  that  "  slaves  do  all  the  laborious 
work  ; "  and  they  are  often  associated  with  the  women  in 
this  function.  Says  Andersson  : — 

**  The  Damaras  are  idle  creatures.    What  is  not  done  by  the  women  is 
left  to  the  slaves,  who  are  either  the  descendants  of  impoverished  mem- 
bers of  their  own  tribe  or  ...  captured  Bushmen." 
Describing  the  people  of  Embomma  on  the  Congo,  Tuckey 
writes : — 

"  The  cultivation  of  the  ground  is  entirely  the  business  of  slaves  and  women, 
the  King's  daughter's  and  princes'  wives  being  constantly  thus  employed." 
Burton  tells  us  that  in  Dahomey  "  agriculture  is  despised, 
because  slaves  are  employed  in  it ; "  but  a  great  deal  of  it 


INDUSTRY.  427 

seems  to  be  done  by  women.  And  similarly  of  the  Mishmees 
in  Asia,  we  read  that  "the  women  and  slaves  do  all  the 
cultivation." 

Naturally,  then,  and,  indeed,  we  may  say  necessarily,  there 
grows  up  in  these  early  stages  a  profound  prejudice  against 
labour — a  pro-ethical  sentiment  condemnatory  of  it.  How 
this  pro-ethical  sentiment,  having  the  sanction  of  ancestral 
usages,  assumes  this  or  that  special  character  according  to 
the  habits  which  the  environment  determines,  we  are  vari- 
ously shown.  Thus  we  read  that — 

The  Bushmen  "  are  sworn  enemies  to  the  pastoral  life.  Some  of  their 
maxims  are,  to  live  on  hunting  and  plunder." 

"  The  genuine  Arabs  disdain  husbandry,  as  an  employment  by  which 
they  would  be  degraded." 

In  which  examples,  as  in  many  already  given,  we  may  see 
how  a  mode  of  life  long  pursued,  determines  a  congruous  set 
of  feelings  and  ideas.  And  the  strength  of  the  prejudices 
which  maintain  inherited  customs  of  this  class,  is  shown  by 
sundry  anomalous  cases.  Livingstone  tells  us  of  the  East 
Africans  that — • 

"  Where  there  are  cattle,  the  women  till  the  land,  plant  the  corn,  and 
build  the  huts.  The  men  stay  at  home  to  sew,  spin,  weave,  and  talk,  and 
milk  the  cows." 

Still  more  strange  is  the  settled  division  of  labour  between 
the  sexes  in  Abyssinia.  According  to  Bruce — 

"  It  is  infamy  for  a  man  to  go  to  market  to  buy  anything.    He  cannot 
carry  water  or  bake  bread ;  but  he  must  wash  the  clothes  belonging  to 
both  sexes,  and,  in  this  function,  the  women  cannot  help  him." 
In  Cieza's  account  of  certain  ancient  Peruvians,  the  Cafiaris, 
we  find  a  kindred  system : — 

The  women  "  are  great  labourers,  for  it  is  they  who  dig  the  land,  sow  the 
crops,  and  reap  the  harvests,  while  their  husbands  remain  in  the  houses 
sewing  and  weaving,  adorning  their  clothes,  and  performing  other  feminine 
offices.  .  .  .  Some  Indians  say  that  this  arises  from  the  dearth  of  men  and 
the  great  abundance  of  women." 

Possibly  such  anomalies  as  these  have  arisen  in  cases  where 
surrounding  conditions,  causing  decrease  of  predatory  ac- 


428  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

tivities  while  the  labours  of  women  continued  to  suffice  for 
purposes  of  production,  left  the  men  to  lead  idle  lives  or 
lives  filled  with  easy  occupations.  We  may  safely  infer  that 
among  barbarous  peoples,  the  men  did  not  take  to  hard  and 
monotonous  labour  until  they  were  obliged. 

§  169.  But  where  chronic  militancy  did  not  effectually 
keep  down  population,  increase  of  it  made  peremptory  the 
devotion  of  men  to  food-production ;  and  with  this  change 
in  social  life  there  was  initiated  a  change  in  the  pro-ethical 
sentiments  respecting  labour.  The  Khonds  furnish  an  ex- 
ample. 

They  "  consider  it  beneath  their  dignity  to  barter  or  traffic,  and  .  .  . 
regard  as  base  and  plebeian  all  who  are  not  either  warriors  or  tillers  of  the 
soil." 

So  of  the  Javans  we  are  told  that — 

"They  have  a  contempt  for  trade,  and  those  of  higher  rank  esteem  it 
disgraceful  to  be  engaged  in  it ;  but  the  common  people  are  ever  ready  to 
engage  in  the  labours  of  agriculture,  and  the  chiefs  to  honour  and  encour- 
age agricultural  industry." 

From  various  sources  we  learn  that  the  Germanic  tribes,  both 
in  their  original  habitats  and  in  those  which  they  usurped, 
became  reconciled  to  husbandry  as  an  alternative  to  hunting 
and  marauding :  doubtless  because  by  no  other  occupation 
could  adequate  sustenance  be  obtained. 

Concerning  these  and  kindred  transitional  states,  two  pass- 
ing remarks  may  be  ventured.  One  is  that  since  industry, 
chiefly  agricultural,  is  at  first  carried  on  by  slaves  and  women, 
working  under  authority,  it  results  that  when  freemen  are 
forced  by  want  of  food  to  labour,  they  have  a  strong  preju- 
dice against  labouring  for  others,  that  is,  labouring  for 
hire ;  since  working  under  authority  by  contract,  too  much 
resembles  working  under  authority  by  compulsion.  "While 
Schomburgk  characterizes  the  Caribs  as  the  most  industrious 
race  in  Guiana,  he  says  that  only  the  extremest  need  can 
induce  a  Carib  so  far  to  lower  his  dignity  as  to  work  for 


INDUSTRY.  429 

wages  for  a  European.  This  feeling  is  shown  with  equal  or 
greater  strength  by  some  peaceful  peoples  to  whom  subordi- 
nation is  unfamiliar  or  unknown.  Speaking  of  South-East 
India,  Lewin  says : — 

"  Among  the  hill  tribes  labour  cannot  be  hired ;  the  people  work  each  one 
for  himself.  In  1865,  in  this  district,  a  road  had  to  be  cut ;  but  although 
fabulous  wages  were  offered,  the  hill-population  steadily  refused  to 
work." 

And  still  more  decided  is  the  aversion  to  working  under 
orders  shown  by  the  otherwise  industrious  Sonthal — 

"  The  Sonthal  will  take  service  with  no  one,  he  will  perform  no  work 
except  for  himself  or  his  family,  and  should  any  attempt  be  made  to  coerce 
him,  he  flies  the  country  or  penetrates  into  the  thickest  jungle,  where  un- 
known and  unsought,  he  commences  clearing  a  patch  of  ground  and  erect- 
ing his  log  hut." 

The  other  remark  is  that  the  scorn  for  trade  which,  as 
above  shown,  at  first  co-exists  with  the  honouring  of  agri- 
culture, is  possibly  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was  originally 
carried  on  chiefly  by  unsettled  classes,  who  were  detached, 
untrustworthy  members  of  a  community  in  which  most  men 
had  fixed  positions.  But  the  growth  of  trade  slowly 
brought  a  changed  estimate.  As,  in  hunting  tribes,  agricult- 
ure, relatively  unessential,  was  despised,  but  became  respect- 
able when  it  became  an  indispensible  means  to  maintenance 
of  life  ;  so  trade,  at  first  relatively  unessential  (since  essential 
things  were  mostly  made  at  home),  similarly  lacked  the 
sanction  of  necessity  and  of  ancestral  custom,  but  in  course 
of  time,  while  growing  into  importance,  gradually  ceased 
to  excite  that  pro-ethical  sentiment  which  vents  itself  in 
contempt. 

§  170.  "With  the  growth  of  populous  societies  and  the 
more  and  more  imperative  need  for  agriculture,  the  honour- 
ableness  of  labour  does  not  for  long  periods  obtain  recog- 
nition, for  the  reasons  indicated  at  the  outset:  it  is  car- 
ried on  by  slaves,  or  by  serfs,  or  in  later  days  by  men 


430  THE   INDUCTIONS    OF   ETHICS. 

more  or  less  inferior  in  body  or  mind.  A  strong  associa- 
tion in  thought  is  thus  established ;  and  the  natural  repug- 
nance to  work  is  enforced  by  the  belief  that  engagement  in 
it  is  a  confession  of  a  low  nature. 

Though,  in  the  literatures  of  ancient  civilized  societies,  we 
find  the  duty  of  labouring  insisted  on,  it  seems  mostly  to  be 
the  duty  of  subject  men.  The  injunction  contained  in  the 
Code  of  Manu — "  Daily  perform  thine  own  appointed  work 
unweariedly,"  refers  by  implication  to  men  under  authority : 
"  appointed  "  work  implies  a  master.  So,  too,  according  to 
the  Book  of  the  Dead  (cxxv),  the  Egyptian,  when  questioned 
after  death,  had  to  declare — "  I  have  not  been  idle,"  and, 
"  I  have  not  made  delays,  or  dawdled."  From  the  phras- 
ing of  the  last  sentence  we  may  fairly  infer  that  the  work 
diligently  performed  was  work  commanded.  Of  the  He- 
brews the  same  may  be  concluded.  Remembering  that, 
being  originally  pastoral,  they  long  continued  to  regard 
the  care  of  cattle  as  relatively  honourable  (like  the  exist- 
ing Arabs  among  whom,  when  the  men  are  not  raiding, 
their  only  fit  occupation  is  herding) ;  we  may  similarly 
gather  that  the  obligation  to  work  was  mostly  the  obliga- 
tion imposed  on  servants  or  slaves :  slaves  being  usually  the 
proper  word.  Though  the  third  Commandment  applies  to 
masters  as  well  as  to  servants,  yet,  even  supposing  the 
Commandments  were  indigenous,  the  fact  that  the  life 
was  still  mainly  pastoral,  implies  that  the  work  spoken 
of  was  pastoral  work  not  manual  labour.  It  is  true  that  in 
the  legend  of  Adam's  condemnation,  the  curse  of  labour  is 
imposed  on  all  his  descendants ;  but  we  have,  in  the  first 
place,  good  reason  for  regarding  this  legend  as  of  Babylonian 
origin,  and  we  have,  in  the  second  place,  the  inference 
suggested  by  recent  researches,  that  the  Adami,  a  dark 
race,  were  slaves,  and  that  the  eating  of  the  forbidden 
fruit  reserved  for  the  superior  race,  was  a  punishable  trans- 
gression ;  just  as  was,  in  ancient  Peru,  the  eating  of  coca, 
similarly  reserved  for  the  Ynca  class.  So  that  possibly 


431 

among  the  Hebrews  also,  the  duty  of  working  was  imposed 
on  inferior  men  rather  than  on  men  as  such.  In  Persian 
literature  we  do,  indeed,  meet  with  more  distinct  recognition 
of  the  virtuousness  of  labour  irrespective  of  conditions. 
Thus  it  is  said : — "  A  sower  of  seeds  is  as  great  in  the  eyes 
of  Ormusd,  as  if  he  had  given  existence  to  a  thousand 
creatures."  And  in  The  JParsees,  by  Dosabhoy  Framjee,  we 
read  that  "  The  Zoroastrian  is  taught  by  his  religion  to  earn 
his  bread  by  the  sweat  of  his  brow." 

§  171.  The  peoples  of  Europe  from  early  days  down  to 
our  own,  illustrate  this  relation  between  the  kind  of  social 
activity  and  the  prevailing  sentiment  about  labour. 

"We  have  first  the  evidence  which  the  Greeks  furnish. 
Plato,  showing  his  feeling  towards  traders  by  saying  that 
the  legislator  passes  them  over,  while  for  agriculturists  he 
shows  such  respect  as  is  implied  by  giving  them  laws,  shows 
more  fully  in  the  Republic  how  degraded  he  holds  to  be  all 
producers  and  distributors:  comparing  them  to  the  basest 
parts  of  the  individual  nature.  Similar  is  the  belief  ex- 
pressed, and  feeling  manifested,  by  Aristotle,  who  says : — 
"  It  is  impossible  for  one  who  lives  the  life  of  a  mechanic  or 
hired  servant  to  practice  a  life  of  virtue." 

Nor  has  it  been  otherwise  further  West.  In  the  Roman 
world,  along  with  persistent  and  active  militancy,  there  went 
an  increasing  degradation  of  the  non-militant  class — slaves 
and  freedmen.  And  throughout  "the  dark  ages,"  which 
collapse  of  the  brutal  civilization  of  Rome  left  behind, 
as  well  as  throughout  those  ages  during  which  perpet- 
ually recurring  wars  at  length  established  large  and  stable 
kingdoms,  this  contempt  for  industry,  both  bodily  and 
mental,  continued ;  so  that  not  only  unskilled  labour 
and  the  skilled  labour  of  the  craftsman,  but  'also  the 
intellectual  labour  of  the  educated  man,  were  treated  with 
contempt.  Only  in  proportion  as  fighting  ceased  to  be  the 

exclusive  business  of  life  with  all  but  the  subject  classes, 
29 


4:32  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

and  only  as  the  subject  classes,  simultaneously  growing 
larger,  gained  a  larger  share  in  the  formation  of  opinion 
did  the  honourableness  of  industry  become  in  some  measure 
recognized:  any  praise  of  it  previously  given  by  the 
governing  classes,  being  due  to  the  consciousness  that  it 
conduced  to  their  welfare. 

In  modern  days,  especially  among  ourselves  and  the 
Americans,  the  industrial  part  of  society  has  so  greatly 
outgrown  the  militant  part,  and  has  come  to  be  so  much 
more  operative  in  forming  the  sentiments  and  ideas  con- 
cerning industry,  that  these  are  almost  reversed.  Though 
unskilled  labour  is  still  regarded  with  something  like 
contempt,  as  implying  inferiority  of  capacity  and  of  social 
position;  and  though  the  labour  of  the  artisan,  more 
respected  because  of  the  higher  mental  power  it  implies, 
is  little  respected  because  of  its  class  associations;  yet 
intellectual  labour  has  in  recent  times  acquired  an  honour- 
able status.  But  the  fact  chiefly  to  be  noted  is  that 
along  with  the  advance  of  industrialism  towards  social 
supremacy,  there  has  arisen  the  almost  universal  feeling 
that  some  kind  of  useful  occupation  is  imperative.  Con- 
demnations of  the  "  idle  rich "  are  now-a-days  uttered  by 
the  rich  themselves. 

It  may  be  noted,  however,  that  even  still,  among  those 
who  represent  the  ancient  regime — the  military  and  naval 
officers — the  old  feeling  survives;  with  the  result  that 
those  among  them  who  possess  the  highest  culture — the 
medical  officers,  both  military  and  naval,  and  the  engineer 
officers — are  regarded  as  standing  on  a  lower  level  than 
the  rest,  and  are  treated  with  less  consideration  by  the 
authorities. 

§  172.  Thus  as  in  all  the  preceding  chapters,  so  in  this 
chapter,  we  see  that  the  ethical  conceptions,  or  rather  the 
pro-ethical  conceptions,  are  determined  by  the  forms  of 
the  social  activities.  Towards  such  activities  as  are  most 


INDUSTRY.  433 

conspicuously  conducive  to  the  welfare  of  the  society, 
sentiments  of  approbation  aje  called  forth,  and  conversely ; 
the  result  being  that  the  idea  of  right  comes  to  be 
associated  with  the  presence  of  them  and  wrong  with  the 
absence  of  them. 

Hence  the  general  contrast  shown  from  the  earliest 
stages  down  to  the  latest,  between  the  disgracefulness  of 
labour  in  societies  exclusively  warlike,  and  the  honourable- 
ness  of  labour  in  peaceful  societies,  or  in  societies  relatively 
peaceful.  This  contrast  is  significantly  indicated  by  the 
contrast  between  the  ceremonies  at  the  inauguration  of  a 
ruler.  Among  uncivilized  militant  peoples,  in  the  formal 
act  of  making  or  crowning  a  chief  or  king,  weapons  always 
figure  :  here  he  is  raised  on  a  shield  above  the  shoulders  of 
his  followers,  and  there  the  sword  is  girded  on  or  the  spear 
handed  to  him.  And  since,  in  most  cases,  relatively 
peaceful  societies  have  preserved  in  their  traditions  the 
ceremonies  used  in  their  exclusively  militant  days,  it  rarely 
happens  that  the  inauguration  of  a  ruler  is  free  from 
symbols  of  this  kind.  But  one  significant  case  of  freedom 
from  them  is  supplied  by  that  tribe  in  Africa,  the  Manansas, 
already  named,  who,  driven  by  warlike  tribes  around  into 
a  hill-country,  have  devoted  themselves  to  agriculture,  and 
who  say  : — "  We  want  not  the  blood  of  the  beasts,  much 
less  do  we  thirst  for  the  blood  of  men ! "  for  among  them, 
according  to  Holub,  a  new  sovereign  receives  as  tokens, 
some  sand,  stones,  and  a  hammer,  "symbolizing  industry 
and  labour." 

There  is  one  remaining  fact  to  be  named  and  emphasized. 
Out  of  the  pro-ethical  sentiments  which  yield  sanction  to 
industry  and  make  it  honourable,  there  eventually  emerges 
the  ethical  sentiment  proper.  This  does  not  enjoin  labour 
for  its  own  sake,  but  enjoins  it  as  implied  by  the  duty  of 
self-sustentation  instead  of  sustentation  by  others.  The 
virtue  of  work  consists  essentially  in  the  performance  of 
such  actions  as  suffice  to  meet  the  cost  of  maintaining 


434:  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

self  and  dependents  and  discharging  social  duties;  while 
the  disgracefulness  of  idleness  essentially  consists  in  the 
taking  from  the  common  stock  the  means  of  living,  while 
doing  nothing  either  to  add  to  it  or  otherwise  to  further 
men's  happiness. 


CHAPTEE    XII. 

TEMPEEANCE. 

§  173.  Such  ethical,  or  rather  pro-ethical,  sentiments  as 
attach  to  temperance,  have  primarily,  like  sundry  of  the 
associated  pro-ethical  sentiments,  religious  origins.  As 
shown  in  The  Principles  of  Sociology,  §  140,  the  bearing  of 
hunger  becomes  in  many  cases  a  virtue,  because  it  is  a 
sequence  of  leaving  food  for  the  ancestor,  and,  at  a  later 
stage,  sacrificing  food  to  the  god.  Where  food  is  not 
abundant,  relinquishments  of  it  involve  either  absolute 
fastings  or  stinted  meals ;  and  hence  there  arises  an 
association  in  thought  between  moderation  in  eating  and  a 
subordination  which  is  either  religious  or  quasi-religious. 

Possibly  in  some  cases  a  kindred  restraint  is  put  on  the 
drinking  of  liquors  which  are  used  as  libations,  since  the 
quantities  required  for  these  also,  restrict  the  quantities 
remaining  for  the  sacrificers.  If,  as  often  happens,  there  is 
at  every  meal  a  throwing  aside  of  drink,  as  well  as  food, 
for  the  invisible  beings  around,  it  tends  to  become  an 
implication  that  one  who  exceeds  so  far  as  to  become 
intoxicated,  has  disregarded  these  invisible  beings,  and  is 
therefore  to  be  blamed.  It  is  true  that,  as  we  shall 
presently  see,  other  ideas  sometimes  lead  to  contrary 
beliefs  and  sentiments ;  but  it  is  possible  that  there  may 
from  this  cause  have  originated  the  divine  reprobation 
which  is  in  some  cases  alleged. 

Since  the  above  paragraphs  were  written,  I  have  found 


436  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

clear  proof  that  the  suspicion  they  express  is  well  founded. 
From  a  people  among  whom  ancestor-worship,  and  the 
habitual  sacrificing  to  ancestors,  have  been  through  all 
known  ages  zealously  carried  on,  we  get  evidence  that 
moderation  in  both  food  and  drink,  pushed  even  to 
asceticism,  is  a  consequence  of  regard  for  the  dead,  to 
whom  oblations  are  constantly  made.  Said  Confucius: — 
"  He  who  aims  to  be  a  man  of  complete  virtue,  in  his  food 
does  not  seek  to  gratify  his  appetite."  Here  we  have  the 
virtue  enunciated  apart  from  its  cause.  But  Confucius 
also  said : — "  I  can  find  no  flaw  in  the  character  of  Yu. 
He  used  himself  coarse  food  and  drink,  but  displayed  the 
utmost  filial  piety  towards  the  spirits.  His  ordinary  gar- 
ments were  poor,  but  he  displayed  the  utmost  elegance  in 
his  sacrificial  cap  and  apron."  Here  we  have  the  virtue 
presented  in  connexion  with  religious  duty :  the  last  being 
the  cause,  the  first  the  consequence. 

Considered  apart  from  supposed  religious  sanction,  the 
virtue  of  temperance  can  of  course  have  no  other  sanction 
than  utility,  as  determined  by  experience.  The  observed 
beneficial  effects  of  moderation  and  the  observed  detrimental 
effects  of  excess,  form  the  bases  for  judgments,  and  the 
accompanying  feelings. 

Rational  ideas  concerning  temperance — especially  temper- 
ance in  food — cannot  be  formed  until  we  have  glanced  at 
those  variations  in  the  physiological  requirements,  entailed 
by  variations  in  surrounding  circumstances. 

§  174.  What  would  among  ourselves  be  condemned  as 
disgusting  gluttony,  is,  under  the  conditions  to  which 
certain  races  of  men  are  exposed,  quite  normal  and  indeed 
necessary.  "Where  the  habitat  is  such  as  at  one  time  to 
supply  very  little  food  and  at  another  time  food  in  great 
abundance,  survival  depends  on  the  ability  to  consume 
immense  quantities  when  the  opportunities  occur.  A 
good  instance  is  furnished  by  Sir  George  Grey's  account 


TEMPERANCE.  437 

of  the  orgies  which  follow  the  stranding  of  a  whale  in 
Australia. 

"  By  and  bye  other  natives  came  gaily  trooping  in  from  all  quarters :  by 
night  they  dance  and  sing,  and  by  day  they  eat  and  sleep,  and  for  days  this 
revelry  continues  unchecked,  until  they  at  last  fairly  eat  their  way  into  the 
whale,  and  you  see  them  climbing  in  and  about  the  stinking  carcase  choosing 
tit-bits  .  .  .  they  remain  by  the  carcase  for  many  days,  rubbed  from  head  to 
foot  with  stinking  blubber,  gorged  to  repletion  wtth  putrid  meat  .  .  .  When 
they  at  last  quit  their  feast,  they  carry  off  as  much  as  they  can  stagger  under." 

Living  as  the  Australians  do  in  a  barren  country,  and  often 
half  starved,  those  of  their  number  who  could  not  fully 
utilize  an  occasion  like  this  would  be  the  first  to  die 
during  times  of  famine.  Proof  that  this  is  the  true  inter- 
pretation, is  furnished  by  Christison's  account  of  a  tribe  of 
central  Queensland.  They  are  great  eaters  "  only  at  first ; 
but  when  they  have  become  used  to  rations  and  regular 
meals,  including  bread  or  damper,  they  are  very  moderate 
eaters,  perhaps  more  moderate  than  Europeans." 

In  other  cases  what  seems  to  us  extreme  and  almost 
incredible  excess,  is  due  to  the  physiological  necessity  for 
producing  heat  in  climates  where  the  loss  of  heat  is  very 
great.  Hence  the  explanation  of  the  following  story. 

"  From  Kooilittiuk  I  learnt  a  new  Eskimaux  luxury :  he  had  eaten  until  he 
was  drunk,  and  every  moment  fell  asleep,  with  a  flushed  and  burning  face, 
and  his  mouth  open  :  by  his  side  sat  Arnalooa  [his  wife],  who  was  attending 
her  cooking  pot,  and  at  short  intervals  awakened  her  spouse,  in  order  to  cram 
as  much  as  was  possible  of  a  large  piece  of  half -boiled  flesh  into  his  mouth, 
with  the  assistance  of  her  forefinger,  and  having  filled  it  quite  full,  cut  off 
the  morsel  close  to  his  lips.  This  he  slowly  chewed,  and  as  soon  as  a  small 
vacancy  became  perceptible,  this  was  filled  again  by  a  lump  of  raw  blubber. 
During  this  operation  the  happy  man  moved  no  part  of  him  but  his  jaws, 
not  even  opening  his  eyes ;  but  his  extreme  satisfaction  was  occasionally 
shown  by  a  most  expressive  grunt,  whenever  he  enjoyed  sufficient  room  for 
the  passage  of  sound." 

Another  case,  equally  astonishing,  comes  from  Northern 
Asia.  Mr.  Cochrane  says : — 

The  Yakuti  and  Tongousi  are  great  gluttons.  "  I  gave  the  child  [a  boy 
about  five  years  old]  a  candle  made  of  the  most  impure  tallow,  a  second, 
and  a  third, — and  all  were  devoured  with  avidity.  The  steersman  then  gave 
him  several  pounds  of  sour  frozen  butter ;  this  also  he  immediately  consumed; 


438  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

lastly,  a  large  piece  of  yellow  soap ;  all  went  the  same  road  ...  In  fact,  there 
is  nothing  in  the  way  of  fish  or  meat,  from  whatever  animal,  however  putrid 
or  unwholesome,  but  they  will  devour  with  impunity,  and  the  quantity  only 
varies  from  what  they  have,  to  what  they  can  get.  I  have  repeatedly  seen 
a  Yakut  or  a  Tongouse  devour  forty  pounds  of  meat  in  a  day." 

The  following  testimony  of  Capt.  Wrangell  shows  the 
physiological  results  of  this  enormous  consumption. 

"  Even  in  Siberia,  the  Jakuti  are  called  iron-men,  and  I  suppose  that  there 
are  not  any  other  people  in  the  world  who  endure  cold  and  hunger  as  they 
do.  I  have  seen  them  frequently  in  the  severe  cold  of  this  country,  and 
when  the  fire  had  long  been  extinguished,  and  the  light  jacket  had  slipped 
off  their  shoulders,  sleeping  quietly,  completely  exposed  to  the  heavens,  with 
scarcely  any  clothing  on,  and  their  bodies  covered  with  a  thick  coat  of  rime." 

And  now  observe  the  remarkable  and  significant  fact  that 
where  survival  primarily  depends  on  this  ability  to  eat  and 
digest  enormous  quantities  of  food,  this  ability  acquires  an 
ethical  or  pro-ethical  sanction.  According  to  Erman,  a 
Yakut  adage  says : — "  To  eat  much  meat  and  to  grow  fat 
upon  it,  is  the  highest  destiny  of  men." 

§  175.  Passing  from  this  extreme  instance  of  the  way  in 
which  the  necessities  of  life  generate  corresponding  ideas 
of  right  and  wrong,  and  coming  to  the  ordinary  cases 
meeting  us  in  temperate  and  tropical  climates,  where  some- 
thing like  an  ethical  sanction,  as  we  ordinarily  understand 
it,  comes  into  play;  we  find  no  connexions  between  tem- 
perance in  food  and  other  traits,  unless  it  be  a  general  asso- 
ciation of  gluttony  with  degradation. 

Even  this  qualified  generalization  may  be  held  doubtful. 
Cook  described  the  Tahitians  as  each  consuming  a  "pro- 
digious" quantity  of  food.  Yet  they  were  physically  a 
fine  race,  intellectually  superior  to  many,  and,  though 
licentious,  were  described  by  him  as  having  sundry  charac- 
teristics to  be  admired.  Conversely,  the  Arabs  are  rela- 
tively abstemious  in  both  food  and  drink.  But  while  in 
their  sexual  relations  they  are  about  as  low  as  the  Tahitians, 
since  they  are  continually  changing  wives,  and  say  of 
themselves — "  Dogs  are  better  than  we  are,"  they  are 


TEMPERANCE.  439 

little  to  be  admired  in  any  respect:  being  fanatically 
revengeful  and  regarding  skilful  robbery  as  a  qualification 
for  marriage. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  uncivilized  at  large  present 
no  definite  relations  between  temperance  or  intemperance 
in  food  and  their  other  traits,  they  display  little  or  no  senti- 
ment in  respect  of  one  or  the  other  which  can  be  called 
ethical.  Save  in  the  above  remarkable  proverb  quoted  from 
the  Yakuts,  opinion  on  this  matter  has  not  taken  shape 
among  them. 

In  some  ancient  semi-civilized  societies,  however,  there 
had  arisen  the  consciousness  that  excess  in  food  is  wrong. 
In  the  Code  of  Manu  it  is  written  : — 

"  For  gluttony  is  hateful,  injures  health, 
May  lead  to  death,  and  surely  bars  the  road 
To  holy  merit  and  celestial  bliss." 

The  fact  that  in  parts  of  the  Mahabharata  "  heavenly 
blessedness  "  is  described  as  without  any  kind  of  "  sensual 
gratification,"  implies  reprobation  of  excess  in  eating.  This 
is  of  course  implied  also  in  the  ascetic  life  on  which  the 
Indian  sages  insisted.  The  Hebrews,  too,  displayed  this  con- 
sciousness :  there  was  occasional  advocacy  of  abstemiousness, 
as  shown  in  the  proverb  : — 

"  Be  not  among  wine  bibbers :  among  riotous  eaters  of  flesh :  for  the 
drunkard  and  the  glutton  shall  come  to  poverty :  and  drowsiness  shall 
clothe  a  man  with  rags."  (Prov.  xxiii,  20-1.) 

By  the  Egyptians  gluttony  was  recognized  as  a  vice,  but  was 
nevertheless  deliberately  practised.  On  the  one  hand,  excess 
in  food  was  set  down  among  the  forty-two  chief  sins  of  the 
Egyptians,  while  on  the  other  hand — 

At  their  "  banquets  the  Egyptians  do  not  seem  to  have  been  very  moderate. 
Herodotus  tells  us  (ii.  78)  that  a  small  wooden  image  of  a  mummy  was 
carried  round  at  their  entertainments  with  the  exhortion, '  Look  on  this, 
drink  and  be  merry.  When  dead,  thou  wilt  be  as  this  is ! '  This  admoni- 
tion was  not  without  its  results.  In  the  pictures  on  monuments  we  find 
not  only  men,  but  women,  throwing  up  the  surfeit  of  food  and  wine." 
But  the  general  aspect  of  the  evidence  seems  to  imply  that 
with  the  rise  of  settled  societies,  and  with  the  generalizing 


440  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

of  experiences,  there  arose  a  utilitarian  condemnation  of 
excess  in  food. 

§  176.  Excess  in  drinking  is  a  phrase  which,  though 
applicable  to  drinking  of  unfermented  liquors  in  injurious 
quantities,  yet  practically  applies  to  liquors  which  are  either 
fermented,  and  therefore  intoxicating,  or  are  otherwise 
intoxicating.  Opinion  concerning  the  taking  of  them  is 
determined  mainly  by  recognition  of  the  effects  they  pro- 
duce—  regarded  here  with  approbation  and  there  with 
reprobation. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  state  of  intoxication 
is  everywhere  condemned.  Whether  produced  by  alcohol 
or  by  other  agent,  it  has  been  in  early  times  lauded,  and 
still  is  so  in  some  places.  An  interpretation  is  suggested 
by  the  remark  of  an  Arafura,  who,  when  belief  in  the 
Christian  God  was  commended  to  him,  and  he  was  told 
that  God  is  everywhere  present,  said : — "  Then  this  God 
is  certainly  in  your  arrack,  for  I  never  feel  happier  than 
when  I  have  drunk  plenty  of  it."  The  idea  thus  implied 
was  distinctly  and  perpetually  expressed  by  the  ancient 
Indians  in  their  praises  of  soma-drinking.  The  god  Soma 
was  supposed  to  be  present  in  the  juice  of  the  plant  called 
soma ;  intoxication  resulted  from  being  possessed  by  him ; 
and  the  exalted  state  desired,  produced,  and  gloried  in,  was  a 
state  of  religious  blessedness :  the  gods  themselves  being 
supposed  to  be  thus  inspired  by  the  god  Soma.  Says  Max 
Miiller : — 

Madakyut=such  "a  state  of  intoxication  as  was  not  incompatible  with 
the  character  of  the  ancient  gods.  .  .  .  We  have  no  poetical  word  to  ex- 
press a  high  state  of  mental  excitement  produced  by  drinking  the  intoxi- 
cating juice  of  the  Soma  or  other  plants,  which  has  not  something  oppro- 
brious mixed  up  with  it,  while  in  ancient  times  that  state  of  excitement 
was  celebrated  as  a  blessing  of  the  gods,  as  not  unworthy  of  the  gods 
themselves,  nay  as  a  s,tate  in  which  both  the  warrior  and  the  poet  would 
perform  their  highest  achievements." 

So,    too,   by  the   Greeks    it  was    believed   that  the    god 


TEMPERANCE.  44:1 

Dionysus  was  present  in  wine,  and  that  "  the  Bacchic 
excitement,"  with  its  accompanying  prophetic  power,  was 
due  to  possession  by  him.  Hence  there  arose  a  religious 
sanction  for  drunkenness,  as  shown  in  the  orgies.  Nor 
are  we  without  cases  in  our  own  times.  The  Dahomans, 
according  to  Burton,  deem  it  a  "duty  to  the  gods  to  be 
drunk ; "  and  the  Ainos  sanctify  their  intoxication  under 
" the  fiction  of  ' drinking  to  the  gods : '"  " the  more  sake 
the  Ainos  drink  the  more  devout  they  are,  and  the  better 
pleased  are  the  gods."  Kindred  ideas  and  sentiments  exist 
in  Polynesia,  in  connection  with  the  taking  of  the  intoxi- 
cating ava,  fcava,  or  yaqona.  In  Fiji  the  preparation  and 
drinking  are  accompanied  by  prayers  to  the  gods  and 
chants,  and  participation  in  the  ceremonies  is  regarded  as 
honourable. 

Evidently  then,  drunkenness,  instead  of  having  in  all  cases 
religious  condemnation,  has  in  some  cases  religious  sanction ; 
and  thus  comes  to  have  a  pro-ethical  sentiment  justifying  it. 
This  is  very  well  shown  by  the  Ainos,  who  refuse  to  associate 
with  those  who  will  not  drink. 

§  177.  Either  with  or  without  this  kind  of  sanction,  intem- 
perance, under  one  or  other  form,  is  widely  spread  among 
the  inferior  races. 

Of  the  Kalmucks,  Pallas  tells  us  that  they  are  intem- 
perate in  eating  and  drinking  when  they  have  the  chance. 
"  The  festivities  of  the  Khonds,"  says  Campbell,  "  usually 
terminate  in  universal  drunkenness."  Brett  writes  that 
the  drunkenness  of  the  natives  of  Guiana  takes  the  shape 
of  "fearful  excess  at  intervals."  And  we  read  of  the 
existing  Guatemalans  that  "  the  greatest  happiness  of 
these  people  consists  in  drunkenness,  produced  by  the 
excessive  use  of  ...  chicha."  These  last  testimonies 
respecting  American  peoples  at  the  present  day,  recall 
kindred  testimonies  respecting  ancient  American  peoples. 
Garcilasso  says  of  the  Peruvians : — "  They  brought  liquor 


442  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

in  great  quantity,  for  this  was  one  of  the  most  prevalent 
vices  among  the  Indians."  Of  the  Yucatanese,  Landa  says : 
— "  The  Indians  were  very  debauched,  and  often  got 
drunk ; "  "  the  women  got  intoxicated  at  the  banquets, 
but  by  themselves."  And  Sahagun  writes  of  the  Mexicans 
that— 

"  They  said  that  the  bad  effects  of  drunkenness  were  produced  by  one  of 
the  gods  of  wine.  Hence  it  appears  that  they  did  not  consider  as  a  sin 
what  they  had  done  while  being  drunk." 

But  intemperance  is  by  no  means  universal  among  the 
uncivilized  and  semi-civilized  :  sobriety  being  shown  by  some 
of  the  utterly  primitive  as  well  as  by  some  of  the  consider- 
ably advanced.  Of  the  Veddahs  we  read  : — "  They  do  not 
smoke,  and  are  very  temperate,  drinking  water  only."  Says 
Campbell : — 

"  Fond  of  fermented  and  spirituous  liquors,  the  Lepchas  are  nevertheless 
not  given  to  drunkenness." 

Of  the  Sumatran  of  the  interior,  only  partially  vitiated  by 
contact  with  the  Malays,  Marsden  tells  us  : — "  He  is  temper- 
ate and  sober,  being  equally  abstemious  in  meat  and  drink." 
Africa,  too,  supplies  instances. 

"The  Foolas  and  Mandingos  very  strictly  abstain  from  fermented 
liquors,  and  from  spirits,  which  they  hold  in  such  abhorrence,  that  if  a 
single  drop  were  to  fall  upon  a  clean  garment,  it  would  be  rendered  unfit 
to  wear  until  washed." 

And  Waitz  makes  the  general  remark  that — 

"  Except  where  they  have  had  much  intercourse  with  whites  the  Negroes 
cannot  be  accused  of  being  specially  addicted  to  intoxicating  liquors." 

This  last  statement,  reminding  us  of  the  demoralization 
which  Europeans  everywhere  produce  in  the  native  races 
whom  they  pretend  to  civilize,  and  reminding  us  more 
especially  of  the  disastrous  effects  which  follow  the  supply- 
ing of  them  with  whisky  or  rum,  shows  how  cautious  we 
must  be  in  our  inferences  respecting  the  relations  between 
drinking  habits  and  social  states.  It  is  clear  that  in  some 
cases,  as  in  that  of  the  Veddahs,  sobriety  may  result  from 
lack  of  intoxicants,  and  that  in  other  cases  insobriety  does 


TEMPERANCE. 

not  naturally  belong  to  the  type  or  the  tribe,  but  has  been 
imported. 

§  178.  Perhaps  among  European  peoples,  with  their  long 
histories,  we  may  with  most  chance  of  success  seek  for  such 
relation  as  exists  between  sobriety  and  social  conditions. 
This  relation  seems  but  indefinite  at  best. 

Brutal  as  was  their  social  system,  the  Spartans  were 
ascetic  in  their  regimen ;  and  remembering  the  lessons 
which  drunken  helots  were  made  to  inculcate,  it  is  clear 
that  originally  the  Spartans  reprobated  drunkenness  and 
were  ordinarily  sober.  Meanwhile  the  Athenians,  much 
more  civilized  as  they  were  in  their  social  state,  and  far 
superior  in  culture,  were  by  no  means  so  sober.  Some 
scanty  testimonies  imply  that  among  the  European  peoples 
who  at  that  time  were  socially  organized  in  but  low  degrees, 
excesses  in  drinking  were  frequent.  Of  the  early  Gauls 
Diodorus  says : — "  They  are  so  exceedingly  given  to  wine, 
that  they  guzzle  it  down  as  soon  as  it  is  imported  by 
the  merchant."  And  describing  the  primitive  Germans, 
Tacitus  tells  us  that  "  to  pass  an  entire  day  and  night  in 
drinking  disgraces  no  one."  Of  course  not  much  has  come 
down  to  us  respecting  men's  drinking  habits  during  "the 
dark  ages ; "  but  the  prevalence  of  intemperance  may  be 
inferred  from  such  indications  as  we  have.  One  of  the 
excesses  occurring  in  the  Merovingian  period  was  that 
Bishop  Eonius  fell  down  drunk  at  mass ;  and  we  are  told  of 
Charlemagne  that  he  was  temperate :  the  implication  being 
that  temperance  was  something  exceptional.  Of  France  it 
may  be  remarked  that  even  when  intoxication  was  not  pro- 
duced, wine  was  taken  in  great  excess  during  many  later 
centuries.  Montaigne,  while  saying  that  drunkenness  was 
less  than  when  he  was  a  boy,  tells  us  that : — 

"  I  have  seen  a  great  lord  of  my  time  .  .  .  who  without  setting  himself 
to't,  and  after  his  ordinary  rate  of  drinking  at  meals,  swallowed  down  not 
much  less  than  five  quarts  of  wine." 


444:  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

Evidently,  from  the  days  of  Montaigne  down  to  those  of 
the  modern  French,  the  majority  of  whom  water  their 
ordinary  weak  wine,  the  decrease  of  intemperance  has  been 
marked.  And  among  ourselves  there  has  taken  place, 
though  with  much  irregularity,  a  kindred  change.  From 
old  English  and  Danish  times,  when  there  was  drunkenness 
among  monks  as  well  as  others,  down  through  the  times 
of  the  Normans,  who  soon  became  as  intemperate  as  those 
they  had  subjugated,  and  down  through  subsequent  cen- 
turies, the  excesses  in  drinks  of  the  less  potent  kinds 
were  great  and  general.  At  the  beginning  of  the  last 
century,  when  the  consumption  of  spirits  increased  greatly, 
rising  to  nearly  a  gallon  per  head  of  the  population 
annually,  and  producing  scenes  such  as  Hogarth  depicted 
in  his  "  Gin  Lane,"  there  came  the  remedial  Gin  Act ; 
which,  however,  was  soon  repealed  after  having  done 
mischief.  Then  during  the  rest  of  the  century,  while 
"drunkenness  was  the  common  vice  of  the  middle  and 
lower  orders,"  wealthier  people  indulged  so  largely  in  wine 
for  their  entertainments,  as  not  unf requently  to  impoverish 
themselves. 

§  179.  Evidently  the  relations  between  drinking  habits 
and  kinds  of  social  life  are  obscure.  We  cannot,  as  the 
teetotalers  would  like,  assert  a  regular  proportion  between 
temperance  and  civilization,  or  between  intemperance  and 
moral  degradation  at  large.  Says  Surgeon-Gen.  Balfour 
—  "Half  of  the  Asiatic  races  —  Arab,  Persian,  Hindu, 
Burman,  Malay,  Siamese  ...  are  abstinents;"  and  yet 
no  one  will  contend  that,  either  in  social  type  or  social 
conduct,  these  races  are  superior  to  the  races  of  Europe 
who  are  anything  but  abstinents.  Within  Europe  itself 
differences  teach  us  the  same  lesson.  Sober  Turkey  is  not 
so  high  in  its  social  life  as  whisky-drinking  Scotland.  Nor, 
on  comparing  Italy  and  Germany,  do  we  see  that  along 
with  the  contrast  between  the  small  potations  of  the  one, 


TEMPERANCE.  445 

and  the  great  potations  of  the  other,  there  goes  contrast 
between  their  moral  states  of  the  kind  that  might  be 
looked  for.  Putting  on  the  one  hand  the  Bedouin,  who, 
habitual  robber  as  he  is  and  displaying  numerous  vices, 
nevertheless  drinks  no  fermented  liquors,  and  cries  "  Fie 
upon  thee,  drunkard  ! "  and  on  the  other  hand  the  clever 
English  artisan,  who  occasionally  drinks  to  excess  (and  the 
clever  ones  are  most  apt  to  do  this)  but  who  is  often  a  good 
fellow  in  other  respects,  we  do  not  find  any  clear  association 
between  temperance  and  rectitude. 

Some  relation  may  reasonably  be  supposed  to  exist 
between  drunkenness  and  general  wretchedness.  Where 
the  life  is  miserable  there  is  a  great  tendency  to  drink, 
partly  to  get  what  little  momentary  pleasure  may  be  had, 
and  partly  to  shut  out  unhappy  thoughts  about  the  future. 
But  if  we  recall  the  drunkenness  which  prevailed  among 
our  upper  classes  in  the  last  century,  we  cannot  say  that 
wretchedness,  or  at  any  rate  physical  wretchedness,  was 
its  excuse.  Ennui,  too,  seems  often  an  assignable  cause, 
and  may  have  produced  the  prevailing  inebriety  throughout 
Europe  in  early  days,  when  there  was  difficulty  in  passing 
the  time  not  occupied  in  fighting  or  hunting.  Yet  we  find 
various  peoples  whose  lives  are  monotonous  enough,  but  who 
do  not  drink.  Manifestly  various  influences  co-operate ;  and 
it  appears  that  the  results  of  them  are  too  irregular  to  be 
generalized. 

§  180.  But  we  are  chiefly  concerned  with  temperance  and 
intemperance  as  ethically  regarded.  That  intemperance, 
whether  in  food  or  drink,  is  condemned  by  the  ethical 
sentiment  proper,  which  refers,  not  to  the  extrinsic  but  to 
the  intrinsic  effects,  as  injurious  alike  to  body  and  mind, 
goes  without  saying.  But  it  is  otherwise  with  the  pro- 
ethical  sentiment.  We  have  many  cases  showing  that  there 
comes  either  approbation  or  reprobation  of  intemperance, 
according  to  the  religious  ideas  and  social  habits. 


44:6  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

Already  we  have  seen  that  intoxication  may  be  sanctified 
by  certain  theological  beliefs;  and  here  we  have  to  note 
that  prevailing  excess  in  drinking,  and  the  current  opinion 
which  grows  up  along  with  it,  may  result  in  a  social  sanction. 
One  of  the  uncivilized  races  shows  us  that  a  habit  of  taking 
a  toxic  agent  may,  where  it  is  general,  generate  for  itself 
not  only  a  justification  but  something  more.  Says  Yule  of 
the  Kasias: — 

"  In  the  people  perhaps  the  first  thing  that  strikes  a  stranger,  is  their 
extreme  addiction  to  chewing  pawn,  and  their  utter  disregard  of  the  traces 
which  its  use  leaves  on  their  teeth  and  lips.  Indeed  they  pride  themselves 
on  this,  saying  that '  Dogs  and  Bengalees  have  white  teeth.' " 

In  records  of  ancient  civilized  races  we  find  evidence  of 
a  kindred  pride  in  excesses.  Apart  from  its  religious 
sanction,  the  drunken  elevation  which  followed  soma- 
drinking  was  gloried  in  by  the  Indian  rishi ;  and  among  a 
neighbouring  people,  alcoholic  excess  was  by  some  thought 
the  reverse  of  disgraceful,  as  witness  the  epitaph  of  Darius 
Hystaspes,  saying  that  he  was  a  great  conqueror  and  a 
great  drinker,  and  as  witness  the  self-commendation  of 
Cyrus,  who  "in  his  epistle  to  the  Spartans  says,  that  in 
many  other  things  he  was  more  fit  than  his  brother  to  be 
a  king,  and  chiefly  because  he  could  bear  abundance  of 
wine."  But  modern  Europe  has  yielded  the  clearest  proofs 
that  prevailing  inebriety  may  generate  a  sentiment  which 
justifies  inebriety.  The  drinking  usages  in  Germany  in 
past  times,  and  down  to  the  present  time  among  students, 
show  that  along  with  an  inordinate  desire  for  fermented 
liquor,  and  the  scarcely  credible  ability  to  absorb  it,  there 
had  grown  up  a  contempt  for  those  who  fell  much  below 
the  average  drinking  capacity,  and  a  glory  in  being  able  to 
drink  the  largest  quantity  in  the  shortest  time.  Among 
ourselves,  too,  in  the  last  century,  kindred  ideas  and  feel- 
ings prevailed.  The  saying  that — "  It  is  a  poor  heart  that 
never  rejoices  "  was  used  as  a  justification  for  excess.  The 
taking  of  salt  to  produce  thirst,  the  use  of  wine-glasses  which 


TEMPERANCE.  447 

would  not  stand,  and  the  exhortation  "  No  heel-taps," 
clearly  showed  the  disapproval  of  moderation  which  went 
along  with  applause  for  the  "  three-bottle "  man.  There 
are  some  still  living  who  have  taken  part  in  orgies  at  which 
after  locking  the  door  and  placing  a  number  of  bottles  of 
wine  on  the  sideboard,  the  host  announced  that  they  had  to 
be  emptied  before  rising :  the  refusal  to  take  the  required 
share  causing  reprobation.* 

But  while,  in  past  generations,  there  was  thus  a  certain 
pro-ethical  sentiment  upholding  intemperance,  in  our  own 
generation  temperance  is  upheld  both  by  the  ethical  senti- 
ment, and  by  a  pro-ethical  sentiment.  Not  only  is  drinking 
to  excess  universally  reprobated,  and  to  have  been  intoxicated 
even  once  leaves  a  stain  on  a  man's  reputation,  but  we  have 
now  a  large  class  by  whom  even  moderate  drinking  is  con- 
demned. While  in  America  water  is  the  universal  beverage 
at  meals  and  the  taking  of  wine  is  regarded  as  scarcely  re- 
spectable. 

*  The  late  Mr.  John  Ball,  F.E.S.,  brought  up  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Belfast,  was,  when  young,  though  nominally  a  Catholic,  intimate  with  a 
wealthy  family  of  Protestants,  at  the  head  of  which  was  an  old  gentleman 
looked  up  to  with  reverence  by  his  descendants.  Mr.  Ball  told  me  that 
this  patriarch  took  a  fancy  to  him  ;  and  one  day,  when  leaving  the  room 
after  dinner,  led  him  aside  and  patting  him  on  the  shoulder  said — "My 
good  young  friend,  I  want  to  talk  to  you  about  your  wine.  You  don't 
drink  enough.  Now  take  my  advice — make  your  head  while  you  are 
young,  and  then  you  will  be  able  to  drink  like  a  gentleman  all  your  life." 


30 


CHAPTEK  XIIL 

CHASTITY. 

§  181.  Before  we  can  understand  fully  the  ethical  aspects 
of  chastity,  we  must  study  its  biological  and  sociological 
sanctions.  Conduciveness  to  welfare,  individual  or  social 
or  both,  being  the  ultimate  criterion  of  evolutionary  ethics, 
the  demand  for  chastity  has  to  be  sought  in  its  effects  under 
given  conditions. 

Among  men,  as  among  inferior  creatures,  the  needs  of 
,the  species  determine  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  these 
•or  those  sexual  relations ;  for  sexual  relations  unfavourable 
to  the  rearing  of  offspring,  in  respect  either  of  number  or 
quality,  must  tend  towards  degradation  and  extinction.  The 
fact  that  some  animals  -are  polygamous  while  others  are 
monogamous  is  thus  to  be  explained.  In  Part  III  of  The 
Principles  of  Sociology,  treating  of  "  Domestic  Institutions," 
it  was  shown  that  the  relation  between  the  sexes  is  liable 
to  be  determined  into  this  or  that  form  by  environing 
conditions ;  and  that  certain  inferior  forms  of  the  relation 
appear,  under  some  conditions,  to  become  necessary:  non- 
adoption  of  them  being  fatal  to  the  society.  A  natural 
connexion  was  found  to  exist  between  polygamy  and  a  life 
of  perpetual  hostilities,  entailing  great  destruction  of  men ; 
since  of  tribes  which  mutually  slaughter  their  men,  tire  one 
which,  being  monogamous,  leaves  many  women  unmarried 
and  childless,  must  fail  to  maintain  its  population  in  face 
of  the  one  which,  being  polygamous,  utilizes  all  its  women 


CHASTITY.  449 

as  mothers.  (§  307).  We  saw,  too,  that  in  some  cases, 
especially  in  Thibet,  polyandry  appears  more  conducive  to 
social  welfare  than  any  other  relation  of  the  sexes.  It 
receives  approval  from  travellers,  and  even  a  Moravian 
missionary  defends  it :  the  missionary  holding  that  "  super- 
abundant population,  in  an  unfertile  country,  must  be  a  great 
calamity,  and  produce  '  eternal  warfare  or  eternal  want.' ': 
(§  301.) 

These  inferior  forms  of  marriage  are  not  consistent  with 
that  conception  of  chastity  which  accompanies  the  settled 
monogamy  of  advanced  societies.  As  we  understand  it, 
the  word  connotes  either  the  absence  of  any  sexual  relation, 
or  the  permanent  sexual  relation  of  one  man  with  one 
woman.  But  we  must  not  extend  this  higher  conception  of 
chastity  to  these  lower  societies.  We  must  not  assume  that 
there  exists  in  them  any  such  ethical  reprobation  of  these 
less-restricted  relations  as  they  excite  in  us.  To  see  this 
clearly  we  must  glance  at  the  facts. 

§  182.  Already  in  §  120  I  have  given  sundry  illustrations 
of  the  truth,  startling  to  those  whose  education  has  left 
them  ignorant  of  multiform  humanity,  that  the  institution 
of  polygamy  is  in  various  places  morally  approved,  while  the 
opposite  institution  is  condemned.  This  truth,  however, 
should  not  cause  surprise,  considering  that  from  childhood 
all  have  been  familiar  with  the  tacit  approval  of  the  usage 
in  the  book  they  regard  as  divine.  The  polygamy  of  the 
patriarchs  is  spoken  of  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  there  is 
implied  approval  of  it  by  a  wife  who  prompts  her  husband 
to  take  a  concubine.  But  beyond  this  we  see,  in  the  case 
of  David,  both  the  religious  and  the  social  sanction  for 
a  harem :  the  one  being  implied  by  the  statement  that 
David,  to  whom  God  had  given  his  "  master's  wives,"  was 
a  man  "after  his  own  heart,"  and  the  other  by  the 
fact  that  when  Nathan  reproached  him,  the  reproach  was 
that  he  had  taken  the  solitary  wife  of  Uriah,  not  that  he 


450  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

had  already  many  wives  (1  Sam.  xiii,  14 ;  2  Sam.  xii).  His 
many  wives  we  may  reasonably  suppose  constituted  a  mark 
of  dignity,  as  do  those  of  kings  among  savage  and  semi-civil- 
ized peoples  now.  Clearly,  then,  under  certain  social  condi- 
tions there  is  a  pro-ethical  sentiment  supporting  polygamy, 
and  that  species  of  unchastity  implied  by  it. 

So,  too,  is  it  with  polyandry.  Yarious  passages  in  the 
Mahabharata  imply  that  it  was  a  recognized  institution 
among  the  early  Indians,  regarded  by  them  as  perfectly 
proper :  practised,  indeed,  by  those  who  are  upheld  as 
models  of  virtue.  The  heroine  of  the  poem,  Draupadi,  is 
the  wife  of  five  husbands.  Each  of  them  had  a  house  and 
garden  of  his  own,  and  Draupadi  dwelt  with  them  "  in  turn 
for  two  days  at  a  time."  Meanwhile,  as  we  have  already 
seen  (§  117),  one  of  the  husbands,  Yudhishthira,  unfortu- 
nate notwithstanding  his  goodness,  enunciates  the  doctrine 
that  right  is  to  be  done  regardless  of  consequences;  while 
elsewhere  Draupadi  describes  the  virtues  which  she  holds 
proper  for  a  wife,  and  represents  herself  as  acting  up  to 
them.  Kindred  evidence  is  yielded  at  the  present  time  by 
some  of  the  tribes  in  the  valleys  of  the  Himalayas — the 
Ladakhis,  and  the  Champas.  Telling  us  that  they  practise 
polyandry,  Drew  says  of  the  Ladakhis  that  they  are 
"cheerful,  willing,  and  good-tempered;"  "they  are  not 
quarrelsome ; "  are  "  much  given  to  truth-telling ; "  and  he 
adds  that  the  "  social  liberty  of  the  women  ...  I  think  it 
may  be  said,  is  as  great  as  that  of  workmen's  wives  in  Eng- 
land." 

Rightly  to  interpret  these  facts,  however,  it  should  be 
added  that  the  social  state  in  which  polyandry  originally 
existed  among  the  Indian  peoples,  had  emerged  from  a 
social  state  still  lower  in  respect  of  the  sexual  relations. 
Bad  as  were  the  gods  of  the  Greeks,  the  gods  of  the 
ancient  Indians  were  worse.  In  the  Puranas  as  well  as  in 
the  Mahabharata  there  are  stories  about  the  "adulterous 
amours "  of  Indra,  Yaruna,  and  other  gods ;  at  the  same 


CHASTITY.  451 

time  that  the  "celestial  nymphs  are  expressly  declared  to 
be  courtezans,"  and  are  "  sent  by  the  gods  from  time  to 
time  to  seduce  austere  sages."  A  society  having  a  theology 
of  such  a  kind,  cannot  well  have  been  other  than  licentious. 
With  the  ascription  even  of  incest  to  some  of  their  gods, 
there  naturally  went  an  utter  disregard  of  restraints  among 
themselves.  In  the  Mahdbharata  we  read  : — 

"  Women  were  formerly  unconfined,  and  roved  about  at  their  pleasure, 
independent.  Though  in  their  youthful  innocence,  they  abandoned  their 
husbands,  they  were  guilty  of  no  offence ;  for  such  was  the  rule  in  early 
times." 

And  according  to  a  tradition  embodied  in  that  poem — 

This  condition  of  things  was  "  abolished  by  Svetakehi,  son  of  the  rishi 
Uddalaka,  who  was  incensed  at  seeing  his  mother  led  away  by  a  strange 
Brahman.  His  father  told  him  there  was  no  reason  to  be  angry,  as :  '  The 
women  of  all  castes  on  earth  are  unconflned  :  just  as  cattle  are  situated,  so 
are  human  beings,  too,  within  their  respective  castes.'  " 

Hence  it  may  possibly  be  that  polyandry  arose  as  a  limita- 
tion of  promiscuity ;  and  that  therefore  the  ethical  sentiment 
existing  in  support  of  it,  was  really  in  support  of  a  relative 
chastity. 

§  183.  Returning  now  from  this  half -parenthetical  discus- 
sion of  those  types  of  undeveloped  chastity  which  are  implied 
by  low  types  of  marriage,  and  resuming  the  discussion  of 
chastity  and  unchastity  considered  in  their  simple  forms,  let 
us  first  look  at  the  evidence  presented  by  various  uncivilized 
peoples.  And  here,  in  pursuance  of  the  course  followed  in 
preceding  chapters  dealing  with  other  divisions  of  conduct, 
I  am  obliged  to  name  facts  which  in  the  absence  of  a  strong 
reason  should  be  passed  over.  They  are  not,  however,  more 
objectionable  than  many  which  are  reported  in  our  daily 
papers  with  no  better  motive  than  ministering  to  a  prurient 
curiosity. 

The  absolute  or  relative  deficiency  of  chastity  may  be  con- 
veniently exemplified  by  a  string  of  extracts  from  books  of 
travel.  We  may  begin  with  North  America.  The  testimony 


452  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

of  Lewis  and  Clarke  respecting  the  Chinooks,  agreeing  with 
that  of  Ross,  as  follows : — 

"  Among  these  people,  as  indeed  among  all  Indians,  the  prostitution  of 
unmarried  women  is  so  far  from  being  considered  criminal  or  improper, 
that  the  females  themselves  solicit  the  favours  of  the  other  sex,  with  the 
entire  approbation  of  their  friends  and  connexions." 

Concerning  the  Sioux,  these  same  travellers  give  us  a  fact 
equally  significant : — 

"  The  Sioux  had  offered  us  squaws,  but  while  we  remained  there  having 
declined,  they  followed  us  with  offers  of  females  for  two  days." 

Coming  further  south  the  Creeks  may  be  named  as,  accord- 
ing to  Schoolcraft,  no  better  than  the  Chinooks.  Like  evi- 
dence is  furnished  by  South  American  races,  as  the  Tupis 
and  Caribs: — 

"  Bands  [of  chastity]  were  broken  without  fear,  and  incontinence  was  not 
regarded  as  an  offence." 

Caribs  "  put  no  value  on  the  chastity  of  unmarried  women." 

These  instances  yielded  by  America,  are  associated  with 
some  in  which  the  uncha&tity  is  of  a  qualified  kind.  To 
the  fact  that  "among  the  Esquimaux  it  is  considered  a 
great  mark  of  friendship  for  two  men  to  exchange  wives  for 
a  day  or  two,"  may  be  added  a  like  fact  presented  by  the 
Chippewayans : — 

"  It  is  a  very  common  custom  among  the  men  of  this  country  to  ex- 
change a  night's  lodging  with  each  other's  wives.  But  this  is  so  far  from 
being  considered  as  an  act  which  is  criminal,  that  it  is  esteemed  by  them 
as  one  of  the  strongest  ties  of  friendship  between  two  families." 

The  Dakotas  supply  an  example,  like  many  found  elsewhere, 
of  the  co-existence  of  laxity  before  marriage  with  strictness 
after  it. 

"  There  are  few  nations  in  the  world  amongst  whom  this  practice,  origi- 
nating in  a  natural  desire  not  to 'make  a  leap  in  the  dark,' cannot  be 
traced.  Yet  after  marriage  they  will  live  like  the  Spartan  matrons  a  life 
of  austerity  in  relation  to  the  other  sex." 

In   ancient   Nicaragua,  as   in  various   countries,  there  was 

another  kind    of  compromise    between    chastity  and   un- 

chastity. 

"  On  the  occasion  of  a  certain  annual  festival,  it  was  permitted  that  all 

the  women,  of  whatever  condition,  might  abandon  themselves  to  the  arms 


CHASTITY.  453 

of  whomsoever  they  pleased.  Rigid  fidelity,  however,  was  exacted  at  all 
other  times." 

But  there  seems  to  have  been  no  restraint  at  other  times  on 
the  unmarried,  as  witness  Herrera's  statement :. — 

"  Many  of  the  women  were  beautiful,  and  their  pa-rents  used,  when  the 
maidens  were  marriageable,  to  send'  them  to  earn  their  portions,  and 
accordingly  they  ranged  about  the  country  in  a  shameful  manner,  till  they 
had  got  enough  to  marry  them  off.'* 

Asia  furnishes  illustrations  of  another  usage-  common 
among  the  uncivilized.  The  Kamtschadales  and  Aleuts 
lend  their  wives  to  guests;  and  sundry  others  of  the 
Northern  Asiatic  races  do  the  like.  Pallas  tells  us  that 
the  Kalmucks  are  little  jealous  of  their  wives,  and  freely  give 
them  up  to  acquaintances.  And  then  of  an  adjacent  people 
we  read — 

"  The  relation  between  the  sexes,  among  the  Kirghizes,,  is  altogether  on 
a  very  primitive  footing ;  mothers,  fathers,  and  brothers  regard  any  breach 
of  morality  with  great  leniency,  and  husbands  even  encourage  their  friends 
to  close  intimacy  with  their  wives.  .  .  .  Like  the-  Kirghizes,  the  Buruts 
are  strangers  to  jealousy." 

So,  too,  of  the  Mongols  Prjevalsky  tells  us  that  "  adul- 
tery is  not  even  concealed,,  and  is  not  regarded  as  a 
vice."  From  peoples  further  south,  two  instances>  may  be 
cited — 

"  Among  the  Red  Karens,  chastity,  both  with  married,  and  unmarried,  is 
reported  as  remarkably  loose.  The  commerce  of  the  sexes  among  young 
people  is  defended  as  nothing  wrong,  because  '  it  is  our  custom.'" 

"  Prostitution  is  exceedingly  common,  while  chastity  is  &  rare  virtue 
among  Toda  women;  and  the  ties  of  marriage  and  consanguinity  are 
merely  nominal." 

To  all  these  instances  from  other  regions  may  be  added 
some  from  Africa.  In  his  Highlands  of  Ethiopia,  Harris 
writes : — 

"  The  jewel  chastity  is  here  [in  ShoaJ  in  no  repute-;  and  the  utmost 
extent  of  reparation  to  be  recovered  in  a  court  of  justice  for  the  most 
aggravated  case  of  seduction  is  but  five-peace  sterling  !" 

The  nature  of  the  sentiment  prevailing  near  the   Upper 
Congo  is  shown  by  this  extract  from  Tuckey  r — 
"Before  marriage,  the  father  or  brothers  of  a  girl,  prostitute  her  to 


454:  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

every  man  that  will  pay  two  fathoms  of  cloth  ;  nor  does  this  derogate  in 
any  way  from  her  character,  or  prevent  her  being  afterwards  married." 

And  so  is  it  with  some  unlike  people  further  south. 

Among  the  Bushmen,  "  infidelity  to  the  marriage  compact  is  ...  not 
considered  as  a  crime ;  it  is  scarcely  regarded  by  the  offended  person.  .  .  . 
They  seem  to  have  no  idea  of  the  distinction  of  girl,  maiden,  and  wife ; 
they  are  all  expressed  by  one  word  alone." 

In  Polynesia  we  have  the  well-known  evidence  yielded  by 
the  Arreoi  society  of  Tahiti ;  and  from  the  same  region,  or 
rather  from  Micronesia,  comes  yet  other  evidence.  In  his 
account  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Ladrone  Islands,  Freycinet 
writes : — 

"  Souvent  on  avoit  vu  les  peres  vendre  sans  rougir  les  premices  de  leurs 
filles  ...  les  meres  elles-memes  engager  leurs  enfants  a  suivre  1'impul- 
sion  de  leurs  sens.  .  .  On  possede  encore  une  des  chansons  qu'elles  chan- 
toient  &  leurs  filles  en  pareille  circonstance.': 

The  Pelew  Islanders  furnish  a  like  case :  the  universal  prac- 
tice being  for  the  mother  to  instruct  her  newly-initiated 
daughter  always  to  exact  payment,  and  the  explanation  of 
the  usage  being  "the  avarice  of  parents  as  recognized  by 
custom." 

Of  the  opposite  trait  a  good  many  examples  are  furnished 
by  primitive  or  uncultured  peoples.  Two  of  them  come  from 
amid  these  generally  lax  tribes  of  North  America.  Catlin 
says  of  the  Mandans : — 

"  Their  women  are  beautiful  and  modest, — and  amongst  the  respectable 
families,  virtue  is  as  highly  cherished  and  as  inapproachable,  as  in  any 
society  whatever." 

And  of  the  Chippewas  Keating  writes  : — 

"  Chastity  is  a  virtue  in  high  repute  among  the  Chippewas,  and  without 
which  no  woman  could  expect  to  be  taken  as  a  wife  by  a  warrior." 
But  he  goes  on  to  admit  that  there  is  a  good  deal  of 
concealed  irregularity.  Africa,  too,  yields  some  instances. 
"  A  Kaffer  woman  is  both  chaste  and  modest : "  "  instances 
of  infidelity  are  said  to  be  very  rare ; "  and  the  like  is  said 
of  the  Bachassins.  The  most  numerous  examples  of  chas- 
tity come  from  the  island  races.  Mariner  tells  us  that 
in  Tonga  adultery  is  very  rare.  "  Chastity  prevails  more 


CHASTITY.  455 

perhaps  among  these  [the  Sumatrans]  than  any  other 
people,"  says  Marsden.  Similar  is  the  statement  of  Low 
about  the  inland  people  of  Borneo :  "  adultery  is  a  crime 
unknown,  and  no  Dyak  (Land)  ever  recollected  an  instance 
of  its  occurrence."  So  in  Dory,  New  Guinea,  according  to 
Kops,  "  chastity  is  held  in  high  regard.  .  .  .  Adultery  is  un- 
known." And  Erskine  testifies  that  the  women  of  Uea, 
Loyalty  Islands,  "  are  strictly  chaste  before  marriage,  and 
faithful  wives  afterwards."  Some  peoples  who  are  in  other 
respects  among  the  lowest  are  in  this  respect  among  the 
highest.  Snow  says  that  the  Fuegian  women  at  Picton  Island 
are  remarkably  modest ;  and  a  fact  worthy  of  special  note  is 
that  among  the  rudest  of  the  Musheras  of  India,  who  have 
no  formal  marriage,  "  unchastity,  or  a  change  of  lovers  on 
either  side,  when  once  mutual  appropriation  has  been  made, 
is  a  thing  of  rare  occurrence ; "  and  when  it  does  occur 
causes  excommunication.  The  remaining  two  most  marked 
instances  are  found  among  other  peaceful  tribes  of  the  In- 
dian hills.  Says  Hodgson  of  the  Bodo  and  Dhimal — 
"  Chastity  is  prized  in  man  and  woman,  married  and  uninar- 
ried."  And  according  to  Dalton — 

"  The  Santal  women  are  represented  by  all  who  have  written  about  them 
as  exceedingly  chaste,  yet  the  young  people  of  the  different  sexes  are 
greatly  devoted  to  each  other's  society  and  pass  much  time  together." 
With  these  cases  of  indigenous  chastity  may  be  named  cases 
of  peoples  who  are  being  degraded  by  foreign  influences. 
In  a  paper  on  the  Veddahs,  whose  neighbours  the  Singhalese 
are  extremely  lax,  Yirchow  quotes  Gillings  to  the  effect  that 
adultery  and  polygamy  are  only  heard  of  among  them  where 
attempts  have  been  made  to  civilize  them.  And  then,  little 
as  we  should  expect  to  meet  with  such  a  testimony  from  a 
clergyman  concerning  a  race  so  low  as  the  Australians,  yet 
of  one  tribe  we  are  told  by  the  Rev.  R.  "W.  Holden,  as  quoted 
by  Taplin,  that — 

"  The  advent  of  the  whites  has  made  the  aborigines  much  more  degraded, 
more  helpless,  more — yea,  much  more — susceptible  to  all  diseases.  Before 
our  coming  amongst  them  their  laws  were  strict,  especially  those  regarding 


456  THE   INDUCTIONS    OF   ETHICS. 

young  men  and  young  women.  It  was  almost  death  to  a  young  lad  or  man 
who  had  sexual  intercourse  till  married." 

But  the  like  cannot  be  said  of  other  Australian  tribes. 

As  thus  presented  by  the  uncivilized  races,  the  facts  do 
not  fall  into  clear  generalizations :  they  do  not  show  distinct 
relations  between  chastity  or  unchastity  and  social  forms  or 
types  of  race.  The  evidence  does,  indeed,  preponderate  in 
favour  of  the  relatively  peaceful  or  wholly  peaceful  tribes, 
but  this  relation  is  not  without  exception ;  and  conversely, 
though  the  standard  of  chastity  is  low  in  most  of  the 
fighting  societies  it  is  not  low  in  all.  Nor,  when  we  con- 
template special  antitheses,  do  we  get  clear  proof.  Of  the 
atrocious  Fijians,  exceeding  in  their  cannibalism  all  other 
peoples,  and  who  glory  in  lying,  theft,  and  murder,  we  read 
in  Erskine  that  the  women  are  modest  and  that  "female 
virtue  may  be  rated  at  a  high  standard,"  while  according  to 
Seemann,  "adultery  is  one  of  the  crimes  generally  pun- 
ished with  death."  On  the  other  hand,  Cook  describes 
the  Tahitians  as  utterly  devoid  of  the  sentiment  of  chastity. 
He  says : — 

They  are  "  people  who  have  not  even  the  idea  of  indecency,  and  who 
gratify  every  appetite  and  passion  before  witnesses,  with  no  more  sense  of 
impropriety  than  we  feel  when  we  satisfy  our  hunger  at  a  social  board 
with  our  family  or  friends." 

At  the  same  time  he  speaks  very  favourably  of  their  dis- 
positions : — 

"  They  seemed  to  be  brave,  open,  and  candid,  without  either  suspicion  or 
treachery,  cruelty  or  revenge ;  so  that  we  placed  the  same  confidence  in 
them  as  in  our  best  friends." 

Here  are  incongruities  which  appear  quite  irreconcilable 
with  the  ideas  current  among  civilized  peoples. 

§  184.  Throughout  the  foregoing  sections  the  aim  has 
been  to  ascertain  by  examination  of  the  facts,  what  re- 
lations, if  any,  exist  between  chastity  and  social  type,  as 
well  as  between  this  virtue  and  other  virtues ;  but  we  must 
now  consider  specifically  the  prevailing  ethical  sentiments 


CHASTITY.  457 

which  go  along  with  observance  and  non-observance  of 
it.  Already,  in  many  of  the  quotations  above  given,  these 
sentiments  have  been  expressed  or  implied  ;  but  to  complete 
the  general  argument  it  seems  needful  to  observe  definitely, 
the  extreme  deviations  from  what  we  may  consider  normal, 
which  they  sometimes  undergo.  I  will  give  three  instances 
— one  from  the  uncivilized,  another  from  a  semi-civilized 
people  now  extinct,  and  a  third  from  an  existing  civilized 
people. 

Of  the  Wotyaks,  a  Finnish  race,  the  German  traveller 
Buch  says : — 

"  Indeed  it  is  even  disgraceful  for  a  girl  if  she  is  little  sought  after  by  the 
young  men  ...  It  is  therefore  only  a  logical  result  that  it  is  honourable 
for  a  girl  to  have  children.  She  then  gets  a  wealthier  husband,  and  her 
father  is  paid  a  higher  kalym  for  her." 

Concerning  the  ancient  Chibchas,  of  Central  America,  we 
read : — 

"Some  Indians  .  .  .  did  not  much  care  that  their  wives  should  be 
virgins.  ...  On  the  contrary,  some,  if  they  discovered  that  they  had  had  no 
intercourse  with  men,  thought  them  unfortunate  and  without  luck,  as  they 
had  not  inspired  affection  in  men:  accordingly  they  disliked  them  as 
miserable  women." 

The  civilized  nation  referred  to  as  showing,  in  some  cases,  a 
feeling  almost  the  reverse  of  that  so  strongly  pronounced 
among  Western  nations,  we  find  in  the  Far  East.  Says 
Dixon  of  the  Japanese : — 

"  It  used  to  be  no  uncommon  thing  (and  we  have  no  clear  evidence  that 
the  custom  is  obsolete)  for  a  dutiful  daughter  to  sell  herself  for  a  term  of 
years  to  the  proprietor  of  a  house  of  ill-fame,  in  order  that  she  might  thus 
retrieve  her  father's  fallen  fortunes.  When  she  returned  to  her  home,  no 
stigma  attached  to  her ;  rather  was  she  honoured  for  her  filial  devotion." 

Though,  in  a  work  just  published,  The  Real  Japan,  Mr. 
Henry  Norman  denies  this  alleged  return  home  with  credit 
(in  modern  times  at  least)  he  verifies  the  earlier  part  of  the 
statement,  that  daughters  are  sold  for  specific  periods  by 
their  parents :  the  fact  that  such  parents  are  tolerated  being 
sufficiently  indicative  of  the  prevailing  sentiment. 

Here  then  we  get  proof  that  in  respect  of  this  division  of 


458  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

conduct,  as  in  respect  of  the  divisions  of  conduct  dealt  with 
in  preceding  chapters,  habits  generate  sentiments  harmonizing 
with  them.  It  is  a  trite  remark  that  the  individual  who  per- 
sists in  wrong-doing  eventually  loses  all  sense  that  it  is 
wrong-doing,  and  at  length  believes  that  it  is  right-doing; 
and  the  like  holds  socially — must,  indeed,  hold  socially, 
since  public  opinion  is  but  an  aggregate  of  individual 
opinions. 

§  185.  If,  instead  of  comparing  one  society  with  another, 
we  compare  early  stages  of  those  societies  which  have  devel- 
oped civilizations  with  later  stages,  we  find  very  variable 
relations  between  chastity  and  social  development.  Only  in 
modern  societies  can  we  say  that  this  relation  becomes  tol- 
erably clear. 

Already  we  have  seen  how  low  in  their  sexual  relations 
were  the  people  of  India  in  early  days,  and  how,  promiscuity 
and  polyandry  having  died  out,  poets  and  sages  in  later 
times  endeavoured  to  explain  away  the  traditional  trans- 
gressions of  their  gods,  while  existing  Hindus  show  shame 
when  reproached  with  the  illicit  amours  of  their  ancient 
heroes  and  heroines.  Here  there  seems  to  have  been  a  prog- 
ress of  the  kind  to  be  looked  for. 

That,  among  adjacent  societies,  there  took  place  some  kin- 
dred changes,  seems  implied  in  the  fact  that  prostitution  in 
temples,  which  prevailed  among  Babylonians,  Egyptians,  &c., 
and  which,  like  other  usages  connected  with  religion,  more 
persistent  than  general  usages,  probably  indicated  certain 
customs  of  earlier  times,  disappeared  partially  if  not  wholly. 
It  is  to  be  observed,  too,  that  along  with  woman-stealing, 
common  during  primitive  stages  of  the  civilized,  as  still 
among  the  uncivilized,  there  naturally  went  a  degraded 
position  of  captured  women  (concubinage  being  a  usual 
concomitant),  and  that  therefore,  with  the  cessation  of  it,  one 
cause  of  low  sexual  relations  came  to  an  end.  That  in  the 
case  of  the  Hebrews  further  advances  took  place  seems  to 


CHASTITY.  459 

be  shown  by  the  facts  that  though  Herod  the  Great  had  nine 
wives,  and  though  in  the  Mishnah  polygamy  is  referred  to 
as  existing,  yet  the  references  in  Ecclesiasticus  imply  the 
general  establishment  of  monogamy. 

The  relevant,  changes  in  the  course  of  Greek  civilization 
clearly  do  not  warrant  the  assertion  that  better  relations 
of  the  sexes  accompanied  higher  social  arrangements. 
The  amount  of  concubinage  implied  by  the  Iliad,  was  less 
than  that  implied  by  the  use  of  female  slaves  and  servants 
in  Athenian  households ;  and  the  established  institution  of 
hetairai,  with  the  many  distinguished  of  whom  coexisted 
a  multitude  of  undistinguished,  the  adding  to  the  public 
revenue  by  a  tax  on  houses  of  ill-fame,  and  the  continuance 
of  authorized  prostitution  in  the  temples  of  Aphrodite 
Pandemos,  further  prove  that  the  relations  of  the  sexes 
had  degenerated.  On  passing  to  Eome  we  meet  with 
an  undeniable  case  of  retrogression  in  sexual  arrange- 
ments and  usages,  going  along  with  that  kind  of  social 
progress  which  is  implied  by  extension  of  empire  and 
increase  of  political  organization.  The  contrast  between 
the  regular  relations  of  men  to  women  in  early  Roman 
times,  and  the  extremely  irregular  relations  which  pre- 
vailed in  the  times  of  the  emperors,  when  the  being  modest 
was  taken  to  imply  being  ugly,  and  when  patrician  ladies 
had  to  be  stopped  by  law  from  becoming  prostitutes,  shows 
that  moral  degradation  of  this  kind  may  accompany  one 
type  of  advancing  civilization. 

The  reaction  which  commenced  after  these  most  -cor- 
rupt Roman  times,  was  greatly  furthered  by  Christianity. 
The  furtherance,  however,  cannot  be  ascribed  to  a  true 
conception  of  the  relations  of  the  sexes,  and  a  sentiment 
appropriate  to  it,  but  rather  to  an  asceticism  which  rep- 
robated the  acceptance  of  pleasures  and  applauded  the  sub- 
mission to  pains.  The  prompting  motive  was  an  other- 
worldly one  more  than  an  intrinsically  moral  one ;  though 
the  other-worldly  motive  probably  fostered  the  moral  mo- 


460  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

tive.  But  in  this  case,  as  in  countless  other  cases,  the 
general  law  of  rhythm  was  illustrated.  Following  this 
violent  reaction  came  in  time  a  violent  re-reaction;  so 
that  after  a  period  of  sexual  restraints  came  a  period  of 
sexual  excesses — a  period  in  which  the  relation  between 
action  and  reaction  was  further  illustrated  by  the  fact  that 
the  nominally-celibate  clergy  and  nuns  became  worse  than 
the  laity  who  were  not  bound  to  celibacy. 

It  should  be  added  that  the  peoples  of  Northern  Europe, 
among  whom  the  relations  of  the  sexes  seem  to  have  been 
originally  good,  also  exhibited  in  course  of  time,  though  in  a 
less  marked  degree,  the  sexual  retrogression  that  may  go 
along  with  some  kinds  of  social  progression.  In  mod- 
ern days,  however,  the  advance  to  higher  political  types 
and  more  settled  social  states,  has  been  accompanied 
by  an  average  improvement  in  this  respect  as  in  other 
respects. 

§  186.  Satisfactory  interpretation  of  these  many  strange 
contrasts  and  variations  is  impracticable :  the  causation  is  too 
complex.  We  may,  however,  note  certain  causes  which 
seem  to  have  been  occasionally  influential,  though  we  cannot 
say  to  what  extent. 

The  extreme  laxity  of  the  Tahitians  may  possibly  have 
been  encouraged  by  the  immense  fertility  of  their  habitat 
Commenting  on  the  abundance  of  food  almost  spontane- 
ously produced  by  their  soil,  Cook  says  of  the  Tahitians : — 
"They  seem  to  be  exempted  from  the  first  general  curse, 
that '  man  should  eat  his  bread  in  the  sweat  of  his  brow.' ': 
Where  self-maintenance  and,  by  implication,  the  main- 
tenance of  children,  is  thus  extremely  easy,  it  seems  that 
comparatively  little  mischief  results  if  a  mother  is  left  to 
rear  a  child  or  children  without  the  aid  of  a  father  •  and  in 
the  absence  of  those  evil  effects  on  both  parent  and  off- 
spring which  result  where  the  necessaries  of  life  are  diffi- 
cult to  get,  there  may  not  tend  to  arise  that  social  reproba- 


CHASTITY.  461 

tion  of  incontinence  which  arises  where  its  mischievous  con- 
sequences are  conspicuous. 

Africa  furnishes  us  with  the  hint  of  another  cause  of 
laxity  which  may  sometimes  operate.  The  fact  that  "  the 
Dahoman,  like  almost  all  semi-barbarians,  considers  a  num- 
erous family  the  highest  blessing" — a  fact  which  recalls 
kindred  ones  implied  in  the  Bible — becomes  comprehensible 
when  we  remember  that  in  early  stages,  characterized  by 
constant  antagonisms,  internal  and  external,  it  is  important 
to  maintain  not  only  the  numbers  of  the  tribe  in  face  of 
other  tribes,  but  also  the  numbers  of  the  families  and  clans ; 
since  the  weaker  of  these  go  to  the  wall  when  struggles 
take  place.  Hence  it  results  that  not  only  is  barrenness 
a  reproach  but  fertility  a  ground  of  esteem  ;  and  hence 
possibly  the  reason  why  in  East  Africa  "it  is  no  disgrace 
for  an  unmarried  woman  to  become  the  mother  of  a 
family:"  the  remark  of  one  traveller,  which  I  cannot  now 
find,  concerning  another  tribe,  being  that  a  woman's  irregu- 
larities are  easily  forgiven,  if  she  bears  many  children. 

This  fact  seems  to  point  to  the  conclusion,  pointed  to 
by  many  preceding  facts,  that  there  is  a  connexion  between 
unchastity  and  a  militant  regime ;  seeing  that  production 
of  many  children  is  a  desideratum  only  where  the  mortality 
from  violence  is  great.  For  suspecting  this  connexion 
we  find  a  further  reason  in  the  degraded  position  of 
women  which  uniformly  accompanies  pronounced  mili- 
tancy (see  Principles  of  Sociology,  Bart  III,  Chapter  X, 
"The  Status  of  Women").  Where,  as  .among  peoples 
constantly  fighting,  the  hard  work  is  done  by  slaves  and 
women — where  women  are  spoils  of  war  to  be  dealt  with 
as  the  victors  please — where,  when  not  stolen  or  gained 
toy  conquest,  they  are  bought;  it  is  manifest  that  the 
wills  of  women  being  in  -abeyance,  the  unchecked  ego- 
dsm  of  men  must  conflict  with  the  growth  of  chastity. 
And  in  the  settled  polygamy  of  societies  which  lose  great 
numbers  of  men  in  battle,  the  large  harems  of  kings  and 


462  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

chiefs,  the  buying  of  female  slaves — all  of  them  character- 
istic of  the  militant  type — we  similarly  see  relations  of  the 
sexes  adverse  to  any  moral  restrictions.  If  we  remember 
that  the  extreme  profligacy  of  Rome  was  reached  after  long 
centuries  of  conquests ;  if  we  remember  that  there  survived 
during  the  feudal  organization  resulting  from  war,  the 
jus  primcB  noctis  /  if  of  Russia,  exclusively  organized  for 
war,  we  read  that  any  girl  on  his  estate  was  until  recently, 
at  the  lord's  disposal ;  we  see  further  reason  for  suspecting 
that  the  militant  type  of  society  is  unfavourable  to  elevated 
relations  of  the  sexes. 

We  must  not  conclude,  however,  that  chastity  always 
characterizes  societies  of  the  non-militant  type.  Though 
sundry  of  the  above-named  peaceful  tribes  are  distinguished 
from  uncivilized  tribes  at  large  by  the  purity  of  their 
sexual  relations,  it  is  not  so  with  another  peaceful  tribe, 
the  Todas  :  these  are  characterized  rather  by  the  opposite 
trait.  The  Esquimaux,  too,  among  whom  there  is  exchange 
of  wives,  do  not  even  know  what  war  is. 

§  187.  It  remains  only  to  emphasize  the  truth,  discern- 
ible amid  all  complexities  and  varieties,  that  without  a 
prevailing  chastity  we  do  not  find  a  good  social  state. 
Though  comparison  of  intermediate  types  of  society  does 
not  make  this  clear,  it  is  made  clear  by  comparison  of 
extreme  types.  Among  the  lowest  we  have  such  a  group 
as  the  Ku-Ka-tha  clan,  inhabiting  "Western  South  Australia, 
whose  chief  characteristics  are  "treachery,  ingratitude, 
lying  and  every  species  of  deceit  and  cunning,"  who  have 
"  no  property,"  "  no  punishment  of  offenders,"  "  no  idea 
of  right  and  wrong,"  and  who  show  absolute  lack  of  the 
sentiment  in  question :  "  chastity  or  fidelity  being  quite 
unknown  to  them."  At  the  other  extreme  come  the 
most  advanced  societies  of  Europe  and  America,  in  which, 
along  with  a  relatively  high  standard  of  chastity  (for 
women  at  least),  there  exist  high  degrees  of  the  various 


CHASTITY.  463 

traits  required  for  social  life  which  are  wanting  in  these 
Australians.  Nor  does  comparison  of  different  stages  of 
civilized  nations  fail  to  furnish  evidence ;  as  witness  the  con- 
trast between  our  own  time  and  the  time  after  the  Ilestora- 
tion,  in  respect  alike  of  chastity  and  of  general  welfare. 

There  are  three  ways  in  which  chastity  furthers  a  superior 
social  state.  The  first  is  that  indicated  at  the  outset — con- 
duciveness  to  the  nurture  of  offspring.  Nearly  everywhere, 
but  especially  where  the  stress  of  competition  makes  the 
rearing  of  children  difficult,  lack  of  help  from  the  father 
must  leave  the  mother  overtaxed,  and  entail  inadequate 
nutrition  of  progeny.  Unchastity,  therefore,  tends  towards 
production  of  inferior  individuals,  and  if  it  prevails  widely 
must  cause  decay  of  the  society. 

The  second  cause  is  that,  conflicting  as  it  does  with  the 
establishment  of  normal  monogamic  relations,  unchastity 
is  adverse  to  those  higher  sentiments  which  prompt  such 
relations.  In  societies  characterized  by  inferior  forms  of 
marriage,  or  by  irregular  connections,  there  cannot  develop 
to  any  great  extent  that  powerful  combination  of  feelings — 
affection,  admiration,  sympathy — which  in  so  marvellous  a 
manner  has  grown  out  of  the  sexual  instinct.  And  in  the 
absence  of  this  complex  passion,  which  manifestly  pre- 
supposes a  relation  between  one  man  and  one  woman,  the 
supreme  interest  in  life  disappears,  and  leaves  behind 
relatively  subordinate  interests.  Evidently  a  prevalent 
unchastity  severs  the  higher  from  the  lower  components  of 
the  sexual  relation :  the  root  may  produce  a  few  leaves,  but 
no  true  flower. 

Sundry  of  the  keenest  aesthetic  pleasures  must  at  the  same 
time  be  undermined.  It  needs  but  to  call  to  mind  what  a 
predominant  part  in  fiction,  the  drama,  poetry,  and  music,  is 
played  by  the  romantic  element  in  love,  to  see  that  anything 
which  militates  against  it  tends  to  diminish,  if  not  to  de- 
stroy, the  chief  gratifications  which  should  fill  the  leisure 

part  of  life. 
81 


CHAPTER  XIY. 

SUMMARY  OF  INDUCTIONS. 

§  188.  Where  the  data  are  few  and  exact,  definite  con- 
clusions can  be  drawn ;  but  where  they  are  numerous  and 
inexact,  the  conclusions  drawn  must  be  proportionately 
indefinite.  Pure  mathematics  exemplifies  the  one  extreme, 
and  Sociology  the  other.  The  phenomena  presented  by 
individual  life  are  highly  complex,  and  still  more  complex 
are  the  phenomena  presented  by  the  life  of  aggregated 
individuals ;  and  their  great  complexity  is  rendered  still 
greater  by  the  multiformity  and  variability  of  surrounding 
conditions. 

To  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  generalization  hence 
arising,  must  be  added  the  difficulties  arising  from  un- 
certainty of  the  evidence — the  doubtfulness,  incompleteness, 
and  conflicting  natures,  of  the  statements  with  which  we 
have  to  deal.  Not  all  travellers  are  to  be  trusted.  Some  are 
bad  observers,  some  are  biassed  by  creed  or  custom,  some 
by  personal  likings  or  dislikings ;  and  all  have  but  imper- 
fect opportunities  of  getting  at  the  truth.  Similarly  with 
historians.  Yery  little  of  what  they  narrate  is  from  imme- 
diate observation.  The  greater  part  of  it  comes  through 
channels  which  colour,  and  obscure,  and  distort;  while 
everywhere  party  feeling,  religious  bigotry,  and  the  senti- 
ment of  patriotism,  cause  exaggerations  and  suppressions. 
Testimonies  concerning  moral  traits  are  hence  liable  to 
perversion. 

Many   of  the   peoples  grouped    under  the   same    name 


SUMMARY   OF   INDUCTIONS.  465 

present  considerable  diversities  of  character:  instar.ee  the 
Australians,  of  whom  it  is  remarked  that  some  tribes  are 
quiet  and  tractable  while  others  are  boisterous  and  difficult 
to  deal  with.  Further,  the  conduct,  sentiments,  and  ideas  of 
native  peoples  often  undergo  such  changes  that  travellers 
between  whose  visits  many  years  have  elapsed,  give  quite 
different  accounts.  The  original  feelings  and  beliefs  are 
frequently  obscured  by  missionary  influences,  and,  in  a  still 
greater  degree,  by  contact  with  white  traders  and  settlers. 
From  all  parts  of  the  world  we  get  proofs  that  aborigines 
are  degraded  by  intercourse  with  Europeans.  Here,  then, 
are  further  causes  which  distort  the  evidence. 

Yet  again  there  are  the  complications  consequent  on 
changes  of  habitats  and  occupations.  In  this  place  tribes 
are  forced  into  antagonism  with  their  neighbours,  and  in 
that  place  they  are  led  into  quiet  lives :  one  of  the  results 
being  that  conceptions  and  feelings  appropriate  to  an  ante- 
cedent state,  surviving  for  a  long  time  in  a  subsequent  state, 
appear  incongruous  with  it. 

Thus  we  must  expect  to  meet  with  anomalies,  and  must  be 
content  with  conclusions  which  hold  true  on  the  average. 

§  189.  Before  we  can  fully  understand  the  significance 
of  the  inductions  drawn,  we  must  reconsider  the  essential 
nature  of  social  co-operation.  As  we  pointed  out  in  §  48, 
from  the  sociological  point  of  view,  "  ethics  becomes  noth- 
ing else  than  a  definite  account  of  the  forms  of  conduct 
that  are  fitted  to  the  associated  state ; "  and  in  subsequent 
sections  it  was  made  clear  that,  rising  above  those  earliest 
groups  in  which  the  individuals  simply  live  in  contiguity, 
without  mutual  interference  and  without  mutual  aid,  the 
associated  state  can  be  maintained  only  by  effectual  co-oper- 
ation :  now  for  external  defence,  now  for  internal  sustentation. 
That  is  to  say,  the  prosperity  of  societies  depends,  other 
things  equal,  on  the  extents  to  which  there  are  fulfilled  in 
them  the  conditions  to  such  co-operation.  .  Whence,  through 


466  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

survival  of  the  fittest,  it  follows  that  principles  of  conduct 
implying  observance  of  these  conditions,  and  sentiments  en- 
listed in  support  of  such  principles,  become  dominant; 
while  principles  of  conduct  which  concern  only  such  parts 
of  the  lives  of  individuals  as  do  not  obviously  affect  social 
co-operation,  do  not  acquire  sanctions  of  such  pronounced 
and  consistent  kinds. 

This  appears  to  be  the  explanation  of  the  fact  which  must 
have  struck  many  readers  of  the  last  two  chapters,  that  the 
ideas  and  sentiments  respecting  temperance  and  chastity, 
display  less  intelligible  relations  to  social  type  and  social 
development,  than  do  the  ideas  and  sentiments  concern- 
ing co-operative  conduct,  internal  and  external.  For  if, 
scattered  throughout  the  community,  there  are  men  who 
eat  or  drink  to  excess,  such  evils  as  are  entailed  on  the 
community  are  indirect.  There  is,  in  the  first  place,  no 
direct  interference  with  military  efficiency,  so  long  as  within 
the  armed  force  there  is  no  such  drunkenness  or  gluttony 
as  sensibly  affects  discipline.  And  in  the  second  place, 
there  is  no  direct  interference  with  the  process  of  social 
sustentation,  so  long  as  one  who  eats  or  drinks  to  excess 
does  not  aggress  upon  his  neighbour  or  in  any  way  incon- 
venience him.  While  erring  in  either  of  these  ways,  a  man 
may  respect  the  persons  and  property  of  his  fellows  and 
may  invariably  fulfil  his  contracts — may,  therefore,  obey 
the  fundamental  principles  of  social  co-operation.  What- 
ever detriment  society  receives  from  his  conduct  arises 
from  the  deterioration  in  one  of  its  units.  Much  the  same 
thing  holds  with  disregard  of  chastity ;  there  is  no  necessary 
or  immediate  interference  with  the  carrying  on  of  co-opera- 
tions, either  external  or  internal ;  but  the  evil  caused  is  an 
ultimate  lowering  of  the  population  in  number  or  quality. 
In  both  these  cases  the  social  consciousness,  not  distinctly 
awakened  to  the  social  results,  does  not  always  generate 
consistent  social  sentiments. 

It  is  otherwise  with  those  kinds  of  conduct  which  directly 


SUMMARY   OF   INDUCTIONS.  467 

and  obviously  transgress  the  conditions  to  social  co-opera- 
tion, external  or  internal.  Cowardice,  or  insubordination, 
diminishes  in  a  very  obvious  way  the  efficiency  of  a  fighting 
body;  and  hence,  in  respect  of  these,  there  are  readily 
established  consistent  ideas  and  sentiments.  So,  too,  the 
murdering  or  assaulting  of  fellow  citizens,  the  taking  away 
their  goods,  the  breaking  of  contracts  with  them,  are 
actions  which  so  conspicuously  conflict  with  the  actions 
constituting  social  life,  that  reprobation  of  them  is  with 
tolerable  regularity  produced.  Hence,  though  there  are 
wide  divergences  of  opinion  and  of  feeling  relative  to  such 
classes  of  offences  in  different  societies,  yet  we  find  these 
related  to  divergences  in  the  types  of  social  activities 
— one  or  other  set  of  reprobations  being  pronounced  ac- 
cording as  one  or  other  set  of  activities  is  most  domi- 
nant. 

Taken  together,  the  preceding  chapters  show  us  a  group 
of  moral  traits  proper  to  a  life  of  external  enmity.  Where 
the  predominant  social  co-operations  take  the  form  of 
constant  fighting  with  adjacent  peoples,  there  grows  up 
a  pride  in  aggression  and  robbery,  revenge  becomes  an 
imperative  duty,  skilful  lying  is  creditable,  and  (save  in 
small  tribes  which  do  not  develop)  obedience  to  despotic 
leaders  and  rulers  is  the  greatest  virtue ;  at  the  same  time 
there  is  a  contempt  for  industry,  and  only  such  small  re- 
gard for  justice  within  the  society  as  is  required  to  main- 
tain its  existence.  On  the  other  hand,  where  the  pre- 
dominant social  co-operations  have  internal  sustentation  for 
their  end,  while  co-operations  against  external  enemies 
have  either  greatly  diminished  or  disappeared,  unprovoked 
aggression  brings  but  partial  applause  or  none  at  all ; 
robbery,  even  of  enemies,  ceases  to  be  creditable ;  revenge 
is  no  longer  thought  a  necessity ;  lying  is  universally 
reprobated ;  justice  in  the  transactions  of  citizens  with 
one  another  is  insisted  upon ;  political  obedience  is  so  far 
qualified  that  submission  to  a  despot  is  held  contemptible  j 


468  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

and  industry,  instead  of  being  considered  disgraceful, 
is  considered  as,  in  some  form  or  other,  imperative  on 
every  one. 

Of  course  the  varieties  of  nature  inherited  by  different 
kinds  of  men  from  the  past,  the  effects  of  customs  sanctified 
by  age,  the  influences  of  religious  creeds,  together  with  the 
circumstances  peculiar  to  each  society,  complicate  and  qualify 
these  relations;  but  in  their  broad  outlines  they  are  suffi- 
ciently clear — as  clear  as  we  can  expect  them  to  be. 

§  190.  Hence  the  fact  that  the  ethical  sentiments  pre- 
vailing in  different  societies,  and  in  the  same  society  under 
different  conditions,  are  sometimes  diametrically  opposed. 
Multitudinous  proofs  of  this  truth  have  been  given  in  pre- 
ceding chapters,  but  it  will  be  well  here  to  enforce  it  by  a 
series  of  antitheses. 

Among  ourselves,  to  have  committed  a  murder  disgraces 
for  all  time  a  man's  memory,  and  disgraces  for  generations 
all  who  are  related  to  him ;  but  by  the  Pathans  a  quite  unlike 
sentiment  is  displayed.  One  who  had  killed  a  Mollah  (priest), 
and  failed  to  find  refuge  from  the  avengers,  said  at  length : — 
"  I  can  but  be  a  martyr.  I  will  go  and  kill  a  Sahib."  He 
was  hanged  after  shooting  a  sergeant,  perfectly  satisfied  "  at 
having  expiated  his  offence." 

The  prevailing  ethical  sentiment  in  England  is  such  that  a 
man  who  should  allow  himself  to  be  taken  possession  of  and 
made  an  unresisting  slave,  would  be  regarded  with  scorn ;  but 
the  people  of  Drekete,  a  slave-district  of  Fiji,  "  said  it  was 
their  duty  to  become  food  and  sacrifices  for  the  chiefs,"  and 
"  that  they  were  honoured  by  being  considered  adequate  to 
such  a  noble  task." 

Less  extreme,  though  akin  in  nature,  is  the  contrast  be- 
tween the  feelings  which  our  own  history  has  recorded 
within  these  few  centuries.  In  Elizabeth's  time,  Sir  John 
Hawkins  initiated  the  slave  trade,  and  in  commemoration  of 
the  achievement  was  allowed  to  put  in  his  coat  of  arms  "  a 


SUMMARY   OF   INDUCTIONS.  469 

demi-moor  proper  bound  with  a  cord : "  the  honourableness 
of  his  action  being  thus  assumed  by  himself  and  recognized 
by  Queen  and  public.  But  in  our  days,  the  making  slaves  of 
men,  called  by  Wesley  "  the  sum  of  all  villainies,"  is  regarded 
with  detestation ;  and  for  many  years  we  maintained  a  fleet 
to  suppress  the  slave-trade. 

Peoples  who  have  emerged  from  the  primitive  family-and- 
clan  organization,  hold  that  one  who  is  guilty  of  a  crime 
must  himself  bear  the  punishment,  and  it  is  thought  extreme 
injustice  that  the  punishment  should  fall  upon  anyone  else ; 
but  our  remote  ancestors  thought  and  felt  differently,  as  do 
still  the  Australians,  whose  "  first  great  principle  with  regard 
to  punishment  is,  that  all  the  relatives  of  a  culprit,  in  the 
event  of  his  not  being  found,  are  implicated  in  his  guilt : " 
"  the  brothers  of  the  criminal  conceive  themselves  to  be  quite 
as  guilty  as  he  is." 

By  the  civilized,  the  individualities  of  women  are  so  far 
recognized  that  the  life  and  liberty  of  a  wife  are  not 
supposed  to  be  bound  up  with  those  of  her  husband ;  and 
she  now,  having  obtained  a  right  to  exclusive  possession  of 
property,  contends  for  complete  independence,  domestic  and 
political.  But  it  is,  or  was,  otherwise  in  Fiji.  The  wives  of 
the  Fijian  chiefs  consider  it  a  sacred  duty  to  suffer  strangu- 
lation on  the  deaths  of  their  husbands.  A  woman  who  had 
been  rescued  by  Williams  "  escaped  during  the  night,  and, 
swimming  across  the  river,  and  presenting  herself  to  her 
own  people,  insisted  on  the  completion  of  the  sacrifice  which 
she  had  in  a  moment  of  weakness  reluctantly  consented  to 
forego ; "  and  Wilkes  tells  of  another  who  loaded  her-  rescuer 
"  with  abuse,  and  ever  afterwards  manifested  the  most  deadly 
hatred  towards  him." 

Here,  and  on  the  Continent,  the  religious  prohibition  of 
theft  and  the  legal  punishment  of  it,  are  joined  with  a  strong 
social  reprobation  ;  so  that  the  offence  of  a  thief  is  never 
condoned.  In  Beloochistan,  however,  quite  contrary  ideas 
and  feelings  are  current.  There  "  a  favourite  couplet  is  to 


4:70  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

the  effect  that  the  Biloch  who  steals  and  murders,  secures 
heaven  to  seven  generations  of  ancestors." 

In  this  part  of  the  world  reprobation  of  untruthfulness  is 
strongly  expressed,  alike  by  the  gentleman  and  the  labourer. 
But  in  many  parts  of  the  world  it  is  not  so.  In  Blantyre, 
for  example,  according  to  Macdonald,  "  to  be  called  a  liar  is 
rather  a  compliment." 

English  sentiment  is  such  that  the  mere  suspicion  of  in- 
continence on  the  part  of  a  woman  is  enough  to  blight  her 
life ;  but  there  are  peoples  whose  sentiments  entail  no  such 
effect,  and  in  some  cases  a  reverse  effect  is  produced :  "  un- 
chastity  is  with  the  Wotyaks  a  virtue." 

So  that  in  respect  of  all  the  leading  divisions  of  human 
conduct,  different  races  of  men,  and  the  same  races  at  differ- 
ent stages,  entertain  opposite  beliefs  and  display  opposite 
feelings. 

§  191.  I  was  about  to  say  that  the  evidence  set  forth  in 
foregoing  chapters,  brought  to  a  focus  in  the  above  section, 
must  dissipate  once  for  all  the  belief  in  a  moral  sense  as  com- 
monly entertained.  But  a  long  experience  prevents  me  from 
expecting  this.  Among  men  at  large,  life-long  convictions 
are  not  to  be  destroyed  either  by  conclusive  arguments  or 
multitudinous  facts. 

Only  to  those  who  are  not  by  creed  or  cherished  theory 
committed  to  the  hypothesis  of  a  supernaturally  created 
humanity,  will  the  evidence  prove  that  the  human  mind  has 
no  originally  implanted  conscience.  Though,  as  shown  in 
my  first  work,  Social  Statics,  I  once  espoused  the  doctrine 
of  the  intuitive  moralists  (at  the  outset  in  full,  and  in 
later  chapters  with  some  implied  qualifications),  yet  it  has 
gradually  become  clear  to  me  that  the  qualifications  re- 
quired practically  obliterate  the  doctrine  as  enunciated  by 
them.  It  has  become  clear  to  me  that  if,  among  our- 
selves, the  current  belief  is  that  a  man  who  robs  and  does 
not  repent  will  be  eternally  damned,  while  an  accepted 


SUMMARY   OF   INDUCTIONS.  471 

proverb  among  the  Bilochs  is  that  "  God  will  not  favour  a 
man  who  does  not  steal  and  rob,"  it  is  impossible  to  hold 
that  men  have  in  common  an  innate  perception  of  right  and 
wrong. 

But  now,  while  we  are  shown  that  the  moral-sense 
doctrine  in  its  original  form  is  not  true,  we  are  also  shown 
that  it  adumbrates  a  truth,  and  a  much  higher  truth.  For 
the  facts  cited,  chapter  after  chapter,  unite  in  proving  that 
the  sentiments  and  ideas  current  in  each  society  become 
adjusted  to  the  kinds  of  activity  predominating  in  it.  A 
life  of  constant  external  enmity  generates  a  code  in  which 
aggression,  conquest,  revenge,  are  inculcated,  while  peaceful 
occupations  are  reprobated.  Conversely,  a  life  of  settled 
internal  amity  generates  a  code  inculcating  the  virtues  con- 
ducing to  harmonious  co-operation — justice,  honesty,  veracity, 
regard  for  other's  claims.  And  the  implication  is  that  if  the 
life  of  internal  amity  continues  unbroken  from  generation 
to  generation,  there  must  result  not  only  the  appropriate 
code,  but  the  appropriate  emotional  nature — a  moral  sense 
adapted  to  the  moral  requirements.  Men  so  conditioned 
will  acquire  to  the  degree  needful  for  complete  guidance, 
that  innate  conscience  which  the  intuitive  moralists  errone- 
ously suppose  to  be  possessed  by  mankind  at  large.  There 
needs  but  a  continuance  of  absolute  peace  externally,  and  a 
rigorous  insistence  on  non-aggression  internally,  to  ensure 
the  moulding  of  men  into  a  form  naturally  characterized  by 
all  the  virtues. 

This  general  induction  is  reinforced  by  a  special  induc- 
tion. Now  as  displaying  this  high  trait  of  nature,  now  as 
displaying  that,  I  have  instanced  those  various  uncivilized 
peoples  who,  inferior  to  us  in  other  respects,  are  morally 
superior  to  us ;  and  have  pointed  out  that  they  are  one  and 
all  free  from  inter-tribal  antagonisms.  The  peoples  showing 
this  connexion  are  of  various  races.  In  the  Indian  hills,  we 
find  some  who  are  by  origin  Mongolian,  Kolarian,  Dravidian ; 
in  the  forests  of  Malacca,  Burmah,  and  in  secluded  parts  of 


4:72  THE   INDUCTIONS    OF   ETHICS. 

China,  exist  such  tribes  of  yet  other  bloods;  in  the  East 
Indian  Archipelago,  are  some  belonging  to  the  Papuan 
stock  ;  in  Japan  there  are  the  amiable  Ainos,  who  "  have  no 
traditions  of  internecine  strife ; "  and  in  North  Mexico  ex- 
ists yet  another  such  people  unrelated  to  the  rest,  the 
Pueblos.  No  more  conclusive  proof  could  be  wished  than 
that  supplied  by  these  isolated  groups  of  men  who,  widely 
remote  in  locality  and  differing  in  race,  are  alike  in  the  two 
respects,  that  circumstances  have  long  exempted  them  from 
war  and  that  they  are  now  organically  good. 

The  goodness  which  may  be  attained  to  under  these  con- 
ditions excites  the  wonder  of  those  who  know  only  such 
goodness  as  is  attained  by  peoples  who  plume  themselves  on 
their  superiority.  Witness  General  Fytche's  comment  on 
the  report  of  Mr.  O'Biley  concerning  the  Let-htas : — "  The 
account  given  by  him  of  their  appreciation  of  moral  good- 
ness, and  the  purity  of  their  lives,  as  compared  with  the 
semi-civilized  tribes  amongst  whom  they  dwell,  almost  savours 
of  romance." 

May  we  not  reasonably  infer  that  the  state  reached  by 
these  small  uncultured  tribes  may  be  reached  by  the  great 
cultured  nations,  when  the  life  of  internal  amity  shall  be  un- 
qualified by  the  life  of  external  enmity? 

§  192.  That  the  contemplation  of  such  an  eventuality  will 
be  agreeable  to  all,  I  do  not  suppose.  To  the  many  who,  in 
the  East,  tacitly  assume  that  Indians  exist  for  the  benefit  of 
Anglo-Indians,  it  will  give  no  pleasure.  Such  a  condition 
will  probably  seem  undesirable  to  men  who  hire  themselves 
out  to  shoot  other  men  to  order,  asking  nothing  about  the 
justice  of  their  cause,  and  think  themselves  absolved  by  a 
command  from  Downing  Street.  As,  among  anthropophagi, 
the  suppression  of  man-eating  is  not  favourably  regarded ; 
so  in  sociophagous  nations  like  ours,  not  much  pleasure  is 
caused  by  contemplating  the  cessation  of  conquests.  No 
strong  desire  for  such  a  state  can  be  felt  by  our  leading 


SUMMARY   OF   INDUCTIONS. 

General,  who  says  that  the  duties  of  a  soldier  "are  the 
noblest  that  fall  to  man's  lot,"  and  whose  motto  is — "  Man  is 
as  a  wolf  towards  his  fellow  man." 

Nor,  strange  though  it  appears,  will  this  prospect  be 
rejoiced  over  even  by  those  who  preach  "  peace  and  good- 
will to  men ; "  for  the  prospect  is  not  presented  in  associa- 
tion with  their  creed.  The  belief  that  humanity  can  be 
made  righteous  only  by  acceptance  of  the  Christian  scheme, 
is  irreconcilable  with  the  conclusion  that  humanity  may  be 
moulded  into  an  ideal  form  by  the  continued  discipline  of 
peaceful  co-operation.  Better  far  to  our  theologians  seems 
the  doctrine  that  man,  intrinsically  bad,  can  be  made  good 
only  by  promises  of  heaven  and  threats  of  hell,  than  does  the 
doctrine  that  man,  not  intrinsically  bad,  will  become  good 
under  conditions  which  exercise  the  higher  feelings  and  give 
no  scope  for  the  lower.  Facts  which  apparently  show  that 
unchristianized  human  nature  is  incurably  vicious,  give  to 
them  satisfaction  as  justifying  their  religion ;  and  evidence 
tending  to  prove  the  contrary  is  repugnant  as  showing  that 
their  religion  is  untrue. 

And  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  their  attitude  is  to 
be  regretted ;  for  there  has  to  be  maintained  a  congruity 
between  the  prevailing  cult  and  the  social  state  and  the 
average  nature.  If  any  one  says  that  the  men  who  form 
the  land-grabbing  nations  of  Europe,  cannot  be  ruled  in 
their  daily  lives  by  an  ethical  sentiment,  but  must  have  it 
enforced  by  the  fear  of  damnation,  I  am  not  prepared  to 
contradict  him.  If  a  writer  who,  according  to  those  who 
know,  represents  truly  the  natures  of  the  gentlemen  we  send 
abroad,  sympathetically  describes  one  of  them  as  saying 
to  soldiers  shooting  down  tribes  fighting  for  their  inde- 
pendence— "  Give  'em  hell,  men ; "  I  think  those  are  pos- 
sibly right  who  contend  that  such  natures  are  to  be  kept  in 
check  only  by  fear  of  a  God  who  will  "  give  'em  hell "  if 
they  misbehave.  It  is,  I  admit,  a  tenable  supposition  that 
belief  in  a  deity  who  calmly  looks  on  while  myriads  of  his 


474:  THE   INDUCTIONS   OF   ETHICS. 

creatures  suffer  eternal  torments,  may  fitly  survive  dur- 
ing a  state  of  the  world  in  which  naked  barbarians  and 
barbarians  in  skins  are  being  overrun  by  barbarians  in 
broadcloth. 

But  to  the  few  who,  looking  back  on  the  changes  which 
past  thousands  of  years  have  witnessed,  look  forward  to  the 
kindred  changes  which  future  thousands  of  years  may  be 
expected  to  bring,  it  will  be  a  satisfaction  to  contemplate  a 
humanity  so  adapted  to  harmonious  social  life  that  all  needs 
are  spontaneously  and  pleasurably  fulfilled  by  each  without 
injury  to  others. 


PAET  III. 
THE  ETHICS  OF  INDIVIDUAL  LIFE. 


COPYRIGHT,  1892, 
BY  D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

§  193.  The  foregoing  fourteen  chapters  have  shown 
that  ethical  sentiments  and  ideas  are,  in  each  place  and 
time,  determined  by  the  local  form  of  human  nature,  the 
social  antecedents,  and  the  surrounding  circumstances. 
Hence  the  question  arises — How  from  all  which  is  special 
and  temporary  shall  we  separate  that  which  is  general  and 
permanent  ? 

"We  have  been  shown,  if  not  overtly  yet  tacitly,  that  the 
very  language  used  in  speaking  of  moral  questions,  so 
involves  the  current  beliefs  that  men  are  scarcely  able  to 
think  away  from  them  :  the  words  used  are  question-beg- 
ging words.  "  Duty  "  and  "  obligation,"  for  example,  carry 
with  them  the  thought  of  obedience,  subordination,  subjec- 
tion to  authority;  and  thus,  imply  that  right  and  wrong 
conduct  are  not  such  by  their  intrinsic  natures,  but  are  such 
by  their  extrinsic  enactments.  How,  then,  shall  we  free  our- 
selves from  the  influence  of  the  particular  code  we  have  been 
brought  up  under,  and  the  misleading  connotations  of  our 
terms  ? 

Evidently  we  must  for  a  time  ignore  established  doctrines 
and  expressions.  We  must  go  direct  to  the  facts  and  study 
them  afresh,  apart  from  all  pre-conceptions.  I  do  not  mean 
that  the  old  ideas  and  the  old  words  are  to  be  rejected. 
Far  from  it.  We  shall  find  that  the  greater  part  of  them 
are  well  warranted  and  have  to  be  reinstated  :  in  some  cases 


478  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

with  added  authority,  and  in  other  cases  with  more  or  less  of 
qualification. 

Ethical  ideas  and  sentiments  have  to  be  considered  as 
parts  of  the  phenomena  of  life  at  large.  We  have  to  deal 
with  Man  as  a  product  of  evolution,  with  Society  as  a  pro- 
duct of  evolution,  and  with  Moral  Phenomena  as  products  of 
evolution.  Let  no  one  anticipate  any  loss  of  authority. 
Instead  of  finding  that  evolutionary  ethics  gives  countenance 
to  lower  forms  of  conduct  than  those  at  present  enjoined,  we 
shall  find  that,  contrariwise,  evolutionary  ethics  is  intolerant 
of  much  which  those  who  profess  to  have  the  highest  guid- 
ance think  harmless  or  justifiable. 

§  194:.  Integration  being  the  primary  process  of  evolution, 
we  may  expect  that  the  aggregate  of  conceptions  constitut- 
ing ethics  enlarges,  at  the  same  time  that  its  components 
acquire  heterogeneity,  definiteness,  and  that  kind  of  cohesion 
which  system  gives  to  them.  As  fulfilling  this  expectation, 
we  may  first  note  that  while  drawing  within  its  range  of 
judgment  numerous  actions  of  men  towards  one  another 
which  at  first  were  not  recognized  as  right  or  wrong,  it 
finally  takes  into  its  sphere  the  various  divisions  of  private 
conduct — those  actions  of  each  individual^  which  directly 
concern  himself  only,  and  in  but  remote  ways  concern  his 
fellows. 

Nearly  all  these  actions  are  usually  supposed  to  lie 
beyond  ethical  rule :  not  only  those  multitudinous  ones 
which  are  indifferent,  and,  like  our  movements  from 
minute  to  minute,  may  be  as  well  one  way  as  another,  but 
those  numerous  ones  which  bring  some  good  or  evil  to 
self.  But  a  theory  of  right  and  wrong  which  takes  no 
cognizance  of  nine-tenths  of  the  conduct  by  which  life  is 
carried  on,  is  a  folly.  life  in  general  is  a  desideratum  or  it 
is  not.  If  it  is  a  desideratum,  then  all  those  modes  of  con- 
duct which  are  conductive  to  a  complete  form  of  it  are  to  be 
morally  approved.  If,  contrariwise,  life  is  not  a  desideratum^ 


INTRODUCTORY.  479 

the  subject  lapses :  life  should  not  be  maintained,  and  all 
questions  concerning  maintenance  of  it,  including  the  ethical, 
disappear.  As  commonly  conceived,  ethics  consists  solely  of 
interdicts  on  certain  kinds  of  acts  which  men  would  like  to 
do  and  of  injunctions  to  perform  certain  acts  which  they 
would  like  not  to  do.  It  says  nothing  about  the  great 
mass  of  acts  constituting  normal  life ;  just  as  though  these 
are  neither  warranted  nor  unwarranted.  So  influential 
are  traditional  sentiments  and  expressions,  that  the  mass  of 
readers  will  even  now  be  unable  to  conceive  that  there 
can  be  an  ethical  justification  for  the  pursuit  of  positive 
gratifications. 

Such  private  conduct  as  errs  in  the  direction  of  sensual 
excess,  like  drunkenness,  they  do  indeed  include  as  subject 
to  ethical  judgment  and  resulting  condemnation :  a  perceived 
injury,  primarily  to  self  and  secondarily  to  others,  being  the 
ground  for  the  condemnation.  But  they  ignore  the  truth 
that  if  injury  to  self  is,  in  this  case,  a  reason  for  moral  repro- 
bation, then  benefit  to  self  (so  long  as  there  is  no  contingent 
injury  to  others  or  remote  injury  to  self)  is  a  reason  for 
moral  approbation. 

§  195.  Far  above  other  creatures  though  he  is,  Man  re- 
mains, in  common  with  them,  subject  to  the  laws  of  life ;  and 
the  requirement  for  him,  as  for  them,  is  conformity  to  these 
laws.  By  him,  as  by  every  living  thing,  self-preservation  is 
the  first  requisite ;  since  without  self-preservation,  the  dis- 
charge of  all  other  obligations,  altruistic  as  well  as  egoistic, 
becomes  impossible. 

But  self-preservation  is  effected  only  by  the  performance 
of  actions  which  are  prompted  by  desires.  Therefore  the 
satisfaction  of  these  desires  is  to  be  enjoined  if  life  should  be 
maintained.  That  this  is  so  with  the  sensations  which  prompt 
breathing,  eating,  drinking,  and  avoidance  of  extremes  of 
temperature,  needs  no  proof:  pain  and  death  result  from 
disobedience  and  pleasure  from  obedience.  And  as  taking 
32 


480  THE   ETHICS   OF  INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

each  of  our  primary  pleasures  directly  furthers  the  vital 
activities,  so,  taking  each  of  our  secondary  pleasures  furthers 
them  indirectly. 

Unquestionably,  then,  there  is  a  division  of  ethics  which 
yields  sanctions  to  all  the  normal  actions  of  individual  life, 
while  it  forbids  the  abnormal  ones.  This  most  general  view, 
at  once  evolutionary  and  hedonistic,  harmonizes  with  several 
more  special  views. 

§  196.  As  was  pointed  out  in  the  preface,  a  disastrous 
effect  is  produced  on  the  majority  of  minds  by  presenting 
ethics  as  a  stern  monitor,  denouncing  certain  kinds  of 
pleasures  while  giving  no  countenance  to  pleasures  of 
other  kinds.  If  it  does  not  openly  assert  that  all  grati- 
fications are  improper,  yet,  by  forbidding  a  number  of 
them  and  saying  nothing  about  the  rest,  it  leaves  the  im- 
pression that  the  rest,  if  not  to  be  condemned,  are  not  to 
be  approved.  By  this  one-sided  treatment  of  conduct  it 
alienates  multitudes  who  would  otherwise  accept  its 
teachings. 

Assuming  that  general  happiness  is  to  be  the  aim  (for 
if  indifference  or  misery  were  to  be  the  aim,  non-existence 
would  be  preferable),  then  the  implication  is  that  the 
happiness  of  each  unit  is  a  fit  aim  ;  and  a  sequent  implica- 
tion is  that  for  each  individual,  as  a  unit,  his  own  happiness 
is  a  fit  aim.  Happiness  as  experienced  by  him,  as  much 
adds  to  the  total  amount  as  does  happiness  experienced  by 
another ;  and  if  happiness  may  not  be  pursued  for  self, 
why  may  it  be  pursued  for  anyone  else?  If  the  totality 
of  happiness  could  be  made  greater  by  each  pursuing 
another's  happiness,  while  his  own  was  pursued  for  him 
by  others,  something  might  be  isaid  for  the  theory  of 
absolute  altruism.  But,  in  the  first  place,  the  greater  part  of 
the  grateful  consciousness  possible  for  each  is  achievable 
only  by  himself — is  a  consciousness  accompanying  certain 
activities,  and  cannot  exist  without  them.  In  the  second 


INTRODUCTORY.  481 

place,  even  were  it  otherwise,  loss  would  arise  if  each 
pursued  only  the  happiness  of  others ;  since  as  each  of  the 
others  would  have  to  do  the  like,  there  would  be  required 
the  same  amount  of  effort  joined  with  a  further  amount  of 
effort  consequent  on  misunderstandings  from  cross-purposes. 
Imagine  A  feeding  B  while  B  fed  A,  and  so  on  with  C,  D, 
<fec.,  and  instead  of  increase  of  satisfactions  there  would  be 
decrease.  The  like  would  happen  with  the  majority  of 
other  wants  to  be  satisfied.  As  shown  at  the  outset  (§§  82, 
91),  a  system  of  ethics  which  insists  on  altruism  and  ignores 
egoism,  is  suicidal. 

Such  a  system  is,  if  the  expression  may  be  admitted, 
doubly  suicidal ;  since,  while  its  immediate  operation  must 
be  detrimental,  its  remote  operation  must  be  still  more 
detrimental.  A  loss  of  capacity  for  happiness  must  be  the 
effect  produced  on  all.  For  many  of  our  pleasures  are 
organically  bound  up  with  performance  of  functions  needful 
for  bodily  welfare ;  and  non-acceptance  of  them  involves  a 
lower  degree  of  life,  a  decreased  strength,  and  a  diminished 
ability  to  fulfil  all  duties. 

§  197.  A  further  implication,  almost  universally  ignored, 
must  be  here  again  emphasized.  Already,  in  §  71,  I  have 
drawn  attention  to  the  obvious  truth  that  the  individual  is 
not  alone  concerned  in  the  matter,  but  that  all  his  descend- 
ants are  concerned. 

In  the  utter  disregard  of  this  truth  we  see  more  clearly 
than  usual  how  low  is  the  average  human  intelligence. 
Sometimes,  when  observing  on  the  Continent  how  the 
women,  with  faces  unshaded,  are,  to  keep  out  the  bright 
sunlight,  obliged  to  half -close  their  eyes  and  wrinkle  up 
the  corners  of  them,  so  producing,  by  daily  repetition, 
crows-feet  some  ten  or  twenty  years  earlier  than  need  be ; 
I  have  thought  it  astonishing  that,  anxious  though  these 
women  are  to  preserve  beauty,  they  should  have  failed  to 
perceive  so  simple  a  relation  between  cause  and  effect. 


482  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

But  it  may  be  held  that  an  instance  of  stupidity  even 
more  extreme  (if  the  expression  may  pass),  is  furnished  by 
the  inability  of  people  to  see  that  disregard  of  self  involves 
disregard  of  offspring.  There  are  two  ways  in  which  it 
does  this. 

Inability  to  provide  for  them  adequately  is  one  evil  con- 
sequence. Without  bodily  welfare  in  parents  there  cannot 
be  effectual  sustentation  of  children ;  and  if  the  race  should 
be  maintained,  then  care  of  self  with  a  view  to  care  of 
progeny  becomes  an  obligation.  This  normal  egoism  must 
be  such  as  results  not  merely  in  continued  life,  but  in  that 
vigorous  life  which  gives  efficiency.  Nor  is  due  care  of  self 
demanded  only  because  the  duties  of  the  bread-winner  can- 
not otherwise  be  fulfilled ;  but  it  is  demanded  also  by  regard 
for  educational  duties.  Ill-health  brings  irritability  and  de- 
pression ;  incapacities  for  right  behaviour  to  children ;  and, 
by  souring  their  tempers  and  deadening  their  sympathies, 
injures  them  for  life. 

Still  more  closely,  however,  is  the  welfare  of  descend- 
ants bound  up  with  self-welfare.  Good  or  ill  treatment 
of  his  or  her  body  or  mind  by  each  person,  influences  for 
good  or  ill  the  constitutions  of  his  or  her  progeny.  Unless 
it  be  held  that  stalwart  and  robust  men  may  be  expected 
to  come  from  stunted  and  unhealthy  parents,  or  that  high 
intelligences  and  noble  characters  are  likely  to  be  inherited 
from  stupid  and  criminal  fathers  and  mothers,  it  must  be 
admitted  that  any  treatment  of  self  which  furthers  bodily 
or  mental  development  tends  towards  the  benefit  of  the 
next  generation  (I  say  "  tends "  because  there  are  com- 
plicating influences  due  to  atavism),  and  that  any  treat- 
ment of  self  which  undermines  bodily  health  or  injures  the 
mind  intellectually  or  emotionally,  tends  towards  a  lower- 
ing of  the  nature  in  the  next  generation.  Yet  while  people 
daily  make  remarks  about  the  likenesses  of  children  to 
parents,  and  note  the  inheritance  of  this  or  that  defect  of 
mind  or  body,  their  criticisms  on  conduct  entirely  disregard 


INTRODUCTORY.  483 

the  implication.  They  fail  to  draw  the  inference  that  if 
constitutions  are  transmitted,  the  actions  which  damage 
constitutions  or  improve  them  influence  for  good  or  ill  the 
physical  and  mental  characters  of  children  and  of  children's 
children. 

In  certain  extreme  cases  there  is,  indeed,  a  distinct 
recognition  of  the  mischiefs  entailed  by  the  transgressions 
of  parents.  Though  reprobation  of  those  who  have  trans- 
mitted acquired  diseases  to  their  children  is  not  often 
heard,  yet  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  is  strongly  felt. 
Probably  most  will  agree  that,  if  the  amount  of  suffering 
inflicted  be  used  as  a  measure,  murder  is  a  smaller  crime 
than  is  the  giving  to  offspring  infected  constitutions  and 
consequent  life-long  miseries.  But  even  in  its  grossest  form 
this  transgression  is  thought  little  of  by  the  transgressors. 
There  are,  indeed,  kindred  cases  in  which  the  sense  of  re- 
sponsibility sometimes  serves  as  a  deterrent — cases,  for  ex- 
ample, where  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  insanity  in  the 
family  causes  abstentation  from  marriage.  Very  generally, 
however,  where  the  weaknesses,  or  disorders,  or  taints  they 
are  likely  to  communicate,  are  of  less  conspicuous  kinds,  peo- 
ple, in  a  light-hearted  way,  are  ready  to  inflict  uncounted 
evils  on  descendants. 

Still  less  is  an  allied  consciousness  of  responsibility.  There 
is  no  recognition  of  the  truth  that  such  persistent  misuse  of 
body  or  mind  as  injures  it,  involves  the  injury  of  descendants ; 
and  there  is  consequently  no  recognition  of  the  truth  that  it 
is  a  duty  so  to  carry  on  life  as  to  preserve  all  parts  of  the 
system  in  their  normal  states. 

These  further  reasons  for  due  care  of  self  have  to  be 
insisted  upon.  Each  man's  constitution  should  be  regarded 
by  him  as  an  entailed  estate,  which  he  is  bound  to  pass  on  in 
as  good  a  condition  as  he  received  it,  if  not  better. 

§  198.  Beyond  this  special  altruism  which  makes  impera- 
tive a  normal  egoism,  there  is  a  general  altruism  which  also 


484  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL    LIFE. 

makes  it  in  a  measure  obligatory.  The  obligation  has  both  a 
negative  and  a  positive  aspect. 

Such  care  of  self  as  is  needful  to  exclude  the  risk  of 
burdening  others,  is  implied  in  a  proper  regard  for  others. 
As,  from  those  rude  groups  in  which  men  lead  lives  so  in- 
dependent that  they  severally  take  the  entire  results  of 
their  own  conduct,  we  advance  to  developed  nations,  fellow- 
men  become  more  and  more  implicated  in  our  actions. 
Under  a  social  system  carried  on  by  exchange  of  services, 
those  on  whom  undue  self-sacrifice  has  brought  incapacity 
are  commonly  obliged  to  break  contracts  partially  or  wholly, 
and  so  to  inflict  evil;  and  then  any  such  incapacity  as 
negatives  bread-winning,  ordinarily  imposes,  first  on  relatives 
and  then  on  friends,  or  else  on  the  public,  a  tax  implying 
extra  labour.  Everyone,  therefore,  is  bound  to  avoid  that 
thoughtless  unselfishness  which  is  apt  to  bring  evils  on  others 
— evils  that  are  often  greater  than  those  which  entire  selfish- 
ness produces. 

The  altruistic  justification  of  egoism  referred  to  as  of  a 
positive  kind,  results,  firstly,  from  the  obligation  to  expend 
some  effort  for  the  benefit  of  particular  persons  or  for  the 
benefit  of  society — an  obligation  which  cannot  be  properly 
discharged  if  health  has  been  undermined.  And  it  results, 
secondly,  from  the  obligation  to  become,  so  far  as  inherited 
nature  permits,  a  source  of  social  pleasure  to  those  around ; 
to  fulfil  this  requirement  there  must  ordinarily  be  a  flow  of 
mental  energy  such  as  the  invalid  cannot  maintain. 


CHAPTER   II. 

ACTIVITY. 

§  199.  In  a  systematic  treatise  the  express  statement  of 
certain  commonplaces  is  inevitable.  A  coherent  body  of 
geometrical  theorems,  for  instance,  has  to  be  preceded  by 
self-evident  axioms.  This  must  be  the  excuse  for  here 
setting  down  certain  familiar  truths. 

The  infant  at  first  feebly  moves  about  its  little  limbs; 
by  and  by  it  crawls  on  the  floor;  presently  it  walks,  and 
after  a  time  runs.  As  it  develops,  its  activities  display 
themselves  in  games,  in  races,  in  long  walks :  the  range  of 
its  excursions  being  gradually  extended,  as  it  approaches 
adult  existence.  Manhood  brings  the  ability  to  make 
tours  and  exploring  expeditions;  including  passages  from 
continent  to  continent,  and  occasionally  round  the  world. 
When  middle  life  is  passed  and  vigour  begins  to  decline, 
these  extreme  manifestations  of  activities  become  fewer. 
Journeys  are  shortened ;  and  presently  they  do  not  go 
beyond  visits  to  the  country  or  to  the  seaside.  As  old  age 
advances,  the  movements  become  limited  to  the  village 
and  the  surrounding  fields;  afterwards  to  the  garden; 
later  still  to  the  house ;  presently  to  the  room ;  finally  to 
the  bed ;  and  at  last,  when  the  power  to  move,  gradually 
decreasing,  has  ceased,  the  motions  of  the  lungs  and  heart 
come  to  an  end.  Taken  in  its  ensemble,  life  presents  itself 
in  the  shape  of  movements  which  begin  feebly,  gradually 
increase  up  to  maturity,  and  then  culminating,  decrease 
until  they  end  as  feebly  as  they  began. 


486  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

Thus  life  is  activity;  and  the  complete  cessation  of 
activity  is  death.  Hence  arises  the  general  implication 
that  since  the  most  highly-evolved  conduct  is  that  which 
achieves  the  most  complete  life,  activity  obtains  an  ethical 
sanction,  and  inactivity  an  ethical  condemnation. 

This  is  a  conclusion  universally  accepted  and  needing 
no  enforcement.  Even  from  those  who  habitually  evade 
useful  activities,  there  comes  reprobation  for  such  of  their 
class  as  are  too  inert  even  to  amuse  themselves;  absolute 
sloth  is  frowned  on  by  all. 

§  200.  The  kind  of  activity  with  which  we  are  here 
chiefly  concerned,  is  the  activity  directed  primarily  to  self- 
sustentation,  and  secondarily  to  sustentation  of  family. 

In  the  order  of  Nature  the  imperativeness  of  such  activity 
effectually  asserts  itself.  Among  all  sub-human  creatures 
(excepting  most  parasites)  individuals  which  lack  it  die, 
and  after  them  their  offspring,  if  they  have  any.  Those 
only  survive  which  are  adequately  active;  and,  among 
such,  a  certain  advantage  in  self -sustentation  and  sustenta- 
tion of  offspring  is  gained  by  those  in  which  activity  is 
greater  than  usual :  the  general  effect  being  to  raise  the 
activity  to  that  limit  beyond  which  disadvantage  to  the 
species  is  greater  than  advantage.  Up  to  the  time  when 
men  passed  into  the  associated  state,  this  law  held  of  them 
as  of  the  lower  animals ;  and  it  held  of  them  also  through- 
out early  social  stages.  Before  the  making  of  slaves 
began,  no  family  could  escape  from  the  relation  between 
labour  and  the  necessaries  of  life.  And  the  ethical  sanc- 
tion for  this  relation  in  primitive  societies  is  implied  in 
the  fact  that  extreme  inequality  in  the  distribution  of 
efforts  and  benefits  between  the  sexes,  must  always  have 
resulted  in  deterioration  and  eventual  extinction. 

Though,  in  the  course  of  social  evolution,  there  have 
arisen  multiplied  possibilities  of  evading  the  normal  relation 
between  efforts  and  benefits,  so  as  to  get  the  benefits 


ACTIVITY.  487 

without  the  efforts;  yet,  bearing  in  mind  the  foregoing 
general  law  of  life,  we  must  infer  that  the  evasions  call 
for  reprobation  more  or  less  decided,  according  to  circum- 
stances. 

Being  here  directly  concerned  only  with  the  ethics  of 
individual  life,  we  need  not  take  account  of  the  implied 
relation  between  the  idle  individual  and  the  society  in 
which  he  exists.  Ignoring  all  other  cases,  we  may  limit 
ourselves  to  those  cases  in  which  property  equitably  ac- 
quired by  a  parent,  without  undue  tax  on  his  energies, 
serves,  when  bequeathed,  to  support  a  son  in  idleness: 
cases  in  which  there  is  no  implied  trespass  on  fellow- 
citizens.  On  each  of  such  cases  the  verdict  is  that  though 
it  is  possible  for  the  individual  to  fulfil  the  law  of  life,  in 
so  far  as  physical  activities  are  concerned,  by  devoting 
himself  to  sports  and  games,  and  in  so  far  as  certain  kinds 
of  mental  activities  are  concerned,  by  useless  occupations; 
yet  there  lack  those  mental  activities,  emotional  and 
intellectual,  which  should  form  part  of  his  life  as  a 
social  being ;  and  in  so  far  his  life  becomes  an  abnormal 
one. 

§  201.  The  chief  question  for  us,  however,  is — What  are 
the  ethical  aspects  of  labour  considered  in  its  immediate 
relations  to  pleasure  and  pain?  From  this  point  of  view 
of  absolute  ethics,  actions  are  right  only  when,  besides 
being  conducive  to  the  future  happiness  of  self,  or  others, 
or  both,  they  are  also  immediately  pleasurable.  What 
then  are  we  to  say  of  necessary  labour ;  most  of  which  is 
accompanied  by  disagreeable  feelings  ? 

Such  labour  is  warranted,  or  rather  demanded,  by  the 
requirements  of  that  relative  ethics  which  is  concerned 
not  with  the  absolute  right  but  with  the  least  wrong. 
During  the  present  transitional  state  of  humanity,  submis- 
sion to  such  displeasurable  feeling  as  labour  involves,  is 
warranted  as  a  means  of  escaping  from  feelings  which  are 


4:88  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

still  more  displeasurable — a  smaller  pain  to  avoid  a  greater 
pain,  or  to  achieve  a  pleasure,  or  both. 

The  state  necessitating  this  compromise  is  the  state  of 
imperfect  adaptation  to  social  life.  The  change  from  the 
irregular  activities  of  the  savage  man  to  the  regular 
activities  of  the  civilized  man,  implies  a  re-moulding — a 
repression  of  some  powers  which  crave  for  action,  and  a 
taxing  of  other  powers  beyond  the  pleasurable  limit:  the 
capacity  for  persistent  effort  and  persistent  attention,  being 
one  especially  called  for,  and  one  at  present  deficient.  This 
adaptation  has  to  be  undergone,  and  the  accompanying 
sufferings  have  to  be  borne. 

And  here  seems  a  fit  place  for  commenting  on  the  vary- 
ing amounts  of  displeasurable  feeling,  often  rising  to  posi- 
tive pain,  necessitated  by  fulfilment  of  the  obligation  to 
work.  The  majority  of  people  speak  of  effort,  bodily  or 
mental,  as  if  the  cost  of  it  were  the  same  to  all.  Though 
personal  experience  proves  to  them  that  when  well  and 
fresh,  they  put  forth  with  ease  a  muscular  force  which, 
when  prostrate  with  illness  or  exhausted  by  toil,  it  is 
painful  to  put  forth — though  they  find,  too,  that  when  the 
mental  energies  are  high  they  think  nothing  of  a  con- 
tinuous attention  which,  when  enfeebled,  they  are  quite 
unequal  to;  yet  they  do  not  see  that  these  temporary 
contrasts  between  their  own  states,  are  paralleled  by  per- 
manent contrasts  between  states  of  different  persons. 

Ethical  judgments  must  take  account  of  the  fact  that 
the  effort,  bodily  or  mental,  which  is  easy  to  one  is  labor- 
ious to  another. 

§  202.  "We  come  now  to  a  question  of  special  interest  to 
us — Can  the  human  constitution  be  so  adapted  to  its  pres- 
ent conditions,  that  the  needful  amount  of  labour  to  be 
gone  through  will  be  agreeable  ? 

An  affirmative  answer  will,  to  most  people,  seem  absurd. 
Limiting  their  observations  to  facts  around,  or  at  most 


ACTIVITY,  489 

extending  them  to  such  further  facts  as  the  records  of 
civilized  people  furnish,  they  cannot  believe  in  the  required 
change  of  nature.  Such  evidence  as  that  which,  in  the 
first  part  of  this  work  (§§  63-67),  was  assigned  to  prove 
that  pleasures  and  pains  are  relative  to  the  constitution  of 
the  organism,  and  that  in  virtue  of  the  unlimited  modi- 
fiability  of  constitution,  actions  originally  painful  may 
become  pleasurable,  does  not  weigh  with  them.  Though 
they  probably  know  some  who  so  love  work  that  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  restrain  them, — though  here  and  there  they  meet 
one  who  complains  that  a  holiday  is  a  weariness ;  yet  it 
does  not  seem  to  them  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  due 
tendency  to  continuous  labour,  which  is  now  an  excep- 
tional trait,  may  become  a  universal  trait. 

It  is  undeniable  that  there  are  various  expenditures  of 
energy,  bodily  and  mental — often  extreme  expenditures — 
which  are  willingly  entered  upon  and  continued  eagerly : 
witness  field-sports,  games,  and  the  intellectual  efforts 
made  during  social  intercourse.  In  these  cases  the  energy 
expended  is  often  far  greater  than  that  expended  in  daily 
avocations.  "What  constitutes  the  difference?  In  the  one 
class  of  actions  emulation  makes  possible  the  pleasurable 
consciousness  which  accompanies  proved  efficiency,  and 
the  pleasurable  consciousness  of  the  admiration  given  to 
efficiency ;  while,  in  the  other  class,  the  absence  of  emula- 
tion, or  at  any  rate  of  direct  visible  emulation,  implies  the 
absence  of  a  large  proportion  of  this  pleasurable  conscious- 
ness. Nevertheless,  what  remains  may  become  a  power- 
ful stimulus,  making  continuous  application  agreeable. 
Hobbies  exemplify  this  truth.  I  can  name  two  cases  in 
which  occupations  of  this  kind  are,  without  need,  pursued 
so  eagerly  as  scarcely  to  leave  time  for  meals.  Though  in 
these  cases  the  pleasurable  exercise  of  skill  is  a  large 
factor,  and  though  in  many  occupations  there  seems  but 
small  scope  for  this,  yet,  nearly  everywhere,  the  satisfac- 
tion attendant  on  the  doing  of  work  in  the  most  perfect 


4:90  THE   ETHICS.  OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

manner,  may  be  sufficient  to  render  the  work  agreeable, 
when  joined  with  that  overflowing  energy  which  is  to  be 
anticipated  as  the  concomitant  of  a  normally  developed 
nature. 

§  203.  It  remains  to  consider  whether,  concluding  that 
labour  up  to  a  certain  limit  is  obligatory,  there  is  any 
reason  for  concluding  that  beyond  that  limit  it  is  the  reverse 
of  obligatory.  The  present  phase  of  human  progress  fosters 
the  belief  that  the  more  work  the  more  virtue ;  but  this  is  an 
unwarranted  belief. 

Absolute  ethics  does  not  dictate  more  work  than  is  re- 
quisite for  efficient  self-sustentation,  efficient  nurture  of 
dependents,  and  discharge  of  a  due  share  of  social  duties. 
As  in  the  lowest  creatures,  so  in  the  highest,  survival  is 
the  primary  end  to  be  achieved  by  actions ;  and  though,  in 
an  increasing  degree  as  we  ascend,  actions  themselves 
with  their  associated  feelings  become  secondary  ends,  yet 
pursued  to  the  detriment  of  the  primary  end  in  all  its  ful- 
ness— the  leading  of  a  life  complete,  not  in  length  only, 
but  in  breadth  and  depth.  The  hedonistic  view,  which  is 
involved  in  the  evolutionary  view,  implies  an  ethical 
sanction  for  that  form  of  conduct  which  conduces  in  the 
highest  degree  to  self-happiness  and  the  happiness  of  others ; 
and  it  follows  that  labour  which  taxes  the  energies  beyond 
the  normal  limit,  or  diminishes  more  than  is  needful  the 
time  available  for  other  ends,  or  both,  receives  no  ethical 
sanction. 

If  adaptation  to  the  social  state  must  in  time  produce  a 
nature  such  that  the  needful  labour  will  be  pleasurable,  a 
concomitant  conclusion  is  that  it  will  not  produce  a 
capacity  for  labour  beyond  this  limit.  Hence  labour  in  ex- 
cess of  this  limit  will  be  abnormal  and  improper.  For  as 
labour  inevitably  entails  physical  cost — as  the  waste  involved 
by  it  has  to  be  made  good  out  of  the  total  supply  which  the 
organic  actions  furnish ;  then  superfluous  labour,  deducting 


ACTIVITY.  491 

from  this  supply  more  than  is  necessary,  diminishes  the 
amount  available  for  life  at  large — diminishes  the  extent  or 
the  intensity  of  that  life. 

Obviously,  however,  this  reasoning  refers  to  that  fully- 
evolved  form  of  life  which  absolute  ethics  contemplates, 
rather  than  to  the  present  form,  which  has  to  be  guided  by 
relative  ethics.  In  our  transitional  state,  with  its  unde- 
veloped capacity  for  work,  frequent  over-stepping  of  the 
limit  is  requisite,  and  must  be  regarded  as  incident  to  the 
further  development  of  the  capacity.  All  we  may  fairly  say 
is  that,  at  present,  the  limit  should  not  be  so  transgressed 
as  to  cause  physical  deterioration,  and  that  it  should  be 
respected  where  there  exists  no  weighty  reason  for  going 
beyond  it. 

§  204.  Connected  as  each  man's  actions  are  with  the  ac- 
tions of  others  in  multitudinous  ways,  it  follows  that  the 
ethics  of  individual  life  cannot  be  completely  separated 
from  the  ethics  of  social  life.  Conduct  of  which  the  pri- 
mary results  are  purely  personal,  has  often  secondary  results 
which  are  social.  Hence  we  must  in  each  case  consider  the 
ways  in  which  acts  that  directly  concern  self  indirectly  con- 
cern others. 

In  the  present  case  it  scarcely  needs  saying  that  beyond 
that  obligation  to  labour  which  is  deducible  from  the  laws  of 
individual  life,  there  is  a  social  obligation  reinforcing  it. 
Though,  in  a  primitive  community,  it  is  possible  for  an  indi- 
vidual to  take  upon  himself  all  the  results  of  his  inactivity ; 
yet,  in  an  advanced  community,  consisting  of  citizens  not 
devoid  of  sympathy,  it  becomes  difficult  to  let  the  idle 
individual  suffer  in  full  the  results  of  his  idleness,  and  still 
more  difficult  to  let  his  offspring  do  this.  Even  should  it 
be  decided  by  fellow-citizens  that  the  extreme  consequences 
of  idleness  shall  be  borne,  yet  this  decision  must  be  at  the 
cost  of  sympathetic  pain.  In  any  case,  therefore,  evil 
is  inflicted  on  others  as  well  as  on  self,  and  the  conduct 


492  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

inflicting  it  is,  for  this  further  reason,  to  be  ethically  repro- 
bated. 

Reprobation,  though  quite  of  another  quality,  is  also  de- 
served by  conduct  of  the  opposite  kind — by  the  carrying  of 
labour  to  such  extreme  as  to  cause  illness,  prostration,  and 
incapacity.  For  by  this  conduct,  too,  burdens  and  pains  are 
entailed  on  others. 

Hence  altruistic  motives  join  egoistic  motives  in 
prompting  labour  up  to  a  certain  limit,  but  not  beyond  that 
limit. 


CHAPTER  III. 

EEST. 

§  205.  Though  the  ethically-enjoined  limitations  of  life- 
sustaining  activities,  specified  towards  the  close  of  the  last 
chapter,  apparently  implies  that  rest  is  ethically  enjoined, 
and  in  a  large  measure  does  so,  yet  this  corollary  must  be 
definitely  stated  and  enlarged  on  for  several  reasons. 

The  first  is  that  there  are  various  activities,  not  of  a  life- 
sustaining  kind,  which  may  be  entered  on  when  the  activities 
devoted  to  sustentation  of  life  are  ended ;  and  hence  the  con- 
clusion drawn  in  the  last  chapter  does  not  involve  insistence 
upon  absolute  rest. 

Further,  we  have  to  observe  the  several  kinds  of  rest, 
which,  if  not  complete,  are  approximately  so ;  and  the  need 
for  each  of  these  kinds  must  be  pointed  out. 

Something  has  to  be  said  under  each  of  the  several  heads 
— rest  at  intervals  during  work ;  nightly  rest ;  rest  of  a  day 
after  a  series  of  days ;  and  occasional  long  rest  at  long  inter- 
vals. 

§  206.  Rhythm,  shown  throughout  the  organic  functions 
as  elsewhere,  has  for  its  concomitant  the  alternation  of 
waste  and  repair.  Every  contraction  of  the  heart,  every 
inflation  of  the  lungs,  is  followed  by  a  momentary  relaxa- 
tion of  the  muscles  employed.  In  the  process  of  alimenta- 
tion, we  have  the  short  rhythms  constituting  the  peristaltic 
motion,  compounded  with  the  longer  rhythms  implied  by 


494  THE   ETHICS    OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

the  periodicity  of  meals.  Far  deeper,  indeed,  than  at  first 
appears,  is  the  conformity  to  this  law;  for  some  organic 
actions  which  appear  continuous  are  in  truth  discontinu- 
ous. A  muscle  which  maintains  for  a  time  a  persistent 
contraction,  and  seems  in  a  uniform  state,  is  made  up  of 
multitudinous  units  which  are  severally  alternating  be- 
tween action  and  rest — these  relaxing  while  those  are 
contracting;  and  so  keeping  up  a  constant  strain  of  the 
whole  muscle  by  the  inconstant  strains  of  its  competent 
fibres. 

The  law  thus  displayed  in  each  organ  and  part  of  an 
organ,  from  moment  to  moment,  is  displayed  throughout 
the  longer  and  larger  co-operations  of  parts.  Combined 
muscular  strains  which  tax  the  powers  of  the  system  in 
any  considerable  degree,  cannot  with  impunity  be  con- 
tinually repeated  without  cessation,  even  during  the  period 
devoted  to  activity.  Waste  in  such  cases  over-runs  repair 
to  a  considerable  extent,  and  makes  needful  a  cessation 
during  which  arrears  may  be  in  some  measure  made  up — 
an  interval  for  "  taking  breath,"  as  the  expression  is. 
Long  unbroken  persistence,  even  in  moderate  efforts,  is 
injurious;  and  though  such  unresting  action  when  occa- 
sional does  no  permanent  harm,  if  it  recurs  daily,  loss  of 
power  is  the  final  result.  Scriveners'  palsy  illustrates  a 
local  form  of  this  evil ;  as  do  also  various  atrophies  of  over- 
used muscles. 

Nor  is  this  true  of  bodily  actions  only.  It  is  true  of 
mental  actions  also.  A  concentrated  attention  which  is 
too  continuous  produces,  after  a  time,  nervous  disturbance 
and  inability.  Daily  occupation  for  many  hours  in  even  so 
simple  a  thing  as  removing  the  small  defects  in  machine- 
made  lace,  not  unfrequently  brings  on  chronic  brain  disorder. 
Some  single-line  railways  in  the  United  States,  the  move- 
ments of  trains  on  which  are  regulated  by  telegraph  from 
a  central  office,  furnish  a  striking  instance  in  the  fact  that 
the  men  who  have  thus  to  conduct  the  traffic,  and  cannot 


BEST.  495 

for  a  moment  relax  under  penalty  of  causing  accidents,  never 
last  for  more  than  a  few  years ;  they  become  permanently 
incapable. 

These  unduly  persistent  strains,  bodily  and  mental,  are 
always  indicated  more  or  less  clearly  by  the  painful  feelings 
accompanying  them.  The  sensations  protest,  and  their  pro- 
tests cannot  with  impunity  be  ignored. 

§  207.  Insistence  on  the  need  for  that  complete  rest 
which  we  call  sleep,  is  not  called  for ;  but  something  may 
fitly  be  said  concerning  its  duration — now  too  small,  now 
too  great. 

Current  criticisms  on  the  habits  of  those  around,  imply 
the  erroneous  belief  that  for  persons  of  the  same  sex  and 
age,  the  same  amount  of  sleep  is  required — a  professed 
belief  which  is,  nevertheless,  continually  traversed  by  re- 
marks on  the  unlike  numbers  of  hours  of  repose  which 
different  persons  can  do  with.  The  truth  is  that  the  re- 
quired amount  of  sleep  depends  on  the  constitution. 
According  as  the  vigour  is  small  or  great,  there  may  be 
taken  many  hours  to  little  purpose  or  few  hours  to  great 
purpose.  To  understand  what  are  the  vital  requirements, 
and,  by  implication,  the  habits  which,  from  our  present 
standpoint,  we  regard  as  having  ethical  sanction,  we 
must  pause  a  moment  to  look  at  the  physiology  of  the 
matter. 

The  difference  between  waking  and  sleeping  is  that  in 
the  one  waste  gets  ahead  of  repair,  while  in  the  other 
repair  gets  ahead  of  waste.  Proof  that  repair  is  always  going 
on,  but  that  it  varies  in  rate,  is  furnished  by  what  are 
known  as  photogenes.  During  early  life,  while  the  blood 
is  rich  and  the  circulation  good,  the  destruction  of  nerve- 
tissue  produced  by  each  impression  the  eye  receives,  is 
made  up  for  instantaneously,  so  that  the  eye  is  at  once 
ready  to  appreciate  perfectly  a  new  impression;  but  in 
later  life  diminished  vigour  is  shown  by  the  greater  time 
33 


4:96  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

required  for  restoring  the  sensitiveness  of  the  retinal  ele- 
ments ;  and  connected  nerves,  after  each  visual  impression — 
a  time  which  is  quite  appreciable  when  the  impression  has 
been  strong.  The  result  is  that  a  new  image  received  is  to 
some  extent  confused  by  the  persistence  of  the  preceding 
image,  presented  in  its  complementary  colours. 

Now  these  differences  in  the  rates  of  repair  at  different 
stages  in  the  life  of  the  same  individual,  are  paralleled  by 
differences  in  the  rates  of  repair  in  different  individuals ; 
and  hence  the  unlike  amounts  of  sleep  required.  There  is  a 
double  cause  for  the  unlikeness.  In  the  vigorous  person  re- 
pair during  the  waking  state  is  relatively  so  rapid  as  not  to 
fall  very  far  in  arrear  of  the  waste  caused  by  action ;  the 
consequence  being  that  at  the  end  of  the  day  less  repair  is 
required.  And  then,  from  the  same  cause,  it  results  that 
during  sleep  such  repair  as  has  to  be  made  is  more  rapidly 
made.  Conversely,  in  the  individual  with  low  nutrition  and 
slow  circulation,  action  is  sooner  followed  by  exhaustion,  and 
the  parts  wasted  by  action  take  a  longer  rest  to  make  them 
fit  for  action. 

But  while  the  implication  is  that  not  unfrequently  one 
who  is  condemned  as  a  sluggard  is  taking  no  more 
absolute  rest  than  is  required  by  him,  and  is  rightly 
prompted  to  take  it  by  his  sensations,  we  must  not  infer 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  sleep  in  excess.  There  is  a 
very  general  tendency  to  take  not  only  more  than  is 
needful  but  more  than  is  beneficial.  Passing  a  certain 
limit,  the  state  of  entire  quiescence  does  not  invigorate  but 
prostrates.  Lacking  their  stimuli  the  vital  organs  flag, 
and  when  the  quiescence  is  continued  after  repairs  have 
been  effected,  a  further  fall  in  their  activities  disables 
them  from  carrying  on  the  repairs  needed  during  working 
life  at  the  ordinary  rate:  a  sense  of  weariness  being  the 
consequence.  Probably  for  those  whose  systems  are  so  far 
in  a  normal  state  that  they  sleep  soundly,  the  first  complete 
waking  marks  the  proper  limit  to  the  night's  rest.  Some- 


BEST.  497 

times  a  day  after  sleep  thus  limited  is  a  day  of  unusual 
vivacity. 

Here  we  have  to  recognize  a  seeming  exception  to  the 
general  law  that  for  maintenance  of  bodily  welfare  the 
sensations  are  adequate  guides.  This  lack  of  adjustment  is 
most  likely  associated  with  our  transitional  state,  during 
which  the  average  life  is  so  uninteresting,  and  often  so 
wearisome,  that  the  prospective  renewal  of  it  on  waking 
does  not  serve  as  a  stimulus  to  get  up,  but  rather  the  con- 
trary; for  everyone  has  found  that  when  the  forthcoming 
day  promises  an  enjoyment,  say  an  excursion,  there  is 
no  difficulty  in  rising  early.  It  may  be,  therefore,  that 
greater  adaptation  to  the  social  state  and  its  needful  occupa- 
tions, will  render  easy  that  normal  abridgment  of  sleep 
which  is  now  difficult.  But  for  a  long  time  to  come,  it  will 
be  an  implication  of  relative  ethics  that  guidance  by  the 
sensations  must  here  be  supplemented  by  judgments  based 
on  experience. 

§  208.  Civilized  mankind  have  fallen  into  the  habit  of 
taking  a  further  periodical  rest — a  weekly  rest ;  and  without 
accepting  their  reasons  given  for  taking  it,  we  may  admit 
the  propriety  of  taking  it  for  other  reasons. 

Monotony,  no  matter  of  what  kind,  is  unfavourable  to 
life.  Not  only  does  there  need  some  discontinuity  in  the 
activities  carried  on  during  the  waking  state,  and  not  only 
must  the  activities  be  made  discontinuous  by  intervals  of 
sleep,  but  that  continuity  of  activities  which  consists  in 
repetition  of  days  similarly  occupied,  also  seems  to  require 
breaking  by  days  of  rest.  There  is  a  cumulative  weariness 
which  is  not  met  by  the  periodical  cessations  which  nights 
bring :  there  require  larger  periodical  cessations  at  longer 
intervals.  The  persistent  strain  of  daily  occupations  is  in  all 
cases  a  strain  falling  on  some  parts  of  the  system  more  than 
on  others;  and  that  daily  repair  which  suffices  to  bring 
the  system  at  large  into  working  order  again,  appears  not 


498  THE   ETHICS    OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

to  suffice  for  bringing  into  working  order  again  parts 
that  have  been  specially  taxed.  So  that  a  recurring  day 
of  rest  has,  if  not  a  religious  sanction,  still  an  ethical 
sanction. 

We  may,  too,  agree  with  the  Sabbatarians  so  far  as  to  ad- 
mit that  a  periodical  cessation  of  daily  business  is  requisite 
as  a  means  to  mental  health.  Even  as  it  is,  most  people 
largely  fail  to  emancipate  themselves  from  those  prosaic  con- 
ceptions of  the  world  and  life  which  mechanical  routine 
tends  to  produce ;  and  they  would  fail  utterly  were  all  their 
days  passed  in  work.  There  require  intervals  of  passivity 
during  which  the  vast  process  of  things  amid  which  we  live 
may  be  contemplated,  and  receptivity  of  the  appropriate 
thoughts  and  feelings  fostered. 

§  209.  I  need  not  insist  on  the  physical  and  mental  bene- 
fits gained  from  those  longer  intermissions  of  labour  which 
now  commonly  recur  annually.  Not  to  dwell  on  the  posi- 
tive pleasures  obtained  by  them  (which,  however,  must  be 
counted  as  effects  to  be  deliberately  sought),  it  suffices  to  re- 
call the  re-invigoration  and  increased  fitness  for  work 
which  they  usually  produce,  to  show  that  they  are  ethically 
sanctioned,  or  rather,  where  circumstances  permit,  ethically 
enjoined. 

Without  further  elaboration  I  pass  to  the  altruistic 
reasons  which  justify  rest,  and  show  the  taking  of  it  in 
due  amount  to  be  obligatory.  The  claims  of  dependents 
and  the  claims  of  fellow-citizens  with  whom  engagements 
have  been  made,  alike  forbid  excess  of  work :  energy 
must  not  be  so  wastefully  expended  as  to  jeopardize  ful- 
filment of  them.  A  -sane  judgment  has  to  balance  between 
the  demand  for  such  efforts  as  are  required  to  meet 
these  claims,  and  the  demand  for  such  rest  as  will  prevent 
exhaustion  and  incapacity.  Duty  to  others  forbids  overtax 
of  self. 

But  strong  as  is  the  interdict  hence   arising,  there  is  a 


BEST.  4:99 

still  stronger  interdict — peremptory,  if  not  for  all,  yet  for 
those  who  are  likely  to  have  offspring.  As  pointed  out 
emphatically  in  the  preliminary  chapter,  preservation  of  a 
sound  body,  as  well  as  of  a  sound  mind,  is  a  duty  to  pos- 
terity. Deterioration  of  physique  must  result  from  per- 
sistence in  undue  activity.  To  suppose  that  whether  a  life 
which  is  physically  normal  has  been  led  by  a  parent,  or  one 
which  is  physically  abnormal,  matters  not  to  children,  is  ab- 
surd. If  there  has  been  habitual  deficiency  of  rest  and  con- 
sequent deficiency  of  repair,  the  abnormality  produced  must, 
like  every  other,  leave  its  trace  in  descendants — not  always 
conspicuously,  since  each  child,  besides  inheriting  from  two 
parents,  inherits  from  many  lines  of  ancestors ;  but,  never- 
theless, in  due  degree  somewhere. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


§  210.  Except  perhaps  in  agreeing  that  gluttony  is  to  be 
reprobated  and  that  the  gourmet,  as  well  as  the  gourmand, 
is  a  man  to  be  regarded  with  scant  respect,  most  people  will 
think  it  is  absurd  to  imply,  as  the  above  title  does,  that 
ethics  has  anything  to  say  about  the  taking  of  food.  Though, 
by  condemning  excesses  of  the  kinds  just  indicated,  they  im- 
ply that  men  ought  not  to  be  guilty  of  them,  and  by  the  use 
of  this  word  class  them  as  wrong  ;  yet  they  ignore  the  ob- 
vious fact  that  if  there  is  a  wrong  in  respect  of  the  taking  of 
food  there  must  also  be  a  right. 

The  truth  appears  to  be  that  daily  actions  performed  in 
ways  which  do  not  obviously  deviate  from  the  normal,  cease 
to  be  thought  of  as  either  right  or  wrong.  As  the  most 
familiar  mathematical  truths,  such  as  twice  two  are  four,  are 
not  ordinarily  thought  of  as  parts  of  mathematics  —  as  the 
knowledge  which  a  child  gains  of  surrounding  objects  is  not 
commonly  included  under  education,  though  it  forms  a 
highly  important  part  of  it  ;  so  this  all-essential  ministration 
to  life  by  food,  carried  on  as  a  matter  of  course,  is  dropped 
out  of  the  theory  of  conduct.  And  yet,  as  being  a  part  of 
conduct  which  fundamentally  affects  welfare,  it  cannot 
properly  be  thus  dropped. 

How  improper  is  the  ignoring  of  it  as  a  subject-matter  for 
ethical  judgments,  we  shall  see  on  observing  the  ways  in 
which  current  opinion  respecting  it  goes  wrong. 

§  211.  Already,  in  §  174,  the  extreme  instances  furnished 
by  the  Esquimaux,  the  Yakuts,  and  the  Australians,  have 


NUTRITION.  501 

shown  us  that  enormous  quantities  of  food  are  proper 
under  certain  conditions,  and  that  satisfaction  of  the  seem- 
ingly inordinate  desires  for  them  is  not  only  warranted  but 
imperative :  death  being  the  consequence  of  inability  to 
take  a  sufficient  quantity  to  meet  the  expenditure  entailed 
by  severe  climate  or  by  long  fasts.  To  which  here  let 
me  add  the  experiences  of  Arctic  voyagers,  who,  like  the 
natives  of  the  Arctic  regions,  acquire  great  appetites  for 
blubber. 

Mention  of  these  facts  is  a  fit  preliminary  to  the  question 
whether,  in  respect  of  food,  desires  ought  or  ought  not  to 
be  obeyed.  As  already  said,  treatment  of  this  inquiry  as 
ethical  will  be  demurred  to  by  most,  and  by  many  ridi- 
culed. Though,  when  not  food  but  drink  is  in  question, 
their  judgments,  very  strongly  expressed,  are  of  the  kind 
they  class  as  moral ;  yet  they  do  not  see  that  since  the 
question  concerns  the  effect  of  things  swallowed,  it  is 
absurd  to  regard  the  conduct  which  causes  these  effects  as 
moral  or  immoral  when  the  things  are  liquid  but  not  when 
they  are  solid. 

Adaptation  goes  on  everywhere  and  always,  in  the 
human  race  as  in  inferior  races,  and,  among  other  results, 
is  the  adjustment  of  the  desire  for  food  to  the  need  for 
food.  Even  were  this  not  shown  us  by  the  extreme  in- 
stances above  given,  it  would  be  an  inevitable  corollary 
from  the  law  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest.  Every  mal- 
adjustment of  the  two  must  have  been  injurious,  and, 
other  things  equal,  the  tendency  must  ever  have  been  for 
mal-adjustment  to  cause  the  dying-out  of  individuals  in 
which  it  existed.  On  the  average,  then,  there  must  be  a 
fair  balance :  what  there  is  of  deviation  from  the  normal, 
bearing  but  a  small  ratio  to  what  there  is  of  normal. 

Some  deviation  doubtless  occurs.  We  still  see  inherit- 
ance of  traits  appropriate  to  the  primitive  wild  life  and 
inappropriate  to  settled  civilized  life;  and  among  such 
traits  is  that  tendency  to  take  food  in  excess  of  immediate 


502  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

need,  which  was  good  in  the  irregularly-living  savage  but 
which  is  not  good  in  the  regularly-living  European. 
Further,  it  may  be  admitted  that  men  who  lead  monot- 
onous lives,  as  most  do,  presenting  much  to  bear  and 
little  to  enjoy,  are  apt  to  prolong  unduly  the  few  actions 
which  are  pleasurable ;  and  of  these  eating  is  one.  "When 
the  occupation  to  be  entered  upon  at  the  end  of  a  meal  is 
pleasurable,  there  is  comparatively  little  wish  to  eke  out 
the  meal. 

But  the  more  or  less  of  excess  apt  to  result  from  these 
causes,  is  consequent  not  upon  obedience  to  the  sensations 
naturally  arising,  but  rather  from  solicitation  of  the  sensa- 
tions :  a  perverting  factor  made  possible  by  that  imagina- 
tion which  has  evil  effects  as  well  as  good  effects.  It  is 
not  that  an  immediate  desire  prompts  the  action,  but  that 
the  action  is  prompted  by  the  hope  of  experiencing  the 
agreeable  feeling  which  accompanies  fulfilment  of  a  desire. 
There  are  kindred  evils  arising  from  sitting  down  to  table 
when  appetite  does  not  suggest — partaking  of  periodically- 
recurring  meals  whether  hungry  or  otherwise.  Very 
often  people  eat  as  a  matter  of  course,  not  in  conformity 
with  their  sensations  but  notwithstanding  the  protests  of 
their  sensations.  And  then,  oddly  enough,  there  comes 
from  these  transgressors  the  assertion  that  sensations  are 
not  fit  guides!  Having  suffered  from  constantly  disobey- 
ing them,  they  infer  that  they  are  not  to  be  obeyed ! 

It  is  doubtless  true  that  those  who  are  out  of  health 
occasionally  entail  on  themselves  mischiefs  by  eating  as 
much  as  they  desire;  and  some  who  are  not  in  obvious 
ways  unwell,  now  and  then  do  the  like.  But  a  demurrer 
drawn  from  these  experiences  is  not  sustainable.  In  such 
cases  the  adjustments  between  all  the  various  needs  of  the 
organism,  and  the  various  sensations  which  prompt  fulfil- 
ment of  them,  have  been  chronically  deranged  by  dis- 
obedience. When  by  persistent  indoor  life,  or  by  overwork, 
or  by  ceaseless  mental  worry,  or  by  inadequate  clothing, 


NUTRITION.  503 

or  by  breathing  bad  air,  the  bodily  functions  have  been 
perverted,  guidance  by  the  sensations  ceases  to  be  reliable. 
It  then  becomes  needful  either,  as  in  some  cases,  to  restrain 
appetite,  or,  as  in  other  cases,  to  take  food  without  appe- 
tite :  an  abnormal  state  having  been  brought  about  by 
physiological  sins,  artificial  regulation  is  called  for  to 
supplement  natural  regulation.  But  this  proves  nothing. 
After  prolonged  starvation,  satisfaction  of  ravenous  hunger 
by  a  good  meal  is  said  to  be  fatal.  The  prostration  is  so 
great  that  any  considerable  quantity  of  food  cannot  be 
digested,  and  administration  in  small  quantities  is  needful. 
But  it  is  not  thence  inferred  that  satisfaction  of  appetite 
by  a  good  meal  will  ordinarily  be  fatal.  Similarly  is  it 
throughout.  The  evils  which  occasionally  arise  from  taking 
as  much  as  appetite  prompts,  must  be  ascribed  to  the  mul- 
titudinous preceding  disobediences  to  sensations,  and  not  to 
this  particular  obedience  to  them. 

While  there  is  recognition  of  the  evils  resulting  from 
excesses  in  eating,  there  is  little  recognition  of  the  evils 
consequent  on  eating  too  little.  The  ascetic  bias  given  by 
their  religion  and  by  their  education,  leads  most  people  to 
think  themselves  meritorious  if  they  do  with  as  little  food  as 
possible  and  tempts  them  to  restrict  the  food  of  others. 
Disastrous  effects  follow.  Inadequate  nutrition,  especially 
while  growth  is  going  on,  is  an  unquestionable  cause  of 
imperfect  development,  either  in  size,  or  in  quality  of  tissue, 
or  in  both;  and  parents  who  are  responsible  for  it  are 
responsible  for  invalid  lives.  Ko  cattle-breeder  or  horse- 
breeder  dreams  of  obtaining  a  fine  animal  on  a  stinted 
diet.  No  possessor  of  a  fine  animal  expects  him  to  do 
good  service  on  the  road  or  in  the  field  unless  he  is  well 
fed.  Science  and  common  sense  unite  in  recognizing  the 
truth  that  growth  and  vigour  are  alike  dependent  on  a 
good  supply  of  the  materials  from  which  body  and  brain 
are  built  up  when  young  and  repaired  when  adult.  The 
taking  of  an  adequate  quantity  of  food  is  insured  if  appe- 


604  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

tite  is  obeyed,  while  if  the  supply  is  restricted  spite  of  the 
demands  of  appetite,  there  will  inevitably  be  more  or  less 
of  defect  in  size  or  in  strength. 

Speaking  generally,  then,  we  may  say  that  there  is  an 
ethical  sanction  for  yielding  in  full  to  the  desire  for  food  ; 
both  because  satisfaction  of  the  desire  is  itself  one  element 
to  be  counted  among  the  normal  gratifications  life  offers, 
and  because  satisfaction  of  it  indirectly  conduces  to  sub- 
sequent fulness  of  life  and  the  power  of  discharging  all 
the  obligations  of  life. 

§  212.  One  who  complains  of  the  monotony  of  his  meals 
and  is  thereupon  reproached  for  seeking  the  enjoyments 
which  change  of  diet  gives  (I  name  a  fact),  is,  by  the 
reproach,  tacitly  condemned  from  a  moral  point  of  view. 
"Whence  the  implication  is  that  a  doctrine  of  right  and 
wrong  has  something  to  say  respecting  the  propriety  or 
impropriety  of  yielding  to  the  wish  for  variety.  Everyone, 
therefore,  who  does  not  agree  in  the  opinion  of  the  pious 
Scotchwoman  just  referred  to,  must  hold  the  opposite 
opinion :  the  desire  for  variety  of  food  should  be  gratified 
— has  a  sanction  like  that  of  the  desire  for  due  quantity  of 
food. 

This  is  of  course  not  a  fit  place  for  entering  on  the 
topics  of  variety,  quality,  and  preparation  of  food — topics 
the  mere  mention  of  which  will  seem  out  of  place  to  those 
who  have  not  accepted  the  doctrines  implied  in  the  first 
chapter  of  this  work,  that  every  part  of  conduct  which 
directly  or  indirectly  affects  welfare  has  an  ethical  aspect. 
Here,  what  has  to  be  said  or  hinted  under  the  three  heads 
named,  may  come  under  the  one  general  head  of  satisfac- 
tion of  the  palate,  as  distinguished  from  the  satisfaction  of 
the  appetite — distinguished  in  a  measure  but  not  wholly ; 
since  the  one  serves  as  a  normal  stimulus  to  the  other. 
Partly  as  a  further  sequence  of  asceticism,  and  partly  as  a 
reaction  against  the  gross  sensualism  which  history  occa- 


NUTBITION.  505 

sionallj  records  from  Roman  days  down  to  recent  days,  it 
has  come  to  be  thought  that  the  pleasures  of  the  table  are 
to  be  reprobated;  or,  if  not  positively  reprobated,  yet 
passed  over  as  not  proper  to  be  regarded.  Those  who  take 
this  view  are,  indeed,  like  others,  discontent  with  insipid 
food;  and  are  no  less  ready  than  others  to  dismiss  cooks 
who  cannot  prepare  enjoyable  dinners.  But  while  prac- 
tically they  pursue  gastronomic  satisfactions,  they  refuse  to 
recognize  their  theoretical  legitimacy. 

Here,  I  cannot  imitate  this  uncandid  mode  of  dealing 
with  the  matter  ;  and  find  myself  obliged  to  assert  that  due 
regard  for  the  needs  of  the  palate  is  not  only  proper  but 
disregard  of  them  is  wrong.  The  contrary  view  involves 
the  belief  that  it  matters  not  to  the  body  whether  it  is  the 
seat  of  pleasurable  feelings,  or  indifferent  feelings,  or  pain- 
ful feelings.  But  it  matters  very  much.  As  asserted  in 
an  early  chapter  (§  36),  pleasures  raise  the  tide  of  life 
while  pains  lower  it ;  and  among  the  pleasures  which  do 
this  are  gustatory  pleasures.  There  are  two  reasons  why, 
when  food  is  liked,  digestion  of  it  is  furthered,  and  when 
disliked  is  hindered.  In  common  with  every  agreeable 
sensation  an  agreeable  taste  raises  the  action  of  the  heart, 
and,  by  implication,  the  vital  functions  at  large;  while 
simultaneously,  it  excites  in  a  more  direct  way  the  struct- 
ures which  secrete  the  digestive  fluids.  It  needs  but  to 
remember  the  common  observation  that  an  appetizing 
odour  makes  the  mouth  water,  to  understand  that  the 
alimentary  canal  as  a  whole  is  made  active  by  a  pleasurable 
stimulation  of  the  palate,  and  that  digestion  is  thus  aided 
And  since  on  good  digestion  depends  good  nutrition,  and  on. 
good  nutrition  depends  the  energy  needed  for  daily  work,  it 
follows  that  due  regard  to  gratification  of  the  palate  is 
demanded. 

Those  who  have  had  any  experience  of  invalid  life,  know 
well  how  small  a  quantity  can  be  eaten  of  food  which  is 
indifferent  or  distasteful,  and  how  trying  is  the  digestion  of 


506  THE    ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

such  food,  while  the  converse  holds  of  food  which  is  grate- 
ful :  the  resulting  adequate  meals  of  such  food  better  di- 
gested, being  a  condition  to  recovery  and  the  resumption  of 
responsibilities.  And  if  the  benefit  of  such  ministrations  to 
the  palate  is  made  thus  manifest  where  the  vitality  is  low,  it 
unquestionably  exists,  though  less  manifestly,  where  the 
vitality  is  high. 

Of  course,  as  in  respect  of  quantity  so  in  respect  of  quality 
and  variety,  there  may  be,  and  often  is,  excess :  the  last  kind 
of  excess  being  conducive  to  the  first.  But  no  more  in  this 
case  than  in  any  other  case  is  abuse  an  argument  against 
use. 

§  213.  Before  ending  this  chapter,  which  I  must  now  do 
lest  it  should  become  a  chapter  on  dietetics,  I  must  say  some- 
thing on  the  altruistic  bearings  of  the  conclusions  drawn ; 
only  making,  in  further  repudiation  of  the  ordinary  ascetic 
view,  the  remark  that  the  Hebrew  myth  which  represents 
the  eating  of  the  apple  by  Eve  as  prompted  by  the  serpent, 
seems  in  many  minds  to  have  been  expanded  into  a  general 
theory  of  our  relations  to  food :  their  asceticism  tacitly 
implying  that  gustatory  promptings  are  suggestions  of  the 
devil. 

Of  the  altruistic  bearings  to  be  noted,  the  first  concerns 
the  indirect  effects  of  excess,  suffered  by  those  around, 
from  the  occasional  illness  and  more  frequent  ill-temper 
which  it  produces :  injuries  to  others  the  prospect  of  which 
should  serve  as  a  deterrent,  no  less  than  prospective  injury 
to  self.  And  then  a  more  remote  altruistic  bearing  is  seen 
in  the  effect  wrought  on  the  community  if  excess  is 
general.  Remembering  that  the  stock  of  food  which  a 
community  obtains  is  a  limited  quantity,  it  results  that  if 
its  members  consume  more  than  is  needful  for  complete 
self-sustentation,  they  diminish  the  amount  of  human  life 
proper  to  the  inhabited  area.  Clearly,  if  people  at  large 
eat,  let  us  say,  one-sixth  more  than  is  required  for  full  life 


NUTRITION.  50  T 

and  vigour — if  ten  millions  of  people  eat  as  much  as  would 
satisfactorily  support  twelve  millions  ;  then,  assuming  human 
life  to  be  a  desideratum,  a  wrong  is  done  by  thus  prevent- 
ing its  increase.  The  share  of  each  individual  in  the  wrong 
may  be  inappreciable;  but  the  aggregate  wrong — prevent- 
ing the  existence  of  two  millions  of  people — is  appreciable 
enough. 

The  remaining  altruistic  bearing  is  that  which  concerns 
offspring.  Chronic  innutrition  of  parents  injures  children. 
In  the  case  of  mothers  the  inevitableness  of  this  result  is 
clear.  Building-up  of  the  foatus  has  to  go  on  simul- 
taneously with  the  carrying  on  of  maternal  life,  and  nutri- 
tive materials  are  used  up  for  both  processes.  Though, 
in  the  competition  between  the  two,  the  first  has  a  certain 
priority,  and  is  effected  at  great  cost  to  the  second;  yet, 
where  the  supply  of  nutritive  materials  is  inadequate,  foatal 
growth  is  checked,  as  well  as  maternal  enfeeblement 
caused.  A  stinted  development  of  the  infant  and  a  sub- 
sequent falling  short  of  full  life  are  the  consequences. 
Regard  for  posterity  thus  peremptorily  demands  good 
feeding. 


CHAPTER  Y. 

STIMULATION. 

§  214.  To  write  sundry  chapters  on  the  ethics  of  individ- 
ual life  and  to  say  nothing  about  the  taking  of  stimulants,  is 
out  of  the  question.  While,  on  large  parts  of  private  con- 
duct, most  men  pass  no  moral  judgments,  and  assume  that 
they  are  subject  to  none  ;  over  that  part  of  private  conduct 
which  concerns  the  drinking  of  fermented  liquors,  most 
men,  passing  strong  moral  judgments,  unhesitatingly  assume 
that  ethics  exercises  peremptory  rule;  and  the  inclusion 
within  the  domain  of  ethics  of  questions  concerning  alcoholic 
stimulants,  is  followed  by  inclusion  of  questions  concerning 
opium-eating. 

We  may  observe  here,  as  we  have  observed  before,  that 
the  reprobation  of  practices  which,  in  excess,  are  certainly 
injurious,  and  are  held  by  many  to  be  injurious  altogether,  is 
practically  limited  to  practices  which  are  primarily  pleasur- 
able. A  man  may  bring  on  himself  chronic  rheumatism  by 
daily  careless  exposure,  or  an  incurable  nervous  disorder  by 
over-application;  and  though  he  may  thus  vitiate  his  life 
and  diminish  his  usefulness  in  a  far  greater  degree  than  by 
occasionally  taking  too  much  wine,  yet  his  physical  trans- 
gression meets  with  only  mild  disapproval,  if  even  that.  But 
in  these  cases  the  transgression  is  displeasurable,  whereas 
excess  in  wine  is  pleasurable  ;  and  the  damnable  thing  in  the 
misconduct  is  the  production  of  pleasure  by  it. 

If  it  be  said  that  this  contrast  of  moral  estimates  is  due  to 


STIMULATION.  509 

the  perception  that  there  is  danger  of  falling  into  injurious 
habits  which  are  primarily  pleasurable,  while  there  is  no  dan- 
ger of  falling  into  injurious  habits  which  are  primarily  pain- 
ful ;  the  reply  is  that  though  we  naturally  suppose  this  to  be 
true,  yet  it  is  not  true.  The  obligations  men  are  under,  or 
suppose  themselves  to  be  under,  lead  them  in  multitudinous 
cases  to  persist  in  sedentary  lives,  to  work  too  many  hours, 
to  breathe  impure  air,  and  so  forth,  spite  of  the  feelings 
which  protest — spite  of  continual  proofs  that  they  are  injur- 
ing themselves.  Clearly  it  is  the  vague  notion  that  gratifi- 
cation is  vicious,  which  causes  the  condemnation  of  gratifying 
transgressions  while  ungratifying  transgressions  are  con- 
demned but  slightly  or  not  at  all. 

Here  we  have  to  consider  the  matter,  as  far  as  we  can, 
apart  from  popular  judgments,  and  guided  only  by  physio- 
logical considerations. 

§  215.  It  cannot,  I  think,  be  doubted  that  from  the  point 
of  view  of  absolute  ethics,  stimulants  of  every  kind  must  be 
reprobated ;  or,  at  any  rate,  that  daily  use  of  them  must  be 
reprobated.  Few,  if  any,  will  contend  that  they  play  a  need- 
ful part  in  complete  life. 

All  normal  ingesta  subserve  the  vital  processes  either 
by  furnishing  materials  which  Bid  in  the  formation  and 
repair  of  tissues,  or  materials  which,  during  their  trans- 
formations, yield  heat  and  force,  or  the  material — water 
— which  serves  as  a  vehicle.  A  stimulant,  alcoholic  or 
other,  is  neither  tissue-food,  nor  heat-food,  nor  force-food. 
It  simply  affects  the  rate  of  molecular  change — exalting  it 
and  then,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  if  taken  in  con- 
siderable quantity,  depressing  it.  Now  matters  which  can 
be  used  neither  for  building  up  the  body  nor  as  stores  of 
force,  do  not  increase  the  sum  of  vital  manifestations,  but 
only  alter  the  distribution  of  them.  And  since,  in  a  being 
fully  fitted  for  the  life  it  has  to  lead,  the  functions  are  already 
adjusted  to  the  requirements,  it  does  not  seem  that  any  ad- 


510  THE    ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

vantage  can  be  obtained  by  changing  the  established  bal- 
ance. 

This  inference  is  far-reaching — carries  us  beyond  the 
point  to  which  the  total-abstainers  from  fermented  liquors 
wish  to  go.  Tea  and  coffee  also  must  be  excluded  from 
dietaries.  The  vegeto-alkalies,  to  which  they  owe  their 
effects,  are  just  as  little  akin  to  food  properly  so  called,  as 
is  alcohol ;  and,  like  alcohol,  simply  modify  for  a  time  the 
rate  of  molecular  change,  causing  greater  genesis  of  energy 
during  one  interval  with  the  effect  of  diminishing  it  during 
another.  From  the  physiological  point  of  view,  therefore, 
the  use  of  these  must  be  condemned  if  the  use  of  alcohol  is 
condemned. 

Should  it  be  said  that  the  condemnation  of  the  last  is 
evoked  by  the  liability  to  abuse,  it  may  be  replied  that  the 
liability  to  abuse  holds  of  the  others  also ;  though  the  mis- 
chiefs wrought  are  neither  so  frequent  nor  so  conspicuous. 
In  France  there  are  occasional  deaths  from  coffee-drinking, 
and  in  England  undue  drinking  of  tea  not  infrequently 
causes  nervousness. 

§  216.  But  while,  from  the  point  of  view  of  absolute 
ethics,  the  use  of  stimulants  seems  indefensible,  we  may  still 
ask  whether  relative  ethics  affords  any  justification  for  it — 
whether,  under  existing  conditions,  imperfectly  adapted  as 
we  are  to  the  social  state,  and  obliged  to  diverge  from  natural 
requirements,  we  may  not  use  stimulants  to  countervail  the 
consequent  mischiefs. 

It  is  a  fact  of  some  significance  that  throughout  the 
world,  among  unallied  races  and  in  all  stages  of  progress, 
we  find  in  use  one  or  other  agent  which  agreeably  affects 
the  nervous  system — opium  in  China,  tobacco  among  the 
American  Indians,  bang  in  India,  hashish  in  sundry  Eastern 
places,  a  narcotic  fungus  in  Northern  Asia,  kava  among 
the  Polynesians,  chica  and  coca  in  Ancient  Peru,  and 
various  fermented  liquors  besides  the  wine  of  Europeans, 


STIMULATION.  511 

and  the  beer  of  various  African  tribes — the  soma  of  the 
primitive  Aryans  and  the  pnlque  of  the  Mexicans.  Not 
that  this  universality  of  habits  of  stimulation  justifies 
them  in  face  of  the  evidence  that  diseases  often  result; 
but  it  suggests  the  question  whether  there  is  not  a  con- 
nexion between  the  use  of  some  exciting  or  sedative  agent, 
and  the  kind  of  life  circumstances  entail — a  life  here 
monotonous,  there  laborious,  and  in  other  places  full  of 
privations.  Possibly  these  drugs  and  liquors  may  some- 
times make  tolerable  an  existence  which  would  be  other- 
wise intolerable ;  or,  at  any  rate,  so  far  mitigate  the  bodily 
or  mental  pains  caused,  as  to  diminish  the  mischiefs  done  by 
them. 

Various  testimonies  are  to  the  effect  that  where  the  daily 
life  is  one  entailing  much  wear  and  tear  of  brain,  the  seda- 
tive influence  of  tobacco  is  useful — serves  to  check  that  nerv- 
ous waste  which  otherwise  the  continuance  of  thought  and 
anxiety  would  produce.  In  a  normal  state,  those  parts  of 
the  system  which  have  been  taxed  cease  to  act  when  the 
strain  is  over  :  the  supply  of  blood  is  shut  off,  and  they  be- 
come quiescent.  But  in  the  abnormal  states  established  in 
many  by  over-work,  it  is  otherwise.  The  parts  which  have 
been  active  become  congested,  and  remain  active  when  action 
is  no  longer  demanded.  Thinking  and  feeling  cannot  be 
stopped,  and  there  occurs  an  expenditure  which  is  not 
•only  useless  but  injurious.  Hence  a  justification  for  using 
an  agent  which  prevents  waste  of  tissue  and  economizes  the 
energies. 

Again,  where  the  constitutional  powers  are  flagging, 
and  a  day's  work  proves  so  exhausting  that  the  ability  to 
digest  partially  fails,  it  may  be  held  that  vascular  action  and 
nervous  discharge  may  advantageously  be  raised  by  alcohol 
to  the  extent  needful  for  effectually  dealing  with  food ; 
since  a  good  meal  well  digested  serves  to  render  the  sys- 
tem fit  for  another  day's  work,  which  otherwise  it  would 
not  .be. 


512  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

There  are  those,  too,  in  whom  undue  application  estab- 
lishes a  state  of  nervous  irritation  which  is  mitigated  or 
ended  by  a  dose  of  opium ;  and  the  life  may  sometimes  be 
such  that  the  state  thus  dealt  with  frequently  recurs.  If  this 
happens  the  use  of  the  remedy  appears  justified. 

§  217.  Even  total  abstainers  admit  that  alcoholic  bever- 
ages may  rightly  be  used  for  medicinal  purposes ;  and  their 
admission,  consistently  interpreted,  implies  that,  as  above 
contended,  stimulants  in  general  may  properly  be  employed, 
not  only  where  positive  illness  exists,  but  where  there  is 
inability  to  cope  with  the  requirements  of  life.  For  if  a 
very  conspicuous  departure  from  the  normal  state  may  often 
be  best  treated  by  brandy  or  wine,  it  cannot  well  be  denied 
that  a  less  conspicuous  departure,  occurring  perhaps  daily, 
may  similarly  be  treated.  Constitutional  debility,  or  the 
debility  which  comes  with  advancing  years,  may,  like  the 
debility  of  an  invalid,  be  advantageously  met  by  temporarily 
raising  the  power  of  the  system  at  times  when  it  has  to  do 
work  conducive  to  restoration — that  is,  when  food  has  to  be 
digested,  and  sometimes  when  sleep  has  to  be  obtained.  But 
there  hence  results  a  defence  only  for  such  uses  of  stimu- 
lants as  aid  the  system  in  repairing  itself.  When,  as  by 
taking  alcoholic  liquors  between  meals,  or  by  the  hypoder- 
mic injection  of  morphia,  there  is  achieved  a  temporary 
exaltation  of  power  or  feeling,  which  conduces  to  no  restora- 
tive end,  reprobation  rightly  takes  the  place  of  approbation. 
In  the  order  of  nature,  normal  pleasures  are  the  concomi- 
tants of  normal  activities,  and  pleasures  which  are  achieved 
by  gratuitous  deviations  from  the  normal  have  no  ethical 
sanctions. 

One  exception  only  should  be  made.  Stimulants  may  be 
taken  with  advantage  when  the  monotony  of  ordinary  life  is 
now  and  then  broken  by  festive  entertainments.  As  im- 
plied in  a  preceding  chapter,  daily  repetition  of  the  same 
activities,  which  in  our  state  are  inevitably  specialized,  neces- 


STIMULATION.  513 

sitates  undue  taxing  of  certain  parts  of  the  system.  Breaches 
in  the  uniformity  therefore  yield  benefits  by  furthering 
restoration  of  equilibrium.  The  functions,  chronically  kept 
out  of  balance,  are  aided  in  returning  to  a  balance.  Hence 
it  happens  that  social  meetings  at  which,  along  with  mental 
exhilaration,  there  goes  the  taking  of  abundant  and  varied 
food,  and  wine  even  in  large  quantity,  often  prove  highly 
salutary — are  not  followed  by  injurious  reactions  but  leave 
behind  invigoration.  Such  means  used  for  such  ends,  how- 
ever, must  be  used  but  occasionally :  if  often  repeated  they 
defeat  themselves. 

§  218.  To  sum  up  what  has  been  said  in  a  tentative  way 
on  this  difficult  question  : — we  may,  in  the  first  place,  con- 
clude that  absolute  ethics,  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  individual 
life,  can  give  no  countenance  to  the  daily  use  of  stimulants. 
They  can  have  no  place  in  a  perfectly  normal  ordei\ 

In  such  approximately  normal  life  as  that  enjoyed  during 
their  early  days  by  vigorous  persons,  there  is  also  no  place 
for  them.  So  long  as  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  full 
discharge  of  all  the  organic  functions,  there  can  be  no  need 
for  agents  which  temporarily  exalt  them.  What  ethics  has 
to  say  in  the  matter  must  take  the  form  of  an  interdict. 

Only  when  the  excessive  obligations  which  life  often 
entails  produce  more  or  less  of  daily  prostration,  or  when 
from  constitutional  feebleness  or  the  diminished  strength 
of  old  age,  the  ordinary  tax  on  the  energies  is  somewhat 
greater  than  can  be  effectually  met,  does  there  seem  a  valid 
reason  for  using  exciting  agents,  alcoholic  or  other;  and 
then  only  when  they  are  taken  in  such  wise  as  to  aid  repara- 
tive  processes. 

Beyond  this  there  is  a  defence  for  such  occasional  uses  of 
these  agents  as  serves,  when  joined  with  raised  nutrition  and 
enlivening  circumstances,  to  take  the  system  out  of  its  rou- 
tine, which  in  all  cases  diverges  somewhat,  if  not  much, 
from  a  perfect  balance. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

CULTURE. 

§  219.  Taken  in  its  widest  sense,  culture  means  prepara- 
tion for  complete  living.  It  includes,  in  the  first  place,  all 
such  discipline  and  all  such  knowledge  as  are  needful  for,  or 
conducive  to,  efficient  self-sustentation  and  sustentation  of 
family.  And  it  includes,  in  the  second  place,  all  such  de- 
velopment of  the  faculties  at  large,  as  fits  them  for  utilizing 
those  various  sources  of  pleasure  which  Nature  and  Hu- 
manity supply  to  responsive  minds. 

The  first  of  these  two  divisions  of  culture  has  more  than 
an  ethical  sanction :  it  is  ethically  enjoined.  Acquisition  of 
fitness  for  carrying  on  the  business  of  life  is  primarily  a  duty 
to  self  and  secondarily  a  duty  to  others.  If  under  the  head 
of  this  fitness  we  comprise,  as  we  must,  such  skill  as  is 
needful  for  those  who  are  to  be  manually  occupied,  as  well 
as  skill  of  every  higher  kind,  it  becomes  manifest  that  (save 
with  those  who  have  sustentation  gratis)  lack  of  it  makes  a 
healthy  physical  life  impracticable,  and  makes  impracticable 
the  nurture  of  dependents.  Further,  the  neglect  to  acquire 
a  power  of  adequately  maintaining  self  and  offspring,  neces- 
sitates either  the  burdening  of  others  in  furnishing  aid,  or 
else,  if  they  refuse  to  do  this,  necessitates  that  infliction  of 
pain  upon  them  which  the  contemplation  of  misery  causes. 

Concerning  the  second  division  of  culture,  peremptory 
obligation  is  not  to  be  alleged.  Those  who  take  an  ascetic 
view  of  life  have  no  reason  for  that  discipline  of  faculties 


CULTUEE.  515 

•which  aims  to  increase  one  or  other  refined  pleasure ; 
and,  as  among  the  Quakers,  we  see  that  there  does  in  fact 
result  a  disregard  of,  and  often  a  reprobation  of,  such  dis- 
cipline, or  of  parts  of  it.  Only  those  who  accept  hedonism 
can  consistently  advocate  this  exercise  of  intellect  and  feel- 
ing which  prepares  the  way  for  various  gratifications  fill- 
ing leisure  hours.  They  only  can  regard  it  as  needful 
for  attaining  complete  life,  and  as  therefore  having  an  ethi- 
cal sanction. 

From  these  general  ideas  of  culture,  essential  and  non- 
essential,  let  us  go  on  to  consider  the  several  divisions  of  it. 

§  220.  There  is  a  part  of  culture,  usually  neglected,  which 
should  be  recognized  alike  by  those  to  whom  it  brings  means 
of  living  and  by  those  who  do  not  seek  material  profit  from 
it,  which  may  fitly  stand  first.  I  mean  the  acquirement  of 
manual  dexterity. 

That  this  is  a  proper  preparation  for  life  among  those 
occupied  in  productive  industry,  will  not  be  disputed ; 
though  at  present,  even  the  boys  who  may  need  it  are  but 
little  encouraged  to  acquire  manipulative  skill :  only  those 
kinds  of  skill  which  games  give  are  cultivated.  But 
manipulative  skill  and  keenness  of  perception  ought  to  be 
acquired  by  those  also  who  are  to  have  careers  of  higher 
kinds.  Awkwardness  of  limb  and  inability  to  use  the 
fingers  deftly,  continually  entail  small  disasters  and  occa- 
sionally great  ones ;  while  expertness  frequently  comes  in 
aid  of  welfare,  either  of  self  or  others.  One  who  has  been 
well  practised  in  the  uses  of  his  senses  and  his  muscles,  is 
less  likely  than  the  unpractised  to  meet  with  accidents  ;  and, 
when  accidents  occur,  is  sure  to  be  more  efficient  in  rectify- 
ing mischiefs.  Were  it  not  that  this  obvious  truth  is  ignored, 
it  would  be  absurd  to  point  out  that,  since  limbs  and  senses 
exist  to  the  end  of  adjusting  the  actions  to  surrounding  ob- 
jects and  movements,  it  is  the  business  of  every  one  to  gain 
skill  in  the  performance  of  such  actions. 


516  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

Let  it  not  be  supposed  that  I  am  here  advocating  the 
extension  of  formal  culture  in  this  direction :  very  much 
to  the  contrary.  The  shaping  of  all  education  into  lessons 
is  one  of  the  vices  of  the  time.  Cultivation  of  manipu- 
lative skill,  in  common  with  expertness  in  general,  should 
be  acquired  in  the  process  of  achieving  ends  otherwise  de- 
sired. In  any  rationally-conducted  education  there  must 
be  countless  occasions  for  the  exercise  of  those  faculties 
which  the  artisan  and  the  experimenter  bring  perpetually 

into  play. 

• 

§  221.  Intellectual  culture  under  its  primary  aspect  links 
on  to  the  culture  just  described ;  for  as  discipline  of  the 
limbs  and  senses  is  a  fitting  of  them  for  direct  dealings 
with  things  around,  so  intelligence,  in  its  successive  grades, 
is  an  agent  for  guiding  dealings  of  indirect  kinds,  greater 
and  greater  in  their  complexity.  The  higher  acquisitions 
and  achievements  of  intellect  have  now  become  so  remote 
from  practical  life,  that  their  relations  to  it  are  usually  lost 
sight  of.  But  if  we  remember  that  in  the  stick  employed  to 
heave  up  a  stone,  or  the  paddle  to  propel  a  boat,  we  have 
illustrations  of  the  uses  of  levers ;  while  in  the  pointing  of 
an  arrow  so  as  to  allow  for  its  fall  during  flight,  certain 
dynamical  principles  are  tacitly  recognized ;  and  that  from 
these  vague  early  cognitions  the  progress  may  be  traced 
step  by  'step  to  the  generalizations  of  mathematicians  and 
astronomers;  we  see  that  science  has  gradually  emerged 
from  the  crude  knowledge  of  the  savage.  And  if  we  re- 
member that  as  this  crude  knowledge  of  the  savage  served 
for  simple  guidance  of  his  life-sustaining  actions,  so  the  de- 
veloped sciences  of  mathematics  and  astronomy  serve  for 
guidance  in  the  workshop  and  the  counting-house  and  for 
steering  of  vessels,  while  developed  physics  and  chemistry 
preside  over  all  manufacturing  processes ;  we  see  that  at 
the  one  extreme  as  at  the  other,  furtherance  of  men's  ability 
to  deal  effectually  with  the  surrounding  world,  and  so  to 


CULTUKE.  517 

satisfy  their  wants,  is  that  purpose  of  intellectual  culture 
which  precedes  all  others. 

Even  for  these  purposes  we  distinguish  as  practical, 
that  intellectual  culture  which  makes  us  acquainted  with 
the  natures  of  things,  should  be  wider  than  is  commonly 
thought  needful.  Preparation  for  this  or  that  kind  of 
business  is  far  too  special.  There  cannot  be  adequate 
knowledge  of  a  particular  class  of  natural  facts  without 
some  knowledge  of  other  classes.  Every  object  and 
every  action  simultaneously  presents  various  orders  of 
phenomena — mathematical,  physical,  chemical, — with,  in 
many  cases,  others  which  are  vital ;  and  these  phenomena 
are  so  interwoven  that  full  comprehension  of  any  group 
involves  partial  comprehension  of  the  rest.  Though  at 
first  sight  the  extent  of  intellectual  culture  thus  suggested 
as  requisite  may  seem  impracticable,  it  is  not  so.  When 
education  is  rightly  carried  on,  the  cardinal  truths  of  each 
science  may  be  clearly  communicated  and  firmly  grasped, 
apart  from  the  many  corollaries  commonly  taught  along 
with  them.  And  after  there  has  been  gained  such  famil- 
iarity with  these  cardinal  truths  of  the  several  sciences  as 
renders  their  chief  implications  comprehensible,  it  becomes 
possible  to  reach  rational  conceptions  of  any  one  group  of 
phenomena,  and  to  be  fully  prepared  for  a  special  occupation. 

That  division  of  intellectual  culture  which  comprises 
knowledge  of  the  sciences,  while  having  an  indirect  ethical 
sanction  as  conducing  to  self-sustentation  and  sustentation  of 
others,  has  also  a  direct  sanction  irrespective  of  practical 
ends.  To  the  servant-girl,  the  ploughboy,  the  grocer,  nay 
even  to  the  average  classical  scholar  or  man  of  letters,  the 
world,  living  and  dead,  with  the  universe  around  it,  present 
no  such  grand  panorama  as  they  do  to  those  who  have 
gained  some  conception  of  the  actions,  infinite  and  infinitesi- 
mal, everywhere  going  on,  and  can  contemplate  them  under 
other  aspects  than  the  technical.  If  we  imagine  that  into 
a  gorgeously-decorated  hall  a  rush-light  is  brought,  and, 


518  THE    ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

being  held  near  to  some  part  of  the  wall,  makes  visible  the 
pattern  over  a  small  area  of  it,  while  everything  else 
remains  in  darkness;  and  if,  instead  of  this,  we  imagine 
that  electric  lights  turned  on  reveal  simultaneously  the 
whole  room  with  its  varied  contents ;  we  may  form  some 
idea  of  the  different  appearance  under  which  Nature  is 
contemplated  by  the  utterly  uncultured  mind  and  by  the 
highly  cultured  mind.  Whoever  duly  appreciates  this  im- 
mense contrast  will  see  that,  rightly  assimilated,  science 
brings  exaltation  of  mental  life. 

One  further  result  must  be  recognized.  That  study  of  all 
orders  of  phenomena  which,  while  it  gives  adequate  gen- 
eral conceptions  of  them,  leads,  now  in  this  direction  and 
now  in  that,  to  limits  which  no  exploration  can  transcend,  is 
needful  to  make  us  aware  of  our  relation  to  the  ultimate 
mystery  of  things ;  and  so  to  awaken  a  consciousness  which 
we  may  properly  consider  germane  to  the  ethical  con- 
sciousness. 

§  222.  In  its  full  acceptation,  knowledge  of  science  in- 
cludes knowledge  of  social  science ;  and  this  includes  a  cer- 
tain kind  of  historical  knowledge.  Such  of  it  as  is 
needful  for  political  guidance,  each  citizen  should  endeavour 
to  obtain.  Though  the  greater  parts  of  the  facts  from 
which  true  sociological  generalizations  may  be  drawn,  are 
presented  only  by  those  savage  and  semi-«ivilized  societies 
ignored  in  our  educational  courses,  there  are  also  re- 
quired some  of  the  facts  furnished  by  the  histories  of  devel- 
oped nations. 

But  beyond  the  impersonal  elements  of  history  which 
chiefly  demand  attention,  a  certain  attention  may  rightly 
be  given  to  its  personal  elements.  Commonly  these  oc- 
cupy the  entire  attention.  The  great-man-theory  of  his- 
tory, tacitly  held  by  the  ignorant  in  all  ages  and  in  recent 
times  definitely  enunciated  by  Mr.  Carlyle,  implies  that 
knowledge  of  history  is  constituted  by  knowledge  of  rulers 


CULTURE.  519 

and  their  doings;  and  by  this  theory  there  is  fostered 
in  the  mass  of  minds  a  love  of  gossip  about  dead  indi- 
viduals, not  much  more  respectable  than  the  love  of  gossip 
about  individuals  now  living.  But  while  no  information 
concerning  kings  and  popes,  and  ministers  and  generals, 
even  when  joined  to  exhaustive  acquaintance  with  in- 
trigues and  treaties,  battles  and  sieges,  gives  any  insight 
into  the  laws  of  social  evolution — while  the  single  fact 
that  division  of  labour  has  been  progressing  in  all  advanc- 
ing nations  regardless  of  the  wills  of  law-makers,  and  un- 
observed by  them,  suffices  to  show  that  the  forces  which 
mould  societies  work  out  their  results  apart  from,  and  often 
in  spite  of,  the  aims  of  leading  men ;  yet  a  certain  moderate 
number  of  leading  men  and  their  actions  may  properly  be 
contemplated.  The  past  stages  in  human  progress,  which 
every  one  should  know  something  about,  would  be  con- 
ceived in  too  shadowy  a  form  if  wholly  divested  of  ideas 
of  the  persons  and  events  associated  with  them.  More- 
over, some  amount  of  such  knowledge  is  requisite  to  enlarge 
adequately  the  conception  of  human  nature  in  general — 
to  show  the  extremes,  occasionally  good  but  mostly  bad, 
which  it  is  capable  of  reaching. 

With  culture  of  this  kind  there  naturally  goes  purely 
literary  culture.  That  a  fair  amount  of  this  should  be 
included  in  the  preparation  for  complete  living,  needs  no 
eaying.  Rather  does  it  need  saying  that  in  a  duly  pro- 
portioned education,  as  well  as  in  adult  life,  literature 
should  be  assigned  less  space  than  it  now  has.  Nearly  all 
are  prone  to  mental  occupations  of  easy  kinds,  or  kinds 
which  yield  pleasurable  excitements  with  small  efforts; 
and  history,  biography,  fiction,  poetry,  are,  in  this  respect, 
more  attractive  to  the  majority  than  science — more  attrac- 
tive than  that  knowledge  of  the  order  of  things  at  large 
which  serves  for  guidance. 

Still,  we  must  not  here  forget  that  from  the  hedonistic 
point  of  view,  taking  account  of  this  pleasure  directly 


520  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

obtained,  literary  culture  has  a  high  claim;  and  we  may 
also  admit  that,  as  conducing  to  wealth  and  force  of  ex- 
pression by  furnishing  materials  for  metaphor  and  allusion, 
it  increases  mental  power  and  social  effectiveness.  In  the 
absence  of  it  conversation  is  bald. 

§  223.  In  culture,  as  in  other  things,  men  tend  towards 
one  or  other  extreme.  Either,  as  with  the  great  majority, 
culture  is  scarcely  pursued  at  all,  or,  as  with  the  few,  it  is 
pursued  almost  exclusively,  and  often  with  disastrous  results. 

Emerson  says  of  the  gentleman  that  the  first  requisite 
is  to  be  a  good  animal,  and  this  is  the  first  requisite  for 
every  one.  A  course  of  life  which  sacrifices  the  animal, 
though  it  may  be  defensible  under  special  conditions 
is  not  defensible  as  a  general  policy.  Within  the  sphere 
of  our  positive  knowledge  we  nowhere  see  mind  without 
life;  we  nowhere  see  life  without  a  body;  we  nowhere 
see  a  full  life — a  life  which  is  high  alike  in  respect  of 
intensity,  breadth,  and  length — without  a  healthy  body. 
Every  breach  of  the  laws  of  bodily  health  produces  a 
physical  damage,  which  eventually  damages  in  some  way, 
though  often  in  an  invisible  way,  the  mental  health. 

Culture  has  therefore  to  be  carried  on  subject  to  other 
needs.  Its  amount  must  be  such  as  consists  with,  and  is  con- 
ducive to,  physical  welfare ;  and  it  must  be  also  such  as 
consists  with,  and  is  conducive  to,  normal  activity  not  only 
of  the  mental  powers  exercised,  but  of  all  others.  When 
carried  to  an  extent  which  diminishes  vivacity,  and  pro- 
duces indifference  to  the  various  natural  enjoyments,  it  is 
an  abuse ;  and  still  more  is  it  an  abuse  when,  as  often 
happens,  it  is  pushed  so  far  as  to  produce  disgust  with  the 
subjects  over  which  attention  has  been  unduly  strained. 

Especially  in  the  case  of  women  is  condemnation  of  over- 
culture  called  for,  since  immense  mischief  is  done  by  it. 
We  are  told  that  the  higher  education,  as  now  carried  on 
at  Girton  and  Newnham,  is  not  inconsistent  with  mainte- 


CULTURE.  521 

nance  of  good  health ;  and  if  we  omit  those  who  are 
obliged  to  desist,  this  appears  to  be  true.  I  say  advisedly 
"appears  to  be  true."  There  are  various  degrees  of 
what  is  called  good  health.  Commonly  it  is  alleged  and 
admitted  where  no  physical  disturbance  is  manifest ;  but 
there  is  a  wide  space  between  this  and  that  full  health 
which  shows  itself  in  high  spirits  and  overflowing  energy. 
In  women,  especially,  there  may  be  maintained  a  health 
which  seems  good,  and  yet  falls  short  of  the  requirements 
of  the  race.  For  in  women,  much  more  than  in  men,  there 
is  constitutionally  provided  a  surplus  vitality  devoted  to 
continuance  of  the  species.  When  the  system  is  over- 
taxed the  portion  thus  set  aside  is  considerably  diminished 
before  the  portion  which  goes  to  carry  on  individual  life 
is  manifestly  trenched  upon.  The  cost  of  activity,  and 
especially  of  cerebral  activity,  which  is  very  costly,  has  to 
be  met ;  and  if  expenditure  is  excessive  it  cannot  be  met 
without  deduction  from  that  reserve  power  which  should  go 
to  race-maintenance.  The  reproductive  capacity  is  dimin- 
ished in  various  degrees — sometimes  to  the  extent  of  inability 
to  bear  children,  more  frequently  to  the  extent  of  inability 
to  yield  milk,  and  in  numerous  cases  to  a  smaller  extent 
which  I  must  leave  unspecified.  I  have  good  authority 
for  saying  that  one  of  the  remoter  results  of  over-culture, 
very  frequently  becomes  a  cause  of  domestic  alienation. 

Let  me  add  that  an  adequately  high  culture,  alike  of 
men  and  women,  might  be  compassed  without  mischief 
were  our  curriculum  more  rational.  If  the  worthless  knowl- 
edge included  in  what  is  now  supposed  to  be  a  good 
education  were  omitted,  all  that  which  is  needful  for 
guidance,  most  of  that  which  is  desirable  for  general  en- 
lightenment, and  a  good  deal  of  that  which  is  distinguished 
as  decorative,  might  be  acquired  without  injurious  reactions. 

§  224.  To  the  egoistic  motives  for  culture  have  to  be 
added  the  altruistic  motives.  A  human  being  devoid  of 


522  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

knowledge,  and  with  none  of  that  intellectual  life  which 
discipline  of  the  faculties  gives,  is  utterly  uninteresting. 
To  become  a  pleasure-yielding  person  is  a  social  duty. 
Hence  culture,  and  especially  the  culture  which  conduces 
to  enlivenment,  has  an  ethical  sanction  and  something 
more. 

Especially  is  this  true  of  aesthetic  culture,  of  which  no 
note  has  thus  far  been  taken.  While  it  is  to  be  enjoined 
as  aiding  that  highest  development  of  self  required  for 
the  fullest  life  and  happiness,  it  is  also  to  be  enjoined  as 
increasing  the  ability  to  gratify  those  around.  Though 
practices  in  the  plastic  arts,  in  music,  and  in  poetry,  are 
usually  to  be  encouraged  chiefly  as  producing  suscepti- 
bility to  pleasures,  which  the  aesthetically  uncultured  can- 
not have ;  yet  those  who  are  endowed  with  something 
more  than  average  ability,  should  be  led  to  develop  it 
by  motives  of  benevolence  also.  In  the  highest  degree 
this  is  so  with  music ;  and  concerted  music,  subordinat- 
ing as  it  does  the  personal  element,  is  above  all  other 
kinds  to  be  cultivated  on  altruistic  grounds.  It  should  be 
added,  however,  that  excess  of  aesthetic  culture,  in  common 
with  excess  of  intellectual  culture,  is  to  be  reprobated; 
not  in  this  case  because  of  the  over-tax  entailed,  but  be- 
cause of  the  undue  expenditure  of  time — the  occupation 
of  too  large  a  space  in  life.  With  multitudes  of  people, 
especially  women,  the  pursuit  of  beauty  in  one  or  other 
form  is  the  predominant  pursuit.  To  the  achievement  of 
prettiness  much  more  important  ends  are  sacrificed.  Though 
aesthetic  culture  has  to  be  recognized  as  ethically  sanctioned, 
yet  instead  of  emphasizing  the  demand  for  it,  there  is  far 
greater  occasion  for  condemning  the  excess  of  it.  There 
needs  a  trenchant  essay  on  aesthetic  vices,  which  are  every- 
where shown  in  the  subordination  of  use  to  appearance. 


CHAPTEK  VII. 

AMUSEMENTS. 

§  225.  I  have  closed  the  last  chapter  with  a  division, 
the  subject  matter  of  which  links  it  on  to  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  this  chapter.  We  pass  insensibly  from  the  activities 
and  passivities  implied  by  aesthetic  culture,  to  sundry  of 
those  which  come  under  the  head  of  relaxations  and  amuse- 
ments. These  we  have  now  to  consider  from  the  ethical 
point  of  view. 

To  the  great  majority,  who  have  imbibed  more  or  less 
of  that  asceticism  which,  though  appropriate  to  times  of 
chronic  militancy  and  also  useful  as  a  curb  to  ungoverned 
senualism,  has  swayed  too  much  men's  theory  of  life,  it  will 
seem  an  absurd  supposition  that  amusements  are  ethically 
warranted.  Yet  unless,  in  common  with  the  Quakers  and 
some  extreme  evangelicals,  they  hold  them  to  be  positively 
wrong,  they  must  either  say  that  amusements  are  neither 
right  nor  wrong,  or,  they  must  say  that  they  are  positively 
right — are  to  be  morally  approved. 

That  they  are  sanctioned  by  hedonistic  ethics  goes  with- 
out saying.  They  are  pleasure-giving  activities ;  and  that 
is  their  sufficient  justification,  so  long  as  they  do  not 
unduly  interfere  with  activities  which  are  obligatory. 
Though  most  of  our  pleasures  are  to  be  accepted  as 
concomitants  of  those  various  expenditures  of  energy  con- 
ducive to  self-sustentation  and  sustentation  of  family;  yet 
the  pursuit  of  pleasure  for  pleasure's  sake  is  to  be  sane- 


524  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

tioned,  and  even  enjoined,  when  primary  duties  have  been 
fulfilled. 

So,  too,  are  they  to  be  approved  from  the  physiological 
point  of  view.  Not  only  do  the  emotional  satisfactions 
which  accompany  normal  life-sustaining  labours  exalt  the 
vital  functions,  but  the  vital  functions  are  exalted  by  those 
satisfactions  which  accompany  the  superfluous  expenditures 
of  energy  implied  by  amusements :  much  more  exalted  in 
fact.  Such  satisfactions  serve  to  raise  the  tide  of  life,  and 
taken  in  due  proportion  conduce  to  every  kind  of  effi- 
ciency. 

Yet  once  more  there  is  the  evolutionary  justification. 
In  §  534  of  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  it  was  shown 
that  whereas,  in  the  lowest  creatures,  the  small  energies 
which  exist  are  wholly  used  up  in  those  actions  which 
serve  to  maintain  the  individual  and  propagate  the  species ; 
in  creatures  of  successively  higher  grades,  there  arises  an 
increasing  amount  of  unused  energy :  every  improvement 
of  organization  achieving  some  economy,  and  so  augment- 
ing the  surplus  power.  This  surplus  expends  itself  in  the 
activities  we  call  play.  Among  the  superior  vertebrata 
the  tendency  to  these  superfluous  activities  becomes  con- 
spicuous ;  and  it  is  especially  conspicuous  in  Man,  when  so 
conditioned  that  stress  of  competition  does  not  make  the 
sustentation  of  self  and  family  too  laborious.  The  impli- 
cation is  that  in  a  fully  developed  form  of  human  life,  a 
considerable  space  will  be  filled  by  the  pleasurable  exer- 
cise of  faculties  which  have  not  been  exhausted  by  daily 
activities. 

§  226.  In  that  division  of  The  Principles  of  Psychology 
above  referred  to  (§§  533 — 540),  in  which  I  have  drawn 
this  distinction  between  life-sustaining  activities  and 
activities  not  of  a  life-sustaining  kind,  which  are  pur- 
sued for  pleasure's  sake,  I  have  not  drawn  the  further 
distinction  between  those  of  the  sensory  structures  and 


AMUSEMENTS.  525 

those  of  the  motor  structures.  There  is  a  distinction 
between  gratifications  which  aesthetic  perceptions  yield 
and  those  yielded  by  games  and  sports.  This  distinction  it 
was  left  for  Mr.  Grant  Allen  to  point  out  in  his  Physiologi- 
cal ^Esthetics.  It  cannot  be  made  an  absolute  distinction, 
however ;  since  gratifications  derived  from  certain  excite- 
ments of  the  senses  are  often  associated  with,  and  de- 
pendent upon,  muscular  actions ;  and  since  the  gratifi- 
cations of  muscular  actions,  whatever  their  kind,  are 
achieved  under  guidance  of  the  senses.  Moreover,  with 
each  of  them  there  usually  exists  a  large  emotional  accom- 
paniment more  important  than  either.  Still  the  division  is 
a  natural  one,  and  Mr.  Grant  Allen  has  established  it  beyond 
question. 

Even  ascetically-minded  people  do  not  repudiate  those  en- 
joyments, intellectual  and  emotional,  which  travelling  yields. 
Pursuit  of  the  aesthetic  delights  derived  from  beautiful 
scenery,  the  mountains,  the  sea — primarily  those  due  to  the 
visual  impressions  which  forms  and  colours  give,  but  sec- 
ondarily and  mainly  those  due  to  the  poetical  sentiments 
aroused  by  association — is  approved  by  all.  So,  too,  in  a 
measure,  is  pursuit  of  the  gratifications  yielded  by  explora- 
tion of  the  unknown  forms  of  human  life  and  its  products — 
foreign  peoples,  their  towns,  their  ways.  One  is  sometimes 
saddened  to  think  what  a  vast  majority  of  men  come  into 
the  world  and  go  out  of  it  again  knowing  scarcely  at  all 
what  kind  of  world  it  is.  And  this  thought  suggests  that 
while  it  is  to  be  sanctioned  for  gratification's  sake,  travel- 
ling is  to  be  further  sanctioned  for  the  sake  of  culture ; 
since  the  accompanying  enlargement  of  the  experiences 
profoundly  affects  the  general  conceptions  and  rationalizes 
them.  Modern  social  changes  and  changes  of  belief,  are  in 
considerable  measure  due  to  facilitation  of  intercourse  with 
unlike  forms  of  life,  and  character,  and  habit,  which  railways 
have  brought  about. 

After  the  pleasures  given  by  actual  presentations  of  new 


526  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

scenes,  may  fitly  be  named  the  pleasures  yielded  by  pictorial 
representations  of  them.  While  in  many  cases  these  fall 
short  of  those  which  the  realities  give,  in  many  other  cases 
they  exceed  them.  By  its  reproduction  on  canvas  there  is 
given  to  a  rural  view  or  a  domestic  interior  an  artificial 
interest;  so  that  something  intrinsically  commonplace  is 
transfigured  into  something  beautiful :  possibly  because  the 
mind  in  presence  of  the  object  itself  was  so  much  occupied 
with  its  other  aspects  as  to  give  no  attention  to  its  aesthetic 
aspects.  Be  the  cause  what  it  may,  however,  works  of  art 
open  new  fields  of  delight,  and  by  hedonism  acceptance  of 
this  delight  is  sanctioned,  or  rather  enjoined.  Few  pleas- 
ures are  more  entirely  to  be  approved,  and  less  open  to 
abuse,  than  those  yielded  by  paintings,  and  of  course  also  by 
sculptures. 

It  seems  undesirable  to  insist  that  there  is  an  ethical  sanc- 
tion for  the  pleasures  given  by  light  literature,  seeing  that 
there  is  so  general  a  tendency  to  excess  in  the  pursuit  of 
them.  Perhaps  such  exaltation  of  feeling  as  the  reading  of 
good  poetry  produces,  is  not  sought  in  an  undue  degree ; 
but,  unquestionably,  there  is  far  too  much  reading  of  fiction ; 
often  excluding,  as  it  does,  all  instructive  reading,  and  caus- 
ing neglect  of  useful  occupations.  While  ethical  approval 
must  be  given  to  occasional  indulgence  in  that  extreme 
gratification  produced  by  following  out  the  good  and  ill 
fortunes  of  imaginary  persons  made  real  by  vivid  charac- 
ter-drawing; yet  there  much  more  needs  ethical  reproba- 
tion of  the  too  frequent  indulgence  in  it  which  is  so  com- 
mon :  this  emotional  debauchery  undermines  mental  health. 
Nor  let  us  omit  to  note  that  while  sanction  may  rightly 
be  claimed  for  fiction  of  a  humanizing  tendency,  there 
should  be  nothing  but  condemnation  for  brutalizing  fiction 
— for  that  culture  of  blood-thirst  to  which  so  many  stories 
are  devoted. 

Of  course  much  that  has  just  been  said  concerning 
fiction  may  be  said  concerning  the  drama.  Higher  even 


AMUSEMENTS.  527 

than  the  gratification  yielded  by  a  good  novel,  is  that 
yielded  by  a  good  play ;  and  the  demoralization  caused 
by  excess  of  it  would  be  still  greater  were  there  the  same 
opportunity  for  continuous  absorption.  Pleasures  which 
are  intense  must  be  sparingly  partaken  of.  The  general 
law  of  waste  and  repair  implies  that  in  proportion  to  the 
excitement  of  a  faculty  must  be  its  subsequent  prostration 
and  unfitness  for  action — aii  unfitness  which  continues 
until  repair  has  been  made.  Hence,  overwhelming  sym- 
pathy felt  for  personages  in  a  fiction  or  drama,  is  felt  at 
the  cost  of  some  subsequent  callousness.  As  the  eye  by 
exposure  to  a  vivid  light  is  momentarily  incapacitated  for 
appreciating  those  feeble  lights  through  which  objects 
around  are  distinguished ;  so,  after  a  tearful  fellow-feeling 
with  the  sufferers  of  imaginary  woes,  there  is  for  a  time  a 
lack  of  fellow-feeling  with  persons  around.  Much  theatre- 
going,  like  much  novel-reading,  is  therefore  to  be  ethically 
reprobated. 

Perhaps  among  gratifications  of  the  aesthetic  class,  that 
which  music  yields  is  that  which  may  be  indulged  in  most 
largely  without  evil  consequences.  Though  after  a  concert, 
as  after  a  fiction  or  a  play,  life  in  general  seems  tame ;  yet 
there  is  a  less  marked  reaction,  because  the  feelings  excited 
are  more  remotely  akin  to  those  associated  with  daily  inter- 
course. Still,  the  pleasures  of  music  are  frequently  enjoyed 
to  an  excess  which,  if  not  otherwise  injurious,  is  injurious  by 
the  implied  occupation  of  time — by  the  filling  of  too  large  a 
space  in  life. 

§  227.  Throughout  the  foregoing  class  of  pleasures,  result- 
ing from  the  superfluous  excitements  of  faculties,  the  indi- 
vidual is  mainly  passive.  We  turn  now  to  the  class  in  which 
he  is  mainly  active ;  which  again  is  subdivisible  into  two 
classes — sports  and  games.  With  sports,  ethics  has  little 
concern  beyond  graduating  its  degrees  of  reprobation.  Such 

of  them  as  involve  the  direct  infliction  of  pain,  especially  on 
35 


528  THE   ETHICS  OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

fellow-beings,  are  nothing  but  means  to  the  gratification  of 
feelings  inherited  from  savages  of  the  baser  sort  That  after 
these  thousands  of  years  of  social  discipline,  there  should  still 
be  so  many  who  like  to  see  the  encounters  of  the  prize- 
ring  or  witness  the  goring  of  horses  and  riders  in  the 
arena,  shows  how  slowly  the  instincts  of  the  barbarian 
are  being  subdued.  No  condemnation  can  be  too  strong 
for  these  sanguinary  amusements  which  keep  alive  in  men 
the  worst  parts  of  their  natures  and  thus  profoundly 
vitiate  social  life.  Of  course  in  a  measure,  though  in  a 
smaller  measure,  condemnation  must  be  passed  on  field- 
sports — in  smaller  measure  because  the  obtainment  of  food 
affords  a  partial  motive,  because  the  infliction  of  pain  is  less 
conspicuous,  and  because  the  chief  pleasure  is  that  derived 
from  successful  exercise  of  skill.  But  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  all  activities  with  which  there  is  joined  the  conscious- 
ness that  other  sentient  beings,  far  inferior  though  they  may 
be,  are  made  to  suffer,  are  to  some  extent  demoralizing. 
The  sympathies  do,  indeed,  admit  of  being  so  far  special- 
ized that  the  same  person  who  is  unsympathetic  towards 
wild  animals  may  be  in  large  measure  sympathetic  towards 
fellow-men ;  but  a  full  amount  of  sympathy  cannot  well  be 
present  in  the  one  relation  and  absent  in  the  other.  It 
may  be  added  that  the  specializing  of  the  sympathies  has 
the  effect  that  they  become  smaller  as  the  remoteness 
from  human  nature  becomes  greater;  and  that  hence  the 
killing  of  a  deer  sins  against  them  more  than  does  the  killing 
of  a  fish. 

Those  expenditures  of  energy  which  take  the  form  of 
games,  yield  pleasures  from  which  there  are  but  small,  if 
any,  drawbacks  in  the  entailed  pains.  Certain  of  them, 
indeed,  as  football,  are  as  much  to  be  reprobated  as  sports, 
than  some  of  which  they  are  more  brutalizing;  and  there 
cannot  be  much  ethical  approbation  of  those  games,  so- 
called,  such  as  boat-races,  in  which  a  painful  and  often 
injurious  overtax  of  the  system  is  gone  through  to  achieve 


AMUSEMENTS.  529 

a  victory,  pleasurable  to  one  side  and  entailing  pain  on 
the  other.  But  there  is  ethical  sanction  for  those  games 
in  which,  with  a  moderate  amount  of  muscular  effort,  there 
is  joined  the  excitement  of  a  competition  not  too  intense, 
kept  alive  from  moment  to  moment  by  the  changing  inci- 
dents of  the  contest.  Under  these  conditions  the  muscular 
actions  are  beneficial,  the  culture  of  the  perceptions  is  useful, 
while  the  emotional  pleasure  has  but  small  drawbacks.  And 
here  I  am  prompted  to  denounce  the  practice,  now  so  gen- 
eral, of  substituting  gymnastics  for  games — violent  muscular 
actions,  joined  with  small  concomitant  pleasures,  for  moder- 
ate muscular  actions  joined  with  great  pleasures.  This 
usurpation  is  a  sequence  of  that  pestilent  asceticism  which 
thinks  that  pleasure  is  of  no  consequence,  and  that  if  the 
same  amount  of  exercise  be  taken,  the  same  benefit  is 
gained  :  the  truth  being  that  to  the  exaltation  of  the  vital 
functions  which  the  pleasure  produces,  half  the  benefit  is 
due. 

Of  indoor  games  which  chiefly  demand  quickness  of 
perception,  quickness  of  reasoning,  and  quickness  of  judg- 
ment, general  approval  may  be  expressed  with  qualifica- 
tions of  no  great  importance.  For  young  people  they  are 
especially  desirable  as  giving  to  various  of  the  intellectual 
faculties  a  valuable  training,  not  to  be  given  by  other 
means.  Under  the  stress  of  competition,  the  abilities  to 
observe  rapidly,  perceive  accurately,  and  infer  rightly,  are 
increased  ;  and  in  addition  to  the  immediate  pleasures 
gained,  there  are  gained  powers  of  dealing  more  effectually 
with  many  of  the  incidents  of  life.  It  should  be  added 
that  such  drawbacks  as  there  are,  from  the  emotions  ac- 
companying victory  and  defeat,  are  but  small  in  games 
which  involve  chance  as  a  considerable  factor,  but  are 
very  noticeable  where  there  is  no  chance.  Chess,  for  ex- 
ample, which  pits  together  two  intelligences  in  such  a  way 
as  to  show  unmistakably  the  superiority  of  one  to  the  other 
in  respect  of  certain  powers,  produces,  much  more  than 


530  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

whist,  a  feeling  of  humiliation  in  the  defeated,  and  if  the 
sympathies  are  keen  this  gives  some  annoyance  to  the  victor 
as  well  as  to  the  vanquished. 

Of  course,  such  ethical  sanction  as  is  given  to  games, 
cannot  be  given  where  gambling  or  betting  is  an  accom- 
paniment. Involving,  as  both  do,  in  a  very  definite  way, 
and  often  to  an  extreme  degree,  the  obtainment  of  pleasure 
at  the  cost  of  another's  pain,  they  are  to  be  condemned  both 
for  this  immediate  effect  and  for  their  remote  effect — the 
repression  of  fellow-feeling. 

§  228.  Before  passing  to  the  altruistic  aspect  of  amuse- 
ments, there  should  be  noted  a  less  familiar  egoistic  aspect. 
Unless  they  have  kept  up  during  life  an  interest  in  pastimes, 
those  who  have  broken  down  from  overwork  (perhaps  an 
overwork  entailed  on  them  by  imperative  duties)  usually  find 
themselves  incapable  of  relaxing  in  any  satisfactory  way: 
they  are  no  longer  amusable.  Capacities  for  all  other  pleas- 
ures are  atrophied,  and  the  only  pleasure  is  that  which  busi- 
ness gives.  In  such  cases  recovery  is,  if  not  prevented, 
greatly  retarded  by  the  lack  of  exhilarating  occupations. 
Frequently  dependents  suffer. 

This  last  consideration  shows  that  these,  like  other 
classes  of  actions  which  primarily  concern  the  individual, 
concern,  to  some  extent,  other  individuals.  But  they 
concern  other  individuals  in  more  direct  and  constant 
ways  also.  On  each  person  there  is  imposed  not  only  the 
peremptory  obligation  so  to  carry  on  his  life  as  to  avoid 
inequitably  interfering  with  the  carrying  on  of  others' 
lives,  and  not  only  the  less  peremptory  obligation  to  aid 
under  various  circumstances  the  carrying  on  of  their  lives, 
but  there  is  imposed  some  obligation  to  increase  the 
pleasures  of  their  lives  by  sociality,  and  by  the  cultivation 
of  those  powers  which  conduce  to  sociality.  A  man  may  be 
a  good  economical  unit  of  society,  while  remaining  other- 
wise an  almost  worthless  unit.  If  he  has  no  knowledge  of 


AMUSEMENTS.  531 

: 

the  arts,  no  aesthetic  feelings,  no  interest  in  fiction,  the 
drama,  poetry,  or  music — if  he  cannot  join  in  any  of  those 
amusements  which  daily  and  at  longer  intervals  fill  leisure 
spaces  in  life — if  he  is  thus  one  to  whom  others  cannot 
readily  give  pleasure,  at  the  same  time  that  he  can  give 
no  pleasure  to  others ;  he  becomes  in  great  measure  a  dead 
unit,  and  unless  he  has  some  special  value  might  better  be 
out  of  the  way. 

Thus,  that  he  may  add  his  share  to  the  general  happiness, 
each  should  cultivate  in  due  measure  those  superfluous 
activities  which  primarily  yield  self -happiness. 


CHAPTER  YIII. 

MARRIAGE. 

§  229.  Up  to  the  present  point  there  has  been  maintained, 
if  not  absolutely  yet  with  tolerable  clearness,  the  division 
between  the  ethics  of  individual  life  and  the  ethics  of  social 
life ;  but  we  come,  in  this  chapter  and  the  chapter  which 
follows  it,  to  a  part  of  ethics  which  is  in  a  sense  intermediate. 
For  in  the  relations  of  marriage  and  parenthood,  others  are 
concerned,  not  contingently  and  indirectly,  but  in  ways  that 
are  necessary  and  direct.  The  implied  divisions  of  conduct, 
while  their  primary  ethical  sanctions  refer  to  the  proper  ful- 
filment of  individual  life,  are  yet  inseparable  from  those 
divisions  which  treat  of  conduct  that  is  to  be  ethically 
approved  or  disapproved  because  of  its  effects  on  those 
around. 

Let  us  glance  first  at  the  general  obligation  under  which 
the  individual  lies  to  aid  in  maintaining  the  species,  while 
fulfilling  the  needs  of  his  own  nature. 

§  230.  In  The  Principles  of  Biology  (§§  334—351)  was  ex- 
plained the  necessary  antagonism  between  individuation  and 
reproduction — between  the  appropriation  of  nutriment  and  en- 
ergy for  the  purposes  of  individual  life,  and  the  appropriation 
of  them  for  the  initiation,  development,  and  nurture  of  other 
lives.  Extreme  cases  in  which,  after  an  existence  of  a  few 
hours  or  a  day,  the  body  of  a  parent  divides,  or  else  breaks 
up  into  numerous  germs  of  new  individuals,  and  less  extreme 
cases  in  which  a  brief  parental  existence  ends  by  the  trans- 


MARRIAGE.  533 

formation  of  the  skin  into  a  protective  case,  while  the  in- 
terior is  wholly  transformed  into  young  ones,  illustrate  in  an 
unmistakable  way  the  sacrifice  of  individual  life  for  the 
maintenance  of  species  life.  It  was  shown  that  as  we  ascend 
to  creatures  of  more  complex  structure  and  greater  activity, 
and  especially  as  we  ascend  to  creatures  of  which  the  young 
have  to  be  fostered,  the  expenditure  of  parental  life  in  pro- 
ducing and  rearing  other  lives  becomes  gradually  less.  And 
then,  in  The  Principles  of  Sociology  (§§  275 — 277),  when 
considering  the  "  diverse  interests  of  the  species,  of  the 
parents,  and  of  the  offspring,"  we  saw  that  in  mankind  there 
is  reached  such  conciliation  of  these  interests  that  along  with 
preservation  of  the  race  there  go  moderated  individual  sacri- 
fices ;  and  further,  that  with  the  ascent  from  lower  to  higher 
types  of  men,  we  tend  towards  an  ideal  family  in  which 
"  the  mortality  between  birth  and  the  reproductive  age  falls 
to  a  minimum,  while  the  lives  of  adults  have  their  subordi- 
nation to  the  rearing  of  children  reduced  to  the  smallest 
possible." 

To  the  last,  however,  the  antagonism  between  individua- 
tion  and  reproduction  holds — holds  in  a  direct  way,  because 
of  the  physical  tax  which  reproduction  necessitates,  and 
holds  in  an  indirect  way  because  of  the  tax,  physical  and 
mental,  necessitated  by  rearing  children :  a  tax  which, 
though  it  is  pleasurably  paid  in  fulfilment  of  the  appropriate 
instincts  and  emotions,  and  is  in  so  far  a  fulfilment  of  in- 
dividual life,  is  nevertheless  a  tax  which  restricts  individual 
development  in  various  directions. 

But  here  the  truth  which  it  chiefly  concerns  us  to  note  is 
that,  assuming  the  preservation  of  the  race  to  be  a  desidera- 
tum, there  results  a  certain  kind  of  obligation  to  pay  this  tax 
and  to  submit  to  this  sacrifice.  Moreover,  something  like 
natural  equity  requires  that  as  each  individual  is  indebted  to 
past  individuals  for  the  cost  of  producing  and  rearing  him, 
he  shall  be  at  some  equivalent  cost  for  the  benefit  of  future 
individuals. 


534  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

In  tribes  and  small  societies,  where  maintenance  of  num. 
bers  is  important,  this  obligation  becomes  appreciable  ;  and, 
as  we  see  in  the  reproach  of  barrenness,  failure  to  fulfil  it 
brings  disapproval.  But  of  course  in  large  nations  wheie 
multiplication  is  rather  an  evil  than  a  benefit,  this  obligation 
lapses  ;  and  the  individual  may,  in  many  cases,  fitly  discharge 
his  or  her  indebtedness  in  some  other  way  than  by  adding  to 
the  population. 

§  231.  Leaving  here  these  considerations  which  pertain, 
perhaps,  more  to  the  ethics  of  social  life  than  to  the  ethics  of 
individual  life,  and  returning  to  the  consideration  of  mar- 
riage as  a  part  of  individual  life,  we  have  first  to  note  its 
ethical  sanctions  as  so  considered.  All  activities  fall  into  two 
great  groups — those  which  constitute  and  sustain  the  life  of 
the  individual,  and  those  which  further  the  life  of  the  race ; 
and  it  seems  inferable  that  if  for  full  health  the  structures 
conducive  to  the  one  must  severally  perform  their  functions, 
so  must  the  structures  conducive  to  the  other.  Such  part  of 
the  organization  as  is  devoted  to  the  production  of  off- 
spring, can  scarcely  be  left  inert  and  leave  the  rest  of  the 
organization  unaffected.  The  not  infrequent  occurrence  of 
hysteria  and  chlorosis  shows  that  women,  in  whom  the 
reproductive  function  bears  a  larger  ratio  to  the  totality 
of  the  functions  than  it  does  in  men,  are  apt  to  suffer 
grave  constitutional  evils  from  that  incompleteness  of  life 
which  celibacy  implies  :  grave  evils  to  which  there  probably 
correspond  smaller  and  unperceived  evils  in  numerous  cases. 
As  before  remarked,  there  are  wide  limits  of  deviation  in 
what  we  call  good  health  ;  and  there  are  everywhere,  in  men 
and  women,  many  shortcomings  of  full  health  which  are  not 
perceived  to  be  such — shortcomings,  however,  which  may 
be  recognized  on  remembering  the  contrast  between  the 
ordinary  state  of  body  and  mind,  and  that  which  is  shown 
after  an  invigorating  holiday.  That  the  physiological  effects 
of  a  completely  celibate  life  on  either  sex  are  to  some  extent 


MARRIAGE.  535 

injurious,  seems  an  almost  necessary  implication  of  the  nat- 
ural conditions. 

But  whether  or  not  there  be  disagreement  on  this  point, 
there  can  be  none  respecting  the  effects  of  a  celibate  life 
as  mentally  injurious.  A  large  part  of  the  nature — partly 
intellectual  but  chiefly  emotional — finds  its  sphere  of  action 
in  the  marital  relation,  and  afterwards  in  the  parental  rela- 
tion ;  and  if  this  sphere  be  closed,  some  of  the  higher  feel- 
ings must  remain  inactive  and  others  but  feebly  active. 
Directly,  to  special  elements  of  the  mind,  the  relation  estab- 
lished by  marriage  is  the  normal  and  needful  stimulus,  and 
indirectly  to  all  its  elements. 

There  is  in  the  first  place  to  be  recognized  an  exaltation 
of  the  energies.  Continuous  and  strenuous  efforts  to  suc- 
ceed in  life  are  often  excited  by  an  engagement  to  marry 
— efforts  which  had  previously  not  been  thought  of.  Then, 
subsequently,  the  consciousness  of  family  responsibilities 
when  these  have  arisen,  serves  as  a  sharper  spur  to  exer- 
tion :  often,  indeed,  a  spur  so  sharp  that  in  the  absence  of 
prudential  restraints  it  leads  to  overwork.  But  the  most 
noteworthy  fact  is  that  under  these  conditions,  an  amount 
of  activity  becomes  relatively  easy,  and  even  pleasurable, 
which  before  was  difficult  and  repugnant. 

The  immediate  cause  of  this  greater  energy  is  the  in- 
creased quantity  of  emotion  which  the  marital  relation, 
and  after  it  the  parental  relation,  excite ;  and  there  is  to 
be  recognized  both  a  greater  body  of  emotion,  and  a 
higher  form  of  emotion.  .To  the  lower  egoistic  feelings 
which  previously  formed  the  chief,  if  not  only,  stimuli,  are 
now  added  those  higher  egoistic  feelings  which  find  their 
satisfaction  in  the  affections,  together  with  those  altruistic 
feelings  which  find  their  satisfaction  in  the  happiness  of 
others.  What  potent  influences  on  character  thus  come  into 
play,  is  shown  in  the  moral  transformation  which  marriage 
frequently  effects.  Often  the  vain  and  thoughtless  girl, 
caring  only  for  amusements,  becomes  changed  into  the 


536  THE   ETHICS    OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

devoted  wife  and  mother;  and  often  the  man  who  is  ill- 
tempered  and  unsympathetic,  becomes  changed  into  the 
self-sacrificing  husband  and  careful  father.  To  which  add 
that  there  is  usually  exercised,  more  than  before,  the  dis- 
cipline of  self-restraint. 

Some  effect,  too,  is  wrought  on  the  thinking  faculties; 
not,  perhaps,  in  their  power,  but  in  their  balance.  In 
women  the  intellectual  activity  is  frequently  diminished ; 
for  the  antagonism  between  individuation  and  reproduc- 
tion, which  is  in  them  most  pronounced,  tells  more 
especially  on  the  brain.  But  to  both  husband  and  wife 
there  daily  come  many  occasions  for  exercises  of  judg- 
ment, alike  in  their  relations  to  domestic  affairs,  to  one 
another,  and  to  children — exercises  of  judgment  which  in 
the  celibate  state  were  not  called  for;  and  hence  an  in- 
crease of  intellectual  stability  and  sense  of  proportion. 

It  must,  however,  be  remarked  that  the  beneficial 
effects  to  be  expected  from  marriage,  as  giving  a  sphere 
to  a  large  part  of  the  nature  otherwise  relatively  inert, 
presuppose  a  normal  marriage — a  marriage  of  affection.  If, 
instead,  it  is  one  of  the  kind  to  be  ethically  reprobated — 
a  mercantile  marriage — there  may  follow  debasement  rather 
than  elevation. 

§  232.  But  now  comes  a  difficult  question.  If,  on  the 
one  hand,  as  being  a  condition  to  fulfilment  of  individual 
life,  marriage  is  ethically  sanctioned  and,  indeed,  ethically 
enjoined ;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  ethical  repro- 
bation for  all  acts  which  will  certainly  or  probably  entail 
evil — reprobation  if  the  evil  is  likely  to  come  on  self,  and 
still  more  if  it  is  likely  to  come  on  others ;  then  what  are 
we  to  say  of  improvident  marriages  ? 

There  needs  no  insistence  on  the  truth  that  if  domestic 
responsibilities  are  entered  upon  without  a  fair  prospect 
of  efficiently  discharging  them,  a  wrong  is  done :  espe- 
cially to  children  and,  by  implication,  to  the  race.  To 


MARRIAGE.  537 

take  a  step  from  which  will  result  a  poverty-stricken 
household,  containing  a  half-starved  and  half-clothed  fam- 
ily, is,  if  estimated  by  entailed  miseries,  something  like  a 
ciime.  When,  after  long  years  of  pain,  anxiety,  cold  and 
hunger,  to  adults  and  young,  some  out  of  the  many  born 
have  been  reared  to  maturity,  ill-grown,  unhealthy,  and 
incapable  of  the  efforts  needed  for  self-support ;  it  becomes 
manifest  that  there  have  been  produced  beings  who  are 
at  once  curses  to  themselves  and  to  the  community.  Severe 
condemnation  must  be  passed  on  the  conduct  which  has  such 
consequences. 

And  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  what  would  happen  if  no 
marriages  took  place  without  a  satisfactory  prospect  of 
maintaining  a  family?  Suppose  that  an  average  delay  of 
ten  years  were  submitted  to,  so  that  there  might  be  no  such 
risks  of  evil  as  are  now  commonly  run.  The  usual  suppo- 
sition is  that  such  persistent  self-restraint  would  be  purely 
beneficial.  This  is  far  from  being  true,  however. 

I  do  not  refer  to  the  fact  that  ten  years  of  partially  abnor- 
mal life  is  a  serious  evil ;  although  this  should  be  taken  ac- 
count of  in  estimating  the  total  results.  Nor  am  I  thinking 
of  the  increased  liability  to  domestic  dissension  which  arises 
when  added  years  have  given  to  each  of  the  married  pair 
greater  fixity  of  beliefs  and  diminished  modifiability  of  feel- 
ings. But  I  am  thinking  chiefly  of  the  effects  on  progeny. 
The  tacit  assumption  made  by  those  who  advocate  the  Mal- 
thusian  remedy  for  over-population,  is,  that  it  matters  not  to 
children  whether  they  are  born  to  young  parents  or  to  old 
parents.  This  is  a  mistake. 

Because  many  factors  co-operate,  the  evidence  is  so  ob- 
scured that  attention  is  not  commonly  drawn  to  the  ef- 
fects indicated ;  but  they  certainly  arise.  The  antagonism 
between  individuation  and  reproduction  implies,  among 
other  things,  that  the  surplus  vitality  available  for  the 
maintenance  of  species-life  is  that  which  remains  after  the 
maintenance  of  individual  life.  Hence  the  effects  on  off- 


638  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

spring  of  early,  medium,  and  late  marriages,  are  not  con- 
stant; because  the  surplus,  though  it  has  a  general  rela- 
tion to  age,  is  not  constant  at  any  age.  But  from  this 
general  relation  it  results,  in  the  first  place,  that  children 
born  of  very  early  marriages  are  injuriously  affected  • 
since  where  the  development  of  parents,  or  more  espe- 
cially the  mother,  is  not  complete,  the  available  surplus  is 
less  than  that  which  exists  after  it  is  complete.  It  results 
also  that  where  maternal  vigour  is  great  and  the  surplus 
vitality  consequently  large,  a  long  series  of  children  may 
be  borne  before  any  deterioration  in  their  quality  becomes 
marked;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  a  mother  with  but  a 
small  surplus  may  soon  cease  altogether  to  reproduce. 
Further,  it  results  that  variations  in  the  states  of  health  of 
parents,  involving  variations  in  the  surplus  vitality,  have 
their  effects  on  the  constitutions  of  offspring,  to  the  extent 
that  offspring  borne  during  greatly  deranged  maternal 
health  are  decidedly  feebler.  And  then,  lastly  and  chiefly, 
it  results  that  after  the  constitutional  vigour  has  culminated, 
and  there  has  commenced  that  gradual  decline  which  in 
some  twenty  years  or  so  brings  absolute  infertility,  there 
goes  on  a  gradual  decrease  in  that  surplus  vitality  on 
which  the  production  of  offspring  depends,  and  a  conse- 
quent deterioration  in  the  quality  of  such  offspring.  This, 
which  is  an  a  priori  conclusion,  is  verified  a  posteriori. 
Mr.  J.  Matthews  Duncan,  in  his  work  on  Fecundity,  Fer- 
tility, Sterility,  and  allied  topics,  has  given  results  of  sta- 
tistics which  show  that  mothers  of  five-and-twenty  bear 
the  finest  infants,  and  that  from  mothers  whose  age  at 
marriage  ranges  from  twenty  to  five-and-twenty,  there 
come  infants  which  have  a  lower  rate  of  mortality  than 
those  resulting  from  marriages  commenced  when  the 
mother's  age  is  either  smaller  or  greater:  the  apparent 
slight  incongruity  between  these  two  statements,  being 
due  to  the  fact  that  whereas  marriages  commenced  be- 
tween twenty  and  five-and-twenty  cover  the  whole  of  the 


MARKIAGE.  539 

period  of  highest  vigour,  marriages  commenced  at  five- 
and-twenty  cover  a  period  which  lacks  the  years  during 
which  vigour  is  rising  to  its  climax,  and  includes  only  the 
years  of  decline  from  the  climax. 

Now  this  fact  that  infants  born  of  mothers  married 
between  twenty  and  five-and-twenty  have  a  lower  rate  of 
mortality  than  infants  born  of  mothers  married  earlier  or 
later,  shows  that  the  age  of  marriage  is  not  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference to  the  race,  and  that  the  question  of  early  or  late 
marriages  is  less  simple  than  appears.  While  the  children 
of  a  relatively  early  marriage  improvidently  entered  upon, 
may  suffer  from  inadequate  sustentation ;  the  children  of  a 
late  marriage  are  likely  to  suffer  from  initial  imperfection 
— imperfection  which  may  be  consistent  with  good  health 
and  fair  efficiency,  but  yet  may  negative  that  high  effi- 
ciency requisite  for  the  best  and  most  successful  life.  For 
especially  nowadays,  under  our  regime  of  keen  competi- 
tion, a  small  falling-short  of  constitutional  vigour  may  entail 
failure. 

Thus,  except  in  the  positive  reprobation  of  marriages  at  an 
earlier  age  than  twenty  (among  the  higher  races  of  man 
kind)  ethical  considerations  furnish  but  indefinite  guidance. 
Usually  there  has  to  be  a  compromise  of  probabilities. 
While  recklessly  improvident  marriages  must  be  strongly 
condemned,  yet  it  seems  that  in  many  cases  some  risk  may 
rightly  be  run,  lest  there  should  be  entailed  the  evils  flowing 
from  too  long  a  delay. 

§  233.  But  what  has  ethics  to  say  concerning  choice  in 
marriage — the  selection  of  wife  by  husband  and  husband  by 
wife  ?  It  has  very  decisive  things  to  say. 

Current  conversation  proves  how  low  is  current  thought 
and  sentiment  about  these  questions.  "  It  will  be  a  very 
good  match  for  her,"  is  the  remark  you  hear  respecting 
some  young  lady  engaged  to  a  wealthy  man.  Or  concern- 
ing the  choice  of  some  young  gentleman  it  is  said — "  She 


540  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

is  an  accomplished  girl  and  well-connected  ;  and  her  friends 
will  help  to  advance  him  in  his  profession."  Another  en- 
gaged pair  are  described  as  well-suited :  he  is  a  domestic 
man,  and  she  does  not  care  much  for  society.  Or,  perhaps, 
the  impending  marriage  is  applauded  on  the  ground  that  the 
lady  will  be  a  good  housekeeper,  and  make  the  best  of  a 
small  income  ;  or  that  the  proposed  husband  is  good-tem- 
pered and  not  too  fastidious.  But  about  the  fitness  of  the 
connexion  as  considered  not  extrinsically  but  intrinsically, 
little  or  nothing  is  said. 

The  first  ground  of  ethical  judgment  is  the  reciprocal  state 
of  feeling  prompting  the  union.  Where  there  exists  none 
of  that  mutual  attraction  which  should  be  the  incentive,  evo- 
lutionary ethics  and  hedonistic  ethics  alike  protest ;  what- 
ever ethics  otherwise  derived  may  do.  Marriages  of  this 
class  are  reversions  to  marriages  of  earlier  types,  such  as 
those  found  among  the  rudest  savages.  The  mariage  de 
corwencmce  has  been  called,  with  some  show  of  reason,  legal- 
ized prostitution. 

But  passing  over  the  interdict  which  ethics  utters  on 
marriages  which  are  mercantile,  or  which  arise  from  other 
motives  than  affection,  we  have  to  notice  its  further  in- 
terdicts physiologically  originating.  Here  we  see,  as  was 
pointed  out  in  the  preliminary  chapter,  how  prevalent  is 
the  blindness  to  all  effects  save  proximate  ones :  unques- 
tionable as  may  be  the  genesis  of  remoter  effects.  Only 
in  extreme  cases  do  either  those  directly  concerned  or 
their  friends,  think  of  the  probable  quality  of  the  offspring 
when  discussing  the  propriety  of  a  marriage.  Disapproval, 
perhaps  rising  to  reprobation,  may  be  expressed  when  the 
proposed  union  is  between  cousins,  or  is  a  union  with  one 
who  probably  inherits  insanity;  but  consideration  of  the 
effects  to  be  borne  by  descendants  goes  scarcely  beyond 
this.  A  feeble  mind  or  a  bad  physique  is  but  rarely 
thought  a  sufficient  reason  for  rejecting  a  suitor.  Thin, 
flat-chested  girls,  debilitated  men  perpetually  ailing,  some 


MARRIAGE.  541 

who  are  constitutionally  wanting  in  bodily  energy,  others 
who  have  no  activity  either  of  intellect  or  feeling,  and 
many  who  are  from  this  or  that  defect  so  inferior  as  to  be 
unfit  to  carry  on  the  battle  of  life,  are  ordinarily  considered 
good  enough  for  marriage  and  parenthood.  In  a  manner 
that  seems  almost  deliberate  there  are  thus  entailed  households 
in  which  illness  and  dulness  and  bad-temper  prevail,  and  out 
of  which  there  come  unhealthy  and  incapable  children  and 
grandchildren. 

Ethical  considerations  should  here  serve  as  rigid  re- 
straints. Though  guidance  by  the  feelings  is  to  be  so  far 
respected  that  marriages  not  prompted  by  them  must  be 
condemned,  yet  guidance  by  the  feelings  must  not  there- 
fore be  regarded  as  so  authoritative  that  all  marriages 
prompted  by  them  should  be  approved.  A  certain  per- 
version of  sentiment  has  to  be  guarded  against.  Relative 
weakness,  appealing  for  protection,  is  one  of  the  traits  in 
women  which  excites  in  men  the  sentiment  of  affection — 
"the  tender  emotion,"  as  Bain  styles  it;  and  sometimes  a 
degree  of  relative  weakness  which  exceeds  the  natural, 
strongly  excites  this  feeling:  the  pity  which  is  akin  to 
love  ends  in  love.  There  are  converse  cases  in  which  a 
woman  of  unusual  power  of  nature  becomes  attached  to 
a  man  who  is  feeble  in  body  or  mind.  But  these  devia- 
tions from  normal  inclinations  have  to  be  resisted.  Ethics 
demands  that  judgment  shall  here  come  in  aid  of  instinct  and 
control  it. 

§  234.  There  remains  a  question  uniformly  passed  over 
because  difficult  to  discuss,  but  the  ignoring  of  which  is 
fraught  with  untold  disasters — a  question  concerning  which 
Ethics,  in  its  comprehensive  form,  has  a  verdict  to  give, 
and  cannot  without  falling  short  of  its  functions  decline  to 
give  it. 

The  saying  "that  the  letter  killeth  but  the  spirit  giveth 
life,"  is  exemplified  not  only  by  the  way  in  which  observance 


542  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

of  religious  ceremonies  replaces  observance  of  the  essential 
injunctions  of  religion,  but  it  is  exemplified  everywhere.  As 
in  the  primitive  legal  system  of  the  Romans,  before  it  was 
qualified  by  infusion  of  the  Jus  Gentium,  the  essential  thing 
was  fulfilment  of  formalities  rather  than  maintenance  of 
right — as,  among  ourselves,  the  sacrifice  of  justice  to  the 
technicalities  of  law,  led  to  the  supplementary  system  of 
equity,  intended  to  rectify  the  entailed  injustices — as,  again, 
in  the  system  of  equity  the  observance  of  rules  and  conform- 
ing to  orders,  ever  complicating,  became  in  course  of  time 
so  burdensome  that  equity,  lost  sight  of,  was  replaced  by  in- 
equity, or  iniquity ;  so  is  it  throughout.  Wherever  require- 
ments which  have  their  roots  in  the  order  of  Nature,  come 
to  be  enforced  by  an  extrinsic  authority,  obedience  to  that 
extrinsic  authority  takes  the  place  of  obedience  to  the  natural 
requirements. 

It  is  thus  in  a  considerable  degree  with  marriage.  I  do 
not  mean  merely  that  unions  of  an  essentially  illegitimate 
kind  are  supposed  to  be  legitimized  by  a  church  service  or  a 
registration  ;  but  I  mean  more.  I  mean  that  when  the  civil 
requirements  have  been  fulfilled,  and  the  ecclesiastical  sanc- 
tion has  been  obtained,  it  is  supposed  that  no  further  control 
has  to  be  recognized — that  when  the  religious  restraints  and 
the  social  restraints  on  the  relations  of  the  sexes  have  been 
duly  respected,  there  remain  no  other  restraints.  The  physi- 
ological restraints,  not  having  received  official  recognition, 
are  not  supposed  to  exist,  or  are  disregarded.  Hence  a  vast 
amount  of  evil. 

The  antagonism  between  individuation  and  reproduc- 
tion comes  into  play  throughout  the  entire  process  of  race- 
maintenance.  It  is  true  that  the  fulfilment  of  individual 
life  largely  consists  in  furthering  species-life;  but  it  is 
none  the  less  true  that  from  beginning  to  end,  the  last  puts 
a  limit  to  the  first.  We  have  but  to  consider  that,  delighted 
as  the  mother  is  in  yielding  food  to  her  infant,  she  yet 
suffers  a  serious  physical  tax  in  addition  to  the  physical  tax 


MARRIAGE.  543 

entailed  by  production  of  it,  to  see  that  great  though  the 
maternal  gratification  may  be,  it  entails  loss  of  gratifications 
which  a  more  developed  individual  life  might  have  brought ; 
and  that  when  many  children  are  produced  and  reared,  the 
sacrifices  of  individual  life  and  of  the  pleasures  which  a 
higher  development  would  bring,  become  very  great.  This 
law  inevitably  holds  throughout  the  entire  reproductive 
function  from  beginning  to  end — with  the  initial  part  as 
with  the  terminal  part ;  and  ignorance  of,  or  indifference  to, 
it  entails  profound  injuries,  physical  and  mental.  If  the 
physiological  restraints  are  not  respected  the  life  is  under- 
mined in  all  ways. 

When,  out  of  the  total  resources  which  the  sustaining 
organs  furnish  in  materials  and  forces,  the  part  required 
for  the  carrying  on  of  individual  life  is  trenched  upon 
beyond  the  normal  ratio,  by  the  part  constitutionally  appro- 
priated to  species-life,  there  comes  a  diminution  of  energy, 
which  affects  the  vital  processes  and  all  dependent  processes. 
Chronic  derangements  of  health  supervene,  diminished  bodily 
activity,  decline  of  mental  power,  and  sometimes  even 
insanity.  Succeeding  the  mischiefs  thus  caused,  even  when 
they  are  not  so  extreme,  there  come  the  mischiefs  entailed 
on  family  and  others  ;  for  inability  to  discharge  obligations, 
depression  of  spirits,  and  perturbed  mental  state,  inevit- 
ably injure  those  around.  Several  specialists,  who  have 
good  means  of  judging,  agree  in  the  opinion  that  the 
aggregate  evils  arising  from  excesses  of  this  kind  are 
greater  than  those  arising  from  excesses  of  all  other  kinds 
put  together. 

If,  then,  Ethics  as  rightly  conceived  has  to  pass  judg- 
ment on  all  conduct  which  affects  the  well-being,  immediate 
or  remote,  of  self  or  others,  or  both  ;  then  the  lack  of  self- 
restraint  which  it  condemns  in  other  cases,  it  must  condemn 
in  this  case  also. 


CHAPTEK  IX. 

PARENTHOOD. 

§  235.  The  subject-matter  of  this  chapter  is  of  course 
only  in  part  separable  from  the  subject-matter  of  the  last 
chapter.  But  though  in  discussing  the  Ethics  of  Marriage, 
as  primarily  concerning  the  relations  of  parents  to  each 
other,  it  has  been  needful  to  take  account  of  the  relations 
of  parents  to  offspring,  it  has  seemed  best  to  reserve  the  full 
consideration  of  these  last  relations  for  a  distinct  chapter. 

Already  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  in  the  order  of 
Nature — uso  careful  of  the  type  ...  so  careless  of  the 
single  life  " — the  welfare  of  progeny  takes  precedence  of 
the  welfare  of  those  who  produce  them.  Though  the 
happiness  or  misery  of  the  married  pair  is  ordinarily  the 
result  chiefly  contemplated,  this  result  must  be  held  of 
secondary  importance  in  comparison  with  the  results 
reached  in  offspring — the  superiority  or  inferiority  of  the 
children  born  and  reared  to  maturity.  For  in  proportion 
as  race-maintenance  is  well  or  ill  achieved  in  each  case, 
must  be  the  tendency  of  the  species  or  variety  to  prosper  or 
decline. 

Hence  all  requirements  touching  the  proximate  end, 
marriage  are  to  be  considered  in  subordination  to  re- 
quirements touching  the  ultimate  end — the  raising  up 
members  of  a  new  generation.  Evolutionary  ethics  de- 
mands that  this  last  end  shall  be  regarded  as  the  supreme  end. 

§  236.  Obviously  the  parental  instincts  in  large  measure 
secure  fulfilment  of  this  supreme  end ;  since  any  species  or 


PARENTHOOD.  545 

variety  in  which  they  are  not  strong  enough  to  do  this,  must 
presently  become  extinct.  Here,  then,  we  are  introduced  to 
the  truth  that  achievement  of  those  pleasures  which  parent- 
hood brings,  has  a  double  sanction— that  which  the  ethics  of 
individual  life  directly  yields,  and  that  which  is  yielded  in- 
directly by  the  ethics  of  social  life. 

But  satisfaction  of  the  parental  affections,  while  not  to  be 
ignored  as  an  end  in  itself,  is,  as  above  implied,  chiefly  to  be 
regarded  as  a  spur  to  the  discharge  of  parental  responsi- 
bilities. The  arrangements  of  things  are  dislocated  if  the 
two  are  not  kept  in  relation — if  the  responsibilities,  instead 
of  being  discharged  by  parents,  are  shouldered  upon  others. 
It  might  have  been  thought  that  this  truth  is  too  obvious  to 
need  enunciation ;  but,  unhappily,  it  is  far  otherwise.  We 
have  fallen  upon  evil  times,  in  which  it  has  come  to  be  an 
accepted  doctrine  that  part  of  the  responsibilities  are  to  be 
discharged  not  by  parents  but  by  the  public — a  part  which  is 
gradually  becoming  a  larger  part  and  threatens  to  become 
the  whole.  Agitators  and  legislators  have  united  in  spread- 
ing a  theory  which,  logically  followed  out,  ends  in  the 
monstrous  conclusion  that  it  is  for  parents  to  beget  children 
and  for  society  to  take  care  of  them.  The  political  ethics 
now  in  fashion,  makes  the  unhesitating  assumption  that 
while  each  man,  as  parent,  is  not  responsible  for  the  mental 
culture  of  his  own  offspring,  he  is,  as  citizen,  along  with 
other  citizens,  responsible  for  the  mental  culture  of  all  other 
men's  offspring !  And  this  absurd  doctrine  has  now  become 
so  well  established  that  people  raise  their  eyebrows  in  aston- 
ishment if  you  deny  it.  A  self-evident  falsehood  has  been 
transformed  into  a  self-evident  truth !  Along  with  the 
almost  universal  superstition  that  society  is  a  manufacture 
and  not  a  growth,  there  goes  the  unwavering  belief  that  leg- 
islators, prompted  by  electors,  can  with  advantage  set  aside 
one  of  the  fundamental  arrangements  under  which  organic 
nature  at  large,  and  human  nature  in  particular,  has  evolved 
thus  far !  Men  who  have  proved  cunning  in  business-specu- 


546  THE    ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

lation,  men  who  ride  well  to  hounds  and  are  popular  in  their 
counties,  men  who  in  courts  of  justice  are  skilled  in  making 
the  worse  cause  appear  the  better,  men  who  once  wrote  good 
Latin  verses  or  proved  themselves  learned  about  the  misbe- 
haviour of  the  Greek  gods,  unite  in  trying  to  undo  organized 
dependencies  resulting  from  millions  of  years  of  discipline. 
Men  whose  culture  is  so  little  relevant  to  the  functions  they 
have  assumed,  that  they  do  not  even  see  that  everything  in 
social  life  originates  from  certain  traits  of  individual  life, 
that  individual  human  life  is  but  a  specialized  part  of  life  at 
large,  and  that  therefore  until  the  leading  truths  presented 
by  life  at  large  are  comprehended,  there  can  be  no  right 
comprehension  of  society — men  who  are  thus  ignorant  of 
the  great  facts  which  it  chiefly  concerns  them  to  know,  have 
promised  to  do  the  behests  of  men  who  are  ignorant  not 
only  of  such  facts  but  of  most  other  things.  The  half -blind 
elected  by  the  wholly  blind  take  upon  themselves  the  office 
of  creation-menders!  Daily  accustomed  to  discover  that 
established  laws  are  bad  and  must  be  repealed  by  Act  of 
Parliament,  they  have  unawares  extended  their  thought  to 
laws  not  of  human  origin,  and  calmly  undertake  to  repeal  by 
Act  of  Parliament  a  law  of  Nature ! 

But  this  ignoring  of  the  truth  that  only  by  due  dis- 
charge of  parental  responsibilities  has  all  life  on  the  Earth 
arisen,  and  that  only  through  the  better  discharge  of  them 
have  there  gradually  been  made  possible  better  types  of  life, 
is  in  the  long  run  fatal.  Breach  of  natural  law  will  in  this 
case,  as  in  all  cases,  be  followed  in  due  time  by  Nature's 
revenge — a  revenge  which  will  be  terrible  in  proportion  as 
the  breach  has  been  great.  A  system  under  which  parental 
duties  are  performed  wholesale  by  those  who  are  not  the 
parents,  under  the  plea  that  many  parents  cannot  or  will 
not  perform  their  duties — a  system  which  thus  fosters  the 
inferior  children  of  inferior  parents  at  the  necessary  cost  of 
superior  parents  and  consequent  injury  of  superior  children 
— a  system,  which  thus  helps  incapables  to  multiply  and  hin- 


PARENTHOOD.  547 

ders  the  multiplications  of  capables,  or  diminishes  their  capa- 
bility, must  bring  decay  and  eventual  extinction.  A  society 
which  persists  in  such  a  system  must,  other  things  equal,  go 
to  the  wall  in  the  competition  with  a  society  which  does  not 
commit  the  folly  of  nurturing  its  worst  at  the  expense  of  its 
best. 

The  ethical  code  of  Nature,  then,  allows  of  no  escape  of 
parents  from  their  obligations.  While  under  its  hedonistic 
aspect  it  sanctions  in  an  emphatic  way  the  gratification  of 
parental  affections,  under  its  evolutionary  aspect  it  per- 
emptorily requires  fulfilment  of  all  those  actions  by  which 
the  young  are  prepared  for  the  battle  of  life.  And  if  the 
circumstances  are  such  that  part  of  these  actions  must  be 
performed  by  deputy,  it  still  requires  that  the  implied  cost 
and  care  shall  be  borne,  and  not  transferred  to  others' 
shoulders. 

§  237.  The  time  will  come  when,  along  with  full  recog- 
nition of  parental  duties,  there  will  go  an  unyielding  resist- 
ance to  the  usurpation  of  those  duties.  While  the  parent, 
as  he  ought  to  be,  will  conscientiously  satisfy  all  the  de- 
mands which  his  parenthood  entails,  he  will  sternly  deny 
the  right  of  any  assemblage  of  men  to  take  his  children 
from  him  and  mould  them  as  they  ptease.  We  have  out- 
grown the  stage  during  which  the  despot,  with  an  army  at 
his  back,  could  impose  his  will  on  all  citizens ;  but  we  have 
not  yet  outgrown  the  stage  during  which  a  majority  of 
citizens,  with  police  at  their  back,  can  impose  their  will, 
concerning  all  matters  whatever,  upon  citizens  not  of  their 
number.  But  when  there  has  passed  away  this  contempti- 
ble superstition  that,  having  the  power,  the  majority  have 
the  right,  to  do  as  they  please  with  the  persons  and  prop- 
erty and  actions  of  those  who  happen  to  be  in  the  mi- 
nority— when  it  is  understood  that  governmental  orders 
are  limited  by  ethical  injunctions ;  every  parent  will  hold 
his  sphere  as  one  into  which  the  State  may  not  intrude. 


548  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

And  if  under  such  conditions  there  occasionally,  though 
rarely,  happens  a  non-performance  of  parental  duties,  the 
entailed  evil  brings,  in  Nature's  stern  way,  its  own  cure. 
For  with  mankind  as  with  lower  kinds,  the  ill-nurtured 
offspring  of  the  inferior  fail  in  the  struggle  for  existence 
with  the  well-nurtured  offspring  of  the  superior ;  and  in  a 
generation  or  two  die  out,  to  the  benefit  of  the  species.  A 
harsh  discipline  this,  most  will  say.  True ;  but  Nature 
has  much  discipline  which  is  harsh,  and  which  must,  in 
the  long  run,  be  submitted  to.  The  necessities  which  she 
imposes  on  us  are  not  to  be  evaded,  even  by  the  joint  ef- 
forts of  university-graduates  and  working-men  delegates ; 
and  the  endeavour  to  escape  her  harsh  discipline  results  in 
a  discipline  still  harsher.  Measures  which  prevent  the 
dwindling  away  of  inferior  individuals  and  families,  must, 
in  the  course  of  generations,  cause  the  nation  at  large  to 
dwindle  away. 

At  the  same  time  that  intrusion  into  the  parental  sphere 
must,  in  a  normal  social  state,  be  resented  as  a  trespass,  it 
will  be  further  resented  as  a  deprivation  of  those  daily 
pleasures  yielded  by  furthering  the  development  of  the 
young  in  body  and  mind.  For  when  there  have  died  out 
the  stupidities  of  an  education  which  may  be  briefly 
described  as  denying  the  mind  that  which  it  wants  and 
forcing  upon  it  that  which  it  does  not  want,  there  will 
have  come  a  time  when  the  superintendence  of  education, 
at  any  rate  in  all  its  simpler  parts,  will  be  at  once  easy 
and  enjoyable.  The  general  law  that  through  successive 
stages  of  organic  evolution,  there  is  an  elongation  of  the 
period  during  which  parental  care  is  given,  shown  finally 
in  the  contrast  between  the  human  race  and  inferior  races, 
as  well  as  in  the  contrast  between  uncivilized  and  civilized, 
is  a  law  which,  involving  as  now  a  long  and  careful 
physical  nurturing  of  the  young  by  their  parents,  will 
hereafter  involve  a  long  and  careful  psychical  nurturing 


PARENTHOOD.  549 

by  them ;  and  though  the  higher  and  more  special  educa- 
tional functions  will  have  to  be  discharged  by  proxy,  yet 
the  proxy-discharge  will  be  under  parental  superintend- 
ence. 

People  feel  no  adequate  pride  in  bringing  to  maturity 
fine  human  beings.  It  is  true  that  the  mother,  exhibiting 
each  infant  with  triumph,  and  during  the  childhood  of 
each  pleasing  herself  by  presenting  it  to  visitors  prettily 
clothed  and  with  hair  on  which  much  time  has  been  spent 
morning  and  evening,  is  not  wholly  neglectful  of  diet, 
and  takes  care  that  the  day's  lessons  are  attended  to.  It 
is  true,  also,  that  the  father,  commonly  leaving  fashion  to 
determine  the  places  of  education  for  his  boys,  sometimes 
makes  inquiries  and  exercises  independent  judgment;  and, 
moreover,  looks  with  satisfaction  on  a  well-grown  youth 
and  one  who  has  brought  home  prizes.  But  it  is  never- 
theless true  that  scarcely  anywhere  do  we  see  proper 
solicitude.  Grave  mischiefs  are  daily  done  in  almost 
every  family  by  ignorance  of  physiological  requirements ; 
and  in  the  absence  of  guiding  knowledge  in  parents,  in- 
numerable children  grow  up  with  constitutions  damaged 
for  life.  At  the  same  time  there  is  no  such  thoughtful 
ministration  to  the  mind  of  each  child  as  is  called  for — 
no  search  for  a  course  of  intellectual  culture  which  is 
rational  in  matter  and  method,  and  nothing  beyond  a 
rough  and  ready  moral  discipline.  On  observing  what 
energies  are  expended  by  father  and  mother  to  achieve 
wordly  success  and  fulfil  social  ambitions,  we  are  reminded 
how  relatively  small  is  the  space  occupied  by  the  ambi- 
tion to  make  their  descendants  physically,  morally,  and 
intellectually,  superior.  Yet  this  is  the  ambition  which 
will  replace  those  they  now  so  eagerly  pursue ;  and  which, 
instead  of  perpetual  disappointments,  will  bring  permanent 
satisfactions. 

And  then,   following   on  the  discharge  of    these    high 


550  THE    ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

parental  functions,  will  come  that  reward  in  old  age  con- 
sisting of  an  affectionate  care  by  children,  much  greater 
than  is  now  known, 

§  238.  Anything  like  due  fulfilment  of  parental  func- 
tions as  thus  conceived,  is  possible  only  under  conditions 
commonly  disregarded — conditions  the  disregard  of  which 
is  supposed  not  to  fall  within  the  range  of  ethical  judg- 
ments. 

"Providence  has  sent  me  a  large  family,"  is  a  remark 
which  may  occasionally  be  heard  from  one  who  has  more 
children  than  he  can  provide  for.  Though,  in  other  direc- 
tions, he  does  not  profess  an  oriental  fatalism,  in  this  direc- 
tion he  does.  "  God  has  willed  it  so,"  appears  to  be  his 
thought ;  and  thinking  this,  he  holds  himself  absolved  from 
blame  in  bringing  about  the  distresses  of  a  poverty- 
stricken  household. 

If,  however,  improvident  marriages  are  to  be  reprobated 
— if  to  bring  children  into  the  world  when  there  will 
probably  be  no  means  of  maintaining  any,  is  a  course 
calling  for  condemnation ;  then  there  must  be  condemna- 
tion for  those  who  bring  many  children  into  the  world 
when  they  have  means  of  properly  rearing  only  a  few. 
Improvidence  after  marriage  cannot  be  considered  right, 
if  improvidence  before  marriage  is  considered  wrong. 

The  stunted  and  ill-formed  bodies  of  dwellers  in  the 
East  end  of  London,  tell  of  the  meagre  diet  and  deficient 
clothing  from  which  the  many  children  of  parents  with 
narrow  means,  have  suffered  during  their  early  days ;  and 
even  in  country  villages,  where  the  sanitary  conditions  are 
relatively  good,  one  may  see  in  feeble  and  sickly  people, 
the  results  of  attempting  to  rear  large  families  on  small 
wages.  This  reckless  multiplication,  while  it  inflicts  the 
daily-recurring  pains  of  unsatisfied  appetites  and  the 
miseries  of  insufficient  warmth — while  it  is  to  be  debited 
with  that  lack  of  bodily  strength  which  makes  efficient 


PARENTHOOD.  551 

work  impracticable,  commonly  involves  also  a  stupidity 
which  negatives  all  but  the  most  mechanical  functions ; 
for  mental  power  cannot  be  got  from  ill-fed  brains. 
Unhappy  and  wearisome  lives  are  thus  entailed  bj 
parents  who  beget  more  children  than  they  can  property 
bring  up. 

Matters  are  made  worse,  too,  by  the  undue  tax  brought 
on  the  parents  themselves — on  the  father,  if  he  is  consci- 
entious by  an  injurious  amount  of  labour ;  and  still  more 
on  the  mother,  whose  system,  exhausted  by  the  bearing 
of  many  children,  is  still  further  exhausted  by  the  cares 
which  all  day  long  the  many  children  need.  Manifestly 
hedonistic  ethics  if  we  regard  it  as  contemplating,  more  es- 
pecially, immediate  effects  on  happiness,  severely  denounces 
conduct  which  thus  creates  miseries  all  round ;  while  evolu- 
tionary ethics,  if  we  consider  it  as  more  especially  contem- 
plating future  results,  severely  denounces  conduct  which  thus 
bequeaths  lower  natures  instead  of  higher  to  subsequent  gen- 
erations. 

Even  where  parents  have  means  sufficient  to  provide 
abundantly  for  the  bodily  welfare  of  many  children,  there 
must  still  be  an  insufficient  provision  for  their  mental  wel- 
fare. Though,  in  a  family  of  several,  the  children  amuse 
and  teach  one  another,  and  thus  mutually  aid  mental  growth ; 
yet,  when  the  number  is  large,  the  parental  attention  they 
severally  need  becomes  too  much  subdivided ;  and  the  daily 
display  of  parental  affection,  which  is  a  large  factor  in  the 
moral  development  of  children,  cannot  be  given  in  adequate 
amount  to  each. 

§  239.  With  the  ethical  censure  of  this  improvident  mul- 
tiplication, must  be  joined  a  like  censure  of  an  improvi- 
dence habitually  associated  with  it,  and  in  large  measure 
the  cause  of  it.  The  nature  of  this  will  best  be  shown 
by  citing  some  facts  furnished  by  races  which,  being  uncivil- 
ized, are  regarded  as  therefore  in  all  respects  our  inferiors. 


652  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

The  first  of  them  comes  from  a  society  utterly  brutal  in 
most  of  its  usages — Uganda. 

"The  women  rarely  have  more  than  two  or  three  children,  and 
the  law  is  that  when  a  woman  has  borne  a  child  she  must  live 
apart  from  her  husband  for  two  years,  at  which  age  the  children  are 
weaned." 

In  a  still  more  brutal  society — that  of  the  Fijians — we 
meet  with  a  kindred  fact.  Says  Seemann — 

"After  childbirth,  husband,  and  wife  keep  apart  for  three,  even  four 
years,  so  that  no  other  baby  may  interfere  with  the  time  considered 
necessary  for  suckling  children.  ...  I  heard  of  a  white  man,  who 
being  asked  how  many  brothers  and  sisters  he  had,  frankly  replied, 
'Ten!'  'But  that  could  not  be,'  was  the  rejoinder  of  the  natives, 
'  one  mother  could  scarcely  have  so  many  children.'  When  told  that 
these  children  were  born  at  annual  intervals,  and  that  such  occurrences 
were  common  in  Europe,  they  were  very  much  shocked,  and  thought 
it  explained  sufficiently  why  so  many  white  people  were  'mere 
shrimps.' " 

In  these  cases,  however,  polygamy  prevails:  in  Uganda, 
for  instance,  the  enormous  preponderance  of  women,  due 
partly  to  the  destruction  of  men  in  war  and  partly  to  the 
capture  of  women  by  war,  rendering  it  almost  universal. 
Here,  therefore,  the  usage,  in  so  far  as  it  affects  men,  is  not 
so  remarkable.  But  in  two  leading  districts  of  New  Gui- 
nea, there  are  monogamous  peoples  among  whom  a  like  rule 
holds.  The  Rev.  J.  Chalmers  tells  us  that  in  Motu-Motu, 
the  parents,  after  the  birth  of  a  child,  "  do  not  live  together 
again  until  the  child  is  strong,  walking,  and  weaned,  and  all 
that  time  he  [the  husband]  sleeps  in  dubu.  His  friends  cook 
food  for  him."  Similarly  of  the  Motu  tribe,  he  tells  us  that 
the  parents  keep  apart  "  until  the  child  walks  and  is  weaned." 
To  ascertain  the  current  opinion  on  the  matter  he  asked  the 
question — "  If  another  child  is  born  before  the  first  is  big 
and  able  to  walk,  are  they  ashamed  ? "  To  which  he  got  the 
answer — "  Yes,  terribly ;  and  all  the  village  will  be  talking 
about  it." 

Even  these  warlike  and  sanguinary  peoples  then,  and 


PARENTHOOD.  553 

still  more  these  trading,  peaceful,  and  monogamous  tribes 
of  New  Guinea,  show  us  a  deep  consciousness  of  the  truth 
that  too  frequent  child-bearing  is  injurious  to  the  race — 
tells  against  the  fullest  development  of  both  the  already 
born  child  and  the  child  to  be  presently  born.  Beyond 
that  constant  surplus  vitality  which,  in  the  female  economy, 
remains  after  meeting  the  expenditure  of  individual  life, 
there  is  also  what  we  may  call  a  reserve  of  vital  capital, 
accumulated  during  intervals  in  which  the  surplus  is  not 
being  demanded.  This  reserve,  used  up  during  the  interval 
in  which  an  infant  is  being  developed,  takes  some  time  to 
replace — a  time  shorter  or  longer  according  as  the  con- 
stitutional vigour  is  great  or  small.  And  if,  much  before 
the  end  of  that  time,  the  reproductive  system  is  again 
called  into  action,  the  double  result  is  an  over-tax  of  the 
maternal  system,  and  an  infant  which  falls  short  of  the 
fullest  development ;  at  the  same  time  that  its  predecessor 
is  too  early  deprived  of  its  natural  supply  of  food.  These 
are  necessary  consequences.  They  are  collateral  re'sults 
of  that  general  cause  which  makes  reproduction  impossible 
before  and  after  certain  ages. 

Here  then,  as  in  sundry  preceding  cases,  evolutionary 
ethics  utters  an  interdict  which  current  ethics,  from  what- 
ever source  derived,  shows  no  signs  of  uttering. 

§  240.  How  then  are  there  to  be  reconciled  the  interests 
of  the  individual  and  the  interests  of  the  race  ?  This  ques- 
tion, which  here  unavoidably  presents  itself,  is  one  diffi- 
cult, if  not  impossible  to  answer — perhaps  they  cannot  be 
reconciled. 

As  already  many  times  said,  men  have  been  long  in 
course  of  acquiring  fitness  for  that  social  state  into  which 
increase  of  numbers  has  forced  them,  and  have  still  but 
partially  acquired  fitness  for  it.  In  multitudinous  ways 
the  survival  of  instincts  appropriate  to  the  pre-social  stage, 
has  been  a  chronic  cause  of  miseries ;  and  in  multitudinous 


554  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

ways  the  lack  of  sentiments  appropriate  to  the  social  stage, 
has  been  a  chronic  cause  of  other  miseries. 

While  it  has  continually  increased  that  pressure  of 
population  which  has  been  a  cause  of  progress,  excess  of 
fertility,  has  been  among  the  chief  factors  in  the  produc- 
tion of  these  miseries,  and  must  long  continue  to  be  such  ; 
but,  as  is  shown  in  The  Principles  of  Biology,  §§  373-374, 
the  implication  of  the  general  law  traceable  throughout 
the  whole  animal  kingdom,  is  that  still  a  higher  develop- 
ment of  mind,  brought  about  by  still  increasing  pressure  of 
population,  and  still  greater  cerebral  activity  entailed  by  it, 
will  gradually  diminish  the  fertility,  until  the  excess  prac- 
tically disappears :  the  highest  degree  of  individuation 
entailing  the  lowest  degree  of  reproduction.  And  the 
further  implication,  there  pointed  out,  is  that  this  degree 
of  individuation,  especially  shown  in  a  more  exalted  mental 
life — wider  intelligence  and  more  intense  feelings — will  not 
involve  conscious  stress,  but  will  be  the  natural  outcome  of 
an  organization  adjusted  to  the  requirements  of  a  more 
costly  self-sustentation.  Hence,  if  there  are  deprivations 
which  ethics  dictates,  they  must  step  by  step  be  accompanied 
by  compensations,  probably  greater  in  amount. 

Only  in  the  slow  course  of  ages,  however,  can  any  such 
such  change  of  balance  be  wrought.  "Whether,  in  the  mean- 
time, there  may  arise  any  qualifications  of  the  process,  it  is 
impossible  to  say.  One  thing,  however,  is  certain.  No 
conclusion  can  be  sustained  which  does  not  conform  to  the 
ultimate  truth  that  the  interests  of  the  race  must  predomi- 
nate over  the  interests  of  the  individual. 


CHAPTER  X. 

GENERAL  CONCLUSIONS. 

§  241.  The  title  of  this  division— "  The  Ethics  of 
vidual  Life  " — has  excited  a  publicly-expressed  curiosity  re- 
specting the  possible  nature  of  its  contents.  Nothing  beyond 
prudential  admonitions  could,  it  was  thought,  be  meant ;  and 
there  was  evident  surprise  that  ethical  sanction  should  be 
claimed  for  these. 

The  state  of  mind  thus  implied  is  not,  I  believe,  excep- 
tional. Ordinary  individual  life,  when  it  is  such  as  not 
directly  to  affect  others  for  good  or  evil,  is  supposed  to  lie 
outside  the  sphere  of  ethics ;  or  rather,  there  is  commonly 
entertained  no  thought  about  the  matter.  Ethics,  as 
usually  conceived,  having  made  no  formal  claim  to  regu- 
late this  part  of  conduct  is  assumed  to  be  unconcerned 
with  it.  It  is  true  that  now  and  then  come  expressions 
implying  a  half -conscious  belief  to  the  contrary.  "You 
ought  not  to  have  overtaxed  your  strength  by  so  great  an 
exertion;"  "you  ought  not  to  have  gone  so  long  without 
food ;  "  are  not  unfrequent  utterances.  "  You  were  quite 
right  to  throw  up  the  situation  if  your  health  was  giving 
way,"  is  said  to  one ;  while  on  another  is  passed  the  criti- 
cism— "  He  is  wrong  in  idling  away  his  time,  wealthy 
though  he  may  be."  And  we  occasionally  hear  insistence  on 
the  duty  of  taking  a  holiday  to  avoid  an  illness :  especially 
in  view  of  responsibilities  to  be  discharged.  That  is  to  say, 
the  words  ought,  right,  wrong,  duty,  are  used  in  connexion 


656  THE   ETHICS   OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

with  various  parts  of  private  conduct ;  and  such  uses  of 
these  words,  which  in  other  cases  have  ethical  significance, 
implies  that  they  have  ethical  significance  in  these  cases 
also. 

Moreover,  as  pointed  out  in  the  opening  chapter,  there 
are  some  modes  of  individual  life  concerning  which  ethical 
convictions  of  the  most  pronounced  kinds  prevail — excess  in 
drinking,  for  example.  Recognition  of  the  immense  evils 
entailed  by  this  prompts  strong  reprobation.  But  there  is 
no  consciousness  of  the  obvious  truth  that  if,  because  of  its 
mischievous  consequences,  this  deviation  from  normal  life  is 
to  be  condemned ;  so,  too,  are  all  deviations  which  have  mis- 
chievous consequences,  however  relatively  small.  It  must 
be  admitted  that,  conceived  in  its  fully  developed  form, 
ethics  has  judgments  to  give  upon  all  actions  which  affect 
individual  welfare. 

Throughout  the  foregoing  series  of  chapters,  it  has,  I 
think,  been  made  sufficiently  manifest  that  there  is  great 
need  for  ethical  rule  over  this  wider  territory. 

§  242.  Doubtless  this  rule  must  be  of  an  indefinite  kind — 
may  be  compared  rather  with  that  of  a  suzerain  than  with 
that  of  an  acting  governor.  For  throughout  the  greater 
part  of  this  territory,  there  have  to  be  effected  compromises 
among  various  requirements ;  and  in  the  majority  of  cases 
ethical  considerations  can  do  little  more  than  guide  us  to- 
wards rational  compromises. 

This  will  probably  be  regarded  as  a  reversion  to  the 
ancient  doctrine  of  the  mean — a  doctrine  expressed  in  a 
manner  generally  vague,  but  occasionally  distinct,  by 
Confucius,  and  definitely  elaborated  by  Aristotle.  And 
it  must  be  admitted  that  throughout  most  classes  of 
actions  which  do  not  directly  affect  other  persons,  paths 
lying  between  extremes  have  to  be  sought  and  followed. 
The  doctrine  of  the  mean  is  not,  as  Aristotle  admitted, 
universally  applicable;  and  its  inapplicability  is  conspicu- 


GENERAL   CONCLUSIONS.  557 

ous  in  respect  of  that  part  of  conduct  which  stands  above 
all  others  in  importance — justice;  not,  indeed,  justice  as 
legally  formulated,  nor  justice  as  it  is  conceived  by  com- 
munists and  others  such,  but  justice  as  deducible  from  the 
conditions  which  must  be  maintained  for  the  carrying  on  of 
harmonious  social  co-operation.  Ethics  does  not  suggest 
partial  fulfilment  of  a  contract,  as  being  the  mean  between 
non-fulfilment  and  complete  fulfilment.  It  does  not  counte- 
nance moderate  robbery  of  your  neighbour,  rather  than  the 
taking  from  him  everything  or  the  taking  nothing.  Nor 
does  it  dictate  the  assault  of  a  fellow-man  as  intermediate 
between  murdering  him  and  not  touching  him.  Contrari- 
wise, in  respect  of  justice  Ethics  insists  on  the  extreme — en- 
joins complete  fulfilment  of  a  contract,  absolute  respect  for 
property,  entire  desistance  from  personal  injury.  So  like- 
wise is  it  with  veracity.  The  right  does  not  lie  between  the 
two  extremes  of  falsehood  and  truth :  complete  adherence  to 
fact  is  required.  And  there  are  sundry  kinds  of  conduct 
classed  as  vices,  which  are  also  not  contemplated  by  the  doc- 
trine; since  they  are  to  be  interdicted  not  partially  but 
wholly.  In  respect  of  ordinary  private  life,  however,  the 
doctrine  of  the  mean  may  be  considered  to  hold  in  the  ma- 
jority of  cases. 

But  admitting  this,  there  still  presents  itself  the  ques- 
tion— How  to  find  the  mean  ?  Until  the  positions  of  the 
extremes  have  been  ascertained,  the  position  of  the  mean 
cannot  be  known.  As  has  rightly  been  remarked,  "  it  is 
impracticable  to  define  the  position  of  that,  which  is  excess- 
ive on  the  one  hand,  and  defective  on  the  other,  till  excess 
and  defect  have  been  themselves  defined."  And  here  it  is 
that  the  Ethics  of  Individual  Life  finds  its  subject  matter. 
The  guidance  of  uncultured  sense,  ordinarily  followed 
throughout  private  conduct,  it  replaces  by  a  guidance  which, 
though  still  mainly  empirical,  is  relatively  trustworthy ; 
since  it  results  from  a  deliberate  and  methodic  study  of  the 
requirements — a  study  which  dissipates  misapprehensions 


558  THE    ETHICS    OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

and  reduces  vague  ideas  to  definite  ones.  In  respect  of 
nutrition,  for  instance,  it  is  doubtless  true  that  abstinence 
on  the  one  hand,  and  gluttony  on  the  other,  are  to  be 
avoided — that  food  is  to  be  taken  in  moderation.  But  it 
may  rightly  be  contended  that  eating  is  not  to  be  guided  by 
observation  of  the  mean  between  these  two  extremes; 
but  is  to  be  guided  by  reaching  that  which  may,  in  a 
sense,  be  called  an  extreme — the  complete  satisfaction  of 
appetite.  And  here  we  are  shown  the  need  for  critical 
inquiry.  For  the  conception  of  a  mean  between  abstinence 
and  gluttony,  is  confounded  with  the  conception  of  a  mean 
between  no  satisfaction  of  appetite  and  complete  satisfac- 
tion of  appetite ;  and  in  consequence  of  the  confusion 
this  last  mean  is  by  some  prescribed.  But  the  notion, 
not  infrequently  expressed,  that  it  is  best  to  leave  off 
eating  while  still  hungry,  would  never  have  been  enun- 
ciated were  there  not  so  many  people  who  lead  abnormal 
lives,  and  so  many  people  who  eat  before  appetite  prompts. 
In  that  state  of  health  which  exists  where  there  has  not 
been,  on  the  part  of  either  self  or  ancestors,  a  chronic  dis- 
regard of  physiological  needs,  proper  nutrition  is  achieved 
not  by  partial  fulfilment  of  the  desire  for  food  but  by 
entire  fulfilment  of  it — by  going  up  to  the  limit  set  by 
inclination. 

Remembrance  of  the  various  conclusions  drawn  in  preced- 
ing chapters,  such  as  those  which  concern  activity  and  rest, 
culture  and  amusement,  will  make  it  clear  that  it  is  every- 
where the  business  of  the  Ethics  of  Individual  Life  thus  to 
dissipate  erroneous  beliefs,  by  systematic  observation  and 
analysis  of  private  conduct  and  its  results. 

§  243.  Remembrance  of  these  conclusions  suggests  that 
beyond  giving  a  definite  conception  of  the  mean,  when  the 
mean  is  to  be  adopted,  the  Ethics  of  Individual  Life  gives 
definiteness  to  a  kindred  idea — the  idea  of  proportion.  I  do 
not  refer  to  that  proportion  which  is  implied  by  the  doctrine 


GENERAL  CONCLUSIONS.  559 

of  the  mean,  and  connotes  a  just  estimation  of  excess  and 
defect;  but  I  mean  that  proportion  which  obtains  among 
different  parts  of  conduct. 

While,  within  each  division  of  the  activities,  the  middle 
place  may  be  duly  regarded,  there  may  be  no  due  regard 
for  proportion  among  the  several  divisions  of  the  activities. 
There  are  various  kinds  of  bodily  action,  some  needed  for 
self-sustentation  and  some  not ;  there  are  various  kinds  of 
mental  action,  aiding  in  different  ways  and  degrees  the  main- 
tenance of  individual  life,  and  various  others  which  do  not  aid 
this  maintenance,  or  do  so  in  but  remote  ways.  And  then, 
beyond  the  preservation  of  a  right  proportion  between  the 
life-subserving  occupations  and  the  occupations  which  do  not 
directly  subserve  life,  there  is  the  preservation  of  right  pro- 
portions among  the  subdivisions  of  these  last — right  pro- 
portions between  culture  and  amusement  and  between  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  culture  and  different  kinds  of  amusements. 
The  conception  of  a  mean  does  not  touch  the  numerous 
problems  thus  presented ;  since  it  implies  a  compromise  be- 
tween two  things,  and  not  a  number  of  compromises  among 
many  things. 

Any  one  on  glancing  round  may  see  that  the  great  majority 
of  lives  are  more  or  less  distorted  by  failure  to  maintain  bal- 
anced amounts  of  the  activities,  bodily  and  mental,  required 
for  complete  health  and  happiness ;  and  that  there  are  here, 
therefore,  many  problems  with  which  the  Ethics  of  Individual 
Life  has  to  concern  itself. 

§  244.  But  while  this  division  of  ethics  which  has  the 
control  of  private  conduct  for  its  function,  may,  by  its 
ordered  judgments,  serve  to  prevent  each  kind  of  activity 
from  diverging  very  far  on  either  side  of  moderation  ;  and 
while  it  may  serve  to  prevent  extreme  disproportions 
among  the  different  kinds  of  activities;  it  cannot  be  ex- 
pected to  produce  by  its  injunctions  a  perfectly-regulated 

conduct. 

37 


560  THE    ETHICS    OF   INDIVIDUAL   LIFE. 

Only  by  the  gradual  re-moulding  of  human  nature  into 
fitness  for  the  social  state,  can  either  the  private  life  or 
the  public  life  of  each  man,  be  made  what  it  should  be. 
In  respect  of  private  life,  especially,  the  problems  pre- 
sented are  so  complex  and  so  variable,  that  nothing  like 
definite  solutions  of  them  can  be  reached  by  any  intel- 
lectual processes,  however  methodic  and  however  careful. 
They  can  be  completely  solved  only  by  the  organic  ad- 
justment of  constitution  to  conditions.  All  inferior  creat- 
ures, incapable  of  elaborating  reasoned  codes  of  conduct, 
are  guided  entirely  by  the  promptings  of  instincts  and 
desires,  severally  adapted  to  the  needs  of  their  lives.  In 
each  species  the  feelings  are  kept  duly  adjusted  in  their 
strengths  to  the  requirements,  and  duly  proportioned  to 
one  another,  by  direct  or  indirect  equilibration,  or  by  both ; 
since,  inevitably,  the  individuals  in  which  the  balance  of 
them  is  not  good,  disappear,  or  fail  to  rear  progeny. 
There  are  many  who,  while  they  recognize  this  necessity 
as  operative  throughout  sub-human  life,  tacitly  deny  that 
it  is  operative  throughout  human  life,  or,  at  any  rate, 
ignore  its  operation ;  and  they  do  this  notwithstanding 
their  knowledge  of  the  immense  divergences  of  habits 
and  sentiments,  which  multiform  human  nature  itself  has 
acquired  under  the  different  circumstances  it  has  been 
subject  to.  Any  one,  however,  who  contemplates  the 
contrast  between  those  who  witness  with  pleasure  the 
tortures  of  men  and  animals,  and  those  who  cannot  be 
induced  to  witness  such  tortures  because  of  the  sympa- 
thetic pain  they  experience,  may  infer  from  this  single 
contrast,  a  capacity  for  modification  which  makes  possible 
an  approximately-complete  adjustment  of  the  nature  to 
the  life  which  has  to  be  led — an  adjustment  towards 
which  there  will  be  appreciable  progress,  when  there 
have  died  out  the  fatuous  legislators  who  are  continually 
impeding  it. 

Eventually,  then,  the  degree  of  each  of  the  activities  con- 


GENEKAL   CONCLUSIONS.  561 

stituting  private  conduct,  and  the  proportions  among  the 
different  activities,  must  be  spontaneously  regulated  by  the 
natural  promptings.  In  the  meantime,  all  which  the  Ethics 
of  Individual  Life  can  do,  is  to  keep  clearly  in  view,  and  con- 
tinually to  emphasize,  the  needs  to  which  the  nature  has  to 
be  adjusted. 

§  245.  Finally,  there  must  be  uttered  a  caution  against 
striving  too  strenuously  to  reach  the  Ideal — against  straining 
the  nature  too  much  out  of  its  inherited  form.  For  the  nor- 
mal re-moulding  can  go  on  but  slowly. 

As  there  must  be  moderation  in  other  things,  so  there  must 
be  moderation  in  self-criticism.  Perpetual  contemplation 
of  our  own  actions  produces  a  morbid  consciousness,  quite 
unlike  that  normal  consciousness  accompanying  right  actions 
spontaneously  done ;  and  from  a  state  of  unstable  equilib- 
rium long  maintained  by  effort,  there  is  apt  to  be  a  fall 
towards  stable  equilibrium,  in  which  the  primitive  nature 
re-asserts  itself.  .Retrogression  rather  than  progression  may 
hence  result. 


END   OF   VOL.    I. 


REFERENCES. 


To  find  the  authority  for  any  statement  in  the  text,  the  reader  is  to 
proceed  as  follows : — Observing  the  number  of  the  section  in  which  the 
statement  occurs,  he  will  first  look  out,  in  the  following  pages,  the  cor- 
responding number,  which  is  printed  in  conspicuous  type.  Among  the 
references  succeeding  this  number,  he  will  then  look  for  the  name  of  the 
person,  tribe,  people,  or  nation  concerning  which  the  statement  is  made 
(the  names  in  the  references  standing  in  the  same  order  as  that  which 
they  have  in  the  text) ;  and  that  it  may  more  readily  catch  the  eye,  each 
such  name  is  printed  in  Italics.  In  the  parentheses  following  the  name, 
will  be  found  the  volume  and  page  of  the  work  referred  to,  preceded  by 
the  first  three  or  four  letters  of  the  author's  name ;  and  when  more  than 
one  of  his  works  has  been  used,  the  first  three  or  four  letters  of  the  title  of 
the  one  containing  the  particular  statement.  The  meanings  of  these  ab- 
breviations, employed  to  save  the  space  that  would  be  occupied  by  fre- 
quent repetitions  of  full  titles,  is  shown  at  the  end  of  the  references ; 
where  will  be-  found  arranged  in  alphabetical  order,  these  initial  syllables 
of  authors'  names,  &e.,  and  opposite  to  them  the  full  titles  of  the  works 
referred  to. 


REFERENCES   TO  VOL.  I. 

§  1 3.  Aristotle  (Arist.  Nicom.  Ethics,  I,  7 ;  Ib.  I,  8,  Gillies'  translation). 
§  14.  Hulcheson  (Hutch,   eh.  IV).  §  14.*  Blessed  (Matthew,  v,  7,  9 ; 

Psalms,  xli,  1).  §  1 8.  Dymond  (Dym.  pref .  ix  ;  ch.  II).  §  52.  Bodo 
and  Dhimals  (J.  A.  S.  B.  xviii,  741).  §  60.  Plato  (Pla.  Rep.,  Davies  and 
Vaughan's  trans,  xxix) — Aristotle  (Arist.  Nic.  Eth.  I,  8;  Ib.  X,  7)— Jews 
(Psalms,  xvii,  2) — Early  Christians  (Colossians,  iv,  1)— -Aristotle  (Arist.  Nic. 
Eth.  V,  1).  §  74.  "Love  thy  neighbour"1  (Leviticus,  xix,  18).  §  89. 
Kant  (Kant,  64-5).  §  106.  Socrates  (Xen.  Mem.  Ill,  9)— Plato  (Grote, 
Plato,  i,  420,  479)— Aristotle  (Arist.  Nic.  Eth.  Ill,  4,  Williams'  trans.)—  Stoics 
(Zeller,  The  Stoics,  Epicureans,  and  Sceptics,  translated  by  Reichel,  pp.  253-4) 
—Epicurus  (Zeller,  456)— Kant  (Kant,  54-5).  §  1 12.  Veddahs  (Bailey  ia 

(563) 


564:  REFERENCES. 

T.  E.  S.  L.  N.a  ii,  802)— Zulus  (Call,  pt.  ii,  146-7)— Australians  (Smyth,  i,  107) 

—  Tongans  (Mar.  ii,  100)—  Gold  Coast  (Ellis,  T-S.P.  11)— Anc.  Mexicans  (Zur. 
138-141) — Hebrews  (Schenk.  v,  431;  Bruch,  368;  Fritz,  v,  xxxiv) — Riff -Veda 
(R.  V.  i,  33,  4,  5;  vi,  14,  3;  x,  81,  7;  iv,  17,  16)— Ramcses  (R.  P.  ii,  70)— 
Chryses  (Horn.  "Iliad,"  Lang,  bk.  i,  2)— Med.  Europe  (Brace,  230).         §  1 13. 
Assyrians  (R.  P.  N.B.  iv,  56;  R.  P.  v,  8;  xi,  49;  ix,  42) — Egyptians  (R.  P.  ii, 
70-72).         §  1 14.  Karens  (Mason  in  J.  A.  S.  B.,  xxxvii,  Pt.  ii,  143)— Dakota* 
(Scho.  iv,  70) — Iroquois  (Morg.  119) — Anc.  Indians  (Maha.  xiii,  3880;  Bha- 
ravi,  in  VVil.  459;  Cural,  in  Con.  220) — Chinese  (Alex.  117,  254-5) — Egyptians 
(Renouf,  72).          §  115.  Bp.  of  Durham  (Herald  of  Peace,  Dec.  1890)— L. 
Cranbrook  (Standard,  July  12,  1889) — Dr.  MoorJwuse  (Manchester  Examiner, 
May  14,  1887)—  German  Emperor  (Daily  Papers,  June  18,  1888).          §  1 16. 
Malagasy  (Drury,  192)— Hebrews  (Bruch,  311) — Egyptians  (Poole  in  Cont.  Rev. 
Aug.    1881,   p.    286)— Mill  (Mill,   124).          §  117.    Otaheitans   (Hawke.   ii, 
101-2)— Anc.  Indians  (Maha.  iii,  1124,  etc.) — Ramayana  (Rich.  149) — Chinese 
(Edkins,  85,  179).          §  120.  Arabs  (Palg.  10-11)— Russians  (Nicmo.  ii,  167) 
— Matelhapees  (Licht.  ii,  306) — Arabs  (Baker,  263)— Makololo  (Liv.  Zamb.  285) 
— Eq.  Africans  (Reade,  260) — Araucanians  (Smith,  214) — Chinooks  (Lewis  & 
C.  439)— -Chukchi  (Erm.  ii,  530,  note)—Mahabharata  (Wheel,  i,  121)— French 
(Leber,  xiii,  10-11) — Patagonians  (Falk.  125) — Dakotas  (Irving,  134) — Esqui- 
maux (Crantz,  i,  154) — Coffers  (Thomp.  ii,  354)— Mayorunas  (Reade,  158) — 
Bambarans  (Cailli6,  i,  398)—  Wa-kavirondo  (Thorn.  487)— Arabs  (Peth.  151)— 
Khonds  (Macpherson  in  Perc.  345) — Tahitians  (Cooke  in  Hawke.  ii,  203) — 

Vateans  (Turn.  "P.  R."  460)— J^MM  (Wilkes,  iii,  100).  §  121.  Innuita 
(Hall,  ii,  315) — Ancient  Peruvians  (Garci.  bk.  ii,  ch.  12).  •§  126.  Bush- 

men  (Liv.  "Miss.  Trav."  159)—  Uganda  (Wils.  &  Fel.  i,  224)—  Bedouins  (Burt. 
"  Pilg."  iii,  66-7)— Kukis  (Rown.  187)— Pathans  (Temp.  "  Rep."  63).  §  1 27. 
Ancient  Indians  (R.  V.  i,  74;  vii,  6,  2;  vii,  32,  7;  Maha.  xii,  52-90;  v.  5617) 
—Assyrians  (R.  P.  i,  49,  78;  v,  9;  Ib.  N.S.  ii,  137,  143,  153;  iv,  61)— Suevi 
(Caesar,  iv,  2;  vi,  21)— -Mottoes  (Various  Peerages) — Wolseley  (Wolse.  5). 
§  128.  Ancient  Indians  (Maha.  xiii,  5571,  in  Wil.  448;  Jones,  Works,  iii, 
242)— Persians  (Sadi,  i,  st.  33  ;  ii,  st.  4) — Chinese  (Lao-Tsze,  xxxi ;  €onf.  Anal, 
xii,  19 ;  Mencius,  bk.  i,  pt.  i,  ch.  6 ;  Ib.  iv,  i,  14) — Sumatra™  (Mars.  173) — 
Thdrus  (Nesfield  in  Cole.  Rev.  1885,  Ixxx,  41)— Iroquois  (Morg  92,  330). 
§  129.  Fijians  (Ersk.  247;  Will,  i,  218,  246-7)—  Waganda  (Wils.  &  Fel.  i, 
201)—  Charlemagne  (Hallam,  16).  §  131.  Comanches  (Moll,  i,  185)— 

Patagonians  (Snow,  ii,  233) — E.  Africans  (Liv.  "  Miss.  Trav."  526) — Kalmucks 
(Pallas,  i,  105)—  Kirghis  (Atkin.  "Amoor,"  206;  Ib.  Sib.  506)— Merv  Turco- 
mans (O'Don.  ii,  407,  278)— Pathans  (Temp.  "Rep."  62)— Afridi  (Rown. 
123-4)— Kukis  (Dalt.  45)— -Mongols  (Gil.  273)— Angamis  (Stewart,  in  J.  A.  S.B. 
xxiv,  652)—  Chinooks  (Waitz,  iii,  337)—  Waganda  (Wils.  &  Fel.  i,  224)— 
Fijians  (Will,  i,  127).  §  132.  Vishnu  (R.  V.  5,  61,  ^—Tvashtri  & 

Indra  (Muir,  0.  S.  T.  v,  229 ;  Wheel,  i,  244) — Norse  (Dasent,  xxxiv)— Prim. 
Germans  (Csosar,  vi,  21)— French  (Ste.  Pal.  Ii,  47)—  TJnrty  Years'  War  (Gind. 
ii,  393-7).  §  133.  Wood-  Veddahs  (Hartshorne  in  Fort.  Rev.  Mar.  1876,  p 
416) — Esquimaux  (King  in  J.  E.  S.  1848,  i,  131) — Fueqians  (Darwin  in  Fitz. 
iii,  242 ;  Snow,  i,  328)— New  Guinea  (Macgil.  i,  270 ;  Earl,  80)— Lette  (Kolff, 
61)—  Vera  Cruz  Indians  (Baker  in  P.  R.  G.  S.  Sept.  1887,  p.  571)—  Thdrus 
(Nesfield  in  Calc.  Rev.  Ixxx,  1,  41)— Iroquois  (Morg,  833).  §  135.  Aus- 
tralians (Grey,  ii,  240) — Sioux  (Burt.  C.  S.  125) — Guiana  (Schom.  i,  158) — 
Fijians  (Will,  i,  186) — New  Zcalanders  (Thorns,  ii,  86) — Kukis  (Macrae  in  As. 
Res.  vii,  189) — Arabs  (Peth.  27) — E.  Africans  (Burt.  C.  A.  ii,  329) — Japanese 
(Dening,  pt.  ii,  81)— Anc.  Indians  (R.  V.  x,  87;  vii,  104;  Wheel,  i.  287-8, 
290).  §  136.  Anc.  Indians  (Manu,  ii,  161  ;  vi,  47-8,  in  Wil.  283 ;  Cural, 

in  Con.  427) — Persians  (Con.  226 ;  Sadi,  ii,  st.  41 ;  Hafiz,  in  Jones,  iii,  244) 

—  Chinese  (Lao-Tsze,  Ixiii;    Mencius,  bk.  v,  pt.  i,  ch.  iii;    Conf.  Anal,  xiv, 


REFERENCES.  565 

36).  §  137.  Lepchas  (Campbell  in  J.  E.  S.  L.  July,  1869,  pp.  150-1). 
§  139.  Philip.  Islands  (Fore.  213)—  Quianganes  (P.  S.  M.  July,  1891,  p.  390) 
—Arabs  (Burck.  84-5).  §  140.  Guiana  (Im  Thurn,  213-4).  §  141. 
Anc.  Indians  (  Wheel,  i,  102,  103  note) — Todas  (Shortt  in  T.  E.  S.  L.  N.S.  vii° 
241)— Bodo  &  D/iimdls  (J.  A.  S.  B.  xviii,  pt.  ii,  744)— Hos  (Hayes  in  Dalt.  194) 
— Pueblos  (Ban.  i,  555,  547) — Manama*  (Holub,  ii,  206-11) — Thdrux  (Nereid 
in  Calc.  Rev.  Ixxx,  41)— Let-Mas  (Fytche,  i,  343).  §  144.  Arabs  (Palg.  i, 
87) — Kirghiz  (Atkin.  Sib.  506)— E.  Africans  (Burt.  C.  A.  ii,  274) — Fijians 
(Wilkes,  iii,  77;  Jackson,  in  Ersk.  460) — Ainos  (Bird,  ii,  101) — Australians 
(T.  E.  S.  L.  N.S.  iii,  246) — Samoans  (Jackson,  in  Ersk.  415)—  Kaffirs  (Licht.  i, 
272) — Africans  (Wint.  i,  213) — N.  American  Indians  (Morg.  327) — New  Zca- 
landers  (Angas,  ii,  22 ;  Thorns,  i,  191,  98) — St.  Augustine  Island  (Turn.  Samoa, 
292-3).  §  145.  Bushmen  (Burch.  ii,  54)—  Hottentots  (Burch.  ii,  349;  Kol- 
ben,  i,  165)— East  Africans  (Liv.  "Miss.  Trav."  601) — Loango  (Proyart  in 
Pink,  xvi,  565) — Australians  (T.  E.  S.  L.  N.S.  iii,  271) — Sand.  Islanders  (Van. 
iii,  21)—  Guiana  (Brett,  276)—  Tldbet  (Bogle,  110).  §  146.  Australians 
(Eyre,  i,  278;  Sturt,  i,  114;  ii,  105) — Tasmanians  (Mered.  i,  201) — Tongam 
(Mar.  i,  228).  §  147.  Anc.  Indians  (R.  V.  x,  107,  2,  5,  &c. ;  Manu,  iii, 

105,  106;  iv,  29;  iii,  98)— Apastamba  (Biihler,  114,  119)— Persians  (Shayast, 
xii,  4,  in  West,  341 ;  Sadi,  viii,  60;  Ib.  viii,  2) — Chinese  (Conf.  Anal,  vi,  28  ; 
viii,  11;  x,  15).  §  148.  Early  Germans  (Tac.  Germ,  xxi) — Christians 

(Lecky,  ii,  93;  Browne,  pt.  ii,  §  2).  §  149.  New  Zealanders  (Angas,  i, 
312;  Cook  in  Hawke.  iii,  447;  Thorns.  5,  149)— East  Africans  (Burt.  C.  A.  ii, 
333)— Fijians  (Will,  i,  55,  133)— Dacotas  (Burt.  C.  S.  124-5)— Nagas  (Butler, 
58)— Steins  (Colq.  Shans,  160)—  Chryse  (Colq.  Chryse,  ii,  120,  268)— Malayan 
Tribes  (Favre,  97-100,  8,  73,  72,  100-2)— Arafuras  (Kolff,  161-3).  §  150. 
Bushmen  (Moffat,  58 ;  Licht.  ii,  195  ;  Moffat,  156) — Hottentots  (Kolben,  i,  332, 
165,  142,  318)— Dyaks  (Boyle,  223.)  §  151.  Karens  (Mason  in  J.  A.  S.  B. 
xxxvii,  pt.  ii,  144) — Honduras  (Herr.  iv,  141) — Loando  (Monte,  i,  244) — Daho- 
mans  (Burt.  "Miss."  i,  195,  note ;  Ib.  ii,  190,  note)—Ashantees  (Burt.  W.  &  W. 
121,  128)— Damaras  (Baines,  243;  Gait.  190)— Dahomano  (Burt.  "Miss."  i, 
845) — Afarutse  (Holub,  ii,  297) —  West  Africans  (Wolseley  in  Fort.  Rev.  Dec. 
1888) — Prairie  Indians  (Burt.  C.  S.  124-5) — Comanches  (Bollaert  in  J.  E.  S. 
1850,  ii,  269).  §  152.  Greeks  (Grote,  ii,  32).  §  153.  Veddahs  (Tenn. 
ii,  445)—  Tannese  (Turn.  "  P.  R."  92)— Papuans  (Jukes,  ii,  248)— Dyaks  (Boyle, 
215) — Malagasy  (Drury,  230) — Esquimaux  (Hall,  ii,  312) — Iroquois  (Morg.  171) 
—  ChippeiKas  (Scho.  ii,  139)— Araucanians  (Thomps.  i,  416,  40S) — Mandingos 
(Park  in  Pink,  xvi,  871)— Luan  (Kolff,  127).  §  154.  Anc.  Indians  (Maha. 
iii,  16782,  16796,  16619,  &c.)— Zend-Avesta  (Haug,  242)—  Persians  (Sadi,  i,  st. 
\0\-Egyptians  (Dunck.  i,  203;  Poole  in  Cont.  Rev.  Aug.  1881,  p.  287)— 
Chinese  (Legge,  R.  of  Ch.  224 ;  Conf.  D.  of  Mean,  ch.  xx ;  Mencius,  bk.  ii, 
pt.  i,  ch.  6;  bk.  i,  pt.  i,  ch.  7).  §  155.  Karens  (Mason  in  J.  A.  S.  B. 
xxxvii,  pt.  ii,  152)— Afridis  (MacGreg.  i,  27)— Fijians  (Will,  i,  128-9)—  Ved- 
dahs (Tenn.  ii,  444;  Prid.  460).  §  157.  Dakotas  (Burt.  C.  S.  130)— 
Mishmis  (Grif.  40)— Kirghiz  (Vali.  279)— Fijians  (Will,  i,  124)—  Uganda 
(Wils.  &  Fel.  i,  224)—  Cent.  Americans  (Laet,  bk.  ix,  ch.  2;  Dun.  336)— Philip. 
Islands  (Fore,  186-7).  §  158.  Greeks  (Mahaf.  27,  IftO)— Merovingian 
Period  (Mart,  ii,  709 ;  Salv.  iv,  c.  U)— Early  Feudal  Period  (Mart,  ii,  709)— 
French  Monarchy  (Crowe,  ii,  201) — Lecky  (Lecky,  i,  138).  §  159.  Kois 
(Morris,  89) — Sowrahs  (Shortt,  pt.  iii,  38) — Cent.  Indians  (Fors.  164) — Ramos-is 
(Sinclair  in  I.  A.  July,  1874,  186)— Sonthdls  (Sherwill  in  J.  A.  S.  B.  xx,  654  ; 
Man,  21)— Puluyan  (Oppert  in  M.  J.  L.  S.  1887-8,  p.  104) — Wood -Veddahs 
(Bailey  in  T.  E.  S.  L.  N.S.  ii,  291)—  Ostiafcs,  &c.  (Rev.  Sib.  ii,  ISO)— Hot- 
tentots (Barrow,  5,  101 ;  Kolben,  i,  59) — Iroquois  (Morg.  335) — Patagonians 
(Snow,  ii,  233) — Khonds  (Macpherson  in  J.  R.  A.  S.  vii,  196)— Kolis  (Sinclair, 
in  I.  A.  July,  1874,  p.  188)— KJionds  (Macph.  Report,  27).  §  160. 


566  REFERENCES. 

Mexicans  (Tern,  v,  102) — E.  Africans  (Liv.  Zatnb.  809;  J — Egyptians 

(St.  John,  77) — France  (Mich,  i,  341) — English  (Kirkus  in  Fort.  Rev.  Nov. 
1866,  p.  644).  §  162.  Araucanians  (Smith,  201) — Arawaks  (Hillhouse  in 

J.  R.  G.  S.  ii,  229)— Dakotas  (Burt.  C.  S.  131)— E.Africans  (Burt,  C.  A.  ii,  333) 
— Bedouins  (Burck.  201,  56)—Chippewayan8(£Lear.  345) — Kamtschadales  (Kotze. 
ii,  16)— Dakotas  (Burt.  C.  S.  131)— Fijians,  Will,  i,  177)— Hottentots  (Kolben, 
i,  123) — Zulus  (Thomp.  ii,  418) — Karens  (Mason  in  J.  A.  S.  B.  xxxvii,  pt.  ii,  144) 
—  Esquimaux  (Hall,  ii,  314).  §  163.  Assyrians  (Smith,  14) — Hindus  (Mvil- 
lor,  H.  L.  833-4)—  Chinese  (Conf.  Anal,  i,  2  ;  Edkins,  165 ;  Legge,  R.  of  Ch.  104) 
—Egypt  (Poole  in  Cont.  Rev.  Aug.  1881,  p.  286).  §  164.  Khonds  (Rown. 
Wl)-£hils  (Hunter  in  J.  R.  A.  S.  viii,  189;  Mai.  C.  I.  ii,  ]  80— Kalmuck*  (Pal- 
las, i,  106) — Sgaus  (Mason  in  J.  A.  S.  B.  xxxv,  pt.  ii,  12)—  Chinese  (Conf.  Anal. 
I,  7;  X,  4) — Persians  (Sadi,  i,  st.  28,  31 ;  Ib.  I,  25) — Anc.  Indians  (Manu,  vii, 
8)— Egyptians  (R.  P.  u.s.  iii,  21 ;  Dunck.  i,  184) — Mottoes  (Burke's  &  Debrett's 
Peerages).  §  165.  Mexicans  (Herr.  iii,  203;  Tern,  ii,  195;  Herr.  iv,  126) 

—Fijians  (Ersk.  208,456 ;  Will,  i,  30)— Dahomans  (Ellis,  E.-S.  P.  162-3  ;  Dalzel, 
69 ;  Ellis,  /.  c.}—  Frederick  II  (Gould,  ii,  302)— France  (  ).  §  1 68. 

Chippewas  (Scho.  v,  150)— Snakes  (Lewis,  308) — Dakotas  (Burt.  C.  S.  126)-^ 
Iroquois  (Morg.  329) — Esquimaux  (Crantz,  i,  154) — Chippcwayans  (Hear.  90) — 
Guiana  Tribes  (Brett.  27) — Araucanians  (Smith,  214) — Chippewat/ans  (Frank. 
Journey,  161)—  Creeks  (Scho.  v,  272)—  Tupis  (Sou.  i,  250]—Patagonians  (Falk. 
125) — Hottentots  (Kolben,  i,  159) — Bechuanas  (Burch.  ii,  564) — Kaffirs  (Shoo. 
79)— Ashanti  (Beech.  129)— Fernando  Po  (J.  E.  S.  1850,  ii,  114)— Lower  Niger 
(Allen  &  T.  i,  396) — Chinooks  (Ross,  Oregon,  92) — Damaras  (And.  Ngaini,  231) 
—Congo  (Tuck.  120)— DaJiome  (Burt.  "Miss."  ii,  248)— Mishmees  (Coop.  207)— 
Bushmen  (Spar,  i,  198) — Arabs  (Niebuhr,  in  Pink,  x,  131) — E.  Africans  (Liv. 
Zamb.  67) — Abyssinia  (Bruce,  iv,  474) — Canaris  (Cieza,  ch.  44).  §  1 69. 

Khonds  (Camp.  50) — Javans  (Raf.  i,  246) — Caribs  (Schom.  ii,  427-8) — S.  E.  India 
(Lew.  90-1)— Santals  (Sherwill  in  J.  A.  S.  B.  xx,  554).  §  1 70.  Manu  (Manu 
iv,  238,  in  Wil.  285)— Book  of  the  Dead  (Bunsen,  v,  254-5)— Persians  (Alb.  21  ; 
Fram.  48).  §  171.  Greeks  (Arist.  Pol.  bk.  iii,  ch.  5).  §  172.  Manan- 
sas  (Holub,  ii,  21 1).  §  1 73.  Confucius  (Anal.  I.  14 ;  VIII.  21).  §  1 74. 
Australians  (Grey,  ii,  277-8;  Christison  in  J.  A.  I.  vii,  148) — Esquimaux  (Lyon, 
181-2)—  Yakuts,  etc.  (Coch.  i,  254;  Wrang.  384;  Erm.  ii,  361).  §  175.  Ta- 
hitians  (Cook  in  Hawke.  ii,  202) — Arabs  (Palg.  i,  10) — Ancients  (Manu,  ii,  57 ; 
Muir,  0.  S.  T.  v.  324)—  Egyptians  (Dunck.  i,  225).  §  176.  Arafuras 

(Kolff,  161)— Ancient  Indians  and  Greeks  (Muller,  R.  V.  i,  118;  Muir,  0.  S.  T. 
v,  260)—  Dahomans  (Burt.  "Miss."  ii,  250) — Ainos  (Bird,  ii,  96,  102)— Polyne- 
sians (Will,  i,  141-5)— Ainos  (Bird,  ii,  68).  §  1 77.  Kalmucks  (Pallas,  i,  131) 
— Khonds  (Camp.  164) — Guiana  (Brett,  349) — Guatemalans  (Haef.  406)— Peru- 
vians (Garci.  bk.  vi,  ch.  22) — Yucatanese  (Landa,  §§  xxii,  xxxii) — Mexicans  (Saha. 
bk.  i,  ch.  22)—  Veddahs  (Bailey  in  T.  E.  S.  L.  N.S.  ii,  291)— Lepchas  (Campbell 
in  J.  E.  S.  L.  July,  1869,  p.  147) — Sumatrans  (Mars.  173) — Foolas,  etc.  (Wint. 
i,  72) — Negroes  (Waitz,  ii,  86).  §  178-  Gauls  (Diod.  v,  2) — Prim.  Germans 
(Tac.  xxii) — Eonius  (Greg,  v,  41) — Charlemagne  (Egin.  ch.  24) — French  (Mont. 
ii,  14) — English  (Massey,  ii,  60).  §  179.  Asiatics  (Balf.  i,  164) — Bedouins 
(Burt.  Pilg.  iii,  93).  §  180.  Kasias  (Yule  in  J.  A.  S.  B.  xiii,  620}—  Cyrus 
(Plut.  Symp.  lib.  I.  qu.  iv).  §  181.  Thibet  (Wilson,  235).  §  182. 
Early  Indians  (Wheel,  i,  131-6,  142 ;  Maha.  v,  14667,  &c.)—Ladakhis  (Drew, 
287,  239,  240,  250)— Ancient  Indians  (Muir,  0.  S.  T.  iv,  41 ;  v,  324 ;  Maha.  i, 
4719-22,  in  Muir,  0.  S.  T.  ii,  336).  §  183.  Chinooks  (Lewis,  439 ;  Ross,  92) 
— Sioux  (Lewis,  77) — Creeks  (Scho.  v,  272) — Tupis  (Sou.i.  241) — Caribs  (Waitz, 
iii,  382) — Esquimaux  (Lubb.  556) — Chippewayans  (Hear.  129) — Dakotas  (Burt. 
C.  S.  142) — Nicaragua  (Pala.  120;  Herr.  iii,  340-1)— Kamtschadales,  &c.  (Ploss, 
i,  293)— Kalmucks  (Pallas,  i,  105)— Kirghizes  (Vali.  85)— Mongols  (Prjev.  i,  70) 
—Karens  (Mason  in  J.  A.  S.  B.  xxxv,  pt.  ii,  19)—  Todas  (Shortt  in  T.  E.  S.  L. 


TITLES   OF   WORKS.  5G7 

vii,  240) — SJwa  (Harris,  Hi,  167) — Upper  Congo  (Tuck.  181) — Bushmen  (Licht. 
ii,  48-9) — Ladrone  hi.  (Frey.  ii,  369)—Pelew  M.  (Kubary,  60-1) — Mandans  (Cat. 
i,  121) — Chippewas  (Keat.  ii,  166) — Kaffirs  (Barrow,  i,  160) — Tongans  (Mar.  ii, 
161) — Sumatrans  (Mars.  222) — Borneo  (Low,  300) — Dory  (Kops  in  Earl,  81)— 
Loyalty  hi.  (Ersk.  341) — Fuegians  (Snow  in  T.E.  S.  L.  i,  262)— Mwheras  (Calc. 
Rev.  April,  1888,  p.  222)— £o<fo  &  Dhimdls  (Hodgson  in  J.  A.  S.  B.  xviii,  719) 
—Santals  (Dalt.  217)—  Veddahs  (Virchow  in  A.  k.  A.  W.  1881,  21)— Austra- 
lians (Tap.  IS)— Fijian*  (Ersk.  255  ;  See.  191-2)—  Tahitians  (Cook  in  Hawke.  ii, 
196,  188).  §  184.  Wotyaks  (Buch,  45)—  Chibchas  (Simon,  254)— Japanese 
(Dixon,  472-3).  §  186.  Tahitians  (Cook  in  Hawke.  ii,  186)— Dahomans 
(Burt.  "Miss."  i,  83)— E.  Africans  (Burt.  C.  A.  ii,  332).  §  187  Ku-ka-iha 
(Tap.  101,  94,  95,  93).  §  1QQ.  Pathdns  (Oliv.  139-40)— Fijians  (Ersk. 
461-4)— Australians  (Grey,  ii,  239)—  Fijians  (Ersk.  228)— Bilochs  (Oliv.  29)— 
Blantyrc  (MacDon.  i,  185)—  Wotyaks  (Buch,  46).  §  191.  Biloclis  (Oliv.  24) 
— Ainos  (Bird,  ii,  103)— LeLhtas  (Fytche,  i,  343).  §  1 92  Wolseley  ( Wolse. 
5  ;  Debrett).  §  239.  Uganda  (Wils.  and  Fel.  i,  186-7)— Fijian*  (See.  190) 
—Motu-Motu  (Chalm.  162-3).  §  242.  Mean  (I.  G.  Smith,  57). 


TITLES  OF  WORKS. 

A.  k.  A.W. — Abhandlungen  der  Koniglichen  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften.  Berlin. 

Alb.— Albitis  (F.)  The  Morality  of  all  Nations.     1850. 

Alex. — Alexander  (G.  G.)  Confucius,  the  Great  Teacher.     1890. 

Allen.— Allen  (Wm.)  and  Thomson  (T.  R.  H.)  A  Narrative  of  the  Expedition  to 

the  River  Niger  in  1841.     2  vols.     1848. 
And. — Andersson  (C.  J.)  Lake  Ngami.     1856. 

Angas. — Angas(G.F.)  Savage  Life  and  Scenes  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  1847. 
Arist. — Aristotle's  Politics. 

„  „          Nicomachean  Ethics. 

As.  Res. — Asiatic  Researches. 

Atkin. — Atkinson  (T.  W.)  Oriental  and  Western  Siberia.     1858. 
Atkin. — Atkinson  (T.  W.)    Travels  in  the  Regions  of  the   Upper  and  Lower 

Amoor,  etc.     1860. 

Baines. — Baines  (T.)  Explorations  in  South-West  Africa.     1864. 
Baker.— Baker  (Sir  S.)  The  Nile  Tributaries  of  Abyssinia.     1867. 
Balf .— Balfour  (E.)  Cyclopcedia  of  India.     3rd  Ed.     3  vols.     1875. 
Ban. — Bancroft  (H.  H.)  Native  Races  of  the  Pacific  States  of  North  America. 

5  vols.     1875. 

Barrow. — Barrow  (Sir  J.)  Travels  into  the  Interior  of  Southern  Africa. 
Beech. — Beecham  (J.)  Ashantee  and  the  Gold  Coast.     1841. 
Bird. — Bird  (Isabella)  Unbeaten  Tracks  in  Japan.     2  vols.     1880. 
Bogle. — Bogle,  Narratives  of  the  Mission  of  George  Bogle  to  Thibet,  &c.    Ed. 

C.  R.  Markham.     1876. 

Boyle. — Boyle  (F.)  Adventures  among  the  Dyaks  of  Borneo.     1865. 
Brace.— Brace  (C.  L.)  Gesta  Christi.     2nd  Ed.     1886. 
Brett. — Brett  (Rev.  W.  H.)  The  Indian  Tribes  of  Guiana.     1868. 
Browne. — Browne  (Sir  T.)  Religio  Medici.     1656. 
Bruce. — Bruce  (J.)  Travels  to  discover  the  Source  of  the  Nile.     1804. 
Bruch. — Bruch  (J.  Fr.)  Weisheitslehre  der  ffebraer.     Strassburg,  1851. 
Buch.— Buch  (M.)  Die  Wotjaken.     Helsingfors,  1882. 
Buhler. — Buhler  (G.)  The  Sacred  Laws  of  the  Aryas.     Oxf. 
Bunsen. — Bunsen  (Baron  C.  C.  J.)  Egypt's  Place  in  Universal  History.    Trans. 

by  C.  H.  Cottrell.     5  vols.     1848-67. 
Burch. — Burchell  (W.  J.)  Travels  in  the  Interior  of  Southern  Africa.     2  vols. 

1822-4.     4to. 
Burck.— Burckhardt  (J.  L.)  Notes  on  the  Bedouins  and  Wahdbys.     1829.     4to. 


568  TITLES   OF   WORKS. 

Burt.— Burton  (R.  F.)  The  City  of  the  Saints,  <tc.     1861. 

Burt. — Burton  (R.  F.)  The  Lake  Regions  of  Central  Africa.     2  vols.     1860. 

Burt. — Burton  (R.  F.)  A  Mission  to  Gelele,  King  of  Dahorne.     1864. 

Burt. — Burton  (R.  F.)  Personal  Narrative  of  a  Pilgrimage  to  El-Medinah  and 

Meccah.     3  vols.     1855,  etc. 

Burt. — Burton  (R.  F.)  Wit  and  Wisdom  from  West  Africa.     1865. 
Butler. — Butler  (Maj.  J.)  Travels  and  Adventures  in  (lie  Province  of  Assam.    1 855. 
Caesar. — Caesar  (C.  Jul.)  Commentarii  de  Bctto  Oallico. 

Cailli6. — Cailli6  (R6n6)  Travels  through  Central  Africa  to  Timbuctoo.     2  vols. 
Calc.  Rev.— The  Calcutta  Review. 
Call. — Callaway  (Rev.  H.)  The  Religious  System  of  the  Amazulu.      3  Parts. 

Natal,  1869. 
Camp. — Campbell  (Maj.-Gen.  J.)  A  Personal  Narrative  of  Thirteen  years'  Service 

amongst  the  Wild  Tribes  of  Khondistan.     1864. 
Cat. — Catlin  (G.)  Letters  and  Notes  on  the  Manners,  Customs,  and  Condition  of 

the  North  American  Indians.     2  vols.     1841. 
Chalm. — Chalmers  (J.)  Pioneering  in  New  Guinea.     1887. 
Cieza.— Cieza  de  Leon  (P.  de)  Travels,  A.D.  1532-50.     Trans,  by  C.  R.  Mark- 
ham.     1864. 
Coch.— Cochrane  (J.  D.)  A  Narrative  of  a  Pedestrian  Journey  through  Russia 

and  Siberian  Tartary.     4th  Ed.     2  vols.     1825. 
Colq.— Colquhoun  (A.  R.)  Across  Chryse.     2  vols.     1883. 
Colq. — Colquhoun  (A.  R.)  Among  the  Shans. 
Con. — Conway  (M.  D.)  The  Sacred  Anthology.     1874. 
Con. — Confucius,  The  Analects  and  The  Doctrine  of  the  Mean.     (In  Legge's 

Chinese  Classics.     Vol.  I.) 
Cont.  Rev. — The  Contemporary  Review. 
Coop.— Cooper  (T.  T.)  Tlie  Mishmee  Hills.     1873. 

Crantz. — Crantz  (D.)  History  of  Greenland.     Translated.     2  vols.     1820. 
Crowe.— Crowe  (E.  E.)  The  History  of  France.     5  vols.     1858-68. 
Dalt. — Dalton  (E.  T.)  Descriptive  Ethnology  of  Bengal.     Calc.  1872. 
Dalzel. — Dalzel  (A.)  The  History  of  Dahomey.     1793.     4to. 
Dasent.— Dasent  (Sir  G.  W.)  The  Story  of  Burnt  Njal.     2  vols.     1861. 
Dening. — Dening  (W.)  The  Life  of  Miyamoto  Musa^hi.     2  Pta.     1887. 
Diod. — Diodorus  Siculus,  The  Historical  Library  of,  made  English  by  G.  Booth. 

2  vols.     1814. 

Dixon. — Dixon  (W.  G.)  TJie  Land  of  the  Morning.     Edin.  1882. 
Drew. — Drew  (F.)  The  Jummoo  and  Kashmir  Territories.     1875. 
Drury. — Drury  (R.)  Madagascar.     1729. 
Dunck. — Duncker  (Max)  The  History  of  Antiquity.     Trans,  by  E.  Abbott     6 

vols.     1879,  etc. 

Dun. — Dunlop  (R.  G.)  Travels  in  Central  America.     1847.    4to. 
Dym. — Dymond  (J.)  Essays  on  the  Principles  of  Morality.     7th  Edit. 
Earl. — Earl  (G.  W.)  Native  Races  of  the  Indian  Archipelago:  Papuans.     1858. 
Edkins. — Edkins  (J.)  The  Religious  Condition  of  the  Chinese.     1859. 
Egin. — Eginhardus,  Life  of  the  Emperor  Karl  the  Great.    Trans,  by  W.  Glais- 

ter.     1877. 
Ellis.— Ellis  (A.  B.)  The  EAe- Speaking  Peoples  of  the  Slave  Coast  of  West  Africa. 

1890. 
Ellis.— Ellis  (A.  B.)  The  Tshi- Speaking  Peoples  of  the  Gold  Coast  of  West  Africa. 

1887. 

Erm. — Erman  (G.  A.)  Travels  in  Siberia.     Trans,  by  Cooley.     2  vols.     1845. 
Ersk. — Erskine  (J.  E.)  Journal  of  a  Cruise  among  the  Islands  of  the  Western 

Pacific.     1853. 
Eyre. — Eyre  (E.  J.)  Journal  of  Expeditions  of  Discovery  into  Central  Australia. 

2  vols.     1845. 


TITLES   OF   WORKS.  569 

Falk. — Falkner  (T.)  A  Description  of  Patagonia.     Hereford,  1774. 

Favre. — Favre  (Abbe)  An  Account  of  the  Wild  Tribes  inhabiting  the  Malayan 

Peninsula.     Paris,  1865. 
Fitz. — Fitzroy  (Adm.  R.)  Narrative  of  (he  Surveying  Voyages  of  His  Majesty's 

Ships  Adventurer  and  Beagle.     3  vols.     1839-40. 
Fore. — Foreman  (J.)  The  Philippine  Islands.     1890. 
Fors. — Forsyth  (Capt.  J.)  Highlands  of  Central  India.     2nd  Ed. 
Fort.  Rev. —  The  Fortnightly  Review. 
Fram. — Framjee  (Dosabhoy)  The  Parsees.     1858. 
Frank  — Franklin  (Capt.  J.)  Narrative  of  a  Journey  to  the  Shores  of  the  Polat 

Sea.     1823.     4to. 

Frey. — Freycinet  (L.  C.  D.  de)  Voyage  autour  du  Monde.    Paris,  1827. 
Fritz. — Fritzsche  (0.  F.)  &  Grimm  (C.  L.  W.)  Kurzgefasstes  exegetisches  Hand- 

buch  zu  den  Apocryphcn  des  Alien  Testaments.     6  Parts.     1851-60. 
Fytche. — Fytche  (Gen.  A.)  Burma,  Past  and  Present.     2  vols.     1878. 
Gait. — Galton  (F.)  Narrative  of  an  Exploration  in  Tropical  South  Africa. 
Garci. — Garcilasso  de  la  Vega,  First  Part  of  the  Royal  Commentaries  of  the 

Yncas  [16041.     Iran,  by  C.  R.  Markham.     2  vols.     1869-71. 
Gil. — Gilmour  (J.)  Among  the  Mongols. 
Gind.— Gindely  (A.)  History  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War.     Trans,  by  Ten  Brook. 

2  vols.     N.  Y.  1884. 

Gould. — Gould  (S.  Baring-)  Germany  Present  and  Past.     2  vols. 
Greg. — Gregory  (of  Tours)  Histoire  ecdesiastique  des  Francs.     Translated.     8 

vols.     Paris,  1836-8. 
Grey. — Grey  (Sir  G.)  Journals  of  Two  Expeditions  of  Discovery  in  North-  West 

and  Western  Australia.     2  vols.     1841. 

Grif. — Griffith  (W.)  Journals  of  Travels  in  Assam.     Calc.  1847. 
Grote. — Grote  (G.)  History  of  Greece.    4th  Ed.     10  vols.     1872. 
Haef. — Haefkens  (T.)  Centr'aal  Amerika.     Dordrecht,  1832. 
Hall.— Hall  (Capt.  C.  F.)  Life  with  the  Esquimaux.     2  vols.     1864. 
Hallam. — Hallam  (H.)  Europe  during  the  Middle  Ages.     4th  Ed.     1869. 
Harris.— Harris  (Sir  W.  C.)  The  Highlands  of  ^Ethiopia.     3  vols.     1844. 
Haug. — Haug  (M.)  Essays  on  the  Sacred  Language,  Writings,  and  Religion  of  the 

^Parsees.     1878. 
Hawke. — Hawkesworth  (J.)An  Account  of  the  Voyages  undertaken  .  .  .  by  Comm. 

Byron,  Capt.  Wallis,  Capt.  Carteret,  and  Capt.  Cook,  etc.    3  vols.    1773.    4to. 
Hear. — Hearne  (S.)  Journey  from  Prince  of  Wales's  Fort,  etc.     Dub.  1796. 
Herr. — Herrera  (A.  de)  The  General  History  of  the  Vast  Continent  and  Islands 

of  America  [1601].     Trans,  by  J.  Stevens.     6  vols.     1725-6. 
Holub.— Holub  (Emil)  Seven  Years  in  South  Africa.     2  vols.     1881. 
Horn. —  Homer,  The  Iliad,  done  into  English  prose  by  A.  Lang*nd  others.    1883. 
Hutch. — Hutcheson  (F.)  A  System  of  Moral  Philosophy. 
I.  A. — The  Indian  Antiquary.     Bombay. 
Irving. — Irving  (Washington)  Astoria.     1850. 
J.  A.  I. — Journal  of  the  Anthropological  Institute, 
J.  A.  S.  B. — Journal  of  the  Asiatic  Society,  Bengal. 
J.  E.  S.  L. — Journal  of  the  Ethnological  Society,  London. 
Jones.— Jones  (Sir  Will.)  Works.     13  vols.     1807. 
J.  R.  A.  S. — Journal  of  the  Royal  Asiatic  Society,  London, 
J.  It.  G.  S. — Journal  of  the  Royal  Geographical  Society,  London. 
Jukes. — Jukes  (J.  B.)  Narrative  of  the  Surveying  Voyage  of  H.M.S.  "Fly," 

1842-6.     2  vols.     1847. 
Kant. — Kant  (E.)  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  and  other  Works  on  the  T/ieory 

of  Ethics.    Trans,  by  T.  K.  Abbott. 
Keat. — Keating  (W.  H.)  Narrative  of  an  Expedition  to  the  Source  of  St.  Peter's 

River,  Lake  Winnepeck,  etc.  in  1823.     2  vols.     1825. 


570  TITLES   OF  WORKS. 

Kolbcn. — Kolben  (P.)  The  Present  State  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.    Trans,  by 

Medley.     2  vols.     1731. 
Kolff.— Ko'lff  (D.  H.)  Voyages  of  the  Dutch  Brig  the  "Dowrya."     Trans,  by 

Earl.     1840. 

Kotze. — Kotzebue  (Otto  von)  New  Voyage  Round  the  World.     1830. 
Kubary. — Kubary  (J.  S.)  hthnographische  Beitriige  zur  Kennlniss  der  Karoli- 

nischen  Insclgruppe.     Berlin,  1885. 
Laet.— Laet  (J.  de)  Novus  Orbis.     1633. 
Landa. — Landa  (D.  de)  Relation  des  cJw&es  de  Yucatan  [1566].     Texte  et  Tra- 

duction  par  Brasseur  de  Bourbourg.     Paris,  1864. 
Lao-Tsze. — Lao-Tsze,  The  Tao-teh-king.     Various  translations. 
Leber. — Leber  (J.  M.  C.)  Collection  des  meilleures  dissertations  .  .  .  relatifs  d 

Phistoire  de  France.     20  vols.     Paris,  1826-38. 
Leeky. — Lecky  (W.  E.  H.)  History  of  European  Morals.     3rd  Ed.     2  vols. 

1877. 

Legge. — Legge  (James)  The  Chinese  Classics.     5  vols.     1869,  etc. 
Legge. — Legge  (James)  The  Religions  of  China.     1880. 
Lew.— Lewin  (Capt.  T.  H.)  Wild  Races  of  South  Eastern  India.     1870. 
Lewis. — Lewis  (Capt.  M.)  &  Clarke,  Travels  to  the  Source  of  the  Missouri  River. 

1814.     4to. 
Licht.— Lichtenstein  (H.)  Travels  in  Southern  Africa  in  the  Years  1803-1806. 

2  vols.     1812-15.     4to. 

Liv. — Livingstone  (D.)  Missionary  Travels  and  Researches.     1857. 
Liv. — Livingstone  (D.  &  C.)  Narrative  of  an  Expedition  to  the  Zambesi.     1865. 
Low. — Low  (Hugh)  Sarawak,  its  Inhabitants  and  Productions.     1848. 
Lubb.— Lubbock  (Sir  J.)  Pre- Historic  Times.     2nd  Ed. 
Lyon. — Lyon  (Capt.  G.  F.)  Private  Journal.     1824. 
MacDon.— MacDonald  (Duff)  Africana.     2  vols.     1882. 
Macgil. — Macgillivray  (J.)  Narrative  of  the  Voyage  of  H.M.S.  Rattlesnake  .  .  . 

1846-50.     2  vols.     1852. 

MacGreg.—  MacGregor  (Gen.)  Central  Asia.     Part  L     2  vols.     Calc.  1873. 
Macph. — Macpherson  (Lieut.)  Report  on  the  Khonds  of  Qanjam  and  Cuttack. 

Calc.  1842. 

Maha. —  The  Mahabharata.     Various  translations. 
Mahaf.— Mahaffy  (J.  P.)  Social  Life  in  Greece.     1874. 
Mai. — Malcolm  (Sir  J.)  Memoir  of  Central  India.     1823. 
Man. — Man  (E.  G.)  Sonthalia  and  the  Sonthals.     1867. 
Manu. — The  Laws  of  Mann.     Various  translations. 
Mar. — Mariner's  (W.)  An  Account  of  the  Natives  of  the  Tonga  Islands.     By  J. 

Martin.     2  vols.     1818. 

Mars. — Marsden  (W.)  The  History  of  Sumatra.     1783.     4to. 
Mart. — Martin  (H.)  Histoire  de  la  France.     1844. 

Massey. — Massey  (W.  N.)  A  History  of  England  during  the  Reign  of  George  III. 
Mencius. — The  Works  of  Mencius.     (In  Legge's  Chinese  Classics.     Vol.  II.) 
Mered. — Meredith  (Mrs.  C.  L.  A.)  My  Home  in  Tasmania.     2  vols. 
Mich. — Michelet  (J.)  History  of  Prance.     2  vols.     Trans,  by  G.  H.  Smith. 
Mill. — Mill  (J.  S.)  An  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy.     3rd 

Ed.     1867. 

M.  J.  L.  S. — The  Madras  Journal  of  Literature  and  Science. 
Moll. — Mollhausen  (B.)  Diary  of  a  Journey  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Coasts 

of  the  Pacific.     2  vols.     1858. 
Moffat. — Moffat  (R.)  Missionary  Labours  and  Scenes  in  Southern  Africa.     4th 

Ed.     1842. 

Mont. — Montaigne  (M.  de)  Essays.    Trans,  by  Cotton.     3  vols. 
Monte. — Monteiro  (J.  J.)  Angola  and  the  River  Congo.     2  vols.     1875. 
Mor^;. — Morgan  (L.  H.)  League  oftJie  .  .  .  Iroyuois.    Roch.  U.S.A.  1851. 


TITLES   OF   WORKS.  571 

Morris. — Morris  (H.)  A  descriptive  and  historical  Account  of  the  Godavery  Dis- 
trict.    1878. 
Miiller. — M tiller  (F.  Max)  Hibbert  Lectures.     On  the  Origin  and  Growth  of  Re~ 

ligion  in  India.     1878. 

Miiller.— Miiller  (F.  Max)  Rig-Veda  Sanhita.     Trans.  &c.  by  F.  M.  M. 
Muir. — Muir  (John)  Metrical  Translations  from  Sanskrit  Writers.     1878. 
Muir. — Muir  (John)  Original  Sanskrit  Texts.     5  vols. 
Nieb. — Niebuhr  (C.)  Travels  in  Arabia.     (In  Pinkerton,  vol.  X.) 
Niemo. — Niemojowski  (L.)  Siberian  Pictures.     Ed.  by  Szulczewski.     2  vols. 
O'Don. — O'Donovan  (E.)  The  Merv  Oasis.     2  vols. 
Oliv.— Oliver  (E.  E.)  Over  the  Border,  or  Path&n  and  Biloch.     1890. 
Pala. — Palacio.     San  Salvador  and  Honduras  in  1576.     (In  Squier's  Collection 

of  Rare  and  Original  Documents.     Vol.  I.)     N.  Y.  1860. 
Palg. — Palgrave  (W.  G.)  Narrative  of  a  Year's  Journey  through  Central  and 

Eastern  Arabia.     2  vols. 
Pallas. — Pallas  (P.  S.)  Sammlung  historischer  Nachrichten  uber  die  Mongolischen 

Vb'lkerschaften.     2  vols.     St.  Petersburg,  1776. 
Park. — Park  (Mungo)  Travels  in  the  Interior  Districts  of  Africa. 
Perc.— Percival  (P.)  The  Land  of  the  Veda.     1854. 
Peth. — Petherick  (J.)  Egypt,  The  Soudan,  and  Central  Africa.     1861. 
Piuk. — Pinkerton  (John)  General  Collection  of  Voyages.     17  vols.     1808-14. 
Plato. — Plato,  Dialogues.     Translated. 
Ploss.— Floss  (H.  H.)  Das  Weib.     2  Bde.     Leipzig,  1887. 
Plut. — Plutarch.     Symposiacs,     (Translated  in  Morals,  vol.  Ill,  edited  by  W. 

W.  Goodwin.)     1870. 
Prid. — Pridham  (C.)  An  Historical,  Political,  and  Statistical  Account  of  Ceylon. 

2  vols.     1849. 

Prjev. — Prjevalsky  (N.)  Mongolia.     Trans,  by  E.  D.  Morgan.     2  vols.     1876. 
P.  R.  G.  S. — Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Geographical  Society.    Lond. 
P.  S.  M.— The  Popular  Science  Monthly.    New  York. 
Raf.— Raffles  (Sir  T.  S.)  History  of  Java.     2  vols.     1817. 
Reade.— Reade  (W.  W.)  Savage  Africa.     1863. 
Renouf.— Renouf  (R.  le  Page)  The  Hibbert  Lectures,  1879. 
Rev.  Sib. — Revelations  of  Siberia.     Ed.  by  Col.  Lach-Szyrma.     2  vole.     1852. 
Rich.— Richardson  (F.)  The  Iliad  of  the  East.     1870. 
Ross. — Ross   (Alex.)  Adventures  .   .   .   on  the    Oregon    or    Columbia  River. 

1849. 

Rown.— Rowney  (H.  B.)  The  Wild  Tribes  of  India.     1882. 
R.  P.— Records  of  the  Past.     Ed.  by  S.  Birch.     1873,  etc. 
R.  P.— Records  of  the  Past.     New  Series.     1888,  etc. 
R.  V. — Ria-  Veda  Sanhita.     Various  translations. 
Sadi. — Sadi.     The  Gulistan.     Eastwick's  and  other  translations. 
Saha. — Sahagun  (B.  de)  Historia  General  de  las  Cosas  de  Nueva  Espana.     3 

torn.     Mexico,  1829-30. 

St.  John. — St.  John  (B.)  Two  Years'  Residence  in  a  Levantine  Family.     1856. 
Ste.  Pal. — Sainte-Palaye  (De  la  Curne  de)  Memoires  sur  Fancienne  chevalerie.     3 

vols.     1781. 

Salv. — Salvianus  (Bishop  of  Marseilles)  De  Gubernatione  Dei.    Paris,  1684. 
Schenk. — Schenkel  (D.)  Bibellexikon.     5  Bde.     Leipzig,  1860-75. 
Scho. — Schoolcraft  (H.  R.)  Historical  and  Statistic  Information  respecting  the 

.  .  .  Indian  Tribes  of  the  United  States.     5  vols.     Philad.  1851-60.     4to. 
Schom. — Schomburgk  (Sir  R.  H.)  Reisen  in  Britisch- Guiana,  1840-44.     3  vols. 

Leipzig,  1847,  &c. 

See. — Seemann  (B.)  Viti.     Camb.  1862. 

Shoo.— Shooter  (Rev.  J.)  The  Kafirs  of  Natal  and  the  Zulu  Country.     1857. 
Shortt.— Shortt  (Dr.  J.)  The  Hill  Ranges  of  Southern  India.     Madras,  1870. 


572  TITLES   OF   WORKS. 

Simon. — Simon  (P.)   Cuarta  Noticia  Historical  de  lot  Conquistas  de    Tierra 

Firme,  etc.     1624.     (In  Aglio's  Antiquities  of  Mexico,  Vol.  VIII.) 
Smith.— Smith  (E.  R.)  The  Araucanians.     N.  Y.  1855. 

Smith. — Smith  (Geo.)  Ancient  History  from  the  Monuments.     Assyria.     1876. 
Smith. — Smith  (Rev.  I.  G.)  The  Ethics  of  Aristotle.     1889. 
Smy. — Smyth  (R.  B.)  The  Aborigines  of  Victoria.     2  vols.     Melbourne,  1878. 
Snow.— Snow  (W.  P.)  A  Two  Years'  Cruise  of  Tierra  del  Fueao.    2  vols.    1857. 
Sou. — Southey  (R.)  History  of  Brazil.     3  vols.     1810-19.     4to. 
Spar. — Sparrman  ( J.)  A  Voyage  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.     2  vols.     1786. 
Sturt. — Sturt  (Capt.  C.  H.)  Two  Expeditions  into  .  .  .  Southern  Australia.     2 

vols.     1833. 

Tac.— Tacitus  (C.  C.)  Germania. 
Tap. — Taplin  (Rev.  G.)  The  Folklore,  Manners,  Customs,  and  Languages  of  the 

South  Australian  Aborigines.     Adelaide,  1879. 
Temp. — Temple  (Sir  R.)  Report  ...  on  the  North- West  Frontier  of  the  Punjab, 

&c.     Lahore,  1865. 

Tenn. — Tennent  (Sir  J.  E.)  Ceylon,  an  Account  of  the  Island.     2  vols. 
Tern. — Ternaux-Compans  (H.)  Voyages,  Relations,  etc.,  pour  servir  d  FHistoire 

de  la  Decouverte  de  V  Amerique.     9  vols.     Paris,  1837-41. 
T.  E.  S.  L. — Transactions  of  the  Ethnological  Society,  London.    New  Series. 
Thorn.— Thomson  (Jos.)  Through  Masai  Land.     3rd  Ed.     1885. 
Thomp. — Thompson  (Geo.)  Travels  and  Adventures  in  Southern  Africa.    2  vols. 

1827. 
Thomps. — Thompson  (G.  A.)  The  Geographical  and  Historical  Dictionary  of 

America,  &c.  of  Col.  Don  Ant.  de  Alcedo.     5  vols.     1812. 
Thorns.— Thomson  (A.  S.)  The  Story  of  New  Zealand.     2  vols.     1859. 
Thurn. — Thurn  (E.  F.  Im.)  Among  the  Indians  of  Guiana.     1883. 
Tuck. — Tuckey  (Capt.  J.  H.)  Narrative  of  an  Expedition  to  explore  the  river  .  .  . 

Congo,  etc.     1818.     4to. 

Turn. — Turner  (Rev.  G.)  Nineteen  Years  in  Polynesia.  1861. 
Turn. — Turner  (Rev.  G.)  Samoa  a  hundred  years  ago.  1884. 
Vali. — Valikhanof  (Capt.)  and  others,  The  Russians  in  Central  Asia.  Trans. 

by  J.  &  R.  Michell.     1865. 
Van. — Vancouver  (Capt.  G.)  A  Voyage  of  Discovery  to  the  North  Pacific  Ocean, 

3  vols.     1798. 

Waitz. — Waitz  (T.)  Anthropologie  der  Naturvolker.     6  vols.     Leipzig,  1869-72. 
West.— West  (E.  W.)  Pahlavi  Texts.    Pt.  I.     (In  Max  Miiller's  Sacred  Books 

of  the  East.    Vol.  V.) 

Wheel.— Wheeler  (J.  T.)  The  History  of  India.     1867,  etc. 
Wil. — Williams  (Monier)  Indian  Wisdom.     1875. 

Wilkes.— Wilkes  (Capt.  C.)  Narrative  of  ihe  United  States'  Exploring  Expedi- 
tion.    4  vols.     Philad.  1844,  &c. 

Will.— Williams  (Rev.  T.)  Fiji  and  the  Fijians.     2  vols. 
Wils.— Wilson  (C.  T.)  and  Felkin  (R.  W.)  Uganda  and  the  Egyptian  Soudan. 

2  vols.     1882. 

Wilson.— Wilson  (A.)  The  Abode  of  Snow.     Edinb.  1875. 
Wint. — Winterbottom  (T.)  An  Account  of  the  Native  Africans  in  the  neighbour- 

hood  of  Sierra  Leone.     2  vols.     1803. 

Wolseley. — Wolseley  (Gen.  Viscount)  The  Soldier's  Pocket  Book. 
Wrang. — Wrangell  (F.  von)  Narrative  of  an  Expedition  to  the  Polar  Sea.     Ed. 

byE.  Sabine.     1840. 
Xen. — Xenophon,  Memorabilia. 
Zur. — Zurita  (Al.  de)  Rapport  sur  les  differences  classes  de  chefs  de  la  Nouvclle 

Espagne.    Trad,  par  H.  Ternaux-Compans. 


**  Destined  to  take  rank  as  one  of  the  two  or  three 
most  remarkable  self-portrayals  of  a  human  life  ever 
committed  to  posterity/' 

— Franklin  H.  Giddings,  LL.D.,  in  the  Independent. 


An  Autobiography  by  Herbert  Spencer. 

With  Illustrations.  Many  of  them  from  tfee 
Author's  Own  Drawings.  Cloth,  8vo.  Gilt  Top. 
Two  vols.  in  a  box,  $5.50  net.  Postage,  40  cents 
additional. 

"It  is  rare,  indeed,  that  a  man  who  has  so  profoundly  influenced  the 
intellectual  development  of  his  age  and  generation  has  found  time  to 
record  the  history  of  his  owu  life.  And  this  Mr.  Spencer  has  done  so 
simply,  so  frankly,  and  with  such  obvious  truth,  that  it  is  not  surprising 
that  Huxley  is  reported  as  having  said,  after  reading  it  in  manuscript, 
that  it  reminded  him  of  the  '  Confessions '  of  Rousseau,  freed  from  every 
objectionable  taint." — New  York  Globe* 

"  As  interesting  as  fiction  ?  There  never  was  a  novel  so  interesting 
as  Herbert  Spencer's  'An  Autobiography '." — New  York  Herald. 

"  It  is  rich  in  suggestion  and  observation,  of  wide  significance  and 
appeal  in  the  sincerity,  the  frankness,  the  lovableness  of  its  human  note." 

— New  York  Mail  and  Express. 

"The  book,  as  a  whole,  makes  Spencer's  personality  a  reality  for 
us,  where  heretofore  it  has  been  vaguer  than  his  philosophical  abstrac- 
tions."— -John  White  Chadwick  in  Current  Literature. 

"  In  all  the  literature  of  its  class  there  is  nothing  like  it.  It  bears 
the  same  relationship  to  autobiographical  productions  as  Boswell's  '  Life 
of  Johnson  '  bears  to  biographies." — Philadelphia  Press. 

"  This  book  will  always  be  of  importance,  for  Herbert  Spencer  was 

a  great  and  original  thinker,  and  his  system  of  philosophy  has  bent  the 

thought  of  a  generation,  and  will  keep  a  position  of  commanding  interest." 

— Joseph  O'  Connor  in  the  New  York  Times. 

"  Planned  and  wrought  for  the  purpose  of  tracing  the  events  of  his 
life  and  the  growth  of  his  opinions,  his  autobiography  does  more  than 
that.  It  furnished  us,  half  unconsciously,  no  doubt,  a  more  vivid  por- 
traiture of  his  peculiarities  than  any  outsider  could  possibly  provide. 
We  pity  his  official  biographer!  Little  can  be  left  for  him.  Here  we 
have  Spencer  in  habit  as  he  was." — New  York  Evening  Post. 

D.     APPLETON      AND      COMPANY,     NEW     YORK. 


DARWIN'S  LIFE  AND  LETTERS. 


More  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin. 

Edited  by  FRANCIS  DARWIN.  Two  vols.,  500  pages 
each.  Eight  photogravures  and  eight  half-tones.  Uniform 
with  "  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Huxley."  Cloth,  gilt  top, 
deckle  edges,  boxed,  $5.00  net. 

The  two  volumes  will  in  no  way  disappoint  readers,  for  it 
will  soon  be  discovered  that  Francis  Darwin's  biography  of  his 
father,  while  made  up  largely  of  letters,  left  unprinted  an 
extremely  valuable  epistolary  collection.  The  new  letters  are 
not  alone  scientific  in  the  subjects  they  treat  of  ;  they  are  often 
personal,  and  delightfully  so.  They  reveal  in  Darwin  that 
persuasive  and  irresistible  charm  which  men  of  real  eminence 
always  possess  when  to  great  talent  they  join  simplicity  and 
unaffected  sincerity.  One  could  quote  indefinitely  from  this 
correspondence  fine  examples  of  a  rare  spirit  which  every  one 
who  came  in  contact  with  has  reported  to  have  been  most  charm- 
ing. There  ought  to  be  wide  interest  in  these  new  letters. 
Everything  that  Darwin  wrote  bore  the  impress  of  his  sincere 
and  gentle  spirit.  Even  his  learned  treatises  disclosed  the  man  as 
very  charming.  In  his  letters  readers  meet  with  that  attractive 
personality  which  no  one  that  ever  came  under  its  spell  can 
forget. 

"  In  these  letters  Darwin  has  given  a  personal  charm  and  biographical 
interest,  which,  although  hitherto  unused  material,  will  serve  as  almost  a 
complete  record  of  Darwin's  work." — Washington  Post. 

Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin. 

Including  an  autobiographic  chapter.  Edited  by  his 
son,  FRANCIS  DARWIN.  With  Portraits  and  Views  of 
"Down  House,"  Darwin's  residence,  etc.  Two  vols., 
i2mo.  Cloth,  $4.50;  cloth,  gilt,  $5.00;  half  calf,  $9.00. 

"Of  such  a  man,  of  so  rare  a  genius  and  so  lofty  a  nature,  the  record  can- 
not fail  to  be  of  deep  and  abiding  interest  for  us  all.  With  a  truly  remarkable 
literary  skill  the  man  and  his  work  are  so  presented  as  never  to  be  dissociated." 
— London  Spectator. 

D.     APPLETON     AND     COMPANY,      NEW     YORK. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

Santa  Barbara  College  Library 
Santa  Barbara,  California 

Return  to  desk  from  which  borrowed. 
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BJ    Spencer 


. 
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1902  ethics 


